JUDGMENT : 1. This judgement will dispose of FAFO No. 1111 of 2019 and FAFO No. 2886 of 2011. 2. Both the appeals relate to the same accident and arise out of the same impugned judgment and award dated 24.02.2011 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal / Additional District Judge, Court No. 14, Allahabad rendered in MACP No. 657 of 2008. Accordingly, both the appeals are being decided by this common judgment. 3. FAFO No. 1111 of 2019 shall be treated as the leading case and facts noticed from the said appeal. It must be mentioned at the outset that the leading appeal is by the owner upon whom liability to satisfy the impugned award has been fastened. The appeal seeks to absolve the owner and shift liability upon the Insurance Company. The connected appeal, that is to say, FAFO No. 2886 of 2011 has been preferred by the claimants seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded. 4. Heard Mr. Ram Singh on behalf of the appellant-owner, Mr. Siddharth Jaiswal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4, the Insurance Company and Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant-respondents. 5. Hereinafter, the appellant-owner shall be called ''the owner', the Insurance Company, ''the insurers', and the claimant-respondents, ''the claimants'. 6. In the connected appeal, Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel has been heard on behalf of the claimants in support of the appeal, Mr. Siddharth Jaiswal, Advocate, on behalf of the insurers and Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel for the owner. 7. The facts giving rise to the appeal are these: On August, the 22nd, 2008 at 1.30 P.M., one Ram Chandra alias Babu Lal Yadav, a man of 25 years, was riding a Honda motorcycle bearing No. UP70AL/4090. Rajesh Yadav was on the pillion. The two were proceeding from Mansurabad to Lal Gopal Ganj on the Allahabad-Lucknow Highway. As the two reached Khuda Baksh ka Pura (Shringverpur), a roadways bus approached from the Lucknow end of the highway. It was a vehicle held on contract, bearing registration No. UP53T/7042. It was driven rashly and negligently. The bus struck the motorcycle, leading the rider and the pillion to sustain injuries. Both the injured were carried to the Swaroop Rani Nehru, Hospital, Allahabad, where they were admitted for necessary medical attention. It was a vehicle held on contract, bearing registration No. UP53T/7042. It was driven rashly and negligently. The bus struck the motorcycle, leading the rider and the pillion to sustain injuries. Both the injured were carried to the Swaroop Rani Nehru, Hospital, Allahabad, where they were admitted for necessary medical attention. Ram Chandra succumbed to his injuries, whereas the pillion rider, Rajesh Yadav was in a critical condition, whose right leg was fractured and grievous injuries sustained to his head. About this incident, the deceased Ram Chandra's father lodged a First Information Report with P.S. Nawabganj, Allahabad, that was registered as Crime No. 28 of 2008, under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC. At the time of his demise, the deceased was aged about 25 years and had established a shop selling sweets and tea. It is the claimants' case that the deceased by his exertions would earn about Rs. 7,000/- per mensem. The claimants are the deceased's widow, father, mother and a child born posthumously. The claimants petitioned the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ''the ''Act') seeking compensation in the sum of Rs. 10 lacs with interest. 8. The opposite party No. 1 to the claim petition, ''the owner' of the vehicle, who is the appellant here, put in a written statement and denied the allegations in the petition. It is averred in the additional plea that the offending vehicle was insured with the insurers,vide Cover Note No.343637 valid and effective from 23.7.2008 to 22.7.2009. The insurers have been asserted to be answerable regarding any claim that may be decreed against the owner relating to the accident caused by the offending vehicle. It was asserted that on the date and time of the accident, the vehicle was being driven by Mohd. Saleem son of Sri Sabir Ali, who held a valid driving licence to drive the vehicle. The licence held by the driver bears No. M08621/LKW/2005 issued on 10.9.1979. It was valid from 11.6.2007 to 10.6.2010. The fitness certificate relating to the offending vehicle was valid from 3.8.2008 to 2.8.2009. On the date and time of the accident, the offending vehicle's route permit, registration certificate were all valid, besides the fact that all requisite taxes were paid up therefor. It was valid from 11.6.2007 to 10.6.2010. The fitness certificate relating to the offending vehicle was valid from 3.8.2008 to 2.8.2009. On the date and time of the accident, the offending vehicle's route permit, registration certificate were all valid, besides the fact that all requisite taxes were paid up therefor. It is then pleaded on behalf of the owner that the offending vehicle never caused the accident nor the driver thereof committed any negligence in the alleged accident. No one sustained any injury nor died in consequence of injury received. The claimants were blamed for instituting the claim petition on twisted facts and suppressing the correct ones, rendering the petition one fit to be rejected. The offending vehicle was being operated in accordance with the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, and that, in the event, the Court was of opinion that the claimants are entitled to receive compensation, the burden thereof would rest on the Insurers' shoulders. 