JUDGMENT: 1. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2012 in M.V.O.P. No.541 of 2011 passed by the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Kadapa at Rajampet (for short, "the tribunal"), whereby the tribunal dismissed the claim petition, the claimants have preferred the present appeal. 2. For convenience, the parties herein will be referred to as per their rankings in the M.V.O.P. 3. The claimants have filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation of Rs. 4,00,000/- on account of the death of their son, Vemula Lakshumaiah, in a road accident that occurred on 10.12.2009. Vemula Lakshmaiah will be referred to as "the deceased." 4. The claimants' case is that on 10.12.2009, the deceased and friends left their village, Ramakrishnapuram, in Sidhout Mandal of Kadapa District on a two-wheeler bearing No. AP 04 L 2496. After finishing their work in Kadapa, they were all returning by motorcycle to their village. One Srinivasulu was riding the motorcycle, whereas Venkatasubbaiah was the first pillion rider, and the deceased was the second pillion rider. When they arrived at Sivunipalli on the Kadapa-Rajampeta main road around 8.30 p.m., the first respondent's jeep, bearing No. AP 21 V 6145, came from the Kadapa side in a rash and negligent manner and collided with the motorcycle on its rear side. As a result, the deceased and two others fell and sustained injuries, and the deceased died instantly. The police recorded the statement of Bathala Venkata Subbaiah and registered a case in Cr. No. 160 of 2009. 5. The first respondent, the driver of the offending vehicle, has remained ex-parte. 6. The second respondent, the insurer of the offending vehicle, filed its counter, submitting that the Jeep of the first respondent was never involved in the accident. The claimants filed a false case against the second respondent by falsely implicating the vehicle belonging to the first respondent in order to claim compensation. A hit-and-run case was registered by Sidhout police, and the police filed a charge sheet after three months. The claimants must prove that the driver had a valid and effective driving licence and that the said Jeep was involved in the accident. 7. Based on the pleadings, the tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim on behalf of the claimant during the trial, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs. The claimants must prove that the driver had a valid and effective driving licence and that the said Jeep was involved in the accident. 7. Based on the pleadings, the tribunal framed relevant issues. To substantiate the claim on behalf of the claimant during the trial, P.Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs. A.1 to A.4. On behalf of the second respondent, R.W.1 was examined, and marked Exs.B.1 to B.3. 8. Based on the oral and documentary evidence, the tribunal held that the claimant failed to establish the vehicle's involvement in the accident and dismissed the claim petition. 9. I have heard the learned counsel representing both the parties. 10. The appellant's/claimant's learned counsel argued that the tribunal overlooked that the police had filed a charge sheet against the crime vehicle following the investigation. But the tribunal could not see the information furnished by the police and registered a case in Crime No. 160 of 2009 as a hit-and-run case; subsequently, during the investigation, the vehicle's involvement was established. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent has supported the findings and observations of the tribunal. 12. Upon hearing the argument of both the learned counsel and having perused the record, now the points that arise for consideration are, I. Whether the tribunal is justified in holding that the claimants failed to establish the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident? II. Whether the claimants are entitled to the compensation amount as claimed? POINT No. I: a. The second claimant, the deceased's mother, was examined as P.W. 1. It is not her evidence that she witnessed the accident. To prove the accident, the claimants examined P.W.2, Bathala Venkata Subbaiah. P.W.2 stated in his evidence that he was a pillion rider at the time of the accident, and he stated in the cross-examination that he could not say that the jeep, which is the offending vehicle, dashed against the motorcycle. Though P.W.2 stated clearly in his testimony about the manner of the accident, he was unable to state particulars of the offending vehicle involved in the accident. As seen from the record, the first respondent examined R.W.1, the manager of the second respondent. He testified that the complainant, P.W.2, filed a complaint alleging that an unknown motorcyclist crashed into the motorcycle they were riding. As seen from the record, the first respondent examined R.W.1, the manager of the second respondent. He testified that the complainant, P.W.2, filed a complaint alleging that an unknown motorcyclist crashed into the motorcycle they were riding. P.W.2 did not specify the type or colour of the vehicle that hit them in his complaint. In the cross-examination, R.W. 1 stated that the accident occurred during the night hours at about 8.30 p.m. A reading of the evidence of P.W.2 