JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Radha Kant Ojha, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Shri Shiv Prakash Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent Nos. 1 and 4, Shri Rajiv Sharma, learned counsel representing respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Shri Abhishek Pandey, learned counsel for the complainant in exercise of power under Chapter XXII Rule 5-A of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 inasmuch as the said complainant had filed caveat application, but has not been impleaded as respondent. 2. This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 05.04.2023 whereby the Director, Khadi & Village Industries Commission (respondent no.3) has communicated the Divisional Director that the Competent Authority has authorized him to act as an Administrator to take care of the day to day affairs of the Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Meerut in anticipation of the Commission’s approval till a new management is elected after following due procedure, with a view to safeguard the funds deployed by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC) and also to protect the large number of artisans and workers associated with Khadi Industry. Another order under challenge is dated 09.09.2022 whereby the Deputy Registrar (respondent no.4) has dislodged the executive body of the petitioner Committee of Management and has directed for holding of fresh elections in purported exercise of powers under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. 3. As per the pleadings contained in the writ petition, Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Garh Road, Meerut is a registered Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Its parent body is Shri Gandhi Ashram, Lucknow, as provided in Clause-21 of the Bye-laws of the Society. It has two types of members; one is trustee and another is general member and at this moment total 11 members are alive and working, 4 are trustees and 7 are general members. The Committee consists of (1) three permanent trustees amongst the alive trustees and (2) amongst the general members for a period of 3 years, members will be elected for the Committee of Management. In Clause 6 of the Bye-laws, it is provided that (1) out of the members of the Committee of Management one will be elected as Sabhapati (2) one or many Secretary will be appointed and there are 4 working trustees and 7 general members of the Committee of Management. In Clause 6 of the Bye-laws, it is provided that (1) out of the members of the Committee of Management one will be elected as Sabhapati (2) one or many Secretary will be appointed and there are 4 working trustees and 7 general members of the Committee of Management. A procedure has also been provided for enrollment/ election of the general members. As it is permanent body: (a) trustees are permanent members of the Committee and (b) amongst the total elected members, 1/3rd members will retire from the Committee. If Secretary/ President of the Committee is retired or a vacancy arises, then on the same post a person is elected for remaining period of 3 years. The present working President, namely, Mr. Ram Naresh Singh was elected as President in the month of August, 2021, therefore, he will continue upto the month of August, 2024. So far as the Secretary, namely, Mr. Prithvi Singh Rawat is concerned, he was elected as Secretary in the month of July, 2020, therefore, new election to the post of Secretary will be held in the month of July, 2023. Similarly, the general election of 1/3rd members of the Committee will be held in the month of July, 2023. Parent body i.e. Shri Gandhi Ashram, Lucknow has directed to the Khestriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Garh Road, Meerut to lease out certain property in favour of one Ranuka Ashiyana Private Limited, Resident of 239 Asoda House Western Kutchery Road, Meerut and on this instructions, the Secretary, Kshetriya Shri Gandhi Ashram, Garh Road, Meerut has executed registered sale deed in favour of Ranuka Ashiyana Private Limited, Resident of 239 Asoda House Western Kutchery Road, Meerut on rent of Rs.1,80,000/- and also advance money to a sum of Rs.5 crore was given in favour of parent body i.e. Shri Gandhi Ashram, Lucknow and after aforesaid lease was executed, certain complaints were made, on which, the District Magistrate, Meerut has conducted an enquiry and enquiry was duly conducted by the Additional City Magistrate (Civil Lines), Meerut who has submitted its report on 29.09.2022 before the District Magistrate, Meerut and in which it was found that there is nothing contrary in executing the aforesaid sale deed. 4. 4. The submission of Sri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel is to the effect that although execution of certain deeds was in pursuance of the directions issued by the parent body, by the orders impugned, action has been taken against the petitioners which is not warranted in the facts of the case. He has further argued that in so far as dislodging the Committee under the order dated 09.09.2022 and directing holding of elections is concerned, the order is without jurisdiction as none of the exigencies contemplated under Section 25 ever existed in the present case. He further submits that for the aforesaid reason, the subsequent order dated 05.04.2023 appointing Administrator is also illegal and is liable to be set aside. