JUDGMENT : (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) :- The matter has been heard at length on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This Court has perused the materials available on record, 3. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties, has dictated the judgment in the open Court in presence of learned counsel for the parties. 4. Both the appeals since arising out of common Judgment of conviction dated 11.02.1994 and Order of sentence dated 14.02.1994 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East at Jamshedpur in Sessions Trial No.06/1992 and as such, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by the common judgment. 5. The instant appeals are against the Judgment of conviction dated 11.02.1994 and Order of sentence dated 14.02.1994 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East at Jamshedpur in Sessions Trial No.06/1992, whereby and whereunder, the appellants (in both the appeals) have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and they have been sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 6. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellant, namely, Narayan Patar, one of the accused/appellant in Cr. Appeal No.64 of 1994 (R) has died on 07.09.1998 and this Court, vide order dated 13.03.2019, has abated the appeal against him. 7. The prosecution story in brief as per the first information report is that on 9th August, 1991 at 7:30 a.m. at Village Jagannathpur, Tola Purnadih, Police Station-Ghatshila, District-East Singhbhum, the Sub-inspector, namely, Maheshwari Prasad recorded the fardbeyan of the informant Janani Patar in the house of accused Narayan Patar. The informant alleged in her fardbeyan that her husband, namely, Prahalad impugned judgment and the lower court records. Patar used to go to Ghatshila for working as Mason and return therefrom in the night every day. On 8th August, 1991, the husband of the informant went to Ghatshila and when he did not return in the night, the informant stood at the door of her house looking northward of the road waiting for return of her husband. It was at about 10 p.m., she noticed that her husband returning from north to village road. On 8th August, 1991, the husband of the informant went to Ghatshila and when he did not return in the night, the informant stood at the door of her house looking northward of the road waiting for return of her husband. It was at about 10 p.m., she noticed that her husband returning from north to village road. But she saw that as soon as on the way her husband reached in front of the house of the accused Narayan Patar, the said accused along with his wife Sonki Patrian [appellant in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.151 of 1995 (R)] and other accused persons, namely, Indrajeet Patar and Pagala Patar @ Sakhi Pater [appellants in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)] and two unknown came out of the said house and caught hold of her husband, Prahalad Patar. They took Prahalad Patar into the court-yard of the house where they started assaulting him by means of sharp edged portion of axes. The informant saw her husband being assaulted in the light of the laltern and torch from beside the wall of the house where she stood and rushed to defend her husband. But accused Narayan Patar chased her away and on this, she fled into her house and started crying for help stating that her husband was being murdered by accused Narayan Patar and his wife and brother-in-laws. Thereafter, she also went into neighbourhood and informed the neighbours about the occurrence and begged them to intervene and save the life of her husband. But by the time when she returned, the accused had left her husband dead in the house of accused Narayan Patar and fled away. The villagers came there. However, according to the fardbeyan, Kalicharan, son of the informant and the deceased saw the occurrence. The informant alleged in the fardbeyan that the genesis of the occurrence was the fact that since six to seven years past, accused Narayan Patar had been cultivating the land of Prahalad Patar, elder brother, Doman Chandra Patar. On 7th August, 1991, Prahalad Patar told the accused Narayan Patar that in the current year, he would cultivate the land and this led to altercation between the two culminating finally in the occurrence aforesaid. On 7th August, 1991, Prahalad Patar told the accused Narayan Patar that in the current year, he would cultivate the land and this led to altercation between the two culminating finally in the occurrence aforesaid. On the basis of the said fardbeyan, Ghatshila P.S. Case No.96/91 was registered on 9th August, 1991 at about 12.15 p.m. The investigation commenced and the charge-sheet was submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur. The concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and committed the case to the Court of Sessions on 07.02.1992 and 05.03.1992 respectively. The Sessions Court thereafter has framed the charge, when the accused persons have pleaded not guilty and show willingness to face the trial, accordingly, trial commenced. The prosecution has altogether examined eight witnesses, namely, Guhi Ram Patar as P.W. 1, Kalicharan Das as P.W. 2, Dr. Ranjan Sinha as P.W. 3, Janani (informant) as P.W. 4, Maheshwari Prasad (Investigating Officer) as P.W. 5, Mukund Patar as P.W. 6 and Kalicharan and Shambhu Nath Rao as P.W. 7 & 8 respectively. The documents have been exhibited more particularly the F.I.R., inquest report and postmortem report. The trial court has passed the judgment finding the charge leveled against the appellants proved beyond all reasonable doubts and has convicted the appellants (in both the appeals) for commission of offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants have been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The aforesaid judgment is under challenge before this Court to consider its legality and propriety. 8. Mr. A.K. Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the appellants (in both the appeals) associated by Ms. Shrestha Priya Jha, has submitted by assailing the impugned judgment that the trial Court has not appreciated the fact while convicting the appellants, even though, there are discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses like the statement which has been made by the Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7, are itself in contradiction, but without taking into consideration the aforesaid contradiction, the reliance has been placed upon the testimony and has convicted the appellants for the commission of offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been argued that the judgment of conviction is based upon the testimony of eye witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7, while all these three witnesses are interested witnesses and as such, convicting the appellants on the basis of the testimony of interested witnesses, cannot be said to be justified and as such, on this ground also, the impugned judgment requires interference by this Court. It has further been agitated that save and except the interested witnesses either it is