ORDER : A.V. Sesha Sai, J. 1. Respondents in W.P.No.18682 of 2014 are the appellants in the present Writ Appeal, preferred under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. 2. Challenge in the present Writ Appeal is to the Order dated 15.06.2022 passed by the learned single Judge in the aforesaid Writ Petition. 3. Respondent No.1-Writ Petitioner was a Scale-I Officer in the appellant-Bank. The appellant-Bank initiated disciplinary enquiry against the respondent No.1-Writ Petitioner and the disciplinary authority issued a Charge Memo vide Office Order dated 27.09.2013, framing the following charges: “Charge No.1: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar has authorized entries allowing TODs in CD A/c.No.3075061443 of M/s.V.R.Projects even though the account was already in debit balance. Thereby he accommodated the party and exposed precious bank funds to financial risk. Charge No.2: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar has retained the cheques received in clearing in CD A/c.No.3075061443 of M/s.V.R.Projects to accommodate the party and thereby he exposed precious bank funds to financial risk. Charge No.3: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar has passed the Cheque No.145678 dt.01.03.2012 for Rs.10,00,000/- pertaining to CD A/c.No.3075061443 of M/s.V.R.Projects by debiting Branch Adjustment A/c. instead of party’s account to accommodate the party, thereby he exposed precious bank funds to financial risk. Charge No.4: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar had with a fraudulent intention and in collusion with another staff member, he has unauthorizedly transferred huge amounts lying in inoperative HSS A/c. term Deposits A/cs to Branch Adjustment A/c. and from that account to third party account without preparing vouchers. Charge No.5: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar had allowed cash withdrawals in SB A/cs without verifying the genuineness/correctness of the credit entries made in the accounts thereby he was instrumental in siphoning off of the funds. Charge No.6: Shri D.N.Arjun Kumar had allowed Demand Loan against deposits to Smt. K.Uma Janaki, Manager without preparing vouchers/loan applications. The proceeds credited to SB A/c. of Smt.B.Radha Rani, Staff Member third party without any authority. The loan was also closed from the SB A/c. of Smt. B.Radha Rani.” 4. Responding to the said Charge Memo, 1st respondent herein submitted an explanation on 03.10.2013. 5. The disciplinary authority appointed an Enquiry Officer and the said Enquiry Officer submitted a report, holding that Charge Nos.1,2,4 and 5 stood proved; Charge No.6 not proved and Charge No.3 stood deleted. Subsequently, a Show Cause Notice was issued by the disciplinary authority on 25.03.2014. Responding to the said Charge Memo, 1st respondent herein submitted an explanation on 03.10.2013. 5. The disciplinary authority appointed an Enquiry Officer and the said Enquiry Officer submitted a report, holding that Charge Nos.1,2,4 and 5 stood proved; Charge No.6 not proved and Charge No.3 stood deleted. Subsequently, a Show Cause Notice was issued by the disciplinary authority on 25.03.2014. After submission of the explanation by the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein on 03.04.2014, the disciplinary authority passed an Order of punishment on 5.6.2014, compulsorily retiring the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent from service. As a consequence of the aforesaid Order, the Administrative Order vide Proceedings No.RO:HRD:2014-15:188, dated 12.06.2014 also came to be issued. Assailing the validity and legal sustainability of the aforesaid Order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority, the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein, by invoking the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed W.P.No.18682 of 2014. The respondents in the said Writ Petition, who are the appellants herein, contested the Writ Petition, by filing counter affidavit. 6. The learned single Judge, by way of the Order under challenge in the present Writ Appeal, allowed the Writ Petition, setting aside the Order of punishment issued vide Proceedings dated 05.06.2014 by the 3rd appellant-3rd respondent herein and the consequential proceedings issued by the 2nd respondent-2nd appellant herein. In the aforesaid background, the respondents in the Writ Petition have come up before this Court by way of the present Writ Appeal under Clause 15 of the the Letters Patent, challenging the validity of the Order passed by the learned single Judge. 7. Heard Sri Ch.Siva Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-bank and Sri J.Sudheer, learned counsel for the respondent- Writ Petitioner, apart from perusing the material available on record. 8. Learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-Bank contends that the Order passed by the learned single Judge, which is impugned in the present Writ appeal, is highly erroneous, contrary to law and opposed to the cardinal principles of service jurisprudence. It is further contended in elaboration by the learned counsel that the learned single Judge acted as an appellate authority over the Orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the same is impermissible. It is further contended in elaboration by the learned counsel that the learned single Judge acted as an appellate authority over the Orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the same is impermissible. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that it is a settled and well established principle of law that unless punishment is shockingly proportionate, there cannot be any interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that the learned single Judge grossly erred in holding that the bank authorities imposed different punishments in respect of different individuals though the Charges framed against them being the same. It is further argued by the learned counsel that the learned single Judge ought to have seen that another Officer namely, Sri Y.V.Ramana Raju was also imposed punishment of compulsory retirement. It is further submitted that the case of the Writ Petitioner herein cannot be equated with the case of Sri L.V.N.Sampat Kumar. