JUDGMENT : 1. Though the matter was listed under ‘Orders’ category, but at the joint request of the counsels for the parties, the matter is finally heard and decided today itself. 2. The present writ petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, claiming following reliefs: ‘It is most respectfully and humbly prayed that: 1. this writ petition may kindly be admitted and allowed and decision taken dated 15.07.2021 (Annexure 8) as issued by Respondent No. 1 be quashed. 2. Respondent ought be estopped from committing any such future acts and be directed to conduct the proceedings with utmost fairness and if deemed fit, to prepare and submit a proper report to the parties before referring the dispute to arbitration, if at all; 3. the cost of this writ petition may also kindly be awarded in favour of the Petitioner; and 4. Any other appropriate order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may consider just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also kindly be passed in favour of the humble petitioner Hotel.’ 3. The essential factual background of the case is that the Petitioner is a company within the tourism sector, with presence in multiple states across India, and has been engaged in business operations for over five decades. The Petitioner-Company and Eagle Intelligence Securities Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'Respondent No. 2’) have periodically conducted business together, with the Petitioner hotel making payments exceeding Rs. 10 Lakhs at various times to Respondent No. 2 for providing security services. 4. The Petitioner allotted new work to Respondent No. 2 in respect of petitioner’s hotel property in Jodhpur. However, the payment was not made to Respondent No. 2 citing the reason that the services of the Respondent No.2 did not meet the standards of the Petitioner company and a concern regarding the quality of services was also raised by Petitioner. 5. Thereafter, the Respondent No 2 filed a complaint before the Rajasthan Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 1’), Respondent No.1, bearing no. RJ/22/S/RIS/01292 and serial No F9.(01292)RMSEFC/2019/8624-8625, regarding the aforesaid non-payment. 6. During the pendency of the complaint which was filed by Respondent No.2, the Respondent No.1 had issued several notices fixing dates in the matter with the direction to Petitioner to appear in person. RJ/22/S/RIS/01292 and serial No F9.(01292)RMSEFC/2019/8624-8625, regarding the aforesaid non-payment. 6. During the pendency of the complaint which was filed by Respondent No.2, the Respondent No.1 had issued several notices fixing dates in the matter with the direction to Petitioner to appear in person. In the notice dated 08.04.2021 (Annexure-5), the Respondent No.1 informed the petitioner that in the event of non-appearance, an award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1996’) would be passed. Then the Respondent No.1 issued a notice dated 25.06.2021 (Annexure-6), fixing a meeting for conciliation between the parties on 05.07.2021. 7. In furtherance of notice dated 25.06.2021, Respondent No.1 conducted a meeting on 05.07.2021. The Petitioner through its counsels requested for a link for video conferencing through e-Mail (Annexure-7). 8. Thereafter, the petitioner received an e-Mail dated 15.07.2021 (Annexure-8) from Respondent No. 1, which contained two screenshots, i.e., pages 1 and 2 respectively of the impugned decision taken by Respondent No.1 in its meeting dated 05.07.2021. 9. Thus, being aggrieved of the order dated 15.07.2021 (Annexure-8) by Respondent No. 1, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents while raising preliminary objections submitted: (A) That the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that there is an alternate remedy available to the petitioner under section 18 and 19 of the Act of 2006, which are reproduced hereunder: ‘18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. (3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in subsection (1) of section 7 of that Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. (5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference. 19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.-No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent. of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose.’ and a conjoint reading of Sections 18 and 19 of the Act of 2006 and Section 2 (4) of the Act of 1996 makes it clear that provisions of Part I of the Act of 1996 are applicable to every arbitration under any other enactment. In the Act of 1996, the grounds for challenge in Section 12 and the challenge of the procedure in Section 13, the competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction in Section 16, conduct of arbitral proceedings in Chapter V, making of arbitral award and termination of proceedings in Chapter VI, recourse against arbitral award in Chapter VII and finality and enforcement of arbitral awards in Chapter VIII are contained in Part L and hence, if the petitioner has any grievance against the arbitral award, the only remedy that is available to it is under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The petitioner is aware of this remedy, but in view of the precondition of deposit of 75% of the awarded amount as contained in Section 19 of the Act of 2006, the petitioner, in order to avoid the same, filed this writ petition. (B) The provisions under the Act of 2006 are self contained and when a self-contained statute is available in a particular situation as an alternate remedy, invocation of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court cannot be sustained. (C) The writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not deposited 75% of the awarded amount, which is the mandate under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and without doing so, the petitioner cannot even avail the alternate remedy under the Act of 1996. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent while raising preliminary objections placed reliance on the judgment dated 20.01.2020 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Ors., the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: ‘35. Thus, in view of the law declared by the Full Bench of the Apex Court in Sterling Industries v. Jayprakash Associates Limited and others MANU/SC/1229/2019 : AIR 2019 SC 3558 (referred supra) and Division" Bench of the Supreme Court in Goodyear India Limited v. Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Ltd. and others MANU/SC/1215/2012 : 2012 (2) CTC 829 (referred supra), which are binding precedents on the Courts, a writ petition against an Award passed by Arbitral Tribunal is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But, the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the judgments referred above did not take note of the principle laid down by the S.B.P. and Co. But, the learned Single Judge of the High Court in the judgments referred above did not take note of the principle laid down by the S.B.P. and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. MANU/SC/1787/2005 : AIR 2006 SC 450 : 2005 (6) ALT 37 .1 (DN SC) (referred supra). Even in the Full Bench judgment of the Apex Court, the issue is identical, but not based on the jurisdictional issue. When the judgment is under the same enactment, the Full Bench judgment will have precedence over the judgments of Division Bench of learned Single Judge of High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, the law declared the Apex Court is a binding precedent on this Court. 45. As per the law declared in long line of perspective pronouncements, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, after commencement of arbitration proceedings, is limited and more particularly against an award passed under the Act, as such the Court cannot exercise power under Article 226 of Constitution of India to issue any order in this writ petition.’ 12. The learned counsel for the respondents while raising the preliminary objections further placed reliance upon the judgment dated 15.03.2012 passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Goodyear India Ltd. v. Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Ltd. And Ors., the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: ‘11. Having considered the submissions made, both on behalf of the Petitioner and on behalf of the Respondents, we do not see any reason to interfere with the views expressed, both by the learned Single Judge, as also the Division Bench with regard to Section 19 of the 2006 Act. It may not be out of place to mention that the provisions of Section 19 of the 2006 Act, had been challenged before the Kerala High Court in K.S.R.T.C. v. Union of India, MANU/KE/0864/2009 : Indlaw Ker 666, where the same submissions were negated and, subsequently, the matter also came up to this Court, when the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, with leave to make the pre-deposit in the cases involved, within an extended period often weeks. 12. We may also indicate that the expression "in the manner directed by such Court" would, in our view, indicate the discretion given to the Court to allow the pre-deposit to be made, if felt necessary, in installments. 13. 12. We may also indicate that the expression "in the manner directed by such Court" would, in our view, indicate the discretion given to the Court to allow the pre-deposit to be made, if felt necessary, in installments. 13. Having regard to the above, we are not inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petitions filed by M/s. Goodyear India Limited and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in keeping with the other decisions rendered in these cases, we extend the time for pre-deposit by the Petitioner, by a further period of twelve weeks. If such deposit is made, the Appeal shall be treated to be in order and, thereafter, the same may be proceeded with. As far as the two Special Leave Petitions filed by M/s. Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Limited and another, are concerned, having regard to the decision in these two Special Leave Petitions, nothing survives therein and the same are disposed of, however, with leave to the Special Leave Petitioner to take whatever objections, that may have been taken in these Special Leave Petitions, at the time of hearing of the Appeal.’ 