ORDER : 1. By way of the present petition, a challenge is made to the order impugned dated 31.03.2014 passed in Case No. 267/2014 titled as State (through Sub-Registrar, Jaipur-4) vs. Alok Agarwal & Anr. whereby stamp duty of Rs. 6,15,93,340/-along with surcharge of Rs. 61,59,340/-and penalty of Rs. 22,47,320/-totaling Rs.7,00,00,000 (7 crores) has been raised against the petitioner. 2. The concise and ineluctable factual matrix, necessary for discerning the issue at hand, is noted herein-under:- 2.1. That the petitioner is the owner of agricultural land comprising an area of 9 Bighas and 11 Biswas. 2.2. That on 07.06.2010, qua the said land, the petitioner entered into a ‘development agreement’ with a company namely, M/s. Sunny Arcade Private Ltd. 2.3. That the said agreement was divided into two distinct parts. The first part of the agreement provided that the developer would furnish a security deposit of Rs. 2 crores in favour of the petitioner by way of post-dated cheques (PDCs). Moreover, the developer would also initiate and complete proceedings under Section 90-B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act along with getting the land use of the said property changed and thereafter, obtain the patta of the total land within a period of 24 months from the date of signing of the said agreement. It was only upon successfully completing the aforementioned requisites, that the approval of construction would be granted. In essence, the agreement stipulated that if the preceding tasks, as noted above, were not duly carried out within a period of 24 months, then in such an eventuality, the agreement as entered between the parties, would be a nullity. Whereas, if the said tasks were carried out, then the agreement would be governed by the second part of the agreement, providing for the development and construction on the subject land. 3. In this background, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though styled as a ‘development agreement’, the subject agreement was divided into two distinct parts, as noted above. Therefore, the said agreement in the first instance was not a development agreement, but an agreement divided into two parts wherein the fulfillment of the first part would effectuate or activate the second part, the latter wherein alone constituted the ‘development agreement’. Therefore, the said agreement in the first instance was not a development agreement, but an agreement divided into two parts wherein the fulfillment of the first part would effectuate or activate the second part, the latter wherein alone constituted the ‘development agreement’. Thus, in essence, the agreement was an agreement which was contingent and was to take effect in future and on happening of certain contingencies as no rights were meant to flow to the developer till the conditions of the first part were fulfilled. Accordingly, as the first part of the said agreement was not duly complied/completed within a period of 24 months as required, the agreement in toto was nullified, thereby, not giving rise to the second part, which in essence was the ‘development agreement’. The said agreement became null and void. Therefore, there was no requirement upon the petitioner to pay stamp duty, in the absence of any development and/or construction being carried out on the subject land/property. In support of the said agreement becoming a nullity, learned counsel submitted that even the cheques (PDCs) paid as security, were returned back to the developer, upon the lapse of the period of 24 months as provided in the first part of the agreement. 4. Furthermore, learned counsel argued that the order impugned dated 31.03.2014 deserves to be quashed and set aside, as the Additional Collector (Stamps) did not consider the nature of the document/agreement which was in fact not a ‘development agreement’ covered under Article 5(bbbb) or 5(e) but an agreement otherwise covered under Article 5(c). Therefore, the liability to pay stamp duty has been incorrectly crystallized qua the petitioner, despite the agreement being a nullity. Lastly, learned counsel also averred that the remedy of revision available to the petitioner under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 (hereinafter, Act of 1998) is ineffective and illusory, especially on account of the fact that as per the said provision, a pre-deposit is required to be made by the aggrieved party to the tune of 25% of the total amount, for the said revision to be entertained. In the present case, the said amount would tantamount to Rs. 1.75 crores, which is highly excessive, thereby frustrating the remedy in toto. In the present case, the said amount would tantamount to Rs. 1.75 crores, which is highly excessive, thereby frustrating the remedy in toto. In support of the contention raised herein-above, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Hardev Asnani vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2011 (11) SCR 599 . 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant petition. It is submitted that the petitioner has filed the present petition challenging the order impugned dated 31.03.2014 whereby a stamp duty has been raised against the petitioner. However, against the said order, a remedy of revision under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 before the Rajasthan Tax Board is available to the petitioner. Furthermore, learned counsel argued that for the maintainability of the said revision petition, it is necessary to deposit 25% amount of the demanded/raised stamp duty and thus, it appears that to save the said stamp duty and cause revenue loss to the State Government, the petitioner has attempted to bypass the said payment and accordingly, filed the present petition invoking the extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, without exhausting the statutory remedy. In this regard, learned counsel argued that when statutory and alternative remedy of revision is available, the petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke the extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, without exhausting such remedy. In addition to the submissions made herein-above, learned counsel also submitted that the instant petition also involves several disputes questions of fact, which cannot be resolved by the writ court while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, especially qua the determination of the nature of the agreement dated 07.06.2010 i.e. whether the same encapsulated a ‘development agreement’ or not and/or qua the nature of the land etc. Therefore, on account of the said counts alone, learned counsel prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition. In support of the arguments so raised, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of this Court as rendered in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3256/2022 titled as M/s Cosmos India Engineering Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, scanned the record of the writ petition and perused the judgments cited at Bar. 7. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties, scanned the record of the writ petition and perused the judgments cited at Bar. 7. At the outset, this Court deems it fit to re-iterate the settled position of the law insofar as it relates to the discretion ought to be exercised by the writ courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whilst entertaining a lis, for the redressal of which, a statutory and alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. In essence, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court, whilst having regard to the totality of facts, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. While doing the latter, the Courts have imposed upon themselves certain restrictions, one of which is, that if an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner, the Courts would not exercise their supervisory jurisdiction. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 8. Upon a considered perusal of the record of the instant petition, the following pertinent facts emerge:- 8.1. That the order impugned dated 31.03.2014 was passed by the Additional Collector (Stamps), after duly taking into consideration, the agreement dated 07.06.2010 as well as the stipulations incorporated therein, read with the corresponding provisions of the Act of 1998. 8.2. That against the order impugned, a statutory/effective/efficacious and alternative remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 65 of the Act of 1998. In order for a revision petition to be entertained by the Rajasthan Tax Board under the said provision, the petitioner would have to fulfill the condition of pre-depositing 25% of the raised/demanded stamp duty. Upon doing so, the petitioner can duly raise his grievance before the learned Tax Board. 8.3. That the present petition involves adjudication upon certain disputed questions of fact, especially qua certain instrumental stipulations necessary for discerning the nature of the agreement dated 07.06.2010 i.e. whether the said agreement as entered between the petitioner and the developer was a ‘development agreement’ or not, or whether the land/property in question was agricultural in nature and if the penalty imposed and/or the amount raised was duly compliant of the provisions of the Act of 1998 etc. In this regard, it is noted that it is a settled position of law that a High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate upon disputed and/or wholly antithetical questions of fact, which may warrant considerable assessment of detailed evidence by the concerned adjudicatory authorities below. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Civil Appeal No. 2848/2021 titled as Shubhas Jain vs. Rajeshwari Shivam & Ors. 8.4. That the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Hardevi Asnani (Supra) is distinguishable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, especially for the following reasons, namely: 8.4.1. At the relevant time, the stipulation of pre-deposit was as high as 50% as opposed to the present requirement of 25%, which has been substantially reduced in terms of the Act of 1998 . 8.4.2. That no disputed questions of facts warranting assessment of evidence were involved in the said case. 9. In this regard, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M/s Cosmos India Engineering (Supra) is squarely applicable. The relevant extract is reproduced herein-under:- “7. In the case in hand, the reliance placed by the petitioner upon the judgment of Hardevi Asnani (supra) is not tenable because the law was amended w.e.f. 2012and the requirement of pre-deposit has been reduced from50% to 50%. Further, the case of Hardevi Asnani (supra) was with regard to an individual not a corporation entity, i.e. builder, who can pass on the cost/taxes upon the purchaser of the flat. Further, nowhere in the writ petition it has been explained by the petitioner that how there is an undue hardship, on account of financial reasons or otherwise, to deposit a sum of 25% of the tax amount when it is statutory mandate. Rather, the Apex Court judgment of M/s Commercial Steel Ltd. (supra), relied upon by the respondents, is fairly applicable in the present case. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the above mentioned case, granted liberty to the respondent to avail alternative statutory remedy under Section 107 of Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 even when there was a condition of pre-deposit of part of demand duty. 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the above mentioned case, granted liberty to the respondent to avail alternative statutory remedy under Section 107 of Central Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 even when there was a condition of pre-deposit of part of demand duty. 8. Further, the petitioner has also not filed the writ petition in the name of M/s Innovative Colonisers Pvt. Ltd. who were having substantial portion of land in their name, nor have they been impleaded as necessary parties. Such practice adopted by the petitioner reflects misrepresentation. 9. Considering the fact that alternative remedy is available in terms of Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 and that there is no ground/argument of undue hardship or exorbitant demand reflected in the body of writ petition, this Court is of the view that the alternate remedy specified in the statute has to be availed before invoking writ jurisdiction, especially when petitioner has failed to establish that alternative remedy is not efficacious. Rather in the given case, looking to the disputed question of facts, issues like whether MOU was rightly treated as development agreement or not; where there was concealment or not; whether penalty was rightly imposed or not etc. are to be decided by the appellate authority as per the record. 10. In light of above observations and discussions, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is liable to be disposed. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to avail alternative statutory remedy, under Section 65 of Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998, within a period of 15 days. If the petitioner chooses to avail the alternative remedy, the appellate authority/revision authority is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from filing. It is made clear that the petitioner will have to deposit 25% of demand in question, as required in law, when filing revision application under Section 65 of Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998.” 10. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court has through a series of judgments, time and again held that once a statute has fixed the condition of pre-deposit before filing an appeal, such a condition must be satisfied. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Civil Appeal No. 3464/2022 titled as The Director, Employees State Insurance Health Care & Ors. vs. Maruti Suzuki India Limited & Ors. 11. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Civil Appeal No. 3464/2022 titled as The Director, Employees State Insurance Health Care & Ors. vs. Maruti Suzuki India Limited & Ors. 11. Therefore, considering the observations made herein-above and especially considering the fact that an alternative remedy is available in terms of Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 and that the instant petition involves several disputed questions of fact, this Court is of the view that the alternate remedy specified in the statute has to be availed before invoking writ jurisdiction, especially when the petitioner has failed to establish that the alternative remedy is not efficacious. Rather, in the facts and circumstances of the given case, looking to the disputed facts especially qua the determination of the nature of the agreement between the petitioner and the developer as well as the nature of the land/property which constituted the subject matter of the said agreement, are to be decided by the appellate authority, as per the record/evidence. 12. In light of the preceding observations and discussions, this Court is of the view that the writ petition is liable to be disposed of. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to avail the alternative statutory remedy, under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998, within a period of six weeks. If the petitioner chooses to avail the alternative remedy, the appellate authority/revision authority is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of three months from filing. It is made clear that the petitioner will have to deposit 25% of the demand in question, as required in law, when filing the revision application under Section 65 of the Rajasthan Stamps Act, 1998. 13. It is made clear that during the pendency of the appeal before the authorities below, the petitioner will not be entitled to alienate with the immovable property to give surety/personal bond for meeting out the liability, if the same arises in the future, in accordance with law. 14. With the observations made herein-above, the writ petition is disposed of. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.