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel takes the support of the Judgments in the case of The State of Karnataka & Anr Vs. N.Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 ; The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Rajit Singh, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 341 and Union of India and Others V.M.Duraisamy, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 404. 9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein, strongly resisting the Writ Appeal, contends that there is absolutely no error nor there exists any infirmity in the Order passed by the learned single Judge and in the absence of the same, the impugned Order is not amenable for any correction under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent. It is further contended by the learned counsel that though the nature of the Charges framed against the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein and Sri L.V.N.Sampat Kumar being the same, infliction of higher punishment on the Writ Petitioner would amount to discrimination, offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as such, the finding of the learned single Judge on the said aspect cannot be faulted. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that having regard to the cogent and convincing reasons assigned by the learned single Judge in the impugned Order, invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent is impermissible. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that having regard to the cogent and convincing reasons assigned by the learned single Judge in the impugned Order, invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Clause-15 of the Letters Patent is impermissible. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel places reliance on the Judgments in Director General of Police and Others Vs. G.Dasayan, (1998) 2 SCC 407 ; Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seeds Growers’ Union Ltd., Vs. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah, (2006) 6 SCC 548 ; Rajendra Yadav Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2013) 3 SCC 73 ; Luknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and another Vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 and Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli V. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 . 10. In the above background, now the issues that emerge for consideration of this Court in the present Writ Appeal are: i) Whether the Order passed by the learned single Judge which is impugned in the present Writ Appeal, is sustainable and tenable ? ii) Whether the appellants are entitled for any relief from this Court ? 11. It is absolutely not in controversy that the appellant-bank initiated disciplinary proceedings against three individuals namely, D.N.Arjun Kumar (Writ Petitioner), Y.V.Ramana Raju and Sri L.V.N.Sampat Kumar. In order to consider the merits and demerits of various contentions sought to be pressed into service in the present Writ Appeal, it is appropriate to extract the Charges framed against the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein and against L.V.N.Sampat Kumar in whose favour punishment of reduction of pay scale by two stages was inflicted. The following are the Charges framed against the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein and L.V.N.Sampath Kumar. Charges framed against the Respondent-Writ Petitioner: S.No. Charge 1. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar has authorized entries allowing TODs in CD A/c No.3075061443 of M/s.VR Projects. 2. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar has retained the cheques received in clearing in CD A/c.3075061443 of M/s.VR Projects. 3. Deleted 4. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar had with a fraudulent intention and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred huge amounts lying in inoperative HSS account, Term Deposits to Branch Adjustment A/c and to 3rd party account. 5. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar had allowed Cash withdrawals in SB A/cs without verifying the genuineness /Correctness of the credit entries, thereby instrumental in siphoning off the funds. 6. 5. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar had allowed Cash withdrawals in SB A/cs without verifying the genuineness /Correctness of the credit entries, thereby instrumental in siphoning off the funds. 6. Sri D.N.Arjun Kumar had allowed Demand Loan against Deposits of Smt.K.Uma Janaki, Asst.Manager without preparing vouchers/Loan application. The proceeds credited to SB A/c of Smt. B.Radha Rani, 3rd party without any authority. Charges framed against Sri L.V.N.Sampat Kumar: S.No. Charge 1. On 19.04.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.4,96,037/- lying in various inoperative HSS accounts to the SB A/c No.317581609 of Sri Madhu Babu 2. On 08.06.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.87,114/- lying in the inoperative HSS A/c to Branch Adjustment A/c No.3125808539 and debited Rs.87,000/- and transferred to SB A/c.No.3177645979 of G.Srinivasulu Reddy 3. On 13.07.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.5,51,398/- lying in overdue Time deposit A/cs to SB A/c No.3177645979 and debited Rs.87,000/- of G.Srinivasulu Reddy. No voucher was prepared to support transaction. 4. On 24.07.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.90,248/- lying in overdue Time Deposit to SB A/c.No.3173826222 of Sri Alapati Panindra. He was instrumental to siphon the amount. No voucher was prepared, 5. On 16.06.