P.W. 4 Janani Patar, who happens to be the wife of the deceased or P.W. 6 Mukund Patar who happens to be the brother of the deceased or P.W. 7 Kalicharan who happens to be the son of the deceased, there is no other independent witnesses to corroborate the occurrence. Learned counsel has further submitted that the major contradiction is regarding the dead body, since, in the inquest report, the Investigating Officer has given the description therein about the location of dead body in the house of one of the accused, namely, Narayan Patar, while, in his deposition as under paragraph-2 thereof, he has stated that the dead body was lying in the house of the deceased itself. Therefore, the trial Court ought to have been taken into consideration the major contradiction since the place of occurrence is itself in dispute if the version of the Investigating Officer will be taken into consideration as was deposed by him in the statement furnished in the examination-in-chief before the trial Court read together with the inquest report. But the said discrepancies have not taken into consideration and as such, on this ground also, the impugned judgment requires interference. Further submission has been made that there is no possibility as was deposed by the informant about witnessing the occurrence in the light of the lantern and torch, since, the house of the deceased where the informant was standing watching her husband to come and the house of the accused, namely, Narayan Patar was at different place having some distance and as such, it is unimaginable that from a distance the culpability of the accused persons can be witnessed by the informant and as such, the informant, P.W. 4 Janani Patar cannot be said to be the eye witness but the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been considered by the trial Court. Another contradiction has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants so far as the statement made by the informant in the fardbeyan regarding the place of occurrence, since, in one place, it has been stated by the informant that after coming from Ghatshila, he straightaway rushed to his residence and while on the other hand, it has been stated by the informant that all the accused persons have dragged the deceased from the front of the house to their own house and assaulted him which resulted into killing of the deceased. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the trial Court has also not appreciated the major contradiction and as such, learned counsel, on the backdrop of the aforesaid ground, has assailed the impugned judgment. 9. Per contra, Mr. Saket Kumar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Jharkhand has submitted that there is no error in the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, since, the trial Court has appreciated the testimony of the eye witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7 and as such, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the impugned judgment. It has been contended that it is incorrect on the part of the appellants to take the ground in assailing the impugned judgment on the ground that P.W. 4 Janai Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan since are interested witnesses, therefore, their testimony cannot be relied. According the learned counsel, as per the testimony of P.W. 4 (informant), the wife of the deceased, which has correctly been considered to be the eye witness since she has deposed in her testimony that she was standing near the door watching for coming of her husband and at that time, he was dragged to the residence of the accused person and as such she is the eye witness who has seen the occurrence. It has been submitted that not only that rather the informant has also called upon the P.W. 6, namely, Mukund Patar who happens to be the brother of the deceased as also the accused namely, Narayan Patar and on her calling, P.W. 6 has rushed to the place of occurrence and saw that Narayan Patar, the appellant along with other accused persons namely, Indrajeet Patar, Pagala Patar and Sonki Patar were assaulting the deceased which ultimately resulted into his death. It has further been submitted that the P.W. 7 Kalicharan, the son of the deceased has also supported the prosecution version. In the backdrop of the aforesaid fact submission has been made that the trial Court has taken into consideration the testimony of the witnesses, i.e., P.W. 4 Janani Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan, basis upon which, the judgment of conviction/sentence has been passed and as such, it cannot be said that the judgment of conviction/sentence suffers from any irregularity. It has further been contended in response to the submission made on behalf of the appellants that the contradiction in the testimony of the witnesses by making a submission that even accepting therein that there is some contradiction but it is a case where the charges have been proved by testimony of eye witnesses, then the testimony of eye witnesses will prevail not the minor contradiction. It has further been submitted in response to the argument pertaining to the place of occurrence by making a submission that the said argument is being made on the basis of the statement made by the informant but if it will be corroborated from the testimony of P.W. 4 Janani Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan, then the same will be evident that what has been said in the fardbeyan and in the testimony of P.W. 4 in the examination-in-chief about the place of occurrence which ultimately resulted into his death in the house of the Narayan Patar. The submission has also been made in response to the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants about the place of location of the dead body by making the submission that the dead body has been shown to have been found in the premise of the accused person, namely, Narayan Patar, as would be evident from the inquest report and the said inquest report has been exhibited without any objection and as such, now it is not available for the appellants to take the point in rebuttal to the reference of the location of the dead body as was in the inquest report. It has further been submitted by replying to the submission made on behalf of the appellants with respect to the statement made by P.W. 6 Mukund Patar at paragraph-2 about the location of the dead body by referring to the statement made at paragraph-12 of the cross-examination, where P.W. 5 Maheshwari Prasad, the Investigating Officer has deposed about the location of dead body by making statement that he was not ascertained the site of the house from the location of dead body which does suggest that the dead body was lying in the house of the accused, namely, Narayan Patar. Learned counsel, on the basis of the aforesaid submission, has submitted that the judgment impugned required no interference. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. This Court, after going through the impugned judgment has found that the trial Court has considered the deposition of all together eight witnesses. The Judgment of conviction has been passed as would appear from the reference of deposition made by the eye witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7 which have fully been corroborated by the other evidences, as would appear from the finding recorded to that effect at paragraph-13 of the impugned judgment. 