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2023 DIGILAW 1878 (RAJ)

Praveen Singh Shekhawat, S/o Shri Shravan Singh Shekhawat v. State Of Rajasthan

2023-10-04

DINESH MEHTA

body2023
ORDER : 1. This batch of writ petitions involves common facts and questions of law and therefore, they are being decided conjointly by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4595/2020 : Dr. Praveen Singh Shekhawat & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. are being taken into consideration. 3. The petitioners were appointed as Senior Demonstrators vide order dated 20.08.2018. 4. After they joined, the petitioners were paid a basic salary of Rs. 70,100/-, House Rent Allowance of Rs. 6,501/- and remote area allowance of Rs. 25,000/-. 5. As per the terms of their appointment, the petitioners being Senior Demonstrators were to undergo a probation period of two years. 6. Before the petitioners could complete their probation period, the respondent No. 6 issued an order dated 14.05.2020 and reduced the salaries to be paid to the petitioners from Rs. 70,100/- to Rs. 58,000/-. 7. Thereafter, another office order dated 29.05.2020 came to be passed, whereby the excess amount of salary paid to the petitioners was ordered to be recovered in four equal quarterly installments (of Rs. 36,500/-) from petitioners’ future salary. 8. By way of present writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the above referred orders dated 14.05.2020 and 29.05.2020 on numerous grounds. 9. In some of the writ petitions, a challenge has also been laid to proviso to Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Medical Education Society Jaipur Personnel’s (Recruitment and Other Conditions) Employment Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 2017). Those writ petitions were initially submitted before the Division Bench, but later on, they were ordered to be listed for decision before learned Single Judge by the order dated 03.02.2023, passed in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4708/2020 and other connected matters. 10. Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that there is an apparent and significant difference in the emoluments being paid to the petitioners (working as Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators) vis-a-vis the salary/emoluments being paid to the other teaching staff, such as Professors, etc. He submitted that the teaching staff such as Professor, Dean, Superintendent, Additional Superintendent, the Clinical Staff such as Senior Professor, Professor and even the non-clinical staff such as Senior Professors, Professors, etc. He submitted that the teaching staff such as Professor, Dean, Superintendent, Additional Superintendent, the Clinical Staff such as Senior Professor, Professor and even the non-clinical staff such as Senior Professors, Professors, etc. are being paid salary as per Schedule VI to the Rules of 2017, whereas the petitioners (working as Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators) are being paid a consolidated salary as per Schedule V. 11. Learned counsel took the Court through Schedule VI, Schedule V and Schedule VII and contended that the respondents have created a discrimination while paying salary to the petitioners considering them to be probationer trainees. It was argued that in Schedule V, only two posts, namely, Assistant Professor and Senior Demonstrator, which are entrusted with teaching duties have been included, while all other posts mentioned in the said Schedule are the posts, which involve non-teaching responsibilities. He thus, argued that these two posts have wrongly been placed in the Schedule V which is meant for non-teaching staff, due to which the petitioners are getting much lesser amount than their colleagues discharging teaching duties. 12. Learned counsel in other words submitted that Schedule VI is meant for teaching staff while Schedule VII is meant for non-teaching staff and therefore, inclusion of posts held by the petitioners, namely, Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators in Schedule V is not only illegal and discriminatory, but also devoid of any logic. 13. Elaborating his arguments further, learned counsel argued that when all the posts entrusted with teaching duties have been kept in Schedule VI, there is no reason or rationale for keeping the posts held by the petitioners in Schedule V and requiring them to work as probationer trainees for a period of two years or one year, as the case may be. 14. Learned counsel also raised a grievance that when the VII Pay Commission was implemented, salary of teaching staff and non-teaching staff was increased, by order of the State Government dated 08.03.2018, but corresponding increase in the salary/emoluments of probationer trainees was not made. He argued that such exploitative approach qua the probationer trainees is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 15. He argued that such exploitative approach qua the probationer trainees is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that before passing of the orders impugned dated 14.05.2020 and 29.05.2020, the respondents have not provided any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and thus, these orders being violative of Principle of Natural Justice are liable to be quashed. 16. Mr. Jain lastly submitted that the amount which was disbursed has been put to use by the petitioners who had worked in difficult terrains such as Dungarpur and Barmer, where people are apprehensive to join and thus, on equitable considerations, the amount of remote area allowance already paid to the petitioners be permitted to be retained by them and the amount which has so far been recovered from the petitioners be ordered to be refunded. 