JUDGMENT : Saurabh Lavania, J. 1. Heard Sri Pradeep Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 & 13, Sri Mohan Singh, Advocate, who has received notice on behalf of respondent No. 12/Gaon Sabha concerned and Sri Pankaj Kumar Pandey, Advocate, appearing for the respondent No. 4, who has also filed his Valakatnama on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 to 11 in the Court today, which is taken on record. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioners have assailed the order dated 15.05.2023 passed by the respondent No. 1/Board of Revenue, U.P., at Lucknow in Second Appeal registered as Case No. SA/205/2022/Ayodhya, Computerized Case No. R2022042300205 (Mirza Khalid Beg and others vs. Mirza Shahid Beg) filed by the private respondents Nos. 4 to 11 under Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short "Act of 1950"). 3. By order dated 15.05.2023, the second appeal has been allowed at the admission stage and the matter has been remanded back to the trial Court concerned for deciding the case afresh on merits after framing the relevant issues. 4. The brief facts of the case, which are required for disposal of this petition, are to the effect that a suit for declaration of rights over certain plots/gatas was instituted by Khursida Begum registered as Case No. 68/192/22/44/61 (Khurshida Begum and others vs. Mirza Zulfikar Beg and others), which was dismissed vide order dated 05.09.2007 based on the plea related to Section 49 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short "Act of 1953"), which creates bar in relation to suit filed subsequent to notification published under Section 52 of the Act of 1953. 5. The order dated 05.09.2007 was assailed by the original plaintiffs namely Khurshida Begum and Sayeeda Begum, who expired during pendency of appeal and in their place, the legal heirs were substituted, who are the private respondent Nos. 4 to 11 in this petition. This first appeal was registered as Case No. 1248/2007-2008, Computerized Case No. C2007040000615 (Khurshida Begum vs. Mirza Zulfikar Beg) under Section 331(3) of the Act of 1950. The First Appellate Court affirmed the order dated 05.09.2007 vide its order dated 18.12.2021. 6. 4 to 11 in this petition. This first appeal was registered as Case No. 1248/2007-2008, Computerized Case No. C2007040000615 (Khurshida Begum vs. Mirza Zulfikar Beg) under Section 331(3) of the Act of 1950. The First Appellate Court affirmed the order dated 05.09.2007 vide its order dated 18.12.2021. 6. Challenging the orders dated 05.09.2007 and 18.12.2021, the Second Appeal registered as Case No. SA/205/2022/Ayodhya, Computerized Case No. R2022042300205 (Mirza Khalid Beg and others vs. Mirza Shahid Beg) was preferred by the private respondents No. 4 to 11, which has been allowed vide impugned order dated 15.05.2023 and matter has been remanded back by the second Appellate Court/respondent No. 1 with a direction to the trial Court to decide the case on merits after framing the issues. 7. The order impugned dated 15.05.2023 has been challenged on several grounds. The main ground is to the effect that the Second Appellate Court has not proceeded in the matter as required under the law. 8. Elaborating this aspect of the case, learned counsel for the petitioners stated that a second appeal under Section 331 of the Act of 1950 has to be decided strictly in terms of mode and manner prescribed under Section 100 CPC read with Order 41 and Order 42 CPC. According to these provisions, a second appeal under Section 331 of the Act of 1950 can be allowed after formulating/framing substantial question law(s) and thereafter fixing a day for hearing on the same. 9. In the instant case, without formulating/framing substantial question of law(s), the second appeal was heard on 17.04.2023 and judgment was reserved on the same day and thereafter, the judgment was pronounced. As such, the second Appellate Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in accordance with the mode and manner prescribed. In these circumstances, interference of this Court is required in the matter. 10. He further stated that there is concurrent finding of fact against the private respondents on the issue related to Section 49 of the Act of 1953 and the manner in which the appeal has been decided would prejudice the rights of the petitioners. 11. In these circumstances, interference of this Court is required in the matter. 10. He further stated that there is concurrent finding of fact against the private respondents on the issue related to Section 49 of the Act of 1953 and the manner in which the appeal has been decided would prejudice the rights of the petitioners. 11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Matashiromani vs. State of U.P. and another reported in AIROnline 2022 ALL 543 as also the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Surat Sigh (dead) vs. Siri Bhagwan and others reported in [ 2018 (141) RD 300 ], Arulmighu Nellukadai Mariamman Tirukkoil vs. Tamilarasi (Dead) reported in AIR 2019 SC 3027 and Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and others vs. Saraswati and others reported in AIR 2022 SC 4601 . 12. Opposing the present petition, learned counsel for the private opposite parties stated that a perusal of impugned order dated 15.05.2023 reflects that the second appeal was heard on 17.04.2023 on the issue involved i.e. the issue related to Section 49 of the Act of 1953 and after considering the law settled on the same, the second appeal has been allowed and being so, the order dated 15.05.2023 is not liable to be interfered with by this Court. 13. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. In order to consider the issue involved in the present petition which is to the effect that as to 'whether the second appeal under Section 331 of the Act of 1950 can be allowed without formulating/framing the substantial question of law and without fixing a date of hearing on the same', it would be appropriate to refer the judgment dated 12.09.2012 passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand (previously State of Uttar Pradesh) v. Mohan Singh and others, reported in (2012) 13 SCC 281 , wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "11. In order to examine the contentions raised by the counsel on either side, it is necessary to first examine the scope of Sections 331(3) and 331(4) of the U.P. Act and those provisions are extracted below for our easy reference: “331. Cognizance of suits, etc. In order to examine the contentions raised by the counsel on either side, it is necessary to first examine the scope of Sections 331(3) and 331(4) of the U.P. Act and those provisions are extracted below for our easy reference: “331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act.