12. This Court in order to scrutinize the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment, deems it fit and proper to scrutinize the testimony of eye witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7 along with the testimony of Investigating Officer and postmortem report, basis upon which, judgment of conviction and order of sentence have been passed. 13. 13. But before scrutinizing the same, it requires to refer herein about the imputation of allegation as per the fardbeyan of Smt. Janani Patar, wife of late Prahalad Patar, the deceased which was recorded by one sub-inspector Maheshwari Prasad, Officer-in-charge, Ghatshila P.S. on 09.08.1991 at 7:30 a.m. at Village Jagannathpur at the house of the accused Narayan Patar. The allegation has been levelled as was referred in the preceding paragraph hereinabove narrating the story about killing of the husband of the informant. The specific allegation has been leveled in the fardbeyan that the informant saw her husband being assaulted in the light of the lantern and torch from beside the wall of the house where she stood and rushed to defend her husband. But accused Narayan Patar chased her away and on this she fled into her house and started crying for help stating that her husband was being murdered by accused Narayan Patar and his wife and his brother-in-laws. She has further stated in the fardbeyan that she went into the neighbourhood and informed the neighbours about the occurrence and begged them to intervene and save the life of her husband. But by the time when she returned, the accused had left her husband dead in the house of accused Narayan Patar and fled away. She has further stated that Kalicharan, the son of the informant and the deceased saw the occurrence. The occurrence has also been disclosed in the fardbeyan which was for the reason that since six to seven years past, the accused Narayan Patar had been cultivating the land of Prahalad Patar, elder brother of the Doman Chandra Patar. On 07.08.1991, Prahalad told accused Narayan Patar that in the current year, he would cultivate the land and this led to altercation between the two culminating finally in the occurrence aforesaid. The prosecution, in order to look into the veracity of the aforesaid allegation, has examined altogether eight witnesses. The informant was examined as P.W. 4. It is evident from the deposition of the informant, i.e., Janani Patar P.W. 4 that he has supported the version which she has stated in the fardbeyan. The prosecution, in order to look into the veracity of the aforesaid allegation, has examined altogether eight witnesses. The informant was examined as P.W. 4. It is evident from the deposition of the informant, i.e., Janani Patar P.W. 4 that he has supported the version which she has stated in the fardbeyan. It is evident from the testimony of P.W. 4 that her husband has come to the house and demanded water and when she went inside the house to bring water at that time, the brother of her husband who was standing in the court-yard happens to be elder brother, namely, Narayan Patar, his wife, namely, Sonaka and the brother of Sonaka, namely, Pagala Sonaka and also brother of Pagala Sonaka have killed her husband. She has further submitted that her brother-in-law (devar), namely, Sunil has gone to save the life of her husband but he was threatened and asked him to go. She has further stated that her husband was shouted but he was killed and thereafter the dead body was dragged and kept in the house of the accused, Nararyan Patar. She has stated at paragraph-7 that the reason of such scuffle was the dispute in between her husband, deceased and elder brother, namely, Doman Chandra Patar regarding the land which was used by the accused Narayan Patar and Prahalad has said that he will now cultivate the land of said Doman Chandra Patar. At paragraph-9 of her deposition, she identifies the accused persons in the dock and stated that all these persons have killed her husband. She was cross-examined and what she has stated in the examination-in-chief regarding the occurrence and killing of her husband by Narayan Patar, appellant nos.1, 2 [In Cr. Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)] & others have been reiterated. It appears from the testimony made at paragraph-15 that her brother-in-law, namely, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 is also known as Sunil. She has stated at paragraph-20 of the deposition that her husband was dragged by Narayan Patar etc. and other persons and the Narayan Patar was having with a Kulhari in his hand. She has further stated at paragraph-26 that her son, namely, Kalicharan has also seen the occurrence. She has stated at paragraph-20 of the deposition that her husband was dragged by Narayan Patar etc. and other persons and the Narayan Patar was having with a Kulhari in his hand. She has further stated at paragraph-26 that her son, namely, Kalicharan has also seen the occurrence. It is, thus, evident that the informant, P.W.4 has supported the version which she has narrated in the fardbeyan about the complicity of the appellants about the killing of the deceased, namely, Prahalad Patar by disclosing the name of the appellant nos.1 and 2 and other accused person, namely, Narayan Patar. Mukund Patar was examined as P.W. 6 who happens to be the common brother of the deceased and one of the accused, namely, Narayan Patar. It is evident from his testimony as recorded under Paragraph-1 thereof that after coming to know about the occurrence from his Bhabhi, (sister-in-law) the informant, he came out from the residence and saw that Narayan, Indrajeet and Sonaka (appellants in both the appeals) together were assaulting the deceased from Kulhari. He has stated that one Pagala Asami had tied both the legs of the deceased. He has stated in his deposition that when he has tried to restrain, then the Indrajeet Patar, [appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)], threatened him and stated that he will also be killed. He has stated at paragraph-3 that his brother, the deceased Prahalad had died on the spot. He has stated at paragraph-4 that the land of his elder brother, namely, Doman Chandra Patar was being cultivated by Narayan Patar for the last seven years. But the deceased, namely, Prahalad has said that he will now cultivate the land of said Doman Chandra Patar. Upon this, one of the accused person, namely, Narayan Patar has said that he will see how he is going to cultivate the land of Doman Chandra Patar. P.W. 6-Mukund Patar has been cross-examined and it appears from the deposition made in the cross-examination that he has not rebutted what he has stated in the examination-in-chief, rather, he has stated at paragraph-12 of the cross-examination that he was the younger brother of the Narayan Patar, one of the accused person and he was in love with his younger brother Narayan and Prahalad both. One Kalicharan, son