ORDER : 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order of Board of Revenue (for short “BOR”) dated 18.05.1998 in Revision Petition No. 93/95/STAMP/JAIPUR, whereby the BOR set aside the stamp duty levied on the construction attached to the leased land, the present petition has been filed under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The facts of the case, as per the learned counsel for the petitioner, are that a lease deed was executed on 17.01.1991 between Respondent No. 2-RIICO and M/s Badaya Industries through its proprietor Shri Meghraj Khandelwa for industrial plot no. F-972-A, Road No. 14, Industrial Area, VKI Area, Jaipur (herein after referred to as “the plot”). Thereafter, a deed of partnership was executed between Shri Meghraj Khandelwal and Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal on 14.12.1991 and the M/s Badaya Industries was structured as a partnership firm with Shri Meghraj Khandelwal having 51% shares and Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal having 49% shares. The permission for change in constitution of firm M/s Badaya Industries was also sought and allowed by RIICO vide letter dated 31.01.1992 and a lease deed agreement for correction was accordingly executed on 04.11.1992. Thereafter, the newly constituted partnership firm was again modified when Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal acquired the 51% shares of outgoing partner Shri Meghraj Khandelwal. Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal now became the sole proprietor of the aforesaid firm and the name of the firm was changed from M/s Badaya Industries to M/s Dangayach Agro Industries. A new lease agreement dated 15.06.1994 was also executed between Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal and Respondent No.2-RIICO, now the sole proprietor of M/s Dangayach Agro Industries, for the plot in question, on which a building was also constructed. The said lease agreement dated 15.06.1994 was submitted before Sub-Registrar Jaipur for its registration on 18.06.1994, who sent it to the D.I.G. (Registrations) and Ex-officio Collector (Stamps), Jaipur under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamps Act, 1908, as adopted in State of Rajasthan. The Sub-Registrar, before impounding the lease agreement, inspected the plot and found that the construction on the plot was not shown in the map and accordingly, after assessing valuation of land, levied stamp duty of Rs. 1,38,964/-and registration fee of Rs. 5,000/-. Since the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal had only deposited stamp duty of Rs. 36,000/-and registration fee of Rs. The Sub-Registrar, before impounding the lease agreement, inspected the plot and found that the construction on the plot was not shown in the map and accordingly, after assessing valuation of land, levied stamp duty of Rs. 1,38,964/-and registration fee of Rs. 5,000/-. Since the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal had only deposited stamp duty of Rs. 36,000/-and registration fee of Rs. 2,000/-, a notice was issued to the respondent for the differential amount and after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal, the petitioner maintained the levy of additional stamp duty and registration fee vide order dated 12.01.1995. The said order was successfully assailed by the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal before the BOR, who vide its impugned order dated 18.05.1998, set aside the order dated 12.01.1995. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the conclusion of the BOR that the valuation could not have included the valuation of construction is erroneous and against the settled position of law. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following submissions: 3.1) That Circular No. 8/95 dated 21.03.1995, issued by office of Inspector General (Registration) & Stamp Department, Government of Rajasthan, clearly states that if a land which was allotted on lease by RIICO is subsequently transferred and if some construction or industry is also existing on such plot, then in addition to the rate of land, market value of the construction should also be included for the purpose of stamp duty. 3.2) That the BOR failed to appreciate the definition of ‘immovable property’ as contained in Section 2(6) of The Registrations Act, 1908, which includes land, building, hereditary allowance, etc. and definition of ‘conveyance’ as contained in Section 2(10) of The Indian Stamp Act, 1899. 3.3) That the interpretation taken by BOR that since the RIICO was not the owner of the construction and therefore could not have leased the same is ex-facie fallacious as the BOR failed to appreciate that if a land is leased out, then as per the terms and conditions contained in the lease deed itself, construction had to be made within a period of two years from the execution of the lease. It is contended that once construction is attached to the land, it cannot be separated and the transfer plot would automatically include transfer of construction attached to it. It is contended that once construction is attached to the land, it cannot be separated and the transfer plot would automatically include transfer of construction attached to it. 3.4) That once the leased out plot was existing in the name of a partnership firm M/s Badaya Industries and when after dissolution of the partnership firm, a proprietorship firm was created in the name and style of M/s Dangayach Agro Industries, and it became the owner of the leased out land, then naturally it was the subsequent transfer of the land and building in favour of M/s. Dangayach Agro Industries and stamp duty would be leviable on the value of the immovable property in its entirety, which would include the construction as well. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal submits that the BOR had passed a well reasoned speaking order which is consonance with the settled position of law. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 contends that the Sub-Registrar Amer acted beyond his jurisdiction when he sent the lease agreement dated 15.06.1994 for impounding as RIICO was only the owner of the land and not of the construction raised by the erstwhile allotted lesee and only land was given on lease by RIICO for 99 years. It is contended that since the constructed property never vested with RIICO, the same could not have been transferred by RIICO. Only the plot of land was leased for 99 years, for which RIICO was also realizing rent on yearly basis along with development charges and other applicable charges. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 further submits that the BOR rightly held that the Circular No. 37/1992 was not applicable and nor did it empower the Additional Collector (Stamps) to ignore the statutory provisions and the settled position of law. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has also relied on judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Bhilwara Spinners Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 Raj 184 . 5. Heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, scanned the record of the writ petition and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 6. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has also relied on judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Bhilwara Spinners Ltd. and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 Raj 184 . 5. Heard the arguments advanced by both the sides, scanned the record of the writ petition and considered the judgments cited at Bar. 6. The definition of ‘immovable property’, as contained in The Registrations Act, 1908, is reproduced as under: “Section 2(6): "Immovable Property" includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops nor grass.” Further, the definition of conveyance, as contained in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 is reproduced as under: “Section 2(10): "Conveyance" includes a conveyance on sale, every instrument and every decree or final order of any Civil Court, by which property, whether moveable or immovable, or any estate or interest in any property is transferred to, or vested in or declared to be of any other person, inter vivos, and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I or Schedule 1-A, as the case may be.” 7. A combined reading of the above two quoted definition would reveal that immovable property would include both land and building and therefore stamp duty has to be charged accordingly. 8. It it is an admitted position that initially the lease deed was executed between RIICO and M/s Badaya Industries through its proprietor Shri Meghraj Khandelwal for the plot in question. Thereafter, the status of this proprietorship was changed to partnership with new partner Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal having 49%. Again the status of the partnership firm was changed to proprietorship after the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal acquired the remaining shares and became 100% owner of the newly constituted proprietorship M/s Dangayach Agro Industries. Acknowledging the change in status, a new lease deed dated 15.06.1994 was also executed between Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal and Respondent No.2-RIICO. Therefore, it is clear that there was a subsequent transfer of the plot in question, which is even acknowledged by the parties as stamp duty and registration fee to the extent of valuation of land was paid by the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal. 9. Therefore, it is clear that there was a subsequent transfer of the plot in question, which is even acknowledged by the parties as stamp duty and registration fee to the extent of valuation of land was paid by the Respondent No.1-Shri Govind Khandelwal. 9. In these facts and circumstances, when there was an admitted change in the status of the respondent from proprietorship to partnership, the learned BOR ought not to have ignored this material fact of change of status and subsequent transfer of the plot in question. The view adopted by the BOR is also against the definition of ‘immovable property’ and ‘conveyance’, and therefore cannot be countenanced. Further, the BOR was also not correct in observing that no stamp duty could be levied on the building component since RIICO was not the owner of the building. It is immaterial whether RIICO was the owner of the building or not as after the initial agreement, only permission was sought from RIICO for new lease deed. In effect, the transfer was by the erstwhile partnership firm M/s Badaya Industries to the new proprietorship firm M/s Dangayach Agro Industries. Since stamp duty is always in rem and not in personam, the petitioner had rightly levied the stamp duty on the building component. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 18.05.1998 of the BOR is quashed and set aside. 11. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.