shows that he categorically stated in his evidence that on 10.12.2009, he, along with the deceased and Srinivasulu, were proceeding on the motorcycle to go to their village. At about 8.30 p.m., they reached Sivunipalli on Kadapa-Rajampet, and the first respondent's jeep was being driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner. In the cross-examination of P.W.2, it is revealed that the accident occurred at 8.30 p.m. He did not mention or state the type of vehicle. From the reading of the contents of the report, Ex.A.1, and the evidence of P.W.2, it is clear that P.W.2 has not furnished offending vehicle’s registration number. Even according to the claimant's version, it is a hit-and-run. The tribunal, in its order, observed that the F.I.R. was registered by Siddhout police as a hit-and-run case on 11.12.2009, and the inquest report did not mention the kind of vehicle or its registration number. Admittedly, after completion of the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the jeep bearing No. A.P. 21 V 6145, i.e., the offending vehicle. b. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the respondent/ insurance company did not take steps to examine the driver of the offending vehicle to show its non-involvement in the accident. It is not the case of the respondent/insurance company that the driver and owner of the offending vehicle colluded with the claimants. The insurance company has not chosen to examine witnesses to prove its stand that the offending vehicle was implicated in the accident. It is not the case that the insurance company's staff or employees witnessed the accident. It has not placed the source of information to contend that the offending vehicle was implicated in the accident. Even though P.W.2 said in his testimony that the offending vehicle was involved and gave its number, the evidence shows that he did not see the vehicle's registration number. It has not placed the source of information to contend that the offending vehicle was implicated in the accident. Even though P.W.2 said in his testimony that the offending vehicle was involved and gave its number, the evidence shows that he did not see the vehicle's registration number. If he had, he could have given the number in that report. As such, this court views that much credence cannot be attached to the evidence of P.W. 2 in this regard. According to P.W.2's evidence, the offending vehicle was involved in the accident. c. The claimants have not taken any steps to examine the witnesses cited in the charge sheet as eyewitnesses to disprove the involvement of the offending vehicle. Ex. A.2 establishes the involvement of the offending vehicle. This court finds no reason for the investigation officer to implicate the offending vehicle in the accident case. If that is so, the owner of the offending vehicle could have contested the matter. However, he remained ex-parte. He has not disputed the vehicle's involvement. Nothing on record remotely suggests collusion between the claimants, owner, and driver of the offending vehicle and the investigation officer. Even during cross-examination, it was not suggested to PW.1 that such collusion occurred. Nothing on record shows such collusion to implicate the vehicle in the accident. d. Simply because the particulars of the vehicle were not given in the report, the claim of the petitioners cannot be thrown out. When the investigation officer, after completion of the investigation, laid the charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver, it could not be ignored based on the contents of the Ex. A. 1 report. It is not the law that an accident claim cannot be pursued in a hit-and-run case. e. In such cases, the purpose of filing an FIR is primarily to alert the police to begin an investigation into criminal offences. The filing of an FIR undoubtedly proves the facts of the accident, allowing the victim to file a compensation claim. This Court views the FIR as not the be-all and end-all of the matter. A First Information Report is not meant to be encyclopedic. One of the important factors that may be considered by the court is whether there was a possibility of a false implication from the vehicle. This Court views the FIR as not the be-all and end-all of the matter. A First Information Report is not meant to be encyclopedic. One of the important factors that may be considered by the court is whether there was a possibility of a false implication from the vehicle. f. It is not universal that once the FIR does not reflect the particulars of the offending vehicle, the whole case of the complainant, as a rule, has to be thrown out. Such can never be the law. FIR would have the effect of throwing out the whole case if the petitioner is accepted, and then there would be no necessity of leading any evidence. g. In Nagappa Vs. Guru Dayal Singh and Ors., AIR 2003 SC 674 , at paragraph 3, the Apex Court held that claims Tribunal in appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. For the above reasons, the contents of F.I.R can be taken into consideration. Simply because the contents of F.I.R can be taken into consideration, it does not mean that the contents of charge sheet cannot be taken into consideration. The respondent places no evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are incorrect. In K.Rajani and V. M.Satyanarayana Goud and others, 2015 ACJ 797 , this Court observed that: "when the insurance company came to know that the police investigation is false, they must also challenge the charge sheet in appropriate proceedings. If at all the findings of the police are found to be incorrect, it is for the insurance company to produce some evidence to show that the contents of the charge sheet are false". h. Nothing on record suggests that the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against the offending vehicle’s driver without conducting a proper investigation. It is also difficult to hold that the Police Officer fabricated a case. In a proceeding under the M.V.Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. In a proceeding under the M.V.Act, where the procedure is a summary procedure, there is no need to go by strict rules of pleading or evidence. The document having some probative value, the genuineness of which is not in doubt, can be looked into by the Tribunal for getting preponderance of probable versions. The preponderance of probabilities is the touchstone for concluding rashness and negligence, as well as the accident's mode and manner of happening. As such, it is by now well settled that even FIR or Police Papers, when made part of a claim petition, can be looked into for giving a finding in respect of happening of the accident. i. The Tribunal has not accepted the claimant’s case regarding the manner of the accident it has not considered the observations made by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet making the offending vehicle’s driver is responsible for the accident. The charge sheet contents also support the claimants' case regarding the manner of the accident. The reading of the documents placed before the Tribunal clearly shows that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle’s driver, when the appellant contends that the accident was caused by the different vehicle, it is to place necessary evidence before the Tribunal basing on which the Tribunal expected to give its conclusion. j. The Court views held that non mentioning the vehicle number in the F.I.R itself is not a ground to reject a claim for compensation. k. Upon careful reading of the material on record, this Court views that the Tribunal has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record and the finding of the Tribunal that the accident occurred that the involvement of the offending vehicle is not established is liable to e set aside. Non mentioning the vehicle number in the F.I.R itself is not a ground to reject a claim for compensation, as held by the Apex Court in Ravi Vs. Badrinarayan and Ors., 2011 ACJ 911 Accordingly, point No.1 is answered. POINT No. II: a. According to the claimants' case, the deceased was 20 years old at the time of the accident, worked as a laborer, and earned Rs.8,000/- per month. The claimants have not placed any evidence to show the occupation of the deceased. The age of the deceased is established by the inquest report and the postmortem examination report, Exs.A.2 and A.3. The claimants have not placed any evidence to show the occupation of the deceased. The age of the deceased is established by the inquest report and the postmortem examination report, Exs.A.2 and A.3. In the absence of proof of the earnings, the Apex Court, in the case of Lakshmi Devi and others vs Mohammad Tabber, 2008 ACJ 1488 , held that in today's world, even common labour can earn Rs.100/- per day. Following the principle laid down by the Apex Court, this court is inclined to consider the monthly earnings at Rs.3,000/-. Insofar as the future prospects are concerned, the Apex Court, in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , at paragraph 61, held that, (iii) While determining the income, an addition of 50% of the actual salary to the income of the deceased towards prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40, should be made. The addition should be 30% if the age of the deceased is between 40 to 50 years. If the deceased was between 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. (iv) If the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an additional 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary computation method. The established income means the income minus the tax component. b. In this case, the deceased was self-employed, and as such, this Court views that an additional 40% of the established income should be warranted towards future prospects. The monthly earnings, including future prospects, arrive at Rs. 4,200/- (3,000+1,200). Following the same, the annual earnings of the deceased, including a future prospectus, can be assessed at Rs. 50,400/- (Rs.4200 x 12) per annum. Out of which, where the deceased is a bachelor, the deduction for personal and living expenses of the deceased should be 50%. After the deduction of 50% of the personal and living expenses of the deceased, the contribution of the deceased for the welfare of the family arrives at Rs.25,200/- as if he had been alive. Out of which, where the deceased is a bachelor, the deduction for personal and living expenses of the deceased should be 50%. After the deduction of 50% of