13. The learned counsel for the respondent while raising preliminary objections also placed reliance on the judgment dated 01.07.2014 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in Ballapur Industries Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council & Ors., the relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: ‘15. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the second respondent, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Goodyear India Ltd. v. Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Ltd., MANU/SC/1215/2012 : (2012) 6 SCC 345 held that the court has no discretion to either waive or reduce the amount of 75% of award as a pre-deposit for filing of application/appeal under the MSMED Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Modern Industries v. SAIL, MANU/SC/0251/2010 : (2010) 5 SCC 44 also held in the context of the Act of 1993 that though the Act of 1993 provides a statutory remedy of appeal against the award, the buyer in that case availing the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution bypassing statutory remedy was held to be not justified.’ 14. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner while replying to the preliminary objections submitted that the at the time of filing the complaint, Respondent No. 2 was not registered as Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise under the Act of 2006 and hence, the said Act of 2006 does not apply and the decision dated 15.07.2021 passed by Respondent No. 1 is without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. 15. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner while replying to the preliminary objections further submitted that the writ petition is maintainable on the ground that the impugned award has been passed by the respondents without having jurisdiction. The Respondent No. 1 have not adhered to the principles of natural justice and further the impugned order manifestly suffers from patent illegality, thus, the alternative and statutory remedy available under Section 18 & 19 of the Act of 2006 cannot be said to be a bar in order to invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent in rebuttal submitted that the contention of the petitioner that the pre-requisite of conducting conciliation proceedings has not been followed by the respondents is absolutely false and baseless, as a bare look at order dated 05.07.2021 reflects that conciliation proceedings have duly been carried out. 17. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted: (A) That the decision dated 15.07.2021 passed by Respondent No. 1 is illegal, arbitrary, perverse and also against the law as the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity of being heard in the conciliation proceedings which took place on 05.07.2021 despite the petitioner being requesting the Video Conferencing link through e-Mail, it was not provided to the petitioner and it is the violation of the principles of the natural justice and thus, the present writ petition is maintainable. (B) That the office of Respondent No. 1’s office conveyed to the petitioner that the matter will not be heard on 05.07.2021 and next date will be informed to the Petitioner. However, Respondent No.1 conducted a meeting on 05.07.2021, after which it took a decision dated 15.07.2021. This makes it clear that Respondent No.1 had acted apparently in an arbitrary and completely illegal manner towards the Petitioner and hence, the impugned decision dated 15.07.2021 should be quashed on this ground alone. However, Respondent No.1 conducted a meeting on 05.07.2021, after which it took a decision dated 15.07.2021. This makes it clear that Respondent No.1 had acted apparently in an arbitrary and completely illegal manner towards the Petitioner and hence, the impugned decision dated 15.07.2021 should be quashed on this ground alone. (C) That the issuance of direction through the decision dated 15.07.2021 is in contravention and complete ignorance of the provisions of not only Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2006’) but also of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and shows bias and unfair conduct of Respondent No.1. (D) That while taking the decision dated 15.07.2021, Respondent No.1 had seemingly assumed the role of an arbitrator/arbitration tribunal. Section 18 of the Act of 2006, provides that in case a reference has been made to the Micro and small Enterprises facilitation Council by virtue of a complaint, conciliation proceedings have to be conducted and in case the same is not successful, it has to be terminated, thereafter, the Council can either by itself or through any institution, provide alternate dispute resolution services, i.e, conduct arbitration proceedings, under the Act of 1996. In any case, without termination of conciliation proceedings and formal commencement of arbitration proceedings and thereafter compliance with provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act have to be done before passing an award but the respondent have not conducted the conciliation proceedings and thus, it is clear that the Respondent No. 1 has not followed the provision of the Act of 