9. A separate written statement was filed on behalf of the Insurers, who too generally denied the allegations in the claim petition. It was averred in the written statement that the deceased met his fate on the date and time of the accident on account of his own negligence. There was no negligence of the bus driver. It is the Insurers' case that there was no evidence of the deceased sustaining fatal injuries in the accident on the date and time of the accident alleged. It is also averred that the claimants have not produced documentary evidence to establish the deceased's age, profession and income. The deceased was an unemployed youth, who had no income of his own. The claimants, before instituting the petition and after the accident, never demanded compensation from the Insurers. In case, demand had been raised, the Insurers would have got facts investigated soon after the accident and proceeded in accordance with law. It is also the Insurers' case that the accident did not involve the offending vehicle, but some other motor vehicle. 10. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal framed the following Issues:- "1. In case, demand had been raised, the Insurers would have got facts investigated soon after the accident and proceeded in accordance with law. It is also the Insurers' case that the accident did not involve the offending vehicle, but some other motor vehicle. 10. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal framed the following Issues:- "1. Whether on 22.8.2008 at about 1.30 in the afternoon, the driver of Bus No.UP-53T/7042, driving it negligently and at a high speed, on the Allahabad-Lucknow Highways, within the limits of village Khudabaksh Ka Pura (Shringverpur), falling under Police Station Nawabganj, hit Motorcycle No.UP-70A.L./4090, that was proceeding on its side at a slow speed, in consequence whereof the rider of the motorcycle, Ram Chandra Yadav @ Guddu son of Sri Babu Lal Yadav died? 2. Whether on the date and time of the accident, the driver of aforesaid Bus No.UP-53T/7042 held a valid and effective driving licence? 3. Whether on the date and time of the accident, Bus No.UP-53T/7042 was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company? 4. Whether the rider of Motorcycle No.UP-70A.L./4090 too had contributory negligence in the accident in question? If yes, its effect? 5. Whether the claimants, who are the dependents of the deceased, are entitled to compensation? If yes, how much and from which opposite party?" 11. On behalf of the claimants, Smt. Sarita Yadav, the deceased's wife, was examined as PW-1, Munnu Lal Yadav was examined as PW-2 and Rajesh Kumar Yadav as PW-3. The claimants produced documentary evidence as well, which includes a xerox copy of the First Information Report and a list of documents, paper No.18-C, photostat copies of documents relating to the offending vehicle, including the driver's driving licence, fitness certificate and registration certificate. Through another list, paper No.23-Ga, a copy of the FIR, a copy of the charge sheet filed against the driver of the offending vehicle, the technical inspection report relating to the offending vehicle, site plan and a certified copy of deceased's autopsy report have been filed. 12. On behalf of the owner and the Insurers, no witness was examined nor any document produced. 13. The Tribunal held on Issue No.1 in favour of the claimants recording a finding that the accident occurred on account of negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle. 12. On behalf of the owner and the Insurers, no witness was examined nor any document produced. 13. The Tribunal held on Issue No.1 in favour of the claimants recording a finding that the accident occurred on account of negligent driving by the driver of the offending vehicle. On Issue No.4, the finding was that the accident happened solely on account of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle with no contributory negligence by the deceased. On Issue Nos. 2 and 3, there are findings that the driver of offending vehicle held a valid and effective driving licence on the date and time of the accident, and likewise, the offending vehicle was covered by a valid insurance policy on the fateful day and time. The Tribunal while deciding Issue No.5 has recorded a very brief finding tucked away somewhere between words, validating all other documents for the offending vehicle but the fitness certificate that was valid from 3.8.2005 to 2.8.2007. Since the accident occurred on 22.8.2008, it was held that there was no valid fitness certificate on the date of accident. The Tribunal held that there was a breach of the insurance policy and held the owner liable to make good the compensation. There is a remark during the course of discussion on Issue No. 5 that on the date of accident, the driver of the offending vehicle did not hold a valid and effective driving licence and, therefore, the owner is liable. The said remark appears to be the result of an apparent mistake because the finding returned on Issue No. 2 is categorical and clear that on the date and time of the accident the driver of the offending vehicle held a valid and effective driving licence. Read together with the finding in the earlier part of discussion on Issue No. 5, the Tribunal appears to have confounded the invalid fitness certificate for the driving licence. 14. This Court, therefore, proceeds on the basis that the Tribunal has exonerated the Insurers for the lack of a fitness certificate. Before this Court, the owner moved an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or on principles analogous to that provision, seeking to bring on record additional evidence. 