ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed against the order dated 22.07.2022 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Churu, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. 3. Briefly, the facts necessary to be noted in the present writ petition for disposal of the present writ petition are that the petitioner was serving as ‘Constable’ in the respondent-Department and while discharging his duties on 19.07.2022, an incident took place, wherein the petitioner alleged to have pointed gun on his Superiors. The petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 20.07.2022 and, thereafter, an order was passed by the respondent on 22.07.2022, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service. Against the order dated 22.07.2022, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, Bikaner Range, Bikaner but the same too has been dismissed vide order dated 28.12.2022. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been dismissed from service without holding any inquiry. The reasons for dispensing with the inquiry given in the order impugned dated 22.07.2022, on the face of it, are not sustainable and it can be presumed that without a reasonable cause and without any foundation of the fact that the petitioner may murder the witnesses, the order impugned has been passed under Rule 19(ii) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred as “the Rules of 1958”) dispensing with the inquiry and straightaway passed an order of dismissal against the petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that by passing such order, the petitioner has been dismissed from service without extending a reasonable opportunity of hearing which is in gross violation of principle of natural justice. 5. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Bhinya Ram V/s State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5669/2021) decided on 23.05.2022 and the order of the Division Bench of this Court passed in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.848/2022 (State of Rajasthan & Ors. V/s. Bhinya Ram) decided on 05.04.2023. He, therefore, prays that the present writ petition may be allowed and the order impugned dated 22.07.2022 as well as the order dated 28.12.2022 may be quashed and set aside. 6. V/s. Bhinya Ram) decided on 05.04.2023. He, therefore, prays that the present writ petition may be allowed and the order impugned dated 22.07.2022 as well as the order dated 28.12.2022 may be quashed and set aside. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that it was impracticable for holding an inquiry in the present case as the petitioner has committed a grave offence and it was not feasible to hold the inquiry against such a person. He further submits that the Disciplinary Authority has recorded sufficient reasons for not holding the inquiry in its order dated 22.07.2022. The order of the disciplinary inquiry was affirmed by the Appellate Authority by passing a reasoned order on 28.12.2022, therefore, the present writ petition is prayed to be dismissed. 7. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar and gone through the relevant record of the case. 8. The fact that the petitioner was serving as ‘Constable’ in the respondent-Department is apparent from the record and the incident which took place on 19.07.2022, is also undisputed. The only point which is required to be considered in the present case is whether in such a case, the recourse to Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 can be taken by dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry and straightaway passing the order of dismissal. The only point which is required to be considered in the present case is whether in such a case, the recourse to Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 can be taken by dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry and straightaway passing the order of dismissal. For brevity, it will be appropriate to reproduce the reasoning given by the Disciplinary Authority in the order dated 22.07.2022 for dispensing with the inquiry in the present case is as under:- ^^;g gS fd Jh lR;ukjk;.k dkfuLVscy ua- 1360 laUrjh igjk ds nkSjku viuh euethZ ls iqfyl Fkkuk jruxढ+ dh gokykr esa cUn eqfYtekuks esa ls ,d eqfYte dks lkFk ys vU; cUn gokykr eqfYteku ,oa lUrjh igjk dks NksM+dj viuh cSfjd esa pys tkuk rFkk jkbZQy yksM dj ,p,e Fkkuk o jk=hdkyhu Mhvks ds lkeus rkuuk ,d xEHkhj d`R; gS] ftldk lEiw.kZ iqfyl egdes ij izfrdwy izHkko iM+us ls fo'ks"k ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, izdj.k dh tkWp dk;Zokgh lhlh, fu;e 16 ds vUrxZr djok;k tkuk ;qfDr;qDr :i ls lk/; ,oa O;ogkfjd ugh ik;s tkus ls dk;Zokgh lhlh, fu;e 19 (II) ,oa lifBr Hkkjr ds lafo/kku dk vuqNsn 311¼2½ ds f}rh; ijUrqd ds Dykst ¼ch½ ds vUrxZr fd;s tkus ds vk/kkj la{ksi esa fuEukuqlkj gSa&---------- ;g gS fd vipkjh dkfu- Jh lR;ukjk;.k uEcj 1360 ds fo:) foHkkxh; tkap dh fu;fer izfØ;k vey esa ykbZ tkrh gS rks bl izfØ;k esa lacaf/kr xogku ftudks vipkjh us ljsvke gR;k djus dh /kedh nh gS] ls lR; dFku fd vis{kk dh gh ugha tk ldrh gS vkSj vipkjh dkfu- vo'; gh bl ?kVukØe dh Hkkafr vius inh; vf/kdkjksa dk nq:i;ksx dj fu;fer foHkkxh; tkap fuckZ/k lEiUu ugha gksus nsxkA ,slh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds dkj.k mDr ?kVuk&Øe dh fu;fer foHkkxh; tkap djokuk ;qfDr;qDr :i ls lk/; ugha gSA** Rule-19 of the Rules of 1958 reads as under : - “19. Special procedure in certain cases.–Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18, (i) where a penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of conduct which has led to him conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure, the disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. Note:– If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give any person an opportunity of showing cause under clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss, or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be subject to only one appeal to the next higher authority.“ (emphasis added) 9. The reasoning given by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the inquiry as per Rule 19(ii) does not appear to be reasonable and correct. The satisfaction which is required to be recorded for dispensing with the holding of the inquiry against a delinquent, is required to be disclosed with concrete and appropriate reasons. A perusal of the reasoning given does not appear to be just, proper and correct. 