2006. (E) That the Respondent No.1 did not make any enquiry/noting, in writing, regarding status of Respondent No.2 as an MSME on date of alleged default in payment by Petitioner Hotel. Also that It was seen in another case that a company, viz., VJ Home Studios Pvt. Ltd. had filed a complaint bearing No. RJ/22/M/RJS/00932 having Serial No. F9 (00932)/RMSEFC/2019/4003-4004 before Respondent No. I against Petitioner and that the said Complaint, was dismissed after making a noting regarding status of complainant as not a MSME at the time of alleged default of Petitioner. (F) Further that there is a clear bias of the Respondent No.1 against Petitioner Company as in the present proceedings, the Respondent No. 1 has not only not allowed the Petitioner Company to participate in the proceedings but has also violated various provisions of the Act of 2006 and the Act of 1996 and has taken a decision against Petitioner Company without formally adopting the role of the arbitrator and also, it is shocking to note that Section 18 provides for conclusion of proceedings in 90 days, however, the Respondent No.1 kept sending notices to Petitioner in the case of VJ Homes (supra) and only when Petitioner filed a Petition before this Hon'ble Court bearing no. 11990/2021 taking into consideration the arbitrary behavior and the clear bias with which Respondent No.1 was operating against Petitioner, did the Respondent No.1 take a decision. The said writ petition remains pending before this Hon'ble Court. (G) The petitioner had not received complete set of complaint documents for a long time and no order in that regard had been passed by Respondent No. 1 and this action of the Respondent No. 1 is in violation of the principles of natural justice. (H) The decision dated 15.07.2021 taken by the Respondent No. 1 is in complete ignorance of Section 18 of the Act of 2006 and Section 67 (2) of the Act of 1996, as Section 18 states that if the conciliation is initiated under Part III of the Act of 1996, then Section 65 to 81 of the Act of 1996 will apply and thus the decision dated 15.07.2021 is not in consonance with the provisions of the Act of 1996. (I) The Respondent No.1 can not only not take any "decision" and/or pass any 'directions' as a means to conclude conciliation proceedings, but it also cannot act as an arbitrator once it has acted as the conciliator and this is a settled legal position and also the Respondent No.1 has not disclosed complete information as received by it from Respondent No.2 which is in contravention of Section 70 of the Act of 1996 and is bad in law. (J) The Respondent No.1 had directed Petitioner to travel from one city to another, without any consideration of the existing pandemic and as such the same shows the arbitrary behavior adopted by it. (J) The Respondent No.1 had directed Petitioner to travel from one city to another, without any consideration of the existing pandemic and as such the same shows the arbitrary behavior adopted by it. (K) The role of Respondent No. 1 is to implement the Act of 2006 and protect and promote MSMEs in general. However, the conduct of proceedings by Respondent No.1 in subject conciliation proceedings is illegal and perverse to law and policy. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that: (A) The Respondent No. 2 – Company is not engaged in any other business activity other than providing security services. (B) There is nothing on record put by the petitioner which suggests that the services provided by the Respondent No. 2 – Company were inferior or were not upto the standards. 17. Heard learned counsels for both the parties and perused the material on record as well as the judgments cited at the bar. 18. This Court observes that the petitioner has an efficacious and statutory alternate remedy available under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 against the award passed by the Respondent No. 1 – Council. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is reproduced hereunder: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is reproduced hereunder: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if:- (a) the party making the application 1 [establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that]— (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that— (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation 1.—For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,— (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or (ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or (iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Explanation 2.—For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. (2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. (5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only after issuing a prior notice to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.” 19. (6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.” 19. This Court further observes that in catena of judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that the Writ Petition can be entertained by the High Court if the petitioner is able to demonstrate before the Court the following conditions: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are whole without jurisdiction, or (d) the vires of legislation is challenged. 