Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 186 (AP)

Komma Nageswara Reddy v. Y. Veera Bhadra Reddy

2023-01-24

T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Dissatisfied with the order and decree dated 16.08.2012 in M.V.O.P. No.290 of 2009 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-Principal District Judge, Kadapa (for short "the tribunal"), the claimant in the M.V.O.P. has preferred the appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. The parties herein will be referred to as arrayed in the M.V.O.P. for convenience. 3. The claimant had filed M.V.O.P. under Section 163-A read with II schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act read with Rule 455 of the Motor Vehicle Rules as per Act (Amended) 54 of 1994 seeking compensation an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 24.02.2008. 4. The claimant's case is that on 24.02.2008 in the morning, while he was proceeding on his motorcycle from Muddanur side, at about 2.00 PM, when he reached the up-gradient road of Mallela hillock, a lorry bearing No. A.P. 04 U 9299 (for convenience, referred to as 'the offending vehicle'), coming in the opposite direction rashly and negligently and losing control over the steering, dashed against the claimant. As a result, the claimant sustained a fracture to his right leg below the knee. After the accident, the claimant shifted to the Government Hospital, Pulivendla, and from there, to RIMS Hospital, Kadapa. He underwent surgery on the right leg below the knee, fixed a rod and treatment for about 20 days, was confined to bed for six months and spent nearly Rs.30,000/- towards treatment, medicines, travelling and attendant expenses and Rs.5,000/- towards extra nourishment. The claimant is an agriculturist, owns Ac.8.85 cents land, and used to plough the land personally. Due to the accident, he was forced to engage coolies to attend to work. 5. Respondents 1 and 3, owner and former owner of the offending lorry, remained ex-parte. 6. The second respondent, the offending vehicle's insurer, has filed its counter, denying the material allegations and further contending that the claim is highly excessive. 7. Based on the pleadings, the tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6 on behalf of the claimant. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the respondents. 8. 7. Based on the pleadings, the tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.6 on behalf of the claimant. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the respondents. 8. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver and awarded compensation of Rs.60,000/- under different heads against respondents 1 to 2. 9. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both parties. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant/ claimant contended that the tribunal erred in holding that P.W.2 is not the doctor who treated the claimant and erred in not awarding any amount towards attendant charges, transport charges and extra nourishment. 11. Learned counsel for the insurer/ second respondent supported the findings and observations of the tribunal. 12. Upon considering the argument of both the learned counsel and the material evidence on record, the point that arises for consideration is, Whether the compensation awarded by the tribunal is just and reasonable, or it requires modification? POINT: a. As seen from the record, the tribunal's finding regarding the accident that occurred due to the negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver is not disputed by the respondents by filing either cross-objection or cross-appeal. Hence, the said finding has attained finality. b. To prove the injuries sustained in the accident, the claimant himself was examined as P.W.1 and Dr C.Sanjeevaiah as P.W.2. During the evidence, P.W.1 testified that he sustained a fracture to his leg. P.W.2 testified that he is practising as an Orthopedic surgeon, and on examination of the claimant, he noticed that: 1. Non-union fracture of pibiable sprain right with internal derangement of the right knee 2. An ethic ugly scar on the needle aspect of the right knee extending to the upper third of the right leg and the lateral aspect across the knee; 3. An isolated scar on the antiral aspect of the right leg; 4. Osteoporosis of the surrounding bones of the right knee; 5. Painful and restricted movements of the right knee due to synovitis; 6. Unstable knee present; 7. Antologit gait present; c. P.W.2 further testified that he issued Ex.A.4-disability certificate to the claimant, assessing the disability at 35%. An isolated scar on the antiral aspect of the right leg; 4. Osteoporosis of the surrounding bones of the right knee; 5. Painful and restricted movements of the right knee due to synovitis; 6. Unstable knee present; 7. Antologit gait present; c. P.W.2 further testified that he issued Ex.A.4-disability certificate to the claimant, assessing the disability at 35%. The tribunal, in its order, observed that P.W.2 is not a doctor who has given treatment to the claimant, and Ex.A.4 is not issued by the Medical Board. Hence, Ex.A.4 has no legal sanctity. By making such an observation, the tribunal has not chosen to award compensation under the head of disability. d. A reading of the order passed by the tribunal shows that, though the claim is filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the tribunal granted an amount of Rs.50,000/- for the pain and suffering of the grievous injury and Rs.10,000/- towards medical expenses. Insofar as the compensation under the head disability is concerned, Ex.A.4, disability certificate was not issued by the board. However, it was issued by P.W.2, who is an orthopaedic surgeon. There is nothing on record to suggest that the evidence of the surgeon who issued the certificate is not worthy of acceptance. The tribunal has not recorded any reasons for not considering the evidence of P.W.2. After carefully reading the evidence of P.W.2, this court views that there is no reason for not accepting the disability certificate issued by the claimants. e. In Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar, 2011 ACJ 1 , the Apex Court held that: “6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. 