JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. The petitioner in the present writ petition had prayed for the following reliefs:- i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature Mandamus directing the respondents to pay the interest calculated on Rs 2,06,43,507/- (Rupees Two Crores Six Lakhs, Forty Three Thousand Five Hundred & Seven only) @ 9% from the date of taking possession ie. 28.12.2017 and 15% from the date of expiry of one year from the Date of Possession to the Date of Amount Received ie on 20.07.2020 for acquisitions of land of the petitioners bearing Khasra No 117 & 119 situated at village Lalpur, tehsil Rudrapur, district Udham Singh Nagar for the purposes of widening existing NH-74; ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature Mandamus directing the respondents to pay statutory interest along with penal interest calculated on Rs 2,06,43,507/- (Rupees Two Crores Six Lakhs, Forty Three Thousand Five Hundred & Seven only) from the Date of Possession to the Date of Amount Received; iii. Issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper. iv. award Cost of the Petition.” 2. In fact the relief of payment of the interest, which has been determined by the petitioner to be payable, as referred to, in the relief clause is a self assessment which has been made by the petitioner for the deprivation of his land, which has been taken over by way of an acquisition under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956. The petitioner submits, that the petitioner would be entitled for an interest from the date of the possession i.e. 28.12.2017, and the claim of the interest, which would be payable on it would be rather 15% instead of 9%, which has been actually paid to the petitioner. 3. There are various contentions, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and this Court feels it apt to deal it with chronology. The first argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is with regards to the impact of the Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 3. There are various contentions, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and this Court feels it apt to deal it with chronology. The first argument which has been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner is with regards to the impact of the Article 300A of the Constitution of India. So far as the implications of Article 300A of the Constitution of India is concerned, it is not in dispute, even by the petitioner, that the land has been taken over as a consequence of the notification of the acquisition issued under the National Highways Act, 1956, and in lieu thereof, the award has also been paid along with interest @ 9%. 4. In that eventuality, where the award has been paid it cannot be said, that taking over of the land was not in consonance or was in violation, to the provisions of the law, Article 300A of the Constitution of India, will only be attracted when the possession is taken of the land of an owner, dehors to the provision and procedure prescribed under law, which would not be a case at hand, because here the controversy has to be splited into for its consideration, where the relief sought for, is confined for the payment of the interest at a particular claimed rate of interest from the date of taking over of the possession i.e 28.12.2017. Hence, the argument extended from the prospective that Article 300A of the Constitution of India, will not be sustainable. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has ventured to argue, that the petitioner would be entitled for the interest, because the concept of solatium and interest, which is contained under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, has been borrowed to be applied in the acquisition proceedings, which are held under the National Highways Act 1956, as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment of the “Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh” as rendered in SLP (C) No.9599 of 2019. The relevant paragraph nos.29 and 31, 46 to 48, are extracted hereunder:- 29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) clinch the issue in favour of the Respondents, as has been correctly held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra). The relevant paragraph nos.29 and 31, 46 to 48, are extracted hereunder:- 29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (supra) and Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) clinch the issue in favour of the Respondents, as has been correctly held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (supra). First and foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to speed up the process of acquiring lands for National Highways. This object has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove. It will be noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do with achieving this object, as it is nobody’s case that land acquisition for the purpose of national highways slows down as a result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, a classification made between different sets of landowners whose lands happen to be acquired for the purpose of National Highways and landowners whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act, i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purpose of National Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of Article 14. 31. Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) has clearly held that ordinarily a classification based on public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. Also, in para 30, the Seven- Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired, as, if the existence of these two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be infracted. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that from the point of view of the landowner it is immaterial that his land is acquired under the National Highways Act and not the Land Acquisition Act, as solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact alone. 46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. 46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect from 1st January, 2015, an Amendment Ordinance No.9 of 2014 was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said amendment Ordinance states as follows: “10. In the principal Act, in Section 105,- (i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:- “(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1st January, 2015.”; (ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.” 47. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the notification dated 28th August, 2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the notification dated 28th August, 2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. This notification is important and states as follows: “MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ORDER New Delhi, the 28th August, 2015 S.O. 2368(E).