17. Mr. K.S.Rajpurohit, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr. Ranka, associate to Ms. Vandana Bhansali appearing on behalf of the respondent - State vehemently opposed the petitioners’ prayer and submitted that the arguments advanced by the petitioners are untenable in law. 18. They submitted that when the petitioners joined on the post of Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators they were very much aware of the position that they have to work as probationer trainees in accordance with Rules of 2017 and that they had accepted their employment consciously with their eyes wide open and therefore, when more amount has been paid to them erroneously, they cannot claim any right to retain such amount. It was argued that the State is fully justified and entitled to recover the amount that has been inadvertently paid to the petitioners. 19. In relation to the increase in the salary of other employees pursuant to the VII Pay Commission, it was argued by learned Additional Advocate General that after considering all relevant factors, the State has decided not to increase emoluments being paid to the probationer trainees while giving benefit of VII Pay Commission and increase in salary to the remaining staff who has completed probation. Such decision being a policy matter is beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny and cannot be gone into by this Court. 20. Such decision being a policy matter is beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny and cannot be gone into by this Court. 20. It was vehemently argued that in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot give direction to increase the salary or emoluments, unless the salary being paid is shown to be shockingly arbitrary or contrary to some statutory provision. 21. In relation to providing opportunity of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents contended that as excess salary, house rent allowance and remote area allowance were erroneously paid to the petitioners, the respondents could recover the same. 22. It was argued by learned counsel for the respondents that even if any notice was issued to the petitioners and their response was called for, things would have remained the same. As the payment was made to the petitioners contrary to provisions of the Rules of 2017, they could in no manner justify the excess payment received by them. 23. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 24. The petitioners’ argument that the respondents have arbitrarily kept the two posts, namely, Assistant Professor and Senior Demonstrator held by the petitioners in Schedule V is misconceived. Petitioners’ endeavour to draw a distinction by contending that only first two posts in Schedule V are teaching posts while all other posts are non – teaching posts and that posts held by the petitioners have been wrongly included in Scheduled V equally lacks substance. 25. Schedule V is linked to Rule 29 of Rules of 2017, which provides for payment to be made to probationer trainees whereas, Schedule VI is linked to Rule 32 of the Rules of 2017, which speaks of consolidated salary and allowances for teaching staff and non-teaching staff. 26. Schedule VII is relevant for persons covered by Rule 32(2) who are working on consolidated salary and are non-teaching staff, whereas Schedule VI is the relevant Schedule issued under Sub-Rule (1) of the Rule 32 which provides for salary to be paid to teaching staff and the same definitely includes the posts held by the petitioners, namely, Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators. 27. 27. It is because of Rule 29 of the Rules of 2017, the petitioners are required to undergo probation period of two years and one year, as the case may be, and per force proviso to Rule 29 of the Rules of 2017, the petitioners and all other employees some of whom are non – teaching staff are being paid a fixed remuneration as indicated in Schedule V. 28. The arguments of discrimination meted out to the petitioners by requiring them to undergo probation is untenable in the eye of law. Because, Assistant Professors and Senior Demonstrators are the posts at the entry level in the Schedule so far as teaching posts are concerned. All other posts even of non-teaching staff such as Principal, Superintendent, Senior Professor, etc. are not entry level posts. These posts are to be filled in mostly by promotion and whenever these higher posts are to be filled by direct recruitment, there is a corresponding condition of experience of having worked on lower posts such as Assistant Professors or Senior Demonstrators. 29. The distinction or classification which the respondents have created is a reasonable classification. A person who has already gained experience and worked as Assistant Professor or Senior Demonstrator cannot normally be asked to work as a probationer and paid substantially lower amount than what he was drawing earlier in other establishments. 30. As a matter of fact, two classes have been created for teaching and non-teaching staff and their salary has been prescribed in Schedule VI and VII of the Rules. Whereas, one common Schedule V has been prepared for all newly recruited employees on different posts, teaching and non-teaching alike. Schedule V has been prepared in terms of Rule 29 which deals with service conditions during probation period. Incidentally, Schedule V includes only two posts which are teaching posts, but no discrimination can be alleged by contending that other teaching staff are getting salary as per Schedule VI. A perusal of Schedule VI reveals that posts of Senior Demonstrator and Assistant Professor have also been enumerated in it. And accordingly, after completion of probation period, persons holdings these posts are to be paid consolidated salary as per Schedule VI. 31. A perusal of Schedule VI reveals that posts of Senior Demonstrator and Assistant Professor have also been enumerated in it. And accordingly, after completion of probation period, persons holdings these posts are to be paid consolidated salary as per Schedule VI. 31. Such being the position, this Court neither finds any infirmity or illegality in proviso to Rule 29 of the Rules of 2017 nor does it finds any error in the State’s action in giving a fixed amount to the petitioners during period of probation. 