JUDGMENT : 1. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur in Securitization Application No.704 of 2022. 2. Vide the impugned order, the Debt Recovery Tribunal has granted interim protection to the petitioner directing the applicant to pay an amount of Rs.20 Lakhs within a period of 2 months, of which 10 Lakh has to be paid by 10.04.2023 and remaining 10 Lakh has to be paid by 10.05.2023. Subject to the petitioner depositing the said 20 Lakh rupees by 10.05.2023, the DRT has ordered for stay of the effect and operation of the order passed by the District Magistrate, Raipur dated 18.07.2022 under Section 14 of the Sarfaesi Act. 3. At this juncture, this Court is of the opinion that writ petition itself would not be maintainable for more than one reasons. Firstly, on the ground that petition is against a private financial institution i.e. respondent no.1. 4. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent past in the case of Phoenix Arc Private Limited Vs. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Others, (2022) 5 SCC 345 in paragraph 18, 20 & 21 has held as under :- 18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution – ARC – appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in the cases of Praga Tools Corporation (supra) and Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel 3 appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers. 20. In the case of Mathew K.C. (supra) after referring to and/or considering the decision of this Court in the case of Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra), it was observed and held in paragraph 5 as under:- “5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , as follows: (SCC p. 611, para 15) “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Titaghur Paper Mills Co. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 , Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Mathew K.C. (supra) to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the Court. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of Court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an exparte ad-interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers.” 5. The aforesaid view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also been taken earlier also in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. Vs. Sagar Thomas & Others, (2003) 10 SCC 733 , wherein in paragraph 27 & 28, it has been held as under :- “27. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with by all concerned including the private companies. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment say Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or 4 Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment say Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or 4 Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance of those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispense with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and have issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to. 28. The six factors which have been enumerated in the case of Ajay Hasia (supra) and approved in the later decisions in the case of Ramana (supra) and the seven Judges Bench in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) may be applied to the facts of the present case and see as to those tests apply to the appellant bank or not. As indicated earlier, share capital of the appellant bank is not held at all by the government nor any financial assistance is provided by the State, nothing to say which may meet almost the entire expenditure of the company. The third factor is also not answered since the appellant bank does not enjoy any monopoly status nor it can be said to be an institution having State protection. So far control over the affairs of the appellant bank is concerned, they are managed by the Board of Directors elected by its shareholders. No governmental agency or officer is connected with the affairs of the appellant bank nor anyone of them is a member of the Board of Directors. In the normal functioning of the private banking company there is no participation or interference of the State or its authorities. No governmental agency or officer is connected with the affairs of the appellant bank nor anyone of them is a member of the Board of Directors. In the normal functioning of the private banking company there is no participation or interference of the State or its authorities. The statutes have been framed regulating the financial and commercial activities so that fiscal equilibrium may be kept maintained and not get disturbed by the mal-functioning of such companies or institutions involved in the business of banking. These are regulatory measures for the purposes of maintaining the healthy economic atmosphere in the country. Such regulatory measures are provided for other companies also as well as industries manufacturing goods of importance. Otherwise these are purely private commercial activities. It deserves to be noted that it hardly makes any difference that such supervisory vigilance is kept by the Reserve Bank of India under a Statute or the Central Government. Even if it was with the Central Government in place of the Reserve Bank of India it would not have made any difference, therefore, the argument based on the decision of All India Bank Employees' Association (supra) does not advance the case of the respondent. It is only in case of mal-functioning of the company that occasion to exercise such powers arises to protect the interest of the depositors, shareholders or the company itself or to help the company to be out of the woods. In the times of normal functioning such occasions do not arise except for routine inspections etc. with a view to see that things are moved smoothly in keeping with fiscal policies in general.” 6. Given the aforesaid authoritative decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court so far as maintainability of writ petition against private banks/financial institutions, the present writ petition in its present form would not be maintainable. 7. Second ground on which this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition is that there is a remedy of statutory appeal available to the petitioner under Section 18 of the Sarfaesi Act which provides for an appeal arising out of the order of DRT. 8. In view of the same, this Court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Right of the petitioner stands reserved to avail such other remedies available to him. 9. The writ petition accordingly stands rejected.