— Whereas, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to as the RFCTLARR Act) came into effect from 1st January, 2014; And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCLTARR Act provided for issuing of notification to make the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub- section (3) of Section 105 of RFCTLARR Act was not issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31st December, 2014, thereby, inter-alia, amending Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3rd April, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30th May, 2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015); And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee; And whereas, as per the provisions of Article 123 of the Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the land owners at the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act as extended to the land owners under the said Ordinance; And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the land owners under the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the land owners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said enactments in the interest of the land owners; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central Government hereby makes the following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely;- 1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015. (2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of September, 2015. 2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act. [F.No. 13011/01/2014-LRD] K. P. KRISHNAN, Addl. Secy.” 48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments. This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act, and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. 1 In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, the case of Chajju Ram (supra), has been referred to a larger Bench. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. 1 In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, the case of Chajju Ram (supra), has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court is not correct.” 6. If the said judgment is taken into consideration, the wider principles which has been enunciated, therein, by the Hon’ble Apex Court is with regards to the borrowing the impact of the beneficial legislation to an owner of the land whose land is being deprived due to an acquisition made by the Government Agencies for public purpose, by giving them solatium and interest as contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act. 7. In order to fill up that lacunae in the National Highways Act 1956, which didn’t contemplated the payment of solatium and the interest, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment of “Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh”, as decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in SLP (C) No.9599 of 2019, will only be attracted to be applied so far it relates to the quantification of entitlement of the land looser for solatium and interest and the rate at which it would be payable. 8. With all due reverence at my command, this Court is of the view, that this judgment cannot be read to answer the claim raised by the petitioner in the present writ petition which is pertaining to the payment of the interest? and the rate at which the petitioner would be entitled to receive interest? Its not issue of entitlement to be granted with interest is under debate. 9. The analogy drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the context of the judgment of “Union of India Vs. and the rate at which the petitioner would be entitled to receive interest? Its not issue of entitlement to be granted with interest is under debate. 9. The analogy drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the context of the judgment of “Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh” (Supra), in fact there cannot be any dispute or debate, on the issue that once the Hon’ble Apex Court has attracted the principles of the payment of solatium and interest on an acquisition of land undertaken under the National Highways Act of 1956, since being a beneficial legislation, the petitioner would be entitled for an interest and solatium payable on the land acquired, but the only question which the petitioner has attempted to press by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is with regards to the entitlement of the interest its rate of interest, and the rate of interest which the petitioner would be entitled to receive, and the date with effect from which the petitioner would be entitled to receive the interest. The question which has been sought to be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that for the purposes of remittance of the interest in the light of the principles, which has been attracted the payment of solatium and interest in the matters of the Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh, the question would be that in the acquisition proceedings taken under the National Highways Act of 1956, which will be the body competent to determine the question of quantification of the interest payable and the date with effect from which the petitioner would be entitled to receive and its arrears. This was not subject matter dealt with in the matters of Tarsem Singh (Supra). 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of “Union of India Vs. Pushpavathi and others” as rendered in Civil Appeal Nos.1622-1631 of 2018, in fact the factual backdrop under which the said matter was being considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it was arising out of the final judgment, which was rendered by the Madras High Court in W.A. Nos.1384 to 1392 and 1755 of 1999, whereby the Division Bench of the Madras High Court has dismissed the writ petition, and has affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 13.04.1999. 11. 11. The said case was emanating from the proceedings of the acquisition undertaken under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984, in fact the mind set of the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the procedure to be adopted for the payment of the appropriate compensation or an interest was from the prospective of the procedure which has been prescribed under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, where there was not a dispute with regards to the entitlement of the land looser to get an interest to be paid on the land acquired, and the ratio of entitlement to the awarded amount. Learned counsel for the petitioner had made a reference to the paragraph nos.35, 36 and 42 of the said judgment, which his extracted hereunder :- “35. Similarly, the reference to the Court under Section 18 is made by the Collector only when there is a dispute as to the measurement of the land or to the amount of the compensation or as to the person(s) to whom the compensation is payable and lastly, regarding the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested in claiming compensation. 36. In our considered opinion, the dispute relating to non-award of the interest to the landowners, whether under Section 28 or Section 34 is not a dispute, which falls under Section 18 or/and 28A(3) of the Act. In other words, a reference under Section 18 can only be made by the Collector in respect of those issues, which are specified under Section 18. 42. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the dispute in relation to non-award of interest can be raised by an aggrieved person only by taking recourse to Article 226of the Constitution in writ petition. In other words, reference under Section 18 or Section 28A(3) cannot be considered to be an alternative statutory remedy available to the landowner for getting the question of non-award of interest payable under Sections 28 or/and 34 of the Act decided by the Civil Court.” 12. In other words, reference under Section 18 or Section 28A(3) cannot be considered to be an alternative statutory remedy available to the landowner for getting the question of non-award of interest payable under Sections 28 or/and 34 of the Act decided by the Civil Court.” 12. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paragraph no.36, that for the purposes of claiming of an interest on the awarded amount or seeking of the reference under sections 18 or 28 (A) (3), in fact, it is a reference under section 18, which is required to be made to the Collector in respect of those issue. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has particularly made a reference to paragraph no.42, wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that in the light of the reasons, which has been considered, therein, the remedy available to the land owner for getting a question of non award of the interest payable under section 28 or under section 34 of the Act, was to be decided by the civil court, the Hon’ble Apex Court, therein, has observed that Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be also a remedy, which is available to the land looser to resort to the recourse for remittance of the interest amount as it entailed consideration in the claim, therein, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as contained under section 28 of the Act. 14. This Court is of the opinion, that the principles of the determination of the interest under section 28 of the Act, which has been left open by the Hon’ble Apex Court, to be resorted or could be resorted to by invoking the provisions contained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the instant case will not be applicable because it will amount to stretching too far the beneficial legislation of the entitlement of the interest of the land looser. First of all the reason being that the entitlement of the interest under section 28 of the Act, as contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act, has been applied on an acquisition under National Highways Act, 1956, in the light of the judgment of the “Union of India Vs. First of all the reason being that the entitlement of the interest under section 28 of the Act, as contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act, has been applied on an acquisition under National Highways Act, 1956, in the light of the judgment of the “Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh”, and further stretching the forum provided under which the statutory interest available to be paid to the land looser is required to be pursued since it has been taken outside the purview of section 18 of the Act, and it has been said that aggrieved person can take a resort to the Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. This Court is not in the agreement with the said observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, and humbly draws a distinction from it with all humility at its command. There are number of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court itself, which provides for that the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has to be invoked only for the purposes of enforcement of the fundamental rights or for the breach of a right, which is ensured to the person approaching to the writ court, which is ensured to be provided under a statute. 16. The opinion expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, that the interest could be enforced to be paid under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could have been only under a condition where the aspect of an entitlement of the interest under section 28 of Act, is not a fact disputed. In fact, in these eventualities, where the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could be a forum for payment of the interest under section 28 of the Act, was not dealing with the aspect, whether it was requiring an appreciation of the controversial question of facts and evidence, as it has been sought to be pressed by the petitioner in the present writ petition, as to the rate of interest! as to the date of its entitlement! the date from which it would be paid! and as to whether at all the interest is required to be paid from the date of an award or from the date of taking over of the possession. 17. as to the date of its entitlement! the date from which it would be paid! and as to whether at all the interest is required to be paid from the date of an award or from the date of taking over of the possession. 17. All these aspects since they are required to be decided on determination of the factual appreciation, that could only be done by a specific forum provided under a statute under which the acquisition has taken, in this instant case, since the land has been acquired under the provisions of National Highways Act of 1956, the appropriate forum which would be available for the petitioner would be to approach before the Arbitrator as provided under section 3G (5) of the Act. The provisions of the Act are extracted hereunder:- “3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.—(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority. (2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent, of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. (4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government.” 18. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government.” 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has attempted to draw a distinction that section 3G (5) of the Act, may not be an appropriate forum available, which could determine the interest and its entitlement and the date with effect from which the interest would be payable; she further attempted to argue that the writ petition from the prospective that the provisions contained under section 3G (5) of the Act, is only qua the challenge to be given to the award, as rendered under the provisions of the National Highways Act of 1956. 19. This limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not accepted because the Legislature in its wisdom has used the word “amount” under section 3G (5) of the Act, and it doesn’t uses the word “award”, thus where the Legislature has used the word “amount”, therein. This Court is of the view, that the amount would be inclusive of the amount payable towards the interest, which the land looser would be otherwise entitled to receive in view of the attraction of the provisions contained under section 28 of the Act to the acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act of 1956. “Amount” would include within itself the principle awarded amount and interest too payable on it. 20. Since the provisions contained under section 3G (5) of the Act is a self contained provisions and which would be inclusive of the award of the interest as referred to therein, the appropriate forum available to the petitioner would be to approach under section 3G (5) of the Act, and as per the opinion of this Court the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked by the petitioner where it entails a controversy requiring a detailed appreciation of the facts or adducing of the evidence for entitlement of the interest as claimed, therein, which is inclusive of entailing arithmetical calculation. 21. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court doesn’t intends to interfere in the writ petition, the writ petition is dismissed, but dismissal of the writ petition would be without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner to approach the competent authority as contemplated under section 3G (5) of the National Highways Act of 1956, with regards to the relief claimed in the writ petition. If the petitioner does so, the same would be proceeded to be decided in accordance with law.