of the informant was examined as P.W.7. One Kalicharan, son of the informant was examined as P.W.7. He has corroborated the prosecution version by disclosing the name of Narayan Patar, Indrajeet Patar, Pagala Patar and Sonki Patar who have killed and while killing he saw, all the persons assaulting his father, namely, Prahalad Patar, the deceased. It has been stated that all the accused persons, namely, Narayan Patar, Indrajeet Patar, Pagala Patar and Sonki Patar were killing his father. Narayan Patar was having his kulhari and other accused persons were having with the Katari and his father was being assaulted. He has stated that in the house of Narayan Patar, the lantern was litting. He has further stated that his father was still outside the house of Narayan Patar and thereafter, the dead body was dragged inside the house. The reason of altercation has been disclosed at paragraph-3 that pertains to cultivation of land of Doman Chandra Patar, the elder brother of the deceased. P.W. 7-Kalicharan was cross-examined but he has not given any contradictory statement regarding killing of his father by the accused persons including the appellants. It is, thus, evident that the version as was narrated in the fardbeyan by the informant, namely, Janai Patar P.W. 4 has fully been corroborated in her deposition made before the trial Court. P.W. 6-Mukund Patar who happens to be the brother of the deceased and another accused person, namely, Narayan Patar has also corroborated the prosecution version by stating in the deposition that Narayan Patar, Indrajeet Patar and Sonaka have jointly killed his brother, namely, Prahalad Patar. It further appears from the deposition of the P.W. 6 that he was having love with Narayan Patar, the brother and the deceased who was also the elder brother of the Mukund Patar. P.W. 7-Kalicharan has also corroborated the prosecution version regarding the implication of the appellants by disclosing their names. The Investigating Officer in course of investigation has prepared the inquest report which is the part of paper-book and referred in column no.3 about the location of the dead body to be in the house of the Narayan Patar. The Investigating Officer has supported the prosecution version. The Investigating Officer in course of investigation has prepared the inquest report which is the part of paper-book and referred in column no.3 about the location of the dead body to be in the house of the Narayan Patar. The Investigating Officer has supported the prosecution version. The Doctor, namely, Ranjan Sinha, P.W. 3 who was conducted the autopsy (postmortem) was also examined and has stated in his deposition, the nature of injury and the opinion with respect to the cause of death, for ready reference, his opinion along with the nature of injury is being referred which reads as under:- “Rigour mortis was present in all four limbs 1. Deep sharp cut wound on postero-lateral aspect of Rt. Side of upper part of Neck extending to back of head and neck and left mastoid process cutting all vital structure of lateral and back of neck including complete transaction of vertebral column of cervical region. Size 7”x2 ½”x6”. 2. Sharp cut wound on back of the neck extending to left side of neck. Size 4”x2”x4”. 3. Sharp cut wound on right side of neck parallel to above injuries. 4. Sharp cut wound on right arm. Size 3”x1”x1”. All the above injuries are ante-mortem in nature 5. Cause of Death -Shock and haemorrhage cause by above injuries due to sharp cut heavy weapon. Death occurred within 24 hours of P.M. examination.” It is in the light of the aforesaid deposition coupled with the fact come in course of investigation by the Investigating Officer and the medical report, the trial Court has passed the judgment finding the charge levelled against the appellants of both the appeals found to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. 14. The aforesaid judgment is under scrutiny to look into its legality and propriety on the ground as has been agitated on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellants as referred hereinabove. 15. The foremost issue which has been raised about the contradiction in the testimony of the witnesses. 16. Before proceeding to examine the aforesaid submission/ground, this Court deems it fit and proper to refer certain judicial pronouncement with respect to the effect in case there is any discrepancy in the testimony of the witnesses in a case where there are eye witnesses, reference in this regard may be made to the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Faquira Vs. State of U.P. [ (1976) 1 SCC 662 ] in particular paragraph 4, which reads as under: “4. We have been taken through the relevant evidence against which some criticism, which is not sufficient to enable us to discard this evidence, was levelled. This Court does not interfere with findings or questions of fact on the strength of minor discrepancies which only indicate that the witnesses were not tutored. The fact that the apparent motive was too flimsy is no reply to the unshaken testimony of creditable and natural eyewitnesses who had no motive whatsoever to implicate the appellant falsely. It was also sought to be shown that the appellant Faquira and Shiamlal had not been on good terms with each other and would not, ordinarily, join in an attack on Chhanga. This suggestion was made as Faquira was shown to have got Shiamlal arrested in some gambling case. We, however, do not think that this is a ground to disbelieve the prosecution case. People of the kind to which Faquira and Shiamlal seem to belong do not generally attach much importance to such matters. The evidence indicates that they were on quite good terms with each other at the time of the incident whatever may have been their past relations. They came together like friends, to have some potato chops.” On the issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs. State of Gurajar [ (1983) 3 SCC 217 ], in particular paragraph 5 and 6, relevant portion of which is quoted as under: “5. ...The finding of guilt recorded by the Sessions Court as affirmed by the High Court has been challenged mainly on the basis of minor discrepancies in the evidence. We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or re-appreciation of the evidence in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly highlighted by learned Counsel for the appellant. Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons are obvious : “(1) By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprised. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprised. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. (3) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. (4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape-recorder. (5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess-work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which takes place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on. (7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him — Perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.” 6. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the all important “probabilities factor” echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Kashiram Vs. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed with undue importance. More so when the all important “probabilities factor” echoes in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Kashiram Vs. State of M.P. [ (1998) 7 SCC 450 ] in particular at paragraph 6 held as under: “6. We heard counsel on both sides at length. We have perused the entire evidence on record. There are five eyewitnesses, namely, PW 2, PW 12, PW 13, PW 14 and PW 15. All of them except PW 2 received gunshot injuries. Their evidence is consistent and excepting minor discrepancies which are natural due to frailty of human memory, nothing has been pointed out for discrediting their evidence. All the five witnesses have categorically spoken to the presence of the appellant on the spot and his firing the gun after taking it from Ram Singh. The argument that no doctor has been examined to prove the injuries of the witnesses is without any substance. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to enable the Court to discard their version of having suffered injuries. On the other hand, suggestions have been made in the cross-examination as if there was a fight between the two groups at the spot.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Parbata Vs. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 13 SCC 398 ] held at paragraph 9 as under: “9. The trial court has really not recorded any convincing reason for not accepting the testimony of PW 2 and PW 8. We have carefully perused their evidence. Their evidence appears to be natural having a ring of truth. Much was sought to be made of minor discrepancies in the evidence of the two eyewitnesses, which have been described as glaring contradictions. Some variation in matters of detail is but natural, and much depends on the capacity of a witness to observe and remember events, particularly in matters of minor details. Moreover, the two witnesses came from two different directions, and they may have observed the incident at different stages, though in quick succession. However, such minor discrepancies do not warrant rejection of their evidence. Moreover, the two witnesses came from two different directions, and they may have observed the incident at different stages, though in quick succession. However, such minor discrepancies do not warrant rejection of their evidence. Their deposition is natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution and we find no reason why they should be disbelieved.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Delhi [(2015) 17 SCC 694] at paragraph 8 held as under: “8. While the slight difference in the initial version of the prosecution and the FIR version has been reasonably explained by the cross-examination of PW 6, it is our considered view that minor discrepancies, embellishments and contradictions in the evidence of the eyewitnesses do not destroy the essential fabric of the prosecution case, the core of which remains unaffected. Even if we have to assume that there are certain unnatural features in the evidence of the eyewitnesses the same can be reasonably explained on an accepted proposition of law that different persons would react to the same situation in different manner and there can be no uniform or accepted code of conduct to judge the correctness of the conduct of the prosecution witnesses i.e. PWs 1 and 2. The relation between PWs 5 and 6 and PWs 1 and 2 and the deceased, in our considered view, by itself, would not discredit the testimony of the said witnesses. There is nothing in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 which makes their version unworthy of acceptance and their testimony remains unshaken in the elaborate cross-examination undertaken.” Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking into consideration the catena of judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue, in the judgment rendered in the case of Karan Singh vs. State of U.P. [(2022) 6SCC 52], held has under: “40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held : (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even in law render credential to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740] , Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case, the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute by minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with the medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777] .” 43. As argued by Mr Tyagi, appearing for the State both PW 2 and PW 3 had clearly mentioned that the appellant and PW 4 Mahender Singh were both present at the place of occurrence. The appellant's presence has been proved by two eyewitnesses. It has been proved by the eyewitnesses, that the appellant carried a rifle. But PW 2 and PW 3 deposed that all the accused had opened fire. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, which it has done, and not beyond all iota of doubt. The fact that one of the injured witnesses may not have mentioned the name of appellant Karan Singh does not demolish the evidence of the other witnesses. 44. We find no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court [Raj Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 6110]. The fact that one of the injured witnesses may not have mentioned the name of appellant Karan Singh does not demolish the evidence of the other witnesses. 44. We find no grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court [Raj Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 6110]. The fact that the trial/appeal should have taken years and that other accused should have died during the appeal cannot be a ground for acquittal of the appellant. The appeal is thus dismissed.” It is, thus, evident that even in case there is any discrepancy in the testimony of witnesses but the case of prosecution is based upon the testimony of eye witnesses, the minor discrepancy is to be ignored, reason being that on the basis of minor discrepancy, the prosecution cannot be allowed to be vitiated. 17. The argument which has been made on behalf of the appellants that the place of occurrence has not conclusively been proved, since, on the one hand, the Investigating Officer in the inquest report has stated that the dead body was in the house of Narayan Patar, as would appear from the description made to that effect at paragraph-3 of the inquest report but simultaneously, in course of examination, i.e., examination-in-chief, he has deposed that the dead body has found in the house of the deceased itself and therefore, the place of occurrence has not conclusively been proved and in that view of the matter, the judgment of conviction cannot be said to be proper. 