20. This Court also observes that it is incumbant upon the petitioner to demonstrate before this court the aforementioned conditions for by-passing the efficacious statutory alternative remedy, which the petitioner has failed to do so. 21. This Court further observes that Section 19 of the Act of 2006 mandates the deposit of 75% amount of the award before initiating any appeal before any Court. In the instant case, the petitioner has not complied with the pre-requisite of depositing 75% of the amount as per Section 19 of the Act of 2006. The provision under Section 19 is crystal clear and unambiguous. The legislative intent behind this is evident that the appellant shall have a financial stake in appeal process, to prevent appeals without merit. Section 19 of the Act of 2006 is reproduced hereunder: “19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.— No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent. of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose.” 22. This Court also observes that the petitioner’s failure to comply with the deposit requirement under Section 19 of the Act of 2006 is a significant impediment to the continuation of this petition. 23. This Court further observes that the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the respondent Council could not have acted as an arbitrator, is not sustainable, as under section 18 (3) of the Act of 2006, it has been specifically laid down that the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration, arbitration or refer it to any institution or Centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration, therefore, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is devoid of merit that the respondents conduct the preconciliation and post-conciliation proceedings as laid down under the Act of 2006. The order dated 05.07.2021 (Annexure - R2/2) clearly reflects that the respondents had conducted duly the Pre- Conciliation proceedings as well as Post-Conciliation proceedings, strictly in accordance with the provisions mentioned under Section 65 to 81 of the Act of 1996. The relevant provision from Section 65 to 81 of the Act of 1996 is reproduced hereunder: “65. Submission of statements to conciliator.— (1) The conciliator, upon his appointment, may request each party to submit to him a brief written statement describing the general nature of the dispute and the points at issue. Each party shall send a copy of such statement to the other party. (2) The conciliator may request each party to submit to him a further written statement of his position and the facts and grounds in support thereof, supplemented by any documents and other evidence that such party deems appropriate. The party shall send a copy of such statement, documents and other evidence to the other party. (2) The conciliator may request each party to submit to him a further written statement of his position and the facts and grounds in support thereof, supplemented by any documents and other evidence that such party deems appropriate. The party shall send a copy of such statement, documents and other evidence to the other party. (3) At any stage of the conciliation proceedings, the conciliator may request a party to submit to him such additional information as he deems appropriate. Explanation.—In this section and all the following sections of this Part, the term "conciliator" applies to a sole conciliator, two or three conciliators, as the case may be. 67. Role of conciliator.— (1) The conciliator shall assist the parties in an independent and impartial manner in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute. (2) The conciliator shall be guided by principles of objectivity, fairness and justice, giving consideration to, among other things, the rights and obligations of the parties, the usages of the trade concerned and the circumstances surrounding the dispute, including any previous business practices between the parties. (3) The conciliator may conduct the conciliation proceedings in such a manner as he considers appropriate, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the wishes the parties may express, including any request by a party that the conciliator hear oral statements, and the need for a speedy settlement of the dispute. (4) The conciliator may, at any stage of the conciliation proceedings, make proposals for a settlement of the dispute. Such proposals need not be in writing and need not be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor. 73. Settlement agreement.— (1) When it appears to the conciliator that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, he shall formulate the terms of a possible settlement and submit them to the parties for their observations. After receiving the observations of the parties, the conciliator may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement in the light of such observations. (2) If the parties reach agreement on a settlement of the dispute, they may draw up and sign a written settlement agreement. If requested by the parties, the conciliator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up, the settlement agreement. (2) If the parties reach agreement on a settlement of the dispute, they may draw up and sign a written settlement agreement. If requested by the parties, the conciliator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up, the settlement agreement. (3) When the parties sign the settlement agreement, it shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. (4) The conciliator shall authenticate the settlement agreement and furnish a copy thereof to each of the parties. 