14. This Court, therefore, proceeds on the basis that the Tribunal has exonerated the Insurers for the lack of a fitness certificate. Before this Court, the owner moved an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or on principles analogous to that provision, seeking to bring on record additional evidence. This includes a certified copy of the judgment and award dated 27.8.2015 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.13, Allahabad in MACP No.415 of 2011, holding the Insurers liable. This award has been brought on record, because it relates to the same accident as the one involved here and arises out of the claim preferred by the injured-victim of the accident, Rajesh Kumar Yadav. In that case, all the documents relating to the offending vehicle, including the fitness certificate, were held to be there and no breach of policy by the Insurers was found. In addition, a xerox copy of the fitness certificate relating to the offending vehicle has also been brought on record. The certified copy of the award and a xerox copy of the fitness certificate relating to the offending vehicle, showing it to be on certified fitness from 3.8.2008 to 2.8.2009, issued by the Regional Inspector (Technical), have been annexed to the application for additional evidence. The application was allowed vide order dated 11.7.2022 and the two documents were admitted without objection. Those documents have been marked as Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-2, respectively, and made part of the record. 15. In view of the fact that Exhibit-2 shows that the offending vehicle had a valid fitness certificate for the period 03.08.2008 to 02.08.2009, there is absolutely no basis to exonerate the insurers of their liability on the Insurance Policy for the breach of its terms. 16. This Court, accordingly, finds that the appeal by the owner ought to succeed and the insurers held liable to satisfy the award. 17. Now, this Court may take up FAFO No. 2886 of 2011, preferred on behalf of the claimants. 18. In this appeal, there is no other Issue involved, except the one relating to the quantum. 19. The claimants are the widow, father and the mother of the deceased, Ram Chandra alias Guddu. The first relevant fact to be determined is the deceased's monthly income. 18. In this appeal, there is no other Issue involved, except the one relating to the quantum. 19. The claimants are the widow, father and the mother of the deceased, Ram Chandra alias Guddu. The first relevant fact to be determined is the deceased's monthly income. About the deceased's income, there is on record the testimony of his widow, P.W. 1, Smt. Sarita Yadav. In her examination-in-chief, P.W. 1 has said that at the time of his demise, her husband was aged 25 years. He had a shop vending tea, betel and sweets. The shop was located in the Mansurabad Bazar. The shop was housed in a rented premises. The shop was running for a time period of 4-5 years ante-dating the accident. According to the witness, the deceased would earn about Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 6,000/- per month. 20. The untimely demise of the witness's husband has left the widow without financial support. It has figured in her evidence that the deceased's father and mother were also dependent upon his income. There is a mention about a posthumous child being also born to parties, but for whatever reasons, there is no claim on his behalf. The insurers have cross-examined this witness, who had knowledge about the deceased's income and said in her cross-examination that he would save Rs. 6,000/- to Rs. 7,000/- per month. This Witness has also said that there were no accounts kept and what she was saying, was on the basis of estimation. The Tribunal has disbelieved the claimants' case about the deceased's income, being Rs 5,000/- - 6,000/- or Rs. 7,000/-. Despite the testimony of his widow, the Tribunal has opined that given the entire circumstances of the deceased, the deceased can be credited with a monthly income of Rs. 2,000/-. 21. This Court must remark that the Tribunal's opinion about the deceased's income being a humble sum of Rs. 2,000/- is way off the mark. It is no fair estimation of the deceased's income contemporaneous in time, when the accident happened. The Tribunal's assessment about the deceased's income is based on a long-standing notion in society that it is only the State borne salaries earned by Government employees that can offer a dependable source of income. 22. 2,000/- is way off the mark. It is no fair estimation of the deceased's income contemporaneous in time, when the accident happened. The Tribunal's assessment about the deceased's income is based on a long-standing notion in society that it is only the State borne salaries earned by Government employees that can offer a dependable source of income. 22. These opinions are generally held because much income that is generated in the unorganized sector does not get recorded the way it is in Government services or more organised employments, but, that does not mean that for self-employed persons working in the unorganized sector, the Court should adopt a pessimistic view about their contributions to the nation's GDP. The deceased was running a shop vending tea, betel and sweets in Mansurabad market. There is evidence on record, unimpeached that the shop was running there for 4-5 years ante-dating his demise in the fateful accident. The deceased was supporting a family of three, besides himself. Going by the contemporary price index prevalent at the time, the income found for the deceased by the Tribunal cannot be countenanced. 