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.1,21,054/- lying in inoperative HSS A/cs to SB A/c No.3175845108 of Sri MadhuBabu. He was instrumental to siphon off the funds. No vouchers were prepared. 6. On 04.07.2012 with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly transferred Rs.88,489/- lying in inoperative HSS A/cs to SB A/c No.3175845108 of Sri M.MadhuBabu. No vouchers were prepared. 7. On 31.08.2012 Sri L.V.N.Sampat Kumar with an intention to defraud the Branch and in collusion with another staff member unauthorizedly debited Branch Adjustment A/c 12. It is absolutely not in dispute that in respect of L.V.N.Sampath Kumar, the Enquiry Officer found that all the seven Charges stood proved. However, as mentioned supra, insofar as the case of the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein is concerned, the Enquiry Officer found that Charge Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 stood proved. 13. It is absolutely not in dispute that in respect of L.V.N.Sampath Kumar, the Enquiry Officer found that all the seven Charges stood proved. However, as mentioned supra, insofar as the case of the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein is concerned, the Enquiry Officer found that Charge Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 stood proved. 13. A perusal of the Charges framed against L.V.N.Sampat Kumar, indicates, in clear and vivid terms, that the said Charges were also serious in nature and despite the same, the disciplinary authority inflicted the punishment of reduction of pay scale in two stages against the said L.V.N. Sampat Kumar. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the Judgment cited by the learned Advocates, appearing for both the parties. In the case of The State of Karnataka & Anr Vs. N.Gangaraj (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraphs-7 to 9 held as follows: “7. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process. The power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority. 8. In State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. V. S.Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ) a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under: “7. …. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence ….” 9. In B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 ], again, a three Judge Bench of this court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. ….” 14. In the case of Union of India and Others Vs. M.Duraisamy (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraphs -6 to 10 held as under: 6. Therefore, the short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and modifying/substituting the same from removal to that of compulsory retirement. 7. While answering the aforesaid question/issue, the decision of this Court in the case of Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu (supra), on the judicial review and the limited jurisdiction of the High Court on the proportionality of the order of departmental authority is required to be referred to. In the said decision, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court, it is observed and held by this Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court on the proportionality of the order of departmental authority is limited. It is observed that it cannot set aside a wellreasoned order only on grounds of sympathy and sentiments. In the said decision, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court, it is observed and held by this Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court on the proportionality of the order of departmental authority is limited. It is observed that it cannot set aside a wellreasoned order only on grounds of sympathy and sentiments. It is further observed and held that once it is found that all the procedural requirements had been complied with, courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. It is further observed that the superior courts, only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality, however if the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the doctrine would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. 7.1 In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the High Court interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and substituted the punishment of dismissal from service to one of compulsory retirement on the reasoning that the employee had put in 30 years of service and that he had a brilliant academic record and that he had earned promotion after the disciplinary proceedings were initiated. Setting aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court, this Court observed that the reasoning is wholly unsupportable. Such reasons are not relevant or germane to modify the punishment. What is required to be considered is the gravity of the misconduct. In the said case, the employee was found to be in possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of his income. Therefore, this Court observed and held that the interference with the imposition of punishment was wholly unwarranted. 8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, the order passed by the Tribunal, confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, substituting the punishment of removal to that of compulsory retirement is unsustainable. Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court have found any irregularity in conducting the departmental enquiry. No procedural lapses have been found. In fact, the respondent employee admitted the charge of having defrauded Rs.16,59,065/- and on detecting the fraud, he deposited the defrauded amount of Rs.16,59,065/- along with penal interest. Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court have found any irregularity in conducting the departmental enquiry. No procedural lapses have been found. In fact, the respondent employee admitted the charge of having defrauded Rs.16,59,065/- and on detecting the fraud, he deposited the defrauded amount of Rs.16,59,065/- along with penal interest. But for the detection of the fraud, probably, the respondent employee would not have deposited the defrauded amount. Once, a conscious decision was taken by the Disciplinary Authority to remove an employee on the proved misconduct of a very serious nature of defrauding public money, neither the Tribunal nor the High Court should have interfered with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, which was after considering the gravity and seriousness of the misconduct. 9. Merely because the respondent-employee had worked for 39 years and in those years, there was no punishment imposed and/or that he voluntarily deposited the defrauded amount along with penal interest and therefore there was no loss to the Government/Department cannot be a ground to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and substitute the same from removal to that of compulsory retirement. Neither the Tribunal nor the High Court have, in fact, considered the nature and gravity of the misconduct committed by the delinquent officer. Therefore, both, the Tribunal as well as the High Court had exceeded in their jurisdiction in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. 10. None of the grounds/reasoning on which the order of punishment of removal has been interfered with by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court are germane and can be sustained. Once it was found that the delinquent officer who was serving in the post office had defrauded to the extent of Rs.16,59,065/- and that too, by way of fraudulent withdrawal in as many as 85 RD accounts and by way of non-credit of deposits in 71 RD accounts, no sympathy on such an employee was warranted. Being a public servant in the post office, the delinquent officer was holding the post of trust. Merely because subsequently the employee had deposited the defrauded amount and therefore there was no loss caused to the department cannot be a ground to take a lenient view and/or to show undue sympathy in favour of such an employee. Being a public servant in the post office, the delinquent officer was holding the post of trust. Merely because subsequently the employee had deposited the defrauded amount and therefore there was no loss caused to the department cannot be a ground to take a lenient view and/or to show undue sympathy in favour of such an employee. What about the loss caused to the department by way of goodwill, name and fame of the department and its reliability amongst the public? By such a misconduct/act on the part of the delinquent officer, the reputation of the department had been tarnished. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, both, the Tribunal as well as the High Court have exceeded in their jurisdiction in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and to substitute the same to that of compulsory retirement. 15. In the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Rajit Singh (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-7 held thus: 7. Now, so far as the quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority applying the Doctrine of Equality on the ground that other officers involved in the incident have been exonerated and/or no action has been taken against them, is concerned, we are of the firm view that on the aforesaid ground, the order of punishment could not have been set aside by the Tribunal and the High Court. The Doctrine of Equality ought not to have been applied when the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority held the charges proved against the delinquent officer. The role of each individual officer even with respect to the same misconduct is required to be considered in light of their duties of office. Even otherwise, merely because some other officers involved in the incident are exonerated and/or no action is taken against other officers cannot be a ground to set aside the order of punishment when the charges against the individual concerned – delinquent officer are held to be proved in a departmental enquiry. There cannot be any claim of negative equality in such cases. Therefore, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by applying the Doctrine of Equality.” 16. There cannot be any claim of negative equality in such cases. Therefore, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in quashing and setting aside the order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by applying the Doctrine of Equality.” 16. In the case of Director General of Police and Others Vs. G.Dasayan (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph - 8 held as follows: “8. On the second ground that the Superintendent of Police, Tirunelveli District, was not the competent authority, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the Tribunal was not right in assuming that the transfer was for administrative purpose and during the pendency of enquiry as the Police Standing Orders enabled the transfer of Constable of one district to another district. The relevant PSO was produced which reads that a Police Constable is liable to serve anywhere in the State. The order of transfer from Kanyakumari District to Tirunelveli District at the relevant time was not challenged. Therefore, this ground of the Tribunal in setting aside the order of dismissal cannot also be supported. The third ground that the co-delinquents except the Head Constable where let off though the charges were identical, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer so far as those two delinquents were concerned. However, the Head Constable, who was also charged along with the respondent, was compulsorily retired by the Disciplinary Authority.” 