32. Adverting to the arguments that prior to passing of impugned orders, the respondents should have provided an opportunity of hearing, it is observed that ideally, an opportunity of hearing should have been provided to the petitioners as recovery of purported excess amount affects their civil rights. 33. But then, this Court cannot lose sight of a vital aspect that had the respondents provided an opportunity of hearing or issued a show cause notice, it would hardly have made any difference, because the excess amount has been paid to the petitioners due to the inadvertence and the same was clearly contrary to Rule 29 and Sub Rule (6) of Rule 32 of the Rules of 2017. 34. Oftentimes, it has been observed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that Principles of Natural Justice are not an unruly horse and no injustice can be said to have been caused by not affording opportunity of hearing, if the facts and circumstances of the case are otherwise clear and admitted. One has to demonstrate and satisfy the prejudice caused to him by non adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice, in order to get an order declared illegal on the ground of breach of natural justice. 35. The grievance or the submissions which could have been put forth by the petitioners pursuant to notice (if any) issued to them have been canvassed by the petitioners before this Court, have been duly responded to by the State and have been considered by this Court. Hence, the order impugned, at this stage, cannot be set aside on the ground of non-adherence to the Principle of Natural Justice. 36. Hence, the order impugned, at this stage, cannot be set aside on the ground of non-adherence to the Principle of Natural Justice. 36. Having held that the petitioners were entitled to get fixed amount as per Rule 29 of the Rules of 2017, as has been reflected in Schedule V and that non-observance of the Principles of Natural Justice is not fatal to the impugned notice of recovery, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the petitioners cannot unjustly enrich themselves and the State is entitled rather justified in recovering the erroneously paid amount. 37. So far as petitioners’ contention that salary of other employees have been increased without there being any increase in the emoluments payable to the probationer including the petitioners, this Court is of the view that such grievance can best be addressed by the State bearing in mind its financial resources and constraints. 38. This Court in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can neither examine the sufficiency of the amount being paid to the petitioners nor can it compel the State to amend the Rules or raise the salary being paid to the probationers. 39. In support of his contention that the State cannot pay lesser amount to a probationer during the period of probation, Mr. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners at the end relied upon the judgment dated 29.07.2015 passed by the Division Bench in the case of Gopal Kumawat Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2963/2007. 40. It is informed by learned Additional Advocate General that the matter is pending before Hon’ble the Supreme Court and the order in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) has been stayed. He also argued that the Rules involved in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) are different than the one involved in the present case. 41. So far as judgment in the case of Gopal Kumawant (supra) is concerned, as the matter is sub-judice before the Apex Court, no relief can be granted to the petitioners at this juncture. True, it is that the Rules involved in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) are different than the present Rules, but in the opinion of this Court, principles may equally apply. True, it is that the Rules involved in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) are different than the present Rules, but in the opinion of this Court, principles may equally apply. Hence, a liberty is given to the petitioners to move the State Government in the event the judgment given in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) is affirmed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. 42. So far as the other allowances such as HRA and remote area allowances are concerned, the probationers are not entitled for the same, in view of the clear embargo given in Rule 29 of the Rules of 2017. 43. It is to be noted that Remote area allowance has been provided in Revised Pay Scale Rules and Note No. 1 of the notification of Schedule I of the Revised Pay Scale Rules clearly prohibits such payment to the probationer trainees. 44. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed. 45. The petitioners shall nevertheless be free to move a representation before the competent authority of the respondent – State for retaining the remote area allowance that has already been paid to the petitioners and to claim full salary in case the judgment in the case of Gopal Kumawat (supra) is affirmed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. 46. The stay applications also stand dismissed accordingly.