23. It has also to be noted that for a self-employed person like the deceased, at the scale that he was working, it is difficult to expect documented records about his income. I had occasion to consider this question in Smt. Dulara and others v. U.P.S.R.T.C. though Regional Manager and another, F.A.F.O. No. 2887 of 2011, decided on 17.11.2022, where I held : "17. A safe benchmark to assess a person's income, where there is no proof aliunde or corroborative about the figure is by reference to the income of an unskilled casual labourer obtaining in time contemporary to the event. In an accident, which took place on 16th May, 2009, a Division Bench of this Court in The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Shashi Devi & others, 2015 SCC OnLine All 8594, approved the Tribunal's approach in inferring an income of Rs. 150/- per day, assessing it for an ordinary labourer and adding 30% towards future prospect to determine a figure of Rs. 240/- per day. In Shashi Devi (supra), it was held by their Lordships of the Division Bench thus: "9. 150/- per day, assessing it for an ordinary labourer and adding 30% towards future prospect to determine a figure of Rs. 240/- per day. In Shashi Devi (supra), it was held by their Lordships of the Division Bench thus: "9. So far as the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is concerned, the Tribunal has noted the age of the deceased as 44 years and having regard to the age of the deceased as mentioned in the post-mortem report and also the evidence on record, the Tribunal af ter taking the income of the deceased as Rs. 4500 per month (Rs. 150 per day) applied the multiplier of 14. Even for a person of an ordinary labourer/coolie the income would be, more than Rs. 240/- per day. At that rate, the annual income would be Rs. 86,400/-. In the present case, the deceased was aged 44-45 years, at the time of his death, (i.e. in the year 2009) and the Tribunal has assessed his income as Rs. 150 per day and at that rate his annual income was assessed as 54,000/- and also looking to the future pros pects of the deceased the Tribunal has in creased 30 % in the total income of the de ceased by applying the ratio of the case of Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2012 ACJ 1428 : ( (2012) 6 SCC 421 : AIR 2012 SC 2185 ). It is not necessary that there should be fixed income or the deceased was self employed for the purpose of calculating the future prospects. The Tribunal has rightly applied the multiplier and awarded the compensation and the same does not call for any interference by this Court." 24. For the reasons indicated in Smt. Dulara and others (supra) and the daily income of an unskilled daily rated labourer at the relevant time, it would be safe to hold the deceased's income to be a sum of Rs. 150/- per day. But, unlike Dulara Devi, the deceased here was not a casual labourer and was in self-employment, where he had a shop. If there would be any deductions, which are often made in cases of casual labourers, there is no reason to do that in the deceased's case. His income, therefore, is to be worked out for the entire month at the rate of Rs. 150/-. If there would be any deductions, which are often made in cases of casual labourers, there is no reason to do that in the deceased's case. His income, therefore, is to be worked out for the entire month at the rate of Rs. 150/-. This would lead to a monthly income for the deceased in the sum of Rs. 4500/-. 25. The annual income of the deceased would, therefore, be a sum of Rs. 54,000/-. The deceased left behind three heirs as the claim petition would indicate. They are Smt. Sarita Devi (widow), Smt. Urmila Devi (his mother) and Babu lal Yadav (his father). Going by paragraph No. 30 of the judgement in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , where the number of dependent family members is 2-3, deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased is one-third. The Tribunal has directed likewise. Again, so far as the issue of the multiplier goes according to the Schedule set out in paragraph No. 40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra), 18 would be the appropriate multiplier to adopt, the deceased being in the age bracket of 21-25 years. 26. The next question that falls for our consideration is about the future prospects, if any, to which the claimants may be entitled. The issue about the future prospects has been authoritatively pronounced upon by the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 . Pranay Sethi (supra) has extended the benefit of future prospects to the self-employed or persons employed on fixed salaries. In Pranay Sethi, it has been held : "56. The seminal Issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self-employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category. 57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable." 27. Another Issue that arises for consideration is whether future prospects are to be awarded according to the law laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra) or Rule 220-A(3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short the ''Rules of 1998'). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, it was held : "9. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, it was held : "9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully. 10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid. 12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs." 28. The principle applicable, therefore, is that Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 would apply in order to determine future prospects and not the law in Pranay Sethi, so far as the State of U.P. is concerned, where these rules are in force. 