17. In the case of Anand Regional Coop.Oil Seeds Growers’ Union Ltd., Vs.Shailesh Kumar Harshadbhai Shah (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraphs-27 and 28 held as under: “27. There is, however, another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. Identical allegations were made against seven persons. The management did not take serious note of misconduct committed by six others although they were similarly situated. They were allowed to take the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme. 28. The first respondent might not have opted therefor. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, he should be, in our opinion, treated on a similar footing. They were allowed to take the benefit of the voluntary retirement scheme. 28. The first respondent might not have opted therefor. However, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, he should be, in our opinion, treated on a similar footing. In view of the fact that the first respondent has succeeded in the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench; we are of the opinion that having regard to the overall situation, the interest of justice would be subserved if the award of the Labour Court dated 31.1.2003 as affirmed by the High Court is substituted by a direction that the first respondent shall also be given the benefit of voluntary retirement scheme from the month in which the other workmen were given the benefit thereof.” 18. In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another V. Rajendra Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-17 held as follows: “17. If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases, imposing different penalties would not be appropriate as inflicting of any/higher penalty in one case would be discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav case, already taken note above. On the other hand, if there is some difference, different penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is to be left to the appellate authority. However, such a penalty should be commensurate with the gravity of misconduct and cannot be shockingly disproportionate. As per the ratio of Obettee (P) Ltd., case even if the nature of misconduct committed by the two sets of employees is same, the conduct of one set of employees accepting the guilt and pleading for lenient view would justify lesser punishment to them than the other employees who remained adopted the mode of denial, with the result that charges stood proved ultimately in a fullfledged enquiry conducted against them. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. In that event, higher penalty can be imposed upon such delinquent employees. It would follow that choosing to take a chance to contest the charges such employees thereafter cannot fall back and say that the penalty in their cases cannot be more than the penalty which is imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges at the outset by tendering unconditional apology.” 19. A perusal of the Order passed by the learned single Judge demonstrates that the principles laid down in the aforesaid Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the Writ Petitioner-1st respondent herein, were considered thoroughly and the learned single Judge came to a categoric conclusion that the respondent-bank authorities acted with discrimination and inflicted lesser punishment on L.V.N.Sampat Kumar. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police and Others Vs. G.Dasayan, the finding of the learned Judge by any stretch of imagination cannot be faulted. Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said Judgment rendered by a larger Bench, the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Vs. Rajit Singh, would not render any assistance to the case of the Writ Appellants. 20. It is also evident from a reading of the Order passed by the learned single Judge that the learned single Judge found that the authorities should have conducted a joint enquiry. The learned counsel for the appellant seeks to justify the impugned action on the part of the appellant-bank authorities in holding different enquiries on the ground that the rules do not mandate such course of action. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli Vs. Gulabhia M. Lad (Supra) and Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-15 of the said Judgment held as under: “15. In a matter of imposition of punishment where joint disciplinary enquiry is held against more than one delinquent, the same or similarity of charges is not decisive but many factors as noticed above may be vital in decision making. A single distinguishing feature in the nature of duties of degree of responsibility may make a difference in so far as award of punishment is concerned. A single distinguishing feature in the nature of duties of degree of responsibility may make a difference in so far as award of punishment is concerned. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and overlapping adducing of evidence, a joint enquiry may be conducted against all the delinquent officers but imposition of different punishment on proved charges may not be impermissible if the responsibilities and duties of the co-delinquents differ or where distinguishing features exist. In such a case, there would not be any question of selective or invidious discrimination.” 21. Therefore, the contention contra advanced by the learned counsel for the Writ Appellants cannot stand for judicial scrutiny. Having regard to the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge in the impugned Order and in view of the Judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to above, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the Order of the learned single Judge. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. 23. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this case, shall stand closed.