ORDER 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the present writ petition is disposed of finally, at this stage. 2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-employer challenging the impugned award dated 16.01.2020, passed by the Labour Court & Industrial Tribunal, Kota, under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby claim of the respondent-workman has been allowed by declaring termination of his services with effect from 04.09.1995 to be illegal and bad in the eyes of law and further a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- along-with interest @ 9% per annum has been given in favour of the respondent-workman. 3. Learned counsel Mr.Vibhor Sharma, appears on behalf of the petitioner, made following submissions while challenging the impugned award:- 1. The respondent-workman was initially employed on 01.09.1989 on daily wage basis with the present petitioner-employer and his appointment was not on regular basis and as such his services were terminated in 1992. 4. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent-workman challenged dis-continuance of service by filing S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.3896/1992 and this Court on 26.05.1992, passed an ex-parte interim order directing the petitioner-employer not to terminate services of the respondent-workman while allowing him to continue in the service. 5. Learned counsel submitted that the said writ petition finally came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 01.09.1995 on account of the respondent-workman having an alternative remedy under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such liberty was granted to the respondent-workman to approach the Labour Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that this Court while deciding the writ petition of the respondent-workman also came to the conclusion that the respondent had not disclosed the complete details in his writ petition but in the reply filed by the petitioner, the date of retrenchment was given as 13.05.1992 and as such the prayer, which was made by the respondent initially for regularization, was also not considered. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that the reference, which was to be made to the Labour Court, was in respect of termination of services of the respondent-workman with effect from 13.05.1992, as whether such order of termination was valid or not. 8. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court, while allowing the claim of the petitioner, has not given any finding about working of the respondent for 240 days prior to the date of his termination. 8. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court, while allowing the claim of the petitioner, has not given any finding about working of the respondent for 240 days prior to the date of his termination. 9. Learned counsel submitted that if the respondent-workman was allowed to work on account of an interim order passed by the High Court, no such benefit could have been given by counting working of the workmen on account of some interim order passed by the Court. 10. Learned counsel submitted that the initial date of appointment of the petitioner was in the year 1989 and his alleged termination in the month of May 1992 was also not preceded by working of 240 days and as such there was no violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the Act of 1947'), as was alleged by the respondent-workman. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer has drawn attention of this Court towards a document (Annex.8), where details of Mustor Roll have been given and if May, 1992 is taken as the date of termination of services of the respondent-workman in preceding 240 days, he had only worked in the months of May, June, October and November, 1991/May 1992. 12. Learned counsel submitted that if viewed from any angle, the alleged termination of services of the respondent-workman could not be said to be in violation of any law and as such the Labour Court, while passing the award, has wrongly awarded a lump-sum compensation to the respondent-workman. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner-employer submitted that any order passed by the Court or any act of the Court, will not prejudice any person and as such counsel refers to the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit and to support his submission learned counsel refers to a judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Mohammed Gazi Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. reported in (2000) 4 SCC 342 . 14. Learned counsel further submitted that in spite of producing the complete documentary evidence before the Labour Court, the perverse findings have been recorded in respect of working of the respondent-workman and wrong conclusion has been drawn only on the basis of statement of one witness from the Department, who had not even admitted the actual working of the respondent-workman for 240 days. 15. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent-workman did not file any material or got any witness examined, which proved the working of 240 days prior to alleged termination either in May, 1992 or in the year 1995, after writ petition of the respondent-workman was dismissed. 16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-workman submitted that this Court may not interfere in the findings, which have been recorded by the Labour Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence. 17. Learned counsel further submitted that the material, which was placed before the Labour Court amply proved that while initial termination of the respondent-workman was made in the year 1992, wherein no procedure was followed even though the respondent-workman had served for more than three years. 18. Learned counsel submitted that working of the respondent-workman on account of interim order passed by this Court and thereafter if his services are terminated, the actual working of the respondent-workman has been taken into account and since the respondent-workman had completed 240 days prior to his termination of services, the petitioners were required to comply with Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. 19. Learned counsel submitted that if the dispute, which was raised by the respondent-workman was subjudice before this Court and interim protection was given, the petitioner-employer could not have ignored the said period for giving the protection and as such action of the petitioner has not been found in consonance with law, as they did not comply with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent-workman further submitted that the Labour Court, in fact, has only granted lumpsum compensation to the respondent-workman and since there is no order of reinstatement and as such the petitioner-employer has wrongly filed the present petition denying rightful claim to the respondent-workman. 21. I have heard the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 22. This Court finds that the alleged termination of services of the respondent-workman had initially taken place in May, 1992 and the respondent-workman had approached the High Court by filing writ petition and finally his writ petition was dismissed by giving liberty to avail an alternative remedy under the Act of 1947. 23. 22. This Court finds that the alleged termination of services of the respondent-workman had initially taken place in May, 1992 and the respondent-workman had approached the High Court by filing writ petition and finally his writ petition was dismissed by giving liberty to avail an alternative remedy under the Act of 1947. 23. This Court, in the first place, finds that term of reference for treating the date of termination of services of the respondent-workman as 04.09.1995 was not proper and if the dispute was in respect of termination of services, which allegedly took place in May, 1992, this Court is at loss to understand, as why the date of termination has been taken as 04.09.1995. 24. This Court also finds that the date of termination of services of the respondent-workman was not disputed by any of the parties to the dispute and as such it would be too late in a day to say that the said alleged date of termination of services of the respondent-workman had taken place in 1992 or in the year 1995. 25. This Court finds substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the working of the respondent-workman on account of an interim order passed by this Court was not required to be considered for the purpose of complying with Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. 26. This Court finds that if interim order granted by this Court had permitted to continue in service, the same was in order to comply with the order of the High Court and as such when the petition was dismissed, the respondent-workman was accordingly removed from service, as there was no stay order, which was continuing after dismissal of the writ petition filed by the respondent-workman. 27. This Court finds substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court has not considered the said aspect as the respondent-workman continued on the strength of the stay order granted by this Court, however, this Court also finds that no such serious plea was taken by the petitioner-employer before the Court below for treating the correct date of termination of respondent-workman. 28. 28. This Court, however, finds that the respondent-workman was employed initially somewhere in 1989 and his services were terminated in May, 1992 and at least the respondent-workman had worked for 3 years with the petitioner-employer and the Labour Court has only awarded a lump-sum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/-. 29. This Court, while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, finds that the interest of justice will be served that if the lump-sum amount of compensation, which has been paid to the respondent-workman, may be upheld by this Court. 30. This Court, however, finds that the award of interest, which has been given to the respondent-workman will not be allowed to be paid to him and he will be only allowed to get lump-sum amount of Rs.1,50,000/- and accordingly award dated 16.01.2020 is upheld to the extent of awarding him a sum amount of Rs.1,50,000. 31. This Court, before parting of the judgment, makes it clear that the present order has been passed considering the peculiar facts of this case and the same may not be cited as a precedent. 32. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands disposed of.