18. This Court, in order to scrutiny the aforesaid fact has considered the inquest report which is the part of the paper-book, wherein, at column-3, the Investigating Officer has referred about the location of the dead body of the deceased in the house of the Narayan Patar, the assailant and the another accused person. However, he has stated at paragraph-3 of his deposition by giving some contradiction regarding the location but if the statement of the Investigating Officer will be considered by taking his statement made in examination-in-chief to that of cross-examination as under paragraph-12 thereof, wherein, it has been stated by him that he is having no idea about the location of the house of the deceased from the location of the dead body. It is, therefore, the statement given by Investigating Officer at paragraph-12 is suggestive of the fact that what has been stated by the Investigating Officer in the inquest report about the location of the dead body as under column-3 of the inquest report that cannot be said to have no evidentiary value merely because the statement has been made at paragraph-3 by giving different opinion with respect to the location of the dead body. Further, the inquest report has been admitted document and there is no objection raised by the appellants in course of trial. Therefore, according to our considered view that once the document which contains the location of the dead body to be referred under Clause-3 thereof, the same will be said to be admitted document in absence of any objection made on behalf of the appellants in course of trial. In Paragraph-3 of the deposition upon which much insistence has been given by the learned counsel for the appellant but there is no contradiction as would appear after going through the testimony of the Investigating Officer, P.W. 5, rather, it would be evident from the statement made at paragraph-12 of the cross-examination of the concerned Investigating Officer, he has stated specifically that at the place where the dead body was there, there was blood stained soil which was seized by him as also the blood stained Kulhari was seized. He has further stated in the aforesaid paragraph that he could not ascertain the location of the house of the deceased from the location of the dead body. 19. Therefore, according to our considered view what has been contended by taking the point about the contradiction in the location of the dead body, cannot be said to have substance allowing the prosecution to be vitiated taking into consideration the testimony of the witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7coupled with the corroboration from the medical report. 20. This Court has also considered one of the arguments raised by the appellants that the prosecution cannot be allowed to stand since the testimony of witnesses, namely, Janani Patar P.W. 4, Mukund Patar P.W. 6 and Kalicharan P.W. 7 is the reliance put by the trial Court in convicting the appellants while they are highly interested witnesses being relatives of the deceased and the informant. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission in the light of the fact that one of the witness i.e., P.W. 6, Mukund Patar who happens to be the brother of the deceased as also the brother of one Narayan Patar and has deposed by proving the allegation narrated by the informant in the fardbeyan. 21. The question is that when it is the version of the Mukund Patar, as would appear from the his testimony that he was in love with both the brothers, namely, Narayan Patar, the accused person and the deceased Prahalad Patar then where is the question to disbelieve if the Mukund Patar being the younger brother is confirming the allegation as was narrated by the Informant in the fardbeyan. This Court further is the view that after taking into consideration the testimony of P.W. 4 Janani Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan and narrations which were made by them regarding the place of occurrence, dragging of dead body and the assault by the accused persons including the appellant nos. 1 and 2 [Cr. Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)] which were seen by these three witnesses, i.e., P.W. 4 Janani Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan and as such, merely because they are relative, the testimony cannot be said to have no evidentiary value, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laltu Ghosh Vs. State of W.B., [(2019), 15, SCC 344], wherein, at paragraph-12 to 16, it has been held, which reads as under: “12. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. As regards the contention that the eyewitnesses are close relatives of the deceased, it is by now well-settled that a related witness cannot be said to be an “interested” witness merely by virtue of being a relative of the victim. This Court has elucidated the difference between “interested” and “related” witnesses in a plethora of cases, stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused (for instance, see State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] ; Amit v. State of U.P. [Amit v. State of U.P., (2012) 4 SCC 107 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 590] and Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy [Gangabhavani v. Rayapati Venkat Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 298 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 182] ). 13. Recently, this difference was reiterated in Ganapathi v. State of T.N. [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793], in the following terms, by referring to the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] : (Ganapathi case [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 793] , SCC p. 555, para 14) “14. “Related” is not equivalent to “interested”. A witness may be called “interested” only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be “interested”.…” 14. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. In criminal cases, it is often the case that the offence is witnessed by a close relative of the victim, whose presence on the scene of the offence would be natural. The evidence of such a witness cannot automatically be discarded by labelling the witness as interested. Indeed, one of the earliest statements with respect to interested witnesses in criminal cases was made by this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465], wherein this Court observed : (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person.” 15. In case of a related witness, the Court may not treat his or her testimony as inherently tainted, and needs to ensure only that the evidence is inherently reliable, probable, cogent and consistent. We may refer to the observations of this Court in Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [Jayabalan v. State (UT of Pondicherry), (2010) 1 SCC 199 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 966] : (SCC p. 213, para 23) “23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 16. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.” 