JUDGMENT : Radhakishan Agrawal, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant-accused person under Section 374 (2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.01.2014 passed in Sessions Trial No.52/2012 by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Mahasamund (C.G.) whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer additional rigorous imprisonment for three months. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that elder brother of the appellant, namely, Satosh Pateva lodged a report in Police Chowki Patewa to the effect that on 07.04.2012 between 12:00 to 02:00 or in and around, wife of the appellant – Dropati Bai was found dead inside the house. It is alleged by the prosecution that on account of old quarrel between them, the appellant committed her murder by sharp edged weapon, i.e. Kattal (used for fish cutting/tabbal) and thereafter he ran away from the spot. 3. During investigation, inquest (Ex.P.2) over the dead body was conducted in presence of witnesses. Spot map (Ex.P.8) was prepared. F.I.R. was lodged by Santosh Pateva, brother of appellant, vide Ex.P.1. Merg intimation was registered vide Exs.P- 21 & P-22. Vide Ex.P-7 bloodstained soil, plain soil, bloodstained, Kattal (Tabbal) and two sets of mobile phone as well as bloodstained pillow were seized from the spot. Dead body of the deceased Dropati Bai was subjected to the postmortem by Dr. Giridharilal Chandrakar (P.W.11) and as per postmortem report (Ex.P.9), the cause of death is severe haemorrahge and injury to wind pipe trachea and esophagus and nature of death is homicidal. As per the memorandum of statement of the appellant (Ex.P.4), blood stained shirt and other material were recovered vide Ex.P-5. According to FSL report (Ex.P.24), human blood was found on the weapon of offence-Kattal (Tabbal) and blood was found on shirt of accused, pillow and clothes of deceased etc. s 4. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Sessions Judge, Mahasamund for its trial in accordance with law. The appellant/accused person abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 5. s 4. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Sessions Judge, Mahasamund for its trial in accordance with law. The appellant/accused person abjured his guilt and entered into defence. 5. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offence, examined as many as 19 witnesses and brought into record 26 documents and defence in support of its case has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document. 6. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant/accused person for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which, this appeal has been preferred questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the judgment under appeal is perverse and illegal, inasmuch, it did not appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective. According to him, the appellant was not present at the house and without considering the evidence adduced in this regard, the trial Court ought not to have convicted the appellant as such. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. Firstly, we shall deal with the question as to whether the death of the deceased – Dropati Bai was homicidal in nature or not. The trial Court, based on the postmortem report (Ex.P.9), in which, four deep cut injuries on the deceased's neck were found and cause of death was due to excessive hemorrhage as a result of cut of trachea and esophagus, which were found and proved by PW-11 Dr. Giridharilal Chandrakar recorded a finding that the death of the deceased – Dropati Bai was homicidal in nature, which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, we shall deal with the next question as to whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question ? 12. Giridharilal Chandrakar recorded a finding that the death of the deceased – Dropati Bai was homicidal in nature, which is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding. 11. Now, we shall deal with the next question as to whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question ? 12. P.W.1 Santosh Kumar is the brother of the appellant, who has deposed in his testimony that at the time of incident he was present at the field, when he came to his house, PW-5 Asha, daughter of the appellant, informed him that her mother was found killed and on receiving such information, he went to the house of the appellant and found the dead body of Dropti Bai and blood was oozing from her neck. This witness found a sharp edged weapon as well as a mobile set on the spot. He has further deposed that before the incident, a dispute ensued between the appellant and the deceased wife and a meeting was convened in the village and the dispute was settled between them amicably. P.W.2 Aagyaram Patel, P.W.3 Indhal Pradhan and P.W.9 Jeevrakhan have also supported the statement of P.W.1 Santosh Kumar. P.W.4 Dayaram Nishad has testified that Santosh Kumar informed him about the murder of the deceased over telephone and the appellant ran away from the spot. 13. P.W.5 Ku. Asha Nishad, daughter of the appellant, aged about 13 years, and PW-8 Arun Nishad, son of appellant, are the star witness to the incident. P.W.8 Arun Nishad is the son of the appellant, aged about 10 years. In his statement, he has deposed that he has two sisters, namely, Anita and Asha and further deposed that at the time of incident he did not go to the school and his sisters were also not present. It has also come in his evidence that his mother was sleeping inside the house and his father was also sleeping in the same room on floor. When he was woke up by her sister, he found his mother dead and there is an injury over her neck. He has also deposed that his father was not present there where he slept. 14. PW-5 Ku. Asha Nishad has deposed that at the time of incident all the family members including the appellant were present in the house. When he was woke up by her sister, he found his mother dead and there is an injury over her neck. He has also deposed that his father was not present there where he slept. 