7…. 8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 10….. 11….. 12….. 13. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 10….. 11….. 12….. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above : (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. f. In the similar facts of the case between A.Chalapathi Vs. Satyanarayana N.Nuwal and others, 2010 (4) ALD 217 this Court held that, “The evidence of qualified orthopaedic surgeon can be accepted unless the court finds evidence of doctor not worthy of acceptance by giving cogent reasons. Opinion of a qualified doctor, that too the doctor who conducted surgery and treated patient, cannot be discredited.” g. In this case, the doctor assessed the disability at 35%. Keeping in mind the aforesaid settled proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court and upon considering the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant, this court is inclined to consider the disability sustained by the claimant to be at 10%. Keeping in mind the aforesaid settled proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court and upon considering the nature of injuries sustained by the claimant, this court is inclined to consider the disability sustained by the claimant to be at 10%. With respect to the loss of earnings due to the disability, in the claim petition, the age of the claimant was mentioned as 34 years and he ekes out the livelihood by doing cultivation and owns Ac.8.85 cents, however, no proof of earnings was filed. In the absence of proof of earnings, this Court relied on a principle laid down by the Apex Court in Lakshmi Devi and others Vs. Mohammad Tabber, 2008 ACJ 1488 , wherein it was held that in today's world, even common labour could earn Rs.100/- per day. As far as the future prospectus is concerned, the Apex Court in R.K.Malik and others vs Kiran Paul, 2009 A.C.J. 1924 while considering the grant of the future prospectus for the deceased child aged about ten years, held in paragraph 31 as follows: “31. A forceful submission has been made by the learned Counsels appearing for the claimants-appellants that both the Tribunal and the High Court failed to consider the claims of the appellants concerning the future prospects of the children. It has been submitted that the evidence with regard to the same has been ignored by the Courts below. On perusal of the evidence on record, we find merit in such submission that the Courts below have overlooked that aspect of the matter while granting compensation. It is well settled legal principle that in addition to awarding compensation for pecuniary losses, it must also grant compensation with regard to the prospects of the children. It is incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while awarding compensation." h. It is held in paragraph 32 that denying compensation towards future prospects seems unjustified. Accordingly, the Apex Court awarded compensation for future prospects in a claim under section 163-A of the MV Act, 1988. i. In Gopalappa Vs. It is incumbent upon the Courts to consider the said aspect while awarding compensation." h. It is held in paragraph 32 that denying compensation towards future prospects seems unjustified. Accordingly, the Apex Court awarded compensation for future prospects in a claim under section 163-A of the MV Act, 1988. i. In Gopalappa Vs. Kanduluru Sankara Reddy and another, 2022 ACJ 1427 the High Court of Karnataka in a case relating to disability observed as follows: "in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pappu Deo Yadav vs Naresh Kumar, 2020 ACJ 2695 (S.C.), the claimant is entitled to an addition of 40 per cent of the assessed income towards future prospects". j. In the present case, the claimant is 34 years old. In National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the Apex Court observed that to assess the future prospectus, in the case of the self-employed or those on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant. k. By following the principles laid down by the Apex Court, this High Court, and other High Courts, this Court considers the monthly earnings, including future prospects, at Rs.4,200/-. By applying the multiplier 17' as provided by the II schedule of the M.V. Act for persons above 30 but not exceeding 35 years, the loss of earnings for the disability would arrive at Rs.1,28,520/- (4,200 x12x17x15%). Hence, this court assessed the compensation Rs.1,28,520/- under the head disability. l. The tribunal awarded an amount of Rs.50,000/- towards grievous injury and awarded Rs.10,000/- towards medical expenses. In a claim under Section 163-A of the M.V.Act, the tribunal should not have awarded more than Rs.5,000/- for the grievous injury and also should not award medical expenses without supporting medical bills. Hence, this court is inclined to award Rs.5,000/- towards grievous injury. In all, the claimant is entitled to an amount of Rs.1,33,520/- (1,28,520+5,000). Accordingly, the point is answered. 13. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, enhancing the compensation from an amount of Rs.60,000/- to an amount of Rs.1,33,520/- (Rupees one lakh, thirty-three thousand, and five hundred and twenty only) with interest at 7.5% per annum as awarded by the tribunal. Accordingly, the point is answered. 13. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, enhancing the compensation from an amount of Rs.60,000/- to an amount of Rs.1,33,520/- (Rupees one lakh, thirty-three thousand, and five hundred and twenty only) with interest at 7.5% per annum as awarded by the tribunal. Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to deposit the compensation amount, excluding the amount already deposited, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On such a deposit, the claimant is permitted to withdraw the entire compensation amount on filing an appropriate application before the tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs. 14. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.