—(1)-(2)*** (3) An appeal shall lie from any decree or from an order passed under Section 47 or an order of the nature mentioned in Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in Order 43 Rule 1 of the First Schedule to that Code passed by a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II to this Act in proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof to the court or authority mentioned in Column 5 thereof. (4) A second appeal shall lie on any of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) from the final order or decree, passed in an appeal under sub-section (3), to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in Column 6 of the Scheduled aforesaid.” 12. Sub-section (4) of Section 331 of the U.P. Act also refers to Column 6 of Schedule II. Hence, the relevant portion of the Schedule is also extracted hereunder: “SCHEDULE II (SECTION 331) Sl. No. Section Description of proceedings Court of original jurisdiction Court of First Appeal Second Appeal (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) * * * 34. 229, 229-B, 229-C Suit for declaration of rights Assistant Collector 1st Class Commissioner Board" 13. Sub-section (4) of Section 331 of the U.P. Act states that a second appeal shall lie on “any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC, 1908. Section 100 CPC, as it stood prior to 1-2-1977, reads as follows: “100. 229, 229-B, 229-C Suit for declaration of rights Assistant Collector 1st Class Commissioner Board" 13. Sub-section (4) of Section 331 of the U.P. Act states that a second appeal shall lie on “any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC, 1908. Section 100 CPC, as it stood prior to 1-2-1977, reads as follows: “100. (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds, namely —(a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law; (c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.” 14. After Section 100 was substituted by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977, it reads as follows: “100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 15. The U.P. Act received the assent of the President on 24-1-1951. It was published in the U.P. Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 26-1-1951. Sub-section (4) of Section 331 has incorporated the unamended Section 100 CPC. 16. The question that calls for consideration is: whether sub-section (4) of Section 331 carries with it the amended Section 100 CPC as well, consequently, making it obligatory for the Board of Revenue to frame substantial questions of law? The question, therefore, calls for consideration is: whether reference to Section 100 in sub-section (4) of Section 331 is by way of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation? 17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by later legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. 18. The question how the above two principles operate came up for consideration in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam [ (1998) 2 SCC 467 ] before a three-Judge Bench of this Court and it was held as follows: (SCC pp. 480-81, para 17) “17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. 480-81, para 17) “17. A subsequent legislation often makes a reference to the earlier legislation so as to make the provisions of the earlier legislation applicable to matters covered by the later legislation. Such a legislation may either be (i) a referential legislation which merely contains a reference to or the citation of the provisions of the earlier statute; or (ii) a legislation by incorporation whereunder the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made are incorporated into the later legislation by reference. If it is a referential legislation the provisions of the earlier legislation to which reference is made in the subsequent legislation would be applicable as it stands on the date of application of such earlier legislation to matters referred to in the subsequent legislation. In other words, any amendment made in the earlier legislation after the date of enactment of the subsequent legislation would also be applicable. But if it is a legislation by incorporation the rule of construction is that repeal of the earlier statute which is incorporated does not affect operation of the subsequent statute in which it has been incorporated. So also any amendment in the statute which has been so incorporated that is made after the date of incorporation of such statute does not affect the subsequent statute in which it is incorporated and the provisions of the statute which have been incorporated would remain the same as they were at the time of incorporation and the subsequent amendments are not to be read in the subsequent legislation. In the words of Lord Esher, M.R., the legal effect of such incorporation by reference ‘is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all’. (See Wood's Estate, In re [(1886) 31 Ch D 607 (CA)], Ch D at 615.) As to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier legislation and other relevant circumstances. (See Wood's Estate, In re [(1886) 31 Ch D 607 (CA)], Ch D at 615.) As to whether a particular legislation falls in the category of referential legislation or legislation by incorporation depends upon the language used in the statute in which reference is made to the earlier legislation and other relevant circumstances. The legal position has been thus summed up by this Court in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan [ (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589] : (SCC p. 385, para 15 : SCR p. 14) ‘15. … Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.’” 