JUDGMENT : The question of maintainability of these applications under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[“Code” for short] has arisen in view of the decision of a learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal v. Asha Devi and others, (2018) SCC OnLine All 2545 : (2019) 132 ALR 809. In Shankar Lal Jaiswal (supra) the learned Single Judge has held that an application under Section 24 of the Code to transfer a claim petition pending before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal would not lie to this Court. It has been held in the said decision that a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988[“the 1988 Act” for short] is not a Court subordinate to the High Court, within the meaning of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code. No transfer application would lie to this Court for transferring a claim petition from one Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to another, constituted under the Act. It would be profitable to quote in extenso what was held in Shankar Lal Jaiswal, which is as follows : 3. A Motor Accident Claim Petition is filed before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is constituted by the State Government in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This section empowers the State Government to constitute by notification, one or more motor accidents Claims Tribunals for the area specified in the notification, for adjudicating claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or for damage to any property of a third party, so arising or both. 4. This section also provides the qualification of a person for his appointment as a Member of the Claims Tribunal. 5. Sub-section 4 of Section 165 states that where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for one area, the State Government can, by a special or general order, regulate the distribution of business among them. 6. In accordance with Section 166(2) of the Act, a claimant can file a claim petition before a Claims Tribunal. (i) having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or (ii) Claims Tribunal within whose local limits the claimant resides or carries on business or (iii) within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. 7. 6. In accordance with Section 166(2) of the Act, a claimant can file a claim petition before a Claims Tribunal. (i) having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or (ii) Claims Tribunal within whose local limits the claimant resides or carries on business or (iii) within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. 7. Section 169 provides the procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunals constituted by the State Government by notification in exercise of powers conferred by Section 165. It provides that the Claims Tribunal may follow such summary procedure as it things fit, subject to the Rules that may be made for the purpose. 8. Sub-section 2 of Section 169 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall have all powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing attendance of witnesses and for compelling discovery and production of documents and material objects. 9. It is also deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter 26 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 10. Section 175 specifically bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts for an area where a Claims Tribunal has been constituted by the State Government, under Section 165. 11. Section 176 confers the Rule making power upon the State Government. It also provides that Rules can be framed regarding the powers of a Civil Court, which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal. 12. In exercise of the aforementioned rule making power, the U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 have been framed. Rule 221 thereof, reads as follows:— “221. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases.- The following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 of Order V; Order IX, Rules 3 to 10 of Order XIII, Rules 2 to 21 of Order XVI; Order XVII; and Rules 1 to 3 of Order XXIII.” 13. From a conjoint reading of the provisions noticed above, it emerges that the Motor Vehicle Act is a complete code in itself. It is also clear from a bare reading of Rule 221 that Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to matters before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 14. From a conjoint reading of the provisions noticed above, it emerges that the Motor Vehicle Act is a complete code in itself. It is also clear from a bare reading of Rule 221 that Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to matters before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 14. Section 24, Civil Procedure Code, which has been invoked in these transfer applications, confers a general power of transfer and withdrawal of a suit, appeal or proceeding upon the High Court or the District Judge, pending in any Court subordinate to them. 15. The words “subordinate to it” occurring in Section 24(1)(b) are, in my considered opinion, crucial for deciding the controversy at hand. 16. Since a Claims Tribunal is created by a notification of the State Government under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, it cannot be said that such Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of the term occurring in Section 24 CPC, despite the fact that an award of the Claims Tribunal is appealable to the High Court under Section 173. 