the personal and living expenses of the deceased, the contribution of the deceased for the welfare of the family arrives at Rs.25,200/- as if he had been alive. To arrive at the loss of earnings, the appropriate multiplier is "18," for the age groups of 15 to 20, as specified by the Apex Court in Sarala Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 ACJ 1298 . Accordingly, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.4,53,600/- (25,200x 18). c. Insofar as the conventional heads is concerned, in Pranay Sethi’s case referred to supra, the Apex Court awarded a total sum of Rs.70,000/- under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. It was further held that the sum should be enhanced at 10% every three years. It was held thus in Paragraph 61: "(viii) Reasonable figures under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Res.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years." d. In Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd., v. Nanu Ram, 2018 ACJ 2782 , at paragraph 8, the Apex Court held that: "(8.6)…the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial and welfare legislation. The Court is duty-bound and entitled to award 'just compensation, irrespective of whether any plea on that behalf was raised by the claimant. (8.7) A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi, 2017 ACJ 2700 (S.C.), dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is the loss of consortium. In legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', parental consortium', and filial consortium. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse (Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh 2013 ACJ 1403 (S.C.). The parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse (Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh 2013 ACJ 1403 (S.C.). The parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training. The filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensate in the case of the accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit." e. The Judgment in Pranay Sethi’s case was rendered in the year 2017. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to a 10% enhancement of conventional heads. In all, the claimants are entitled to the compensation as detailed below: Towards loss of dependency Rs.4,53,600/- Towards funeral expenses Rs. 16,500/- Towards loss of estate Rs. 16,500/- Towards filial consortium Rs. 44,000/- Total: Rs.5,30,600/- f. The claimants sought compensation an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- on account of the death of their son. However, this court arrived to the compensation Rs.5,30,600/- under the heads “loss of dependency”, “funeral expenses”, “loss of estate” and “filial consortium”. g. In such a case, the Apex Court observed in Laxman @ Laxman Mourya v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another, (2011) 10 SCC 756 while referring to Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, 2003 A.C.J. 12 (SC) 274 held as under: “It is true that in the petition filed by him under Section 166 of the Act, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- only, but as held in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh (2003) 2 SCC 274 , in the absence of any bar in the Act, the Tribunal and for that any competent Court is entitled to award higher compensation to the victim of an accident.” h. In Ramla vs National Insurance Co. Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL No.11495 OF 2018 the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. As such, given the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the claimants are entitled to an amount of Rs.5,30,600/- exceeding the claimed amount. However, the claimants shall pay the requisite court fee over and above the compensation awarded. Ltd., CIVIL APPEAL No.11495 OF 2018 the Apex Court held no restriction to award compensation exceeding the amount claimed. As such, given the principle laid down by the Apex Court, the claimants are entitled to an amount of Rs.5,30,600/- exceeding the claimed amount. However, the claimants shall pay the requisite court fee over and above the compensation awarded. i. Following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments, this Court can safely be concluded that the claimants are entitled to get more amount than what has been claimed. Further, the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation where the interest of the claimants is a paramount consideration. The Courts should always endeavour to extend the benefit to the claimants to a just and reasonable extent. Accordingly, point No. II is answered. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed without costs, awarding compensation of Rs.5,30,600/- (Rupees five lakhs, thirty thousand, and six hundred only) to the first claimant with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of the claim petition till realization against the respondents, subject to the payment of the requisite court fee. The respondents are directed to deposit the compensation, including interest, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The first claimant is permitted to withdraw the entire compensation amount. 14. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.