19. The law is, therefore, clear that a distinction has to be drawn between a mere reference or citation of one statute into another and incorporation. In the case of mere reference of citation, a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have effect for the statute in which it is referred; but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. 20. We need not further elaborate this point, since almost identical question came up for consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1979) 2 SCC 529 ] wherein this Court dealt with the scope of Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 read with Section 100 CPC, which reads as follows: “55. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by any decision on any question referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) of Section 2-A, or any order made by the Central Government under Chapter III or Chapter IV, or, as the case may be, or the Commission under Section 12-A or Section 13 or Section 36-D or Section 37, may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).” 21. This Court in the abovementioned case examined the scope of Section 55 read with Section 100 CPC, both amended and unamended. Section 55 provides inter alia that any person aggrieved by an order made by the Commissioner under Section 13 may prefer an appeal to this Court on “one or more of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC, 1908. When Section 55 was enacted, namely, 27-12-1969, being the day of coming into force of the Act, Section 100 CPC specified three grounds on which a second appeal could be brought to the High Court on one of those grounds was that the decision appealed against was contrary to law. Therefore, if the reference in Section 55 was to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100, there can be no doubt that an appeal would lie to this Court under Section 55 on a question of law. The above aspects have been elaborately dealt with in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. [ (1979) 2 SCC 529 ] The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows: (SCC pp. 547-48, para 8) “8. … It was sufficient under Section 100 as it stood then that there should be a question of law in order to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal and, therefore, if the reference in Section 55 were to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100, there can be no doubt that an appeal would lie to this Court under Section 55 on a question of law. But subsequent to the enactment of Section 55, Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was substituted by a new section by Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1-2-1977 and the new Section 100 provided that a second appeal shall lie to the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. The three grounds on which a second appeal could lie under the former Section 100 were abrogated and in their place only one ground was substituted which was a highly stringent ground, namely, that there should be a substantial question of law. This was the new Section 100 which was in force on the date when the present appeal was preferred by the appellant and the argument of the respondents was that the maintainability of the appeal was, therefore, required to be judged by reference to the ground specified in the new Section 100 and the appeal could be entertained only if there was a substantial question of law. The respondents leaned heavily on Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which provides: ‘8. Construction of references to repealed enactments.—(1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted.’ and contended that the substitution of the new Section 100 amounted to repeal and re-enactment of the former Section 100 and, therefore, on an application of the rule of interpretation enacted in Section 8(1), the reference in Section 55 to Section 100 must be construed as reference to the new Section 100 and the appeal could be maintained only on ground specified in the new Section 100, that is, on a substantial question of law. We do not think this contention is well founded. It ignores the distinction between a mere reference to or citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means bodily lifting a provision of one enactment and making it a part of another. We do not think this contention is well founded. It ignores the distinction between a mere reference to or citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means bodily lifting a provision of one enactment and making it a part of another. Where there is mere reference to or citation of one enactment in another without incorporation, Section 8(1) applies and the repeal and re-enactment of the provision referred to or cited has the effect set out in that section and the reference to the provision repealed is required to be construed as reference to the provision as re-enacted. Such was the case in Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty [ AIR 1962 SC 316 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 364 : (1962) 3 SCR 786 ] and New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. CCE [ (1970) 2 SCC 820 ]. But where a provision of one statute is incorporated in another, the repeal or amendment of the former does not affect the latter. The effect of incorporation is as if the provision incorporated were written out in the incorporating statute and were a part of it. Legislation by incorporation is a common legislative device employed by the legislature, where the legislature for convenience of drafting incorporates provisions from an existing statute by reference to that statute instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it desires to adopt. Once the incorporation is made, the provision incorporated becomes an integral part of the statute in which it is transposed and thereafter there is no need to refer to the statute from which the incorporation is made and any subsequent amendment made in it has no effect on the incorporating statute. Once the incorporation is made, the provision incorporated becomes an integral part of the statute in which it is transposed and thereafter there is no need to refer to the statute from which the incorporation is made and any subsequent amendment made in it has no effect on the incorporating statute. Lord Esher, M.R., while dealing with legislation by incorporation in Wood's Estate, In re [(1886) 31 Ch D 607 (CA)] pointed out at p. 615: ‘… If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it, and, the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all.’ Lord Justice Brett, also observed to the same effect in Clarke v. Bradlaugh [(1881) 8 QBD 63 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 1002 (CA)] : (QBD p. 69) ‘… there is a rule of construction that, where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third [statute] does not affect the second.’” 22. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secy. of State for India in Council v. Hindustan Coop. Insurance Society Ltd. [(1930-31) 58 IA 259] also applied the same rule. The Judicial Committee pointed out that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 having been incorporated in the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911 had become an integral part of it, the subsequent amendment of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the addition of sub-section (2) in Section 26 had no effect on the Calcutta Land Improvement Trust Act, 1911 and could not be read into it. Sir George Lowndes delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee observed: (IA p. 267) “… In this country it is accepted that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second: see the cases collected in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Edn., pp. 349 and 350. … The independent existence of the two Acts is therefore recognised; despite the death of the parent Act, its offspring survives in the incorporating Act. 349 and 350. … The independent existence of the two Acts is therefore recognised; despite the death of the parent Act, its offspring survives in the incorporating Act. … It seems to be no less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition.” 23. This Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi [ AIR 1963 SC 553 : (1963) 3 SCR 858 ] held that since the definition of “agricultural land” in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 was bodily incorporated in the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, the repeal of the former Act had no effect on the continued operation of the later. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court observed at pp. 868-69 of the Report: (AIR p. 558, para 11) “11. … Where the provisions of an Act are incorporated by reference in a later Act the repeal of the earlier Act has, in general, no effect upon the construction or effect of the Act in which its provisions have been incorporated. … *** In the circumstances, therefore, the repeal of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 has no effect on the continued operation of the Pre-emption Act and the expression ‘agricultural land’ in the later Act has to be read as if the definition in the Alienation of Land Act had been bodily transposed into it.” 24. In Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa [ (1974) 2 SCC 777 ], this Court proceeded on the same principle. There the question arose in regard to the interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 (hereinafter referred to as “the Taxation Act”). This section when enacted adopted the definition of “motor vehicle” contained in Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Subsequently, Section 2(18) was amended by Act 100 of 1956 but no corresponding amendment was made in the definition contained in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act. This section when enacted adopted the definition of “motor vehicle” contained in Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Subsequently, Section 2(18) was amended by Act 100 of 1956 but no corresponding amendment was made in the definition contained in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act. The argument advanced before the Court was that the definition in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act was not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference and the meaning of “motor vehicle” in Section 2(c) must, therefore, be taken to be the same as defined from time to time in Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This argument was negatived by the Court and it was held that this was a case of incorporation and not reference and the definition in Section 2(18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as then existing was incorporated in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act and neither repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 nor any amendment in it would affect the definition of “motor vehicle” in Section 2(c) of the Taxation Act. It is, therefore, clear that if there is mere reference to a provision of one statute in another without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears, Section 8(1) would apply and the reference would be construed as a reference to the provision as may be in force from time to time in the former statute. But if a provision of one statute is incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in the former statute or even its total repeal would not effect the provision as incorporated in the latter statute. The question is as to which category the present case belongs. 25. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. [ (1979) 2 SCC 529 ] after referring to the abovementioned judgment, this Court held as follows : (SCC pp. 550-51, para 9) “9. We have no doubt that Section 55 is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Section 55 provides for an appeal to this Court on ‘one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100’. 