10. A perusal of the above provision would reveal that it is only in the exceptional circumstance, the special procedure prescribed in Rule-19 is required to be resorted to. Where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the Rules 16, 17 & 18 of Rules of 1958, the Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstance of the case and pass such orders as it may deem fit. For dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry in accordance with the Rules 16, 17 & 18, the Disciplinary Authority is required to record reasons, much less in the opinion of this Court, strong reasons. For dispensing with the disciplinary inquiry in accordance with the Rules 16, 17 & 18, the Disciplinary Authority is required to record reasons, much less in the opinion of this Court, strong reasons. In the present case, a bare perusal of the reasoning recorded by the Disciplinary Authority shows that the reasons recorded are not convincing, much less the same cannot be termed as the impracticable reasons for not holding the inquiry in the present case. 11. In the case of Bhinya Ram V/s State of Rajasthan & Ors., the writ petition was allowed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court relying upon the following judgments : - “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudesh Kumar V/s State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2005) 11 SCC 525 inter alia came to the following conclusion: “5. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry under Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is an exception. The authority dispensing with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) must satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. A reading of the termination order by invoking Article 311(2) (b), as extracted above, would clearly show that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned as to why it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons disclosed in the termination order are that the complainant refused to name the accused out of fear of harassment; the complainant, being a foreign national, is likely to leave the country and once he left the country, it may not be reasonably practicable to bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated 23-12-1999, the visa of the complainant was extended up to 22-12-2000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi Tanaka in the inquiry.” Similarly in the case of Tarsem Singh V/s State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (2006) 13 SCC 581 , a case of constable against whom serious allegations were there, it was inter alia laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “12. Even the Inspector General of Police in passing his order dated 26-11-1999, despite having been asked by the High Court to pass a speaking order, did not assign sufficient or cogent reason. Even the Inspector General of Police in passing his order dated 26-11-1999, despite having been asked by the High Court to pass a speaking order, did not assign sufficient or cogent reason. He, like the appellate authority, also proceeded on the basis that the appellant was guilty of commission of offences which are grave and heinous in nature and bring a bad name to the police force of the State on the whole. None of the authorities mentioned hereinbefore proceeded on the relevant material for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case sufficient cause existed for dispensing with the formal enquiry.” Similarly in the case of Reena Rani V/s. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 215 , again a case of a Constable, the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to the following conclusion: “7. In the order of dismissal, the Superintendent of Police has not disclosed any reason as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry. The learned Additional Advocate General fairly stated that the order of dismissal does not contain the reasons as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry against the appellant. He also admitted that no other record has been made available to him which would have revealed that the Superintendent of Police had recorded reasons for forming an opinion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental enquiry for proving the particular charge(s) against the appellant.” In the case of Banwari Lal & Ors. V/s State of Rajasthan & Anr., reported in 2014(4) WLC (Raj.) 337, again a case of sub-Inspector and Constables, this Court, even in a case where some reasons were indicated, came to the conclusion that same were not founded on valid reasons permissible under law, set aside the order of punishment. So far as the judgment in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) is concerned, the same has upheld the validity of the provisions providing for dispensing with the inquiry, however, the said judgment nowhere provides that requirement of recording of satisfaction in writing can be given a go-bye.” 12. So far as the judgment in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) is concerned, the same has upheld the validity of the provisions providing for dispensing with the inquiry, however, the said judgment nowhere provides that requirement of recording of satisfaction in writing can be given a go-bye.” 12. In view of the discussions made above, it is noticed that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is devoid of the reasonable and practicable reasons recorded in the order for not holding the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner and the same has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority without proper reasoning. 13. Consequently, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner merits acceptance and the same is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.07.2022 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 28.12.2022 passed by the Appellate Authority are quashed and set-aside. The petitioner is entitled to reinstate with all benefits, however, it would be open for the respondents to initiate the departmental inquiry against the petitioner, if they so desired. The payment of back-wages shall abide by the result of such inquiry. If such an inquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. 14. The stay petition as well as other pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.