2. This matter has come up before me sitting singly. Speaking for myself, I could not have agreed more both with the reasoning and the conclusions of the learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal. But, a difficulty is posited because, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, the same question had arisen before the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav v. Smt. Sushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40, where the Full Bench had the following questions for consideration of their Lordships : Whether Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a subordinate Civil Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Whether in view of the provision of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code only the Courts referred to in Section 3 are the Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court and the District Court as the case may be and no other i.e. the authorities and that Tribunals such as one constituted under Motor Vehicles Act do not come within the framework of expression “Courts subordinate to High Court” for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code? Whether the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mussamant Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company, reported in (1979 ALJ page 1168) to the effect that Claims Tribunal constituted under Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to High Court and its orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code is in consonance with the letter and spirit of provisions of Section 115 read with Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and in particular Section 110-C(2) Motor Vehicles Act, if not, is the present revision maintainable in this Court? If not, is it open to this Court to entertain, hear and dispose of the same under Article 227 of the Constitution? 3. These questions were answered by the Full Bench thus : Our answer to question No. 1 is in affirmative, that a revision lies against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Our answer to question No. 2 is that the Courts mentioned in Section 3 CPC are not the only Civil Courts, other Courts and Tribunals can also be Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, for the purposes of Section 115 CPC. Our answer to question No. 3 is that the judgment rendered in the case of Mussamat Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company. 1979 ALJ 1168, has been rightly decided and is approved. Hence, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise. 4. If the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the 1988 Act is a Court subordinate to this Court, for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code, I do not see any reason why it would not be subordinate for the purpose of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code. The attention of the learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal was not drawn to the holding of the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav and no argument seems to have been addressed in this regard. The attention of the learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal was not drawn to the holding of the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav and no argument seems to have been addressed in this regard. Howsoever convincing the opinion of the learned Single Judge on its own reasoning might be, it is difficult to come out of the binding precedent in Kamla Yadav, which holds in answer to Question No. 2 that the Courts mentioned in Section 3 of the Code are not only the Civil Courts, but Tribunals can also be Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. The Full Bench also approved the holding of an earlier Division Bench in Smt. Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company and others, 1979 SCC OnLine All 191 : 1979 AWC 438 , where the Division Bench answered the question referred by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is a Civil Court amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code. In Afsari Begum (supra) it was held : 5. Section 110-D confers appellate jurisdiction on the High Court against awards made by the Claims Tribunal provided the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than Rs. 2,000/-. It is thus apparent that the legislature has conferred appellate jurisdiction on the High Court against awards made by the Claims Tribunal. It has not been disputed that the Claims Tribunal is, in the eye of law, a Court exercising civil jurisdiction. If the tribunal is a Civil Court it cannot be gainsaid that it was a civil Court subordinate to the High Court. 6. It has been stated by the Supreme Court that revisional jurisdiction possessed by the High Court is a part of its appellate jurisdiction (See Shankar Ram Chandra Abhayankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat [ (1969) 2 SCC 74 : A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1.] . In that case, it was observed: “Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of the jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. In that case, it was observed: “Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of the jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute, basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense.” 7. It is thus evident that the Claims Tribunal being a Civil Court was amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it was a Court subordinate to the High Court. 8. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us by holding that a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable against the order passed by the Claims Tribunal on the ground that such a tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Sitting singly, it would not be appropriate for me to hold contrary to the learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal, extending the principle that Full Bench has laid down regarding exercise of this Court's jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code to the power of transfer under Section 24(1)(b) of the Code, in relation to Tribunals constituted under the Act. 6. The following questions are, accordingly, referred for consideration by a larger Bench : (1). Whether a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of exercise of power of transfer under Section 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (2). Whether by extension of the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav v. Smt. Sushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40 a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (3). (2). Whether by extension of the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav v. Smt. Sushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40 a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (3). Whether the decision of the learned Single Judge in Shankar Lal Jaiswal v. Asha Devi and others, (2018) SCC OnLine All 2545 : (2019) 132 ALR 809 correctly lays down the law in holding that a Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? 7. Till decision by the larger Bench, there shall be interim stay of further proceedings in the pending petitions before the Claim Tribunals subject matter of these applications. 8. The Registry is directed to lay the papers before His Lordship the Hon'ble The Chief Justice for being placed before a larger Bench.