550-51, para 9) “9. We have no doubt that Section 55 is an instance of legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Section 55 provides for an appeal to this Court on ‘one or more of the grounds specified in Section 100’. It is obvious that the legislature did not want to confer an unlimited right of appeal, but wanted to restrict it and turning to Section 100, it found that the grounds there set out were appropriate for restricting the right of appeal and hence it incorporated them in Section 55. The right of appeal was clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100. Those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to restrict the right of appeal. The legislature could never have intended to limit the right of appeal to any ground or grounds which might from time to time find place in Section 100 without knowing what those grounds were. The grounds specified in Section 100 might be changed from time to time having regard to the legislative policy relating to second appeals and it is difficult to see any valid reason why the legislature should have thought it necessary that these changes should also be reflected in Section 55 which deals with the right of appeal in a totally different context. We fail to appreciate what relevance the legislative policy in regard to second appeals has to the right of appeal under Section 55 so that Section 55 should be inseparably linked or yoked to Section 100 and whatever changes take place in Section 100 must be automatically read into Section 55. It must be remembered that the Act is a self-contained code dealing with monopolies and restrictive trade practices and it is not possible to believe that the legislature could have made the right of appeal under such a code dependent on the vicissitudes through which a section in another statute might pass from time to time. The scope and ambit of the appeal could not have been intended to fluctuate or vary with every change in the grounds set out in Section 100. The scope and ambit of the appeal could not have been intended to fluctuate or vary with every change in the grounds set out in Section 100. Apart from the absence of any rational justification for doing so, such an indissoluble linking of Section 55 with Section 100 could conceivably lead to a rather absurd and startling result. Take for example a situation where Section 100 might be repealed altogether by the legislature—a situation which cannot be regarded as wholly unthinkable. If the construction contended for on behalf of the respondents were accepted, Section 55 would in such a case be reduced to futility and the right of appeal would be wholly gone, because then there would be no grounds on which an appeal could lie. Could such a consequence ever have been contemplated by the legislature? The legislature clearly intended that there should be a right of appeal, though on limited grounds, and it would be absurd to place on the language of Section 55 an interpretation which might, in a given situation, result in denial of the right of appeal altogether and thus defeat the plain object and purpose of the section. We must, therefore, hold that on a proper interpretation the grounds specified in the then existing Section 100 were incorporated in Section 55 and the substitution of the new Section 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated and since the present appeal admittedly raises questions of law, it is clearly maintainable under Section 55. We may point out that even if the right of appeal under Section 55 were restricted to the ground specified in the new Section 100, the present appeal would still be maintainable, since it involves a substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 13(2).” 26. We are of the view that the principle laid down in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. [ (1979) 2 SCC 529 ] and the judgments referred to earlier clearly apply when we interpret sub-section (4) of Section 331 of the U.P. Act. Sub-section (4), as we have already indicated, has used the expression “on any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC. Consequently, the then existing Section 100 (i.e. Section 100, as it existed in 1908 unamended) was incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 331 and substitution of the new Section 100 does not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated. Sub-section (4), as we have already indicated, has used the expression “on any of the grounds” specified in Section 100 CPC. Consequently, the then existing Section 100 (i.e. Section 100, as it existed in 1908 unamended) was incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 331 and substitution of the new Section 100 does not affect or restrict the grounds as incorporated. The right of appeal to the Board of Revenue under sub-section (4) of Section 331 clearly intended to be limited to the grounds set out in the then existing Section 100, since those were the grounds which were before the legislature and to which the legislature could have applied its mind and it is reasonable to assume that it was with reference to those specific and known grounds that the legislature intended to limit the right of appeal. 27. The appeal before the Board of Revenue would, therefore, lie on a question of law. This legal aspect was not considered properly either by the Board of Revenue or by the High Court. Further, we also notice that the Board of Revenue has not examined the provisions of the land record and Lekhpal diary number, date and P.A. 10. The Additional Commissioner had specifically noticed that P.A. 10 which had been filed pertaining to year 1976 did not bear any signature and the same was found to be doubtful, as to whether the original “Kashtkar” (tillers) of the land in dispute belonged to Tharu tribe, was also not properly examined. Further, the Board of Revenue also should have examined whether the land belonged to Tharu tribe and the plaintiff could claim the benefit of Section 210 of the U.P. Act. All these aspects are very vital for a proper and just adjudication of the dispute, which has not been done. 28. In such circumstances, we are inclined to allow the appeals and set aside the order passed by the High Court as well as that of the Board of Revenue and the matter is remanded to the Board of Revenue for fresh consideration, in accordance with law. However, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, since we are remitting the matter to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue will pass the final orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order." 