29. The question further to be answered is whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 that was introduced by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, apply retrospectively to an accident that happened much before the introduction of Rule 220-A of the Rules of 1998. 29. The question further to be answered is whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 that was introduced by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, apply retrospectively to an accident that happened much before the introduction of Rule 220-A of the Rules of 1998. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held by their Lordships of the Division Bench : "31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule. 32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. 33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi, AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. 34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu, AIR 1971 SC 89 . 35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit, AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. 36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh, AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. 37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak, AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. 38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. 39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature." 30. The law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra) is binding precedent. The award for future prospects is required to be made in accordance with the Rule 220-A(3) of Rules, 1998. For a person of the deceased's age, which was decisively below 40 years, Rule 220-A(3) prescribes 50% to be added to his income towards future prospects. 31. There is still another Issue which requires consideration and, that is, compensation payable to the claimants under the conventional heads. In this regard, the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra) again becomes relevant where, it is observed; "48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. 31. There is still another Issue which requires consideration and, that is, compensation payable to the claimants under the conventional heads. In this regard, the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra) again becomes relevant where, it is observed; "48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ]. Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574 it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) "54. ... we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy." 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: "3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: (i) Funeral expenses Rs. 2000 (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse Rs. 5000 (iii) Loss of estate Rs. 2500 (iv) Medical expenses -- actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding Rs. 15,000" 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362 ] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. The justification for grant of consortium, as we find from Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149], is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads. 52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]. It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads." (emphasis by Court) 32. So far, award of compensation under the head of the loss of consortium is concerned, the same was considered by the supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130 . In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), it has been held : "21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training" 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 33. In view of what this Court has found, compensation payable to the claimants in this appeal would have to be revised in the following manner : (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) Rs.4500/- (ii) Monthly Income+Future Prospects (monthly income x 50%) = 4500+2250 Rs.6750/- (iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 6750x12 Rs.81,000/- (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income - one-third deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 81000-27000 Rs.54,000/- (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 54000x18 Rs.9,72,000/- (vi) Claimants' entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents' Consortium =15000+15000+40000x3 Rs.1,50,000/- The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.9,72,000/- + Rs.1,50,000/- Rs.11,22,000/- 34. In the result FAFO No. 1111 of 2019 succeeds and is allowed. 35. It is ordered that the compensation awarded by this judgment and award shall be payable by the insurer and not the owner. 36. FAFO No. 2886 of 2011 succeeds and is allowed. In the result FAFO No. 1111 of 2019 succeeds and is allowed. 35. It is ordered that the compensation awarded by this judgment and award shall be payable by the insurer and not the owner. 36. FAFO No. 2886 of 2011 succeeds and is allowed. The impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded is enhanced to Rs. 11,22,000/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition until realisation. Any sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal pursuant to the impugned award, or the interim orders of this Court shall be adjusted against the award. The other directions made by the Tribunal shall remain intact. 37. Costs easy in both appeals. 38. The sum of statutory deposit made by the owner shall be refunded to him. 39. Let the lower court record be sent to the Tribunal at once.