JUDGMENT : BHARGAV D. KARIA, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Harshadray A. Dave for the applicant and learned advocate Mr. Manish S. Shah for the respondent No. 2. 2. RULE returnable forthwith. Mr. Manish Shah, learned advocate waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of respondent No. 2. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Harshadray Dave for the applicant submitted that the impugned order passed by the Gujarat State Waqf Tribunal is without jurisdiction, and therefore, it is required to be interfered with under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’). 3.1. Drawing attention of the Court to Section 83 of ‘the Act’ it was submitted that the State Government may constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit by notification in the Official Gazette, for determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to and covered under ‘the Act’ and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such Tribunals. 3.2. Drawing attention of the Court to sub-section (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’ it was submitted that every Tribunal shall consist of a chairman necessarily a Judicial Officer, not below the rank of a District, Sessions or Civil Judge, Class-I, a member to be an Officer from State Civil Services equivalent in rank to that of the Additional District Magistrate and a member as a person having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence. Therefore, each Tribunal shall consist of in all three persons, one judicial Officer shall act as Chairman or two other member as defined under ‘the Act’. It was submitted that unless and until a case is determined by duly constituted Tribunal i.e. by all the three members, it is a decision by “coram non judice” an order would be without jurisdiction. It was submitted that the impugned judgment and order is non est as it is passed by a Tribunal not duly constituted under ‘the Act’ for the determination of the issue before it. 3.3. It was therefore submitted that the impugned judgment and order is required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded back for the purpose of decision afresh by duly constituted Tribunal under sub-section (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’. 4. As against that, learned advocate Mr. 3.3. It was therefore submitted that the impugned judgment and order is required to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded back for the purpose of decision afresh by duly constituted Tribunal under sub-section (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’. 4. As against that, learned advocate Mr. Manish Shah appearing for respondent No. 2- Waqf Board submitted that the impugned judgment and order lacks jurisdiction as the same is not passed by duly constituted Tribunal under ‘the Act’. 4.1. Learned advocates appearing for the respective parties are unanimous on the issue of impugned judgment and order being passed by Tribunal, ‘coram non judice’. They have relied on precedents determining the very same issue by Telangana High Court and Calcutta High Court. Learned advocate Mr. Shah for the respondent No. 2 has relied on a decision of the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Shree Hanuman Foundries Ltd. vs. Hem Ranjan Deb and Others, 1965 SCC Online Cal. 215, for the proposition that, even if, a case is heard on merit by two members out of three constituting Tribunal and ultimate conclusion is signed by all the three members, the said order can be said to be without jurisdiction. Drawing attention of the Court to Para-25 of the very decision, it is submitted that for arriving at such conclusion, the Calcutta High Court has relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court. 4.2. It was submitted that, a Tribunal which is improperly or imperfectly constituted lacks jurisdiction and its decision is void and liable to be quashed. It was further submitted that if the impugned judgment and order passed by improperly or imperfectly constituted Tribunal is quashed and set aside and matter is sent back to the Tribunal for a decision afresh, they have no objection. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it is admitted fact that the impugned judgment and order is not passed by the duly constituted Tribunal under ‘the Act’. 6. For consideration of the issue raised in this application, it would be profitable to refer sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’ which reads as under: “83. 6. For consideration of the issue raised in this application, it would be profitable to refer sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’ which reads as under: “83. Constitution of Tribunals: (1) the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property, eviction of a tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee of such property, under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such Tribunals. (2) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (4) Every Tribunal shall consist of: (a) one person, who shall be member of the State Judicial Service holding a rank, not below that of a District, Sessions or Civil Judge, Class I, who shall be the Chairman. (b) one person, who shall be an officer from the State Civil Services equivalent in the rank to that of the Additional District Magistrate, Member. (c) one person having knowledge of Muslim law and jurisprudence, Member and the appointment of every such person shall be made either by name or by designation.” 7. Under sub-section (1) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’ the State Government is empowered to constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit. If the said fact is to be read with constitution of a tribunal provided under sub-section (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’ every Tribunal shall consist of a chairman and two members as provided therein. So if one or more Tribunals are constituted by the State Government, every Tribunal constituted under that authority shall consist of three members each, out of which, one would be a chairman being Judicial Officer. Thus, intention of the legislature is very clear that every tribunal shall consist three members including chairman, as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 83 of ‘the Act’. If decision by less number of members constituting tribunal to be treated as valid, it should have been provided under ‘the Act’ itself, despite constituting a tribunal of three members. Thus, intention of the legislature is very clear when it constitutes a tribunal consisting of three members, one would be chairman necessarily to be a Judicial Officer and two members as mentioned in sub-section (4) itself. Thus, intention of the legislature is very clear when it constitutes a tribunal consisting of three members, one would be chairman necessarily to be a Judicial Officer and two members as mentioned in sub-section (4) itself. When the provision in ‘the Act’ doesn’t permit any less number of member to determine an issue as a tribunal, the impugned judgment and order can be termed as an order without jurisdiction. When every Tribunals constituted under ‘the Act’ to contain three members, if an issue is determined by members less than three, it can be termed to be an improperly or imperfectly constituted tribunal, lacking jurisdiction to decide the issue under ‘the Act’ as empowered under Section 83 of ‘the Act’. 8. Considering the provisions of ‘the Act’ impugned judgment and order is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Gujarat State Waqf Tribunal for a decision afresh in accordance with law by a duly constituted Tribunal. 9. In view thereof, the Civil Revision Application is required to be allowed and the same is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute. It is needless to say that on remand of this case, decision of the duly constituted tribunal shall be in accordance with law and without being prejudiced by the earlier decision rendered by it or the present order and it shall determine the same in accordance with law after providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to all the concerned parties.