15. However, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, since we are remitting the matter to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue will pass the final orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order." 15. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the second appeal before the Board of Revenue would lie on a substantial question of law. Requirement of formulating/framing of substantial question of law(s) has been held to be mandatory for deciding the appeal, as would appear from the judgment passed in the case of Surat Singh (supra), followed in the judgment passed in the case of Arulmighu Nellukadai Mariamman Tirukkoil (supra), wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:- "19. In our considered opinion, the manner and the procedure adopted by the High Court while allowing the second appeal are against the procedure laid down in Section 100. Section 100 of the Code reads as under: “100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.” 20. Sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal would be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is “satisfied” that the case involves a “substantial question of law”. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Subsection (4) provides that where the High Court is satisfied that any substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate that question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant or his counsel, as the case may be, that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, it has to formulate that question and then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of appeal along with the question of law framed by the High Court. 21. Sub-section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section (4). In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the second appeal is confined only to the question framed by the High Court under subsection (4). The respondent, however, at the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-section (5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High Court under sub-section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason for giving this right to the respondent for raising such objection at the time of hearing is because the High Court frames the question at the admission stage which is prior to issuance of the notice of appeal to the respondent. In other words, the question is framed behind the back of the respondent and, therefore, sub-section (5) enables him to raise such objection at the time of hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognises the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under sub-section (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal. 22. However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal. 22. Adverting to the facts of this case at hand, we are at a loss to understand as to how the High Court while passing a final judgment in its concluding para could frame the substantial question of law for the first time and simultaneously answered the said question in the appellant's favour. Obviously, the learned Judge must have done it by taking recourse to sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code. 23. Here is the case where the High Court was under a legal obligation to frame the substantial question at the time of admission of the appeal after hearing the appellant or/and his counsel under sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the Code, but the High Court did it while passing the final judgment in its concluding para. 24. Such novel procedure adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, is wholly contrary to the scheme of Section 100 of the Code and renders the impugned judgment legally unsustainable. 25. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction to frame the substantial question at the time of writing of its final judgment in the appeal except to the extent permitted under subsection (5). The procedure adopted by the High Court, apart from it being against the scheme of Section 100 of the Code, also resulted in causing prejudice to the respondents because the respondents could not object to the framing of substantial question of law. Indeed, the respondents could not come to know on which question of law, the appeal was admitted for final hearing. 26. In other words, since the High Court failed to frame any substantial question of law under sub-section (4) of Section 100 at the time of admission of the appeal, the respondents could not come to know on which question of law, the appeal was admitted for hearing. 27. It cannot be disputed that sub-section (5) gives the respondents a right to know on which substantial question of law, the appeal was admitted for final hearing. 27. It cannot be disputed that sub-section (5) gives the respondents a right to know on which substantial question of law, the appeal was admitted for final hearing. Sub-section (5) enables the respondents to raise an objection at the time of final hearing that the question of law framed at the instance of the appellant does not really arise in the case. 28. Yet, the other reason is that the respondents are only required to reply while opposing the second appeal to the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section (4) and not beyond that. If the question of law is not framed under sub-section (4) at the time of admission or before the final hearing of the appeal, there remains nothing for the respondent to oppose the second appeal at the time of hearing. In this situation, the High Court will have no jurisdiction to decide such second appeal finally for want of any substantial question(s) of law. 29. The scheme of Section 100 is that once the High Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, such question shall have to be framed under sub-section (4) of Section 100. It is the framing of the question which empowers the High Court to finally decide the appeal in accordance with the procedure prescribed under sub-section (5). Both the requirements prescribed in sub-sections (4) and (5) are, therefore, mandatory and have to be followed in the manner prescribed therein. Indeed, as mentioned supra, the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal finally arises only after the substantial question of law is framed under sub-section (4). There may be a case and indeed there are cases where even after framing a substantial question of law, the same can be answered against the appellant. It is, however, done only after hearing the respondents under sub-section (5). 