16. In the instant matter, as already discussed above, we find the testimony of the eyewitnesses to be consistent and reliable, and therefore reject the contention of the appellants that the testimony of the eyewitnesses must be disbelieved because they are close relatives of the deceased and hence interested witnesses.” Likewise, in the case of Ramji Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P., [ (2020) 2 SCC 425 ], wherein, at paragraph-21, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court which reads as under: “21. We must remember that the prosecution story is that six persons who were heavily armed, two of them with guns, killed the deceased in broad daylight. This itself shows that these accused persons were not scared of the villagers. While leaving the place of occurrence they threatened all gathered there by saying that anybody who tried to interfere would meet the same fate. In such a situation no other villager who may have been present would turn up to give evidence. This Court cannot lose sight of the harsh reality that witnesses are scared to depose in court. In this case two of the witnesses have spoken up and their evidence has been corroborated on all counts. It may be true that their relations with the accused may not have been cordial but the evidence does not show that the enmity or dispute between these two witnesses and the accused was of such a nature that these two witnesses would make false statements only to settle scores with the appellants thereby leaving the real culprits to go scot-free. In our opinion merely because these witnesses are interested witnesses their testimony cannot be discarded.” 22. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that it is the highly improbable to acknowledge the assailant in the light of lantern and torch and as such, on the ground also the prosecution story is not being established. 23. In our opinion merely because these witnesses are interested witnesses their testimony cannot be discarded.” 22. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that it is the highly improbable to acknowledge the assailant in the light of lantern and torch and as such, on the ground also the prosecution story is not being established. 23. But this court after considering the testimony of all the witnesses in entirety and taking into consideration the material available on record to the effect that the deceased, other accused person, namely, Narayan Patar and the appellant nos.1 and 2 [Cr. Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)] all are related to one another. They were living just adjacent to the house of one and another, meaning thereby, when the deceased of the other accused persons are related to one another, there is no unlikelihood of not identifying a person who is assaulting the deceased. The house as per the testimony of the Investigating Officer is just adjacent and having only 5 feet height and it has come in the testimony of P.W. 4 Janani Patar, the informant that she was standing near the door and seeing the assailant who were assaulting the deceased. Her version was supported by P.W. 6, the brother, namely, Mukund Patar and P.W. 7, the son, namely, Kalicharan. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the ground which has been agitated of disbelieving the identification only on the ground that the assailant cannot be identified in the light of the lantern and torch, are having no substance. 24. The ground has also been taken that the blood stained soil and the blood stained axe (Kulhari) has not been sent for its examination before the Forensic Science Laboratory even the same was not produced before the trial Court for its examination. But even accepting the same to be correct then also the question is that in presence of deposition of the eye witnesses, can the entire prosecution be allowed to be vitiated. 25. The position of law is well settled in this regard as per the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Surendra Paswan Vs. State of Jharkhand, [(2003) 12 SCC 360], wherein, at paragraph-9, it has been held, which reads as under: “9. 25. The position of law is well settled in this regard as per the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Surendra Paswan Vs. State of Jharkhand, [(2003) 12 SCC 360], wherein, at paragraph-9, it has been held, which reads as under: “9. So far as the non-seizure of blood from the cot is concerned, the investigating officer has stated that he found bloodstained earth at the place of occurrence and had seized it. Merely because it was not sent for chemical examination, it may be a defect in the investigation but does not corrode the evidentiary value of the eyewitnesses. The investigating officer did not find presence of blood on the cot. The trial court and the High Court have analysed this aspect. It has been found that after receiving the bullet injury the deceased leaned forward and whatever blood was profusing spilled over onto the earth.” Likewise, in Sheo Shankar Singh, Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., [ (2011) 3 SCC 654 , wherein, at pargraph-56, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that: “56. The same view was expressed by this Court in Surendra Paswan v. State of Jharkhand [(2003) 12 SCC 360 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 415]. In that case the investigating officer had not sent the blood samples collected from the spot for chemical examination. This Court held that merely because the sample was not so sent may constitute a deficiency in the investigation but the same did not corrode the evidentiary value of the eyewitnesses.” In the case of Amar Singh Vs. Balwinder Singh & Ors., [ (2003) 2 SCC 518 ], wherein, at paragraph-15, it has been by the Hon’ble Apex Court that: “15. Coming to the last point regarding certain omissions in DDR, it has come in evidence that on the basis of the statement of PW 4 Amar Singh, which was recorded by PW 14 Sardara Singh, SI in the hospital, a formal FIR was recorded at the police station at 9.20 p.m. In accordance with Section 155 CrPC the contents of the FIR were also entered in DDR, which contained the names of the witnesses, weapons of offence and place of occurrence and it was not very necessary to mention them separately all over again. It is not the case of the defence that the names of the accused were not mentioned in DDR. We fail to understand as to how it was necessary for the investigation officer to take in his possession the wire gauze of the window from where A-1 is alleged to have fired. The wire gauze had absolutely no bearing on the prosecution case and the investigating officer was not supposed to cut and take out the same from the window where it was fixed. It would have been certainly better if the investigating agency had sent the firearms and the empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison. However, the report of the ballistic expert would in any case be in the nature of an expert opinion and the same is not conclusive. The failure of the investigating officer in sending the firearms and the empties for comparison cannot completely throw out the prosecution case when the same is fully established from the testimony of eyewitnesses whose presence on the spot cannot be doubted as they all received gunshot injuries in the incident. In Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. [ (1995) 5 SCC 518 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 977] it was held that in cases of defective investigation the court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence but it would not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of the defect and to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly defective. In Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar [ (1999) 2 SCC 126 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 104] while commenting upon certain omissions of the investigating agency, it was held that it may be that such lapse is committed designedly or because of negligence and hence the prosecution evidence is required to be examined dehors such omissions to find out whether the said evidence is reliable or not. Similar view was taken in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar [ (1998) 4 SCC 517 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085] when this Court observed that in such cases the story of the prosecution will have to be examined dehors such omissions and contaminated conduct of the officials, otherwise, the mischief which was deliberately done would be perpetuated and justice would be denied to the complainant party and this would obviously shake the confidence of the people not merely in the law-enforcing agency but also in the administration of justice. In our opinion the circumstances relied upon by the High Court in holding that the investigation was tainted are not of any substance on which such an inference could be drawn and in a case like the present one where the prosecution case is fully established by the direct testimony of the eyewitnesses, which is corroborated by the medical evidence, any failure or omission of the investigating officer cannot render the prosecution case doubtful or unworthy of belief.” It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid judicial pronouncement that even if the weapons used in killing or the blood stained soil had not been sent for its examination or not produced before the Court, the prosecution will not vitiate by discarding the other evidences put-forth by the eye witnesses. 26. This Court, after discussing the factual aspect vis-à-vis the legal position and after going through the finding recorded by the trial Court is of the view that the trial Court has considered the testimony of P.W. 4 Janani Patar, P.W. 6 Mukund Patar and P.W. 7 Kalicharan and after its close scrutiny, the trial Court has come to the conclusion about the proving of charge beyond all reasonable doubt so far as it relates to offence committed under Section 302 of IPC which is the requirement to prove the charge. The appellants have also been convicted under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code along with the offence committed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 27. It is the settled position of law that Section 34 of I.P.C. is a rule of evidence and does not create substantive offence. The intention can be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case as also the meeting of minds of all accused persons to commit offence should be established. 27. It is the settled position of law that Section 34 of I.P.C. is a rule of evidence and does not create substantive offence. The intention can be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case as also the meeting of minds of all accused persons to commit offence should be established. It is not necessary to prove or to show the overt act on the part of every accused. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Atul Singh etc., reported in AIR 2009 (SC) 2173 and in the case of Bengai Mandal @ Begai Mandal Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2010 (SC) 686 has held that common intention in most of the cases is to be inferred from the act and conduct of the accused and other relevant circumstances. In the case of Thoti Manohar Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2012 (78) A.C.C. 511 SC, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the previous meetings of minds with pre-arranged plan or prior concert is difficult to establish by way of direct evidence. It has to be inferred from the conduct of the accused and the circumstances. 28. Here in the instant case, the trial Court after taking into consideration the overt act committed on behalf of the appellants in committing murder of the deceased, therefore, according to our considered view, is correct in coming to conclusion by convicting the appellants also under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code along with the offence committed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of evidence gathered in course of trial by the testimony of the witnesses having been corroborated in the postmortem report and the deposition of the Investigating officer as referred hereinabove. 29. This Court, on the basis of the entirety of the facts and circumstances and discussions made hereinabove by taking into consideration the deposition of the witnesses, is of the view that the judgment impugned requires no interference. 30. 29. This Court, on the basis of the entirety of the facts and circumstances and discussions made hereinabove by taking into consideration the deposition of the witnesses, is of the view that the judgment impugned requires no interference. 30. This Court, after having passed the order as aforesaid has considered the sentence and found therefrom that the order of sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for the offence committed under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code suffers from infirmity, reason being that Section 302 provides that along with the sentence of rigorous imprisonment, the fine is also mandatory to be inflicted as would appear from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under:- “302. Punishment for murder.-Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine.” 31. The trial Court while imposing the sentence has not considered the mandatory provision as contained under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and passed the order of sentence without inflicting any fine, therefore, the order of sentence is modified to the extent that apart from the sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life, a fine of Rs.25,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) to each of the appellants, is hereby imposed. 32. With the aforesaid modification in the order of sentence, the instant appeals stand dismissed. 33. Consequent upon dismissal of the appeals preferred by the appellants, since appellant nos.1 and 2, namely, Inderjeet Patro @ Indrajeet Pater and Lakhi Patro @ Pagala Patar @ Sakhi Pater [in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.64 of 1994 (R)] and appellant, namely, Mossmt. Sonaka Patrain [in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.151 of 1995 (R)] who are enjoying suspension of sentence after the order being passed by this Court directed to release them during pendency of the appeals, their bail bonds are cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the learned trial Court who would send them jail to serve out their remaining sentence. 34. Needless to say that if the appellants will not surrender, the trial Court will take endeavours for securing custody to serve out their remaining sentence and further secure that they deposit the amount of fine so imposed by this Court. 35. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.