14. PW-5 Ku. Asha Nishad has deposed that at the time of incident all the family members including the appellant were present in the house. She has further deposed that when she returned from school, she found that her mother, father and brother were all present and has further deposed that she found that her mother was lying dead. It has also come in her evidence that she informed about the incident to her uncle, i.e., Santosh Kumar. P.W.6 Jhanku is the father of deceased Dropti. In his statement, he has deposed that a meeting was convened for resolving the dispute ensued between the appellant and his wife and 4 – 5 months after the meeting, the appellant committed the murder of his daughter. Then he went to the spot and saw the dead body of her daughter and found an injury around her neck. Statements of PW-8 and PW-5 were not rebutted in their cross-examination. 15. A bare perusal of the aforesaid evidence would show that the appellant addicted to alcohol and was in the habit of assaulting his wife frequently over petty issues. There were untimely disputes and quarrels between the couple and in order to resolve their disputes and quarrels, social meeting was also convened for amicable settlement between the appellant and the deceased wife and in the meeting the appellant also assured to keep her wife properly without drinking alcohol and the same was given in writing. Even it is proved that the appellant and the deceased were last seen together, as per the fully reliable evidence of P.W.-5 Asha and P.W.-8 Arun Nishad, which cannot be ignored. 16. After due and proper appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court held that the appellant/accused person is the author or the crime in question, who has committed murder of his wife by means of Kattal (tabbal) and ran away from the scene of offence. 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under :- “106. 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under :- “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.--- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 18. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 19. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under :- “11. …... The word “especially” stresses that it means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 At P. 49 (B).” Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 20. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under :- “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always drawn an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 21. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 21. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him. 22. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or nor the accused has made out a specific defence. 23. The five golden principles to constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been narrated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , in which it was observed in paragraph 153 as under : “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 24. The Supreme Court in the matter of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 held in para 22 as under :- “22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh [ (1972) 2 SCC 80 ] it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra [ (1992) 3 SCC 106 ] the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time.” 25. All the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, if considered in the light of the principles laid down in the above referred cases, it would show that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. 26. Now, we shall consider incriminating circumstances found proved by the trial Court against the appellant one by one. 27. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive losses its importance. Even otherwise, it is aid in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. Now, we shall consider incriminating circumstances found proved by the trial Court against the appellant one by one. 27. As regards question of motive, in case of direct evidence, motive losses its importance. Even otherwise, it is aid in criminality and can be inferred from the kind of weapon used, part of body hit, nature of injury and other circumstances. In the present case, as per case of the prosecution, grave deep cut injuries were found around neck of the deceased, which shows grave intention of the appellant to commit her murder as the appellant had untimely disputes and quarrels with his deceased-wife on account of he being addicted to alcohol and was in the habit of assaulting his wife frequently. 28. The trial Court has relied upon the circumstance of the appellant being last seen together with the deceased in the house. It appears from the testimony of P.W.5 Ku. Asha and P.W.8 Arun Nishad that at the time of the incident the appellant was present and was sleeping in the room where their mother (deceased) was also sleeping on the same floor. As such, the evidence of last seen together is borne out from their testimony, which is established by the prosecution and in view of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant fails to offer any explanation as to how his wife was murdered in spite of the fact that he was present along with his wife in the same room in the house. 29. It is also to be noted that seizure of shirt of appellant was made vide Ex.P-5. in which, only blood has been found as per FSL report (Ex.P/24). Moreover, as per Ex.P/24, human blood was found on the weapon of offence, i.e., Kattal. 30. 29. It is also to be noted that seizure of shirt of appellant was made vide Ex.P-5. in which, only blood has been found as per FSL report (Ex.P/24). Moreover, as per Ex.P/24, human blood was found on the weapon of offence, i.e., Kattal. 30. In that view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the above chain of circumstances is complete and leads only to the conclusion that it was the appellant/accused person, who caused the death of the deceased and he alone committed the murder of the deceased, as the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles which constitute the 'panchsheel' of proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and the learned trial Court, upon due and proper appreciation of the evidence led before it, has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the accused-appellant is the perpetrator/author of the crime in question, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. 31. Resultantly, the learned trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C. We do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.01.2014 passed by the learned trial Court. Consequently, this criminal appeal is dismissed.