JUDGMENT : 1. Aggrieved by the order and decree dated 13.09.2012 in M.V.O.P. No. 579 of 2009 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-I Additional District Judge, Kadapa (for short, "the tribunal"), the second respondent, New India Assurance Company Limited, represented by its Divisional Manager, Kadapa, preferred the present appeal seeking dismissal of the M.V.O.P. 2. For convenience, the parties herein will be referred to as arrayed in the M.V.O.P. 3. The claimant has filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/- for the injuries he sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 22.04.2008. 4. The claimant's case is that on 22.04.2008 at about 7.00 p.m., as a compounder-cum-attender, he was accompanied by a patient, namely Giri, in the ambulance bearing No. A.P. 05 V 6632 to take him to S.V.R.R. Hospital, Tirupati, from Seelam Nursing Home. After joining the said patient at S.V.R.R. Hospital, he was travelling back in the same ambulance. At about 3.00 a.m. on 23.04.2008, the said ambulance reached Korlakunta village on the Tirupati-Kadapa main road, and the said ambulance driver drove it in a rash and negligent manner at high speed, lost control over the vehicle and dashed to a stationed lorry on its backside. Due to that, the claimant sustained severe injuries all over his body. He was taken to S.V.R.R. hospital, Tirupati. The said ambulance will be referred to as “the offending vehicle”. 5. The first respondent, the owner of the offending vehicle, filed a written statement claiming that the accident occurred due to the lorry's negligent parking on the road. Since the second respondent insures the offending vehicle, any compensation payable by him shall be payable by the second respondent. 6. The second respondent, the offending vehicle's insurer, filed a written statement claiming the claimant was travelling as an unauthorized passenger in the offending vehicle at his own risk. And that the policy issued by the second respondent did not cover the liability to compensate unauthorized passengers like the claimant. 7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim, during the trial, on behalf of the claimant, P.Ws.1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.13 and Ex.X.1. On behalf of the respondents, R.W.1 got examined and marked Ex.B.1. 8. 7. Based on the pleadings, the Tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim, during the trial, on behalf of the claimant, P.Ws.1 to 3 got examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.13 and Ex.X.1. On behalf of the respondents, R.W.1 got examined and marked Ex.B.1. 8. On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver, further held that the claimant received injuries in a motor vehicle accident, awarded compensation at Rs.5,80,039/- with interest at 6% per annum and costs from the date of petition till realization. 9. Heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant/second respondent contended that the Tribunal should have dismissed the claim petition but instead allowed it. It is also claimed that the alleged accident was caused by the offending vehicle's driver's negligence. However, the claim petition is filed against the offending vehicle's owner and insurer. Furthermore, the injured was an unauthorized passenger in the offending vehicle, and the policy does not cover such an unauthorized passenger (Ex.B.1). As a result, there is no justification for assessing disability at 65%. The Tribunal erred in determining permanent disability at 20%, and finally, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive. 11. Learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 has supported the findings and observations of the Tribunal. 12. Considering the material evidence on record and the upon hearing the argument of both the learned counsel, the following points arise for consideration are, I. Whether the Tribunal is justified in holding that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligence of the offending vehicle’s driver? II. Whether the Tribunal is justified in fastening the liability on the second respondent, who is the appellant herein? III. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable? POINT No. I: a. According to P.W.1, on 23.01.2008, while driving from S.V.R.R. hospital in Tirupati after admitting the patient, the driver of the offending vehicle drove at high speed, lost control of the vehicle, and dashed the stationed lorry on its back side. b. On behalf of the second respondent, one M. Lakshmi Naik was examined as R.W.1; it is not the evidence of R.W.1 that he witnessed the accident in question. b. On behalf of the second respondent, one M. Lakshmi Naik was examined as R.W.1; it is not the evidence of R.W.1 that he witnessed the accident in question. Admittedly, the claimant was travelling in the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. Though P.W.1 was cross-examined, nothing was elicited in cross-examination to discredit his evidence. The second respondent has not examined any witness in support of its contention that the lorry was stationed without indication of parking; not explained the source of information regarding the manner of the accident. It is not the case of the second respondent that its staff witnessed the accident in question. The claimant relied on Exs. A.1 and A.3, the certified copies of the first information report and charge sheet, respectively, to prove the manner of the accident. In the charge sheet, it is observed that on 22.05.2008 at 7.00 p.m., at Seelam nursing home, one patient, Giri, was boarded