30. If, however, the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant at the time of admission that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, then such appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine without any notice to the respondents after recording a finding in the dismissal order that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of sub-section (4). It is needless to say that for passing such order in limine, the High Court is required to assign the reasons in support of its conclusion. 31. It is, however, of no significance, whether the respondent has appeared at the time of final hearing of the appeal or not. The High Court, in any case, has to proceed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 100 while disposing of the appeal, whether in limine or at the final hearing stage. 32. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation that whenever a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner then such act has to be done in that manner only and in no other manner. (See Interpretation of Statutes by G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., p. 347 and Baru Ram v. Prasanni [Baru Ram v. Prasanni, AIR 1959 SC 93 ]. 33. The aforesaid principle applies to the case at hand because, as discussed above, the High Court failed to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 100 of the Code while allowing the second appeal and thus committed a jurisdictional error calling for interference by this Court in the impugned judgment. 34. [Ed. : Para 34 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F-3/Ed.B.J./14/2018 dated 8-5-2018.] . While construing Section 100, this Court in [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] succinctly explained the scope, the jurisdiction and what constitutes a substantial questions of law under Section 100 of the Code. 35. It is, therefore, the duty of the High Court to always keep in mind the law laid down in Santosh Hazari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ] while formulating the question and deciding the second appeal." 16. Mode and manner to be adopted for deciding a second appeal has also been explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and Ors. vs. Saraswati and Ors. reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273. Relevant paras are as under:- "23. It is well settled that a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) can only be entertained on a substantial question of law. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa (Dead) by LRs. (2006) 2 SCC 496 , this Court held:— “16. In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High Court suffers from serious infirmities. It is well settled that a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) can only be entertained on a substantial question of law. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa (Dead) by LRs. (2006) 2 SCC 496 , this Court held:— “16. In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High Court suffers from serious infirmities. It suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court under the law. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves reappreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami [ (1997) 4 SCC 713 ] and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait [ (1997) 5 SCC 438 ]). The High Court has not even discussed any evidence. No basic finding of fact recorded by the courts below has been reversed much less any reason assigned for taking a view contrary to that taken by the courts below. The finding on the question of readiness and willingness to perform the contract which is a mixed question of law and fact has been upset. It is statutorily provided by Section 16(1)(c) of the Act that to succeed in a suit for specific performance of a contract the plaintiff shall aver and prove that he has performed and has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by him other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.” 24. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. (1998) 6 SCC 748 , this Court held that, “Once the proceeding in the High Court is treated as a Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC, the restrictions prescribed in the said Section would come into play. The High Court could and ought to have dealt with the matter as a Second Appeal and found out whether a substantial question of law arose for consideration. Unless there was a substantial question of law, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Second Appeal and consider the merits.” 25. The High Court could and ought to have dealt with the matter as a Second Appeal and found out whether a substantial question of law arose for consideration. Unless there was a substantial question of law, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Second Appeal and consider the merits.” 25. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438 , this Court held that existence of substantial question of law was the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. 26. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait (supra), this Court held:— “10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline.” 27. The guidelines to determine what is a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 CPC has been laid down by this Court in Sir Chunnilal V. Lal Mehta & Sons v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 . 28. The guidelines to determine what is a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 CPC has been laid down by this Court in Sir Chunnilal V. Lal Mehta & Sons v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 . 28. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons (supra), this Court agreed with and approved a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad 969 which laid down the principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law. 29. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 , this Court followed Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarized the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. 30. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below : “21. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase “substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [ AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 Mad LJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], SCR p. 557) “[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.” 31. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be, whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or the question raised is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial question of law. 32. To be ‘substantial’, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. To be a question of law “involving in the case” there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 ). 33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. 34. In this case, it cannot be said that the First Appellate Court acted on no evidence. The Respondents in their Second Appeal before the High Court did not advert to any material evidence that had been ignored by the First Appellate Court. The Respondents also could not show that any wrong inference had been drawn by the First Appellate Court from proved facts by applying the law erroneously. 35. In this case, as observed above, evidence had been adduced on behalf of the Original Plaintiff as well as the Defendants. The First Appellate Court analysed the evidence carefully and in effect found that the Trial Court had erred in its analysis of evidence and given undue importance to discrepancies and inconsistencies, which were not really material, overlooking the time gap of 34 years that had elapsed since the date of the adoption. There was no such infirmity in the reasoning of the First Appellate Court which called for interference. 36. Right of appeal is not automatic. Right of appeal is conferred by statute. There was no such infirmity in the reasoning of the First Appellate Court which called for interference. 36. Right of appeal is not automatic. Right of appeal is conferred by statute. When statute confers a limited right of appeal restricted only to cases which involve substantial questions of law, it is not open to this Court to sit in appeal over the factual findings arrived at by the First Appellate Court." 17. Now coming to the impugned order dated 15.05.2023. In order to examine as to whether the impugned order passed by the Board of Revenue in the second appeal preferred by the opposite party is sustainable, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the same, which reads as under:- 18. A perusal of impugned order dated 15.05.2023 including the above quoted portion of the same reflects that without formulating/framing substantial question of law, the second appeal was heard on 17.04.2023 on the issue related to Section 49 of the Act of 1953 and thereafter, on the same day, the judgment was reserved and subsequently, the second appeal was allowed. 19. Whereas, according to law settled as also mode and manner prescribed for deciding the appeal from appellate decree under Order 42 CPC, as applicable in State of U.P., which says that Rules of Order 41 and 41-A shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decree and accordingly the second appeal, if not dismissed in limine in terms of under Rule 11 of Order 41, should be decided after formulating/framing substantial question of law and thereafter fixing a day for hearing on the same, as would appear from a conjoint reading of Section 100, Rule 11 and 12 of Order 41 and Rule 2 of Order 42 CPC. 20. Thus, the Board of Revenue/respondent No. 1 ought to have first formulated/framed the substantial question of law(s) and thereafter, ought to have fixed a day/date for hearing on the same. Accordingly, in the instant case, the Board of Revenue/respondent No. 1 failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed for deciding a second appeal. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the view that interference in the matter is required. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 15.05.2023 is hereby quashed. Accordingly, in the instant case, the Board of Revenue/respondent No. 1 failed to follow the mandatory procedure prescribed for deciding a second appeal. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the view that interference in the matter is required. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated 15.05.2023 is hereby quashed. The matter is remanded back to the respondent No. 1/Board of Revenue, U.P. at Lucknow to decide the second appeal afresh strictly in accordance with the mode and manner prescribed under Section 100 CPC read with Order 41 and Order 42 CPC, as the same has to be followed in view of the provisions of the Act of 1950 while dealing with second appeal, after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties to the litigation preferably within a period of four months from 28.08.2023, if possible and if there is no other legal impediment in this regard. While conducting the proceedings, the Authority concerned is directed to avoid unnecessary adjournments to either party. It is in order to decide the appeal within the time specified in this order. The parties present before this Court are directed to appear before the Board of Revenue on 28.08.2023. 22. It is open for the appellants, who are private respondents in this petition, to prefer an application for interim protection within a week w.e.f. 28.08.2023, which shall be considered and decided expeditiously. 23. It is provided that till disposal of the application seeking interim protection, the parties are directed to maintain status-quo regarding the property in issue. It is in view of substantial justice between the parties. However, this protection would be available if the application seeking interim protection is filed in terms of this order. 24. The petition is allowed in above terms.