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the contesting respondents stating therein that the respondents no.2 and 3 are the officials of Khadi and Village Industries Commission which is an institution established by Government of India under Act of Parliament with a view to fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the father of nation – late Mahatma Gandhi about the upliftment of the poor in rural and village areas through the promotion of Khadi and Village Industries activities. The programs of KVIC are implemented mainly through societies and institutions registered under Societies Registration Act. KVIC provides all sorts of financial and other supports to the societies and institutions for undertaking Khadi and Village Industries activities with zero interest, besides providing grants for creation of the infrastructure. All those societies and institutions which are financed by KVIC either create equitable mortgage of their properties in favour of KVIC or incorporate a condition in their Bye-laws that they will not dispose of their any immovable properties without the approval and permission of KVIC till the entire dues of KVIC are repaid together with interest. It has also been provided that if any society or institution disposes of any of its properties without the prior permission of KVIC, the respondents no.2 and 3 have to initiate legal proceedings both civil as well as criminal against the office bearers of the said society or institution. It has been clearly provided in Clauses 37, 38 and 40 of the Bye-laws of the petitioner that so long as the dues of KVIC are not repaid no moveable or immoveable property of the society will be transferred to anyone. It has been clearly provided in Clauses 37, 38 and 40 of the Bye-laws of the petitioner that so long as the dues of KVIC are not repaid no moveable or immoveable property of the society will be transferred to anyone. The society will be entitled to dispose of its properties only when the entire dues of KVIC are repaid and a clearance certificate is obtained. It has further been provided that if it comes in the notice of KVIC that the office bearers of any society are not working properly then KVIC will have right to interfere in the working of the society and it will refer the matter either to the parent society or to the Registrar for removal of such office bearers. In this case, the total outstanding dues of the petitioners as against KVIC as per the balance sheet of 2021-22 is Rs.6,46,57,252.29. An information was received that the petitioners are going to create a lease deed of the property of the Society without the permission and approval of the Commission and this information was brought to the notice of the respondent no.4 who was pleased to stay vide its order dated 08.01.2021 the sale/ transfer of this property until further orders. Despite all this, the petitioners have executed the lease deed of 3271.40 sq mtr land recorded at Nagar Nigam, Khasra No.4674 situated at Shri Gandhi Ashram, Gandhi Nagar, Garh Road, Meerut in favour of M/s Renuka Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. This lease deed was executed by the petitioner without the permission and approval of KVIC and as such it is illegal, unjust and arbitrary on the face of it. However, the respondent no.4 vide his letter 17.12.2021 was pleased to set aside the lease deed in view of the circular dated 26.10.2007 passed by KVIC. The order dated 17.12.2021 passed by the respondent no.4 was not challenged before any court of law by the petitioners. However, the respondent no.4 vide his letter 17.12.2021 was pleased to set aside the lease deed in view of the circular dated 26.10.2007 passed by KVIC. The order dated 17.12.2021 passed by the respondent no.4 was not challenged before any court of law by the petitioners. As per the certified copy of the registry of this lease deed, it is clear that the land of the petitioners is 18 biswa 3 biswansi (2745 sq yards only) whereas the lease deed has been signed for 3271.40 sq mtr (3912.59 sq yard) which means excess land of 1167.50 sq yard has been given on lease to M/s Renuka Ashiyana Pvt. Ltd. The market value of this excess land of 1167.59 sq yard is Rs.7.59 crores as per the valuation report of adjoining land/ property of the petitioners bearing khasra No.4674 which has clearly resulted loss to the Society on account of the petitioners. 6. Various other allegations have been levelled against the petitioners and, in sum and substance, the contention of the respondents is that the petitioners being guilty of committing financial embezzlement and the officials of parent and subsidiary bodies being in hand in gloves and in collusion with each other and transactions of immovable properties having been done contrary to the Bye-laws, rightful decision has been taken in the interest of Gandhi and Village Industries. 7. 7. The arguments on the aforesaid lines have been advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents and in this regard reference to Clauses 37, 38, 39 and 40 of the concerned Bye-laws has been made, which read as follows:- ^^37- ;fn dkj.ko.k laLFkk dh xfrfof/k;ka iw.kZ ;k vkaf'kd :i ls can gks tkrh gS vkSj deh'ku dk ns; QUM 'ks"k jg tkrk gS rks vk;ksx igys laLFkk dh lHkh vpy o py lEifr ij viuk ÁFke Hkkj jD[ksxk vkSj laLFkk fdlh Hkh Ádkj viuh py] vpy lEifr dks rc rd fdlh Hkh O;fDr ;k O;fDr;ksa ;k fdlh nwljh ,tsfUl;ksa dks gLrkarfjr ;k csp ugha ldrh tc rd fd laLFkk }kjk vk;ksx dh lHkh ns;rk;sa iw.kZr;k okil ugha dj nh tkrh vkSj mldks nwj ugha dj fn;k tkrkA 38- ;fn dHkh vk;ksx ds uksfVl esa ,slh ckrsa vkrh gS fd laLFkk dk dk;Z lqpk: :i ls ugha py jgk gS ;k bldk ÁcU/k Bhd ugha gS rks vk;ksx ds laLFkk ds dk;Z esa gLr{ksi djus dk vf/kdkjh gksxk o ,sls dqÁcU/kdh; ekeys ds mfpr lek/kku gsrq ekr` laLFkk ;k jftLVªkj ds ikl Hkstus esa deh'ku l{ke gksxk o laLFkk ds ,sls vf/kdkfj;ksa dks gVkus ds fy, dgsxk] ftuds jgus ls laLFkk ds fgrksa dks uqdlku igqaprk gksA 39- laLFkk }kjk vk;ksx ls _.k o vuqnku ds :i esa ÁkIr vkfFkZd lgk;rk laLFkk }kjk dsoy mlh mÌs'; ds fy, gLrkarfjr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA 40- fdlh ekeys esa ;fn deh'ku dk dksà _.k cdk;k gS rks laLFkk viuh py&vpy lEifr dks cspus dh rHkh ik= gksxh tc mlus deh'ku ds lHkh _.kksa dk okil dj fn;k gks vkSj mlds fy, vk;ksx ls vf/kd`r tkudkjh ;k vf/kdkfj;ksa ls Dyh;jsUl lfVZfQdsV ys fy;k gksA** 8. Learned counsel for the respondents has argued that certain FIRs were registered against the office bearers of the petitioners and despite the fact that a final report was illegally submitted by the investigating agency, the same has not been approved so far by the court concerned. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a Division Bench decision of Lucknow Bench of this Court dated 13.05.2019 passed in Misc. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon a Division Bench decision of Lucknow Bench of this Court dated 13.05.2019 passed in Misc. Bench No.31167 of 2018 as well as order dated 22.09.2022 passed in Writ-C No.28763 of 2022 and it has been contended that once on the ground of financial embezzlement and misappropriation of properties, the authorities of Gandhi and Village Industries Commission took action of the identical nature which they have taken in the present case, no interference is warranted. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I find it appropriate to refer the provisions under which the order impugned dated 09.09.2022 has been passed. As stated above, the Deputy Registrar has directed holding of fresh elections in purported exercise of powers under Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860. The said provision reads as follows:- "25 (2) Where by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of a Society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of that Society, he may call a meeting of the general body of such Society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorised by him this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the Society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications." 10. The issue that falls for consideration by this Court is as to whether the Deputy Registrar had power to dislodge the existing Committee of Management and issue a direction for holding of fresh elections in exercise of powers under Section 25(2) of the Act. 11. Sri Ojha submits that an order under sub-section (2) of Section 25 can be passed only when by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office bearers of a Society has not been held within the time specified in the Rules of that Society. He submits that no order has been passed under Section 25(1) of the Act to the aforesaid effect and, therefore, the direction for dislodging the existing Committee or for holding of fresh elections is contrary to law. He also submits that the consequential order appointing Administrator is also invalid in the facts of the case. 12. Per contra, the submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that for the reasons stated in the counter affidavit and the arguments advanced, the action has been taken by invoking Clauses 37 to 40 of the Bye-laws, as already quoted in this judgment. 13. Sri Rajiv Sharma has vehemently argued that though action under sub-section (2) is dependent upon an order passed under subsection (1), however, that is not the only contingency in law and action can be taken even in absence of an order passed under subsection (1), where the Registrar is otherwise satisfied to direct for holding of elections and, in the present case, since there are serious grounds for taking action against the petitioners in the light of concerned Bye-laws, which empower the authorities to take over the management, the consequential action for holding fresh elections is according to law. 14. Since different interpretations in relation to Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860 are being made by learned counsel for both sides, this Court feels necessary to refer the law settled by the Apex Court with regard to interpretation of a Statute with reference to the context. 15. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute or any statutory provision is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature or the Authority enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 74 ). The intention of the maker is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1, Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures, defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 6 Moore PC 1, Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures, defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (Also See State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr,. JT 1998 (2) SC 253). It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., 1978 (1) All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 847 . 16. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended, but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981 . 17. In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. Etc., AIR 1977 SC 842 , it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 18. While interpreting a provision, the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain, 2000 (5) SCC 515 . The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 19. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain, 2000 (5) SCC 515 . The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. 19. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Case 61). Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378). 20. Jurisprudence of statutory interpretation has moved from literal interpretation to purposive interpretation, which advances the purpose and object of a legislation. The Supreme Court in catena of judgments has dealt with the issue of literal interpretation vis-a-vis purposive interpretation. The Apex Court in The Central India Spinning and Weaving Manufacturing Comp. Vs. The Municipal Committee, Wardha; AIR 1958 SC 341 has held that it is also a recognised principle of construction that general words and phrases however wide and comprehensive they may be in their literal sense must usually be construed as being limited to the actual objects of the Act. 21. The Apex Court in Girdhari Lal & Sons Vs. Balbir Nath Mathur; 1986 (2) SCC 237 , has held that the primary and foremost task of a Court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to so interpret the statute as to promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Having ascertained the intention, the Court must then strive to so interpret the statute as to promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. For this purpose, where necessary the Court may even depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according to their plain meaning. There need no meek and mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent injustice, anomly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a law, the court would be well justified in departing from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing the written word if necessary. Supreme Court has generally taken the view that ascertainment of legislative intent is a basic rule of statutory construction and that a rule of construction should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of a legislation and that though a construction, according to plain language, should ordinarily be adopted, such a construction should not be adopted where it leads to anomalies, injustices, or absurdities, vide K.P. Varghese V. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173 , State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. M. Khan, (1981) 4 SCC 82 , Som Prakash Rekhi V. Unioin of India, (1981) 1 SCC 449 , Ravula Subba Rao V. CIT, AIR 1956 SC 604 , Govindlal v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, (1975) 2 SCC 482 and Babaji Kondaji v. Nasik Merchants Co-op Bank Ltd. (1984) 2 SCC 50 . 22. Reference to similar decision of Apex Court in Utkal Contractors & Joinery Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa; 1987 (3) SCC 279 can also be made. 23. In the light of aforesaid judicial pronouncements, Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860 is to be examined by this Court. The comma (,) used after the words and figure “sub-section (1)” in the first line of subsection (2) makes it clear that the subsequent portion of the said subsection (2) has to be read in connection with an order made under subsection (1) and not separately. The comma (,) used after the words and figure “sub-section (1)” in the first line of subsection (2) makes it clear that the subsequent portion of the said subsection (2) has to be read in connection with an order made under subsection (1) and not separately. The words “or an office bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office” used in sub-section (2) of Section 25 cannot be read separately from words immediately following Comma (,), i.e. an election is set aside or an office bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office and both the said situations have to come into existence in pursuance of an order made under sub-section (1) of Section 25 and not otherwise. Therefore, even if the respondents feel that by any act of the petitioners any office bearer of the petitioner Committee/Society is held no longer entitled to continue in office, they cannot, at their own, take a decision against the petitioners by either removing any office bearer nor can they dislodge the Committee/Society of the governing body which they have done in the present case. 24. Admittedly, no proceedings were held under sub-section (1) of Section 25 nor was any order passed by any authority under that provision. I also find that even if there were certain allegations against the petitioners in relation to the transactions qua immovable properties, Clause 38 of the Bye-laws provides that the Commission shall have a right to interfere in the management and for the purposes of appropriate solution of mismanagement, the Commission would be competent to refer the matter to the parent Society or Registrar and would ask them to take action against such officers whose presence in the Society was causing harm to the interest of the Society. 25. I do not find anything in the Bye-laws that the Deputy Registrar can directly order for holding elections under Section 25(2) of the Act or that he can directly dislodge an elected body and, in the opinion of the Court, if there were certain allegations against the petitioners, the Commission was competent to refer the matter to the parent body and if the allegation is against the parent body also, the matter could be referred to the Registrar. In such event, the Registrar could have initiated the procedure under Section 23 or 24 of the Act which are the provisions for conducting audit on the basis of production of financial documents by the Society and also for mismanagement of the affairs or of any breach of fiduciary or other like obligations and consequential investigation into the affairs of the society. Admittedly, no proceedings under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act have been held in the present case nor has any order been passed under Section 25(1) of the Act. In absence of any such action or proceedings, I do not find it to be within jurisdiction of the Deputy Registrar to directly dislodge the Committee and direct holding of fresh elections. Therefore, the order impugned dated 09.09.2022 is found to be without jurisdiction. 26. In so far as the order dated 05.04.2023 is concerned, I do not find any provision in the Bye-laws under which Administrator can be appointed. It appears that considering the nature of allegations against the petitioners, the Director has proceeded to appoint the Divisional Director, Meerut as Administrator. In the order dated 05.04.2023 reference to Clause 38 of the Bye-laws has been made and even after perusing the said clause, power to appoint Administrator is not inferred. 27. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders dated 09.09.2022 and 05.04.2023 do not sustain and are hereby quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 28. However, setting aside of the orders impugned will not preclude the respondents to hold proceedings under Sections 23 and 24 or any other proceedings under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as may be warranted in the facts of the case, keeping in view the role of the parent body also and the fact as to who actually is guilty of misappropriation etc., if at all anybody is. This order shall also not preclude the respondent Commission to make a reference as provided under Clause 38 of the Bye-laws. It is expected that in case any action is proposed under the said provisions, fullest opportunity of hearing shall be provided to the petitioners as well as parent body, keeping in view the provisions themselves and also the registered Bye-laws.