in ambulance with the compounder, T. Vasudevaiah, the claimant herein, to go to Tirupati. After admitting the patient, in return, the offending vehicle's driver drove the same rashly and negligently, turned the same on its left side, and dashed the stationed lorry. The charge sheet does not mention the stationed lorry parked in the middle of the road. There is nothing to show that the said lorry was parked without proper indication; if that is so, the charge sheet could have been filed against the concerned driver, the owner of the stationed lorry. The material on record shows that the offending vehicle’s driver could not control the vehicle. Even otherwise, he has not come forward to explain his stand as to why he was not be able to control the vehicle. c. In K.Rajani and others, V. M.Satyanarayana Goud and others, 2015 ACJ 797 , this High Court observed that: "when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be totally incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". If at all the findings of the police are found to be totally incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". d. In Bheemla Devi V. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1725 (S.C.) the Apex Court observed as follows: "It was necessary to bear in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be done by the claimants. The claimants are merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been applied". e. There needs to be something on record to suggest that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the driver of the offending vehicle without conducting a proper investigation. Consequently, it is also difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case against the driver of the offending vehicle. f. In a proceeding under the M.V. Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. As such, it is by now well settled that even F.I.R. or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of the happening of the accident. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for arriving at a conclusion regarding rashness and negligence, as well as the accident's mode and manner of occurrence. g. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver. When it contends that the accident occurred due to negligent parking of the stationed lorry, the respondent has to place necessary evidence before the Tribunal, based on which the Tribunal is expected to give its conclusion. The Tribunal has accepted the claimant’s case regarding the manner of the accident and also accepted the observations made by the investigating Officer in the charge sheet, making the driver of the offending vehicle responsible for the accident. The Tribunal has accepted the claimant’s case regarding the manner of the accident and also accepted the observations made by the investigating Officer in the charge sheet, making the driver of the offending vehicle responsible for the accident. As already observed, the contents of the charge sheet also support the case of the claimant regarding the manner of the accident. There is no material placed by the second respondent to show that the accident occurred due to the negligent parking of the stationed lorry. h. The driver of the offending vehicle is the best person to speak about the manner of an accident. Accordingly, the second respondent needs to take steps to prove the manner of the accident by summoning the offending vehicle's driver to establish that he did not rashly and negligently drive the vehicle at the time of the accident. i. This Court believes that negligence or contributory negligence must be proved like any other fact. There are no different standards for proving negligence or contributory negligence. But they cannot be decided on suspicion or surprise. The pleas taken in the counter will remain not substantiated by acceptable, relevant and legal evidence. There must be cogent evidence to prove contributory negligence. In the instant case, there is no specific evidence to verify that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. In the absence of convincing evidence to prove the plea of contributory negligence, the common law doctrine cannot be applied in the present case. There are no details of contributory negligence in the counter, and no evidence is also put forth except alleging a stray sentence in the counter. How the accident happened leaves no doubt that the driver of the offending vehicle was solely negligent in causing the said accident. While granting relief under the Act, the courts are not to be bound by mere technicalities but would adopt a liberal approach by giving the law a more comprehensive construction and meaning that would favour the victims. j. A standard rule is for the claimant to prove the negligence. But in accident cases, hardship is caused to the claimant as the actual cause of the accident is not known to them but is solely within the knowledge of the respondents who caused it. j. A standard rule is for the claimant to prove the negligence. But in accident cases, hardship is caused to the claimant as the actual cause of the accident is not known to them but is solely within the knowledge of the respondents who caused it. It will then be for the respondents to establish the accident was due to some other cause than their negligence. As the respondents did not choose to examine the driver of the offending vehicle who was involved in the accident, and he did not enter into the box to explain the manner of the accident, there is no ocular evidence led in by the respondents. k. Upon careful reading of the material