79. Deposits.— (1) The conciliator may direct each party to deposit an equal amount as an advance for the costs referred to in sub-section (2) of section 78 which he expects will be incurred. (2) During the course of the conciliation proceedings, the conciliator may direct supplementary deposits in an equal amount from each party. (3) If the required deposits under sub-sections (1) and (2) are not paid in full by both parties within thirty days, the conciliator may suspend the proceedings or may make a written declaration of termination of the proceedings to the parties, effective on the date of that declaration. (4) Upon termination of the conciliation proceedings, the conciliator shall render an accounting to the parties of the deposits received and shall return any unexpended balance to the parties.” 24. This Court also observes that in the order dated 05.07.2021 (Annexure - R2/2) it has been specifically mentioned that the petitioner was given several opportunities to produce the relevant documents, however, the petitioner failed to do so. It is further seen that in the order dated 05.07.2021, it has been specifically mentioned that the petitioner sought time for settlement between the parties however, choose to remain absent on the date when they were required to remain personally present before the Council. It is also seen from the order dated 05.07.2021 that the petitioner sought time by way of an email sent to the respondents, however, the respondent after examining the record mentioned that no such e-Mail has been found with the respondent. It is also seen from the order dated 05.07.2021 that the petitioner sought time by way of an email sent to the respondents, however, the respondent after examining the record mentioned that no such e-Mail has been found with the respondent. The relevant portion of the order dated 05.07.2021 is reproduced hereunder: ^^izdj.k ifj"kn dh cSBd fnukad 25-02-2020 esa j[kk x;kA ftlesa vkiwfrZdrkZ ,oa Øsrk mifLFkr jgsA ftlls vkiwfrZdrkZ dks Øsrk dks nLrkost miyC/k djokus ds funsZ'k fn, x, rFkk Øsrk dks 15 fnol esa i{k izLrqr djus ds funsZ'k fn, x, FksA ifj"kn dh cSBd fnukad 24-07-2020 esa iqu% j[kh xbZA ftlesa vkiwfrZdrkZ mifLFkr Fks ,oa Øsrk vuqifLFkr jgsA ifj"kn }kjk Øsrk ds izfrfuf/k Jh lqfuy xqIrk ls nwjHkk"k ij okrkZ dh xbZ ftlesa mUgksus nks&rhu fnol esa le>kSrk djus dk vk'oklu fn;k FkkA ifj"kn }kjk fnukad 07-08-2020 rd lqyg djus ds funsZ'k fn,A mifLFkr gksus ds funsZ'k fn,A cSBd esa vkiwfrZdrkZ mifLFkr jgs ysfdu Øsrk }kjk i= fy[kdj vkxzg iathd`r Mkd ls fd;k fd dksfoM 19 egkekjh ds dkj.k ;g O;fDRk'k% mifLFkr gksus esa vleFkZ gSA ifj"kn }kjk cSBd nkSjku lqyg gsrq le>kbZ'k ds n`f"Vdks.k ls drk ds vf/kd`r izfrfuf/k Jh ,pŒ,pŒ :ikuh ls nwjHkk"k ij lEidZ gsrq iz;kl fd;k ysfdu okrkZ ugh gks ldhA vkiwfrZdrkZ }kjk fnukad 06-11-2020 dks izdj.k ls lEcaf/kr vkQykbZu nLrkost lfpoky; esa izLrqr fd, x,A ftls fnukad 04-01-2021 dks ifj"kn }kjk Øsrk dks izsf"kr djrs gq, nks lIrkg esa i{k izLrqr djus ds funsZ'k fn, ,oa fnukad 12-01-2021 dks izdj.k iqu% cSBd esa j[kk x;kA ftlesa Øsrk vuqifLFkr jgsA muds izfrfuf/k ds :i esa Jh vuUr dklyhoky@'k'kkad dk'kyhoky dk bZ esy izkIr gqvk ftlesa muds }kjk pdkykr ukek izLrqr djus dk nkok djrs gq, cSBd gsrq ch-lh- fyad miyC/k djokus dh ekax dh xbZ tcfd ifj"kn ds lfpoky; fjdkMZ esa fdlh izdkj dk ukek izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA lqyg izfØ;k dks/;ku esa j[krs gq, Jh vuURk dklyhoky ls fofM;ksa fyad fHktokus gsrq nwjHkk"k ij ckr dh xbZA ysfdu Jh dklyhoky fofM;ks dkaQzsflax ds fy, miyC/k ugha gq,A vr% lqyg izfØ;k lekIr djrs gq, fVª'ku izfØ;k izkjEHk djus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;kA^^ 25. This Court further observes that as far as the contention of learned Senior counsel for the petitioner in respect to registration of the respondent with MSME is concerned, is not sustainable as the Council after examining the facts and records has duly arrived at a conclusion that the Respondent No. 2 was duly registered under the Act of 2006 which is substantiated by a bare look at order dated 05.07.2021 (Annexure-R2/2), wherefrom it is clear that the respondent Enterprise qualified as a “Supplier” in accordance with Section 2(n) of the Act of 2006. The relevant portion of the order dated 05.07.2021 is reproduced hereunder: ^^vkiwfrZdrkZ }kjk ;w-,-,e- Øekad vkjts22bZ0003635 izkIr fd;k gqvk gSA tks fd lw{e lsok m|e Js.kh esa tkjh fd;k gqvk gSA vr% vkosnd m|e lw{e] y?kq ,oa e/;e m|e fodkl vf/kfu;e] 2006 dh/kkjk 2¼,u½ ds vuqlkj vkiwfrZdrkZ m|e dh ik=rk j[krk gSA^^ 26. In view of the above discussion, the instant petition being devoid of merits is dismissed and all pending applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.