on record, this Court views that the Tribunal has correctly appreciated the evidence and observed that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle's driver, which cannot be found fault with. Accordingly, point No.I is answered. POINT No. II a. It is the evidence of R.W.1, M. Lakshmi Naik, Assistant Manager in the second respondent's company, that the second respondent issued Ex.B.1 policy for the ambulance, the offending vehicle herein. In the cross-examination, R.W. 1 admitted that Ex. B. 1 was given under the B-package policy for the ambulance to carry a patient and attendant. He also admitted that the claimant was an attendant travelling in the ambulance, and again, he admitted that Ex.B.1 is the comprehensive policy. In the chief- examination also, R.W.1 stated that the claimant was a compounder in Seelam Nursing Home at Kadapa and boarded the offending vehicle with the patient, Giri, to admit him at S.V.R.R. Hospital, Tirupati. The Tribunal observed that R.W.1 himself admitted that a policy was issued for the ambulance under B-package to carry the patient and the attendant. Admittedly, the claimant was an attendant in the ambulance to take care of the patient. Hence, this Court views that the contention raised by the second respondent that it is not liable to indemnify the liability of the first respondent cannot be accepted. As such, this Court is inclined to hold that the insurer of the offending vehicle owned by the first respondent is liable to reimburse the compensation to the claimant. Accordingly, point No.II is answered. As such, this Court is inclined to hold that the insurer of the offending vehicle owned by the first respondent is liable to reimburse the compensation to the claimant. Accordingly, point No.II is answered. POINT No. III: a. To prove that the claimant sustained injuries and a partial permanent disability in the accident, he filed a wound certificate, Ex.A.2, and a disability certificate, Ex.A.10. To prove Ex.A.10; the claimant examined Dr C. Sanjeevaiah as P.W.3, who is the Member of the Medical Board. P.W.3 testified that on examination of P.W.1, he found a left femur commuted fracture, a left talus fracture, a left forearm both bones fracture, a right knee open injury exposing the patella, left heal pad lacerations over the calcaneum, multiple bilateral rib fractures with hemothorax, and a lung contusion, and he assessed the partial permanent disability at 65%. According to the evidence of P.W.3, the claimant cannot squat in a cross-legged position as usual. A disability would result from such an injury, but the claimant's job as a compounder-cum- attender in a hospital did not require him to sit or squat cross-legged while doing his work. The Tribunal, by giving this reason, is not inclined to assess the disability at 65%, but it does assess a 20% permanent disability on the earning power of the claimant. The claimant does not assail the said finding of the Tribunal, and in light of the said finding, I find no force in the contention of the second respondent/appellant herein. b. It is the evidence of P.W. 1 that he spent an amount of Rs. 2,07,633/- toward medical expenses. To establish the said fact, the claimant produced an inpatient bill, Ex.A.4, for Rs.2,07,633.99 p.s., as well as medical bills (68 nos.), Ex.A.5, for Rs. 1,18,492/-. To prove the treatment, on behalf of the claimant, Dr Vinod Mathew Cherien, professor at the C.M.C. hospital in Vellore, was examined as P.W. 2. He confirmed that the amount spent under Ex.A.5 is the sum of the other bills and Ex.A.9 reports from their hospital. Based on the evidence in P.Ws. 1 and 2, the Tribunal held that the claimant spent an amount of Rs. 3,27,239/-. While determining the loss of earnings due to the permanent disability, the Tribunal considered the claimant's monthly earnings at Rs. 6,000/-. Based on the evidence in P.Ws. 1 and 2, the Tribunal held that the claimant spent an amount of Rs. 3,27,239/-. While determining the loss of earnings due to the permanent disability, the Tribunal considered the claimant's monthly earnings at Rs. 6,000/-. As per the case of the claimant, he was 27 years old on the date of the accident, and thereby the Tribunal has applied the multiplier "17" as provided by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 and comes to the conclusion that the claimant is entitled to Rs. 2,44,800/- towards loss of earnings due to permanent disability. The claimant has also been awarded Rs. 4,000/- for transportation charges and another Rs. 4,000/- pain and suffering. As seen from the order of the Tribunal, it has not awarded loss of earnings during the treatment period, attendant charges, or extra nourishment. If the Tribunal had awarded those amounts, the claimant could get more compensation. It seems that the claimant has not filed either a cross-appeal or a cross-objection for not granting amounts under those amounts. Hence, by any stretch of the imagination, it cannot be concluded that the Tribunal awarded an excessive amount. After considering the same, this Court views the Tribunal's award is just and reasonable compensation. I do not find any reason to interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, point No. III is answered. 13. In view of the aforementioned discussion, I do not find any substance in the appeal, and the appeal is devoid of merit and warrants the interference of this Court. Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. As a result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs. 15. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.