JUDGEMENT 1. A college boy, namely, Shabir Ahmad Rather, lost his life to electrocution on 6th August, 2007, in Village Chandrigam Tral. It so happened that the father of the deceased, namely, Ghulam Mohammad Rather, went out of his house to fetch water from the water hand pump installed nearby. The moment Ghulam Mohammad Rather touched the handle of the water hand pump, he got electric shock. On his crying, his wife, Mst. Taja Begum, and his son, the deceased, came out of their house and tried to save him from the electric shock. While doing so, the deceased go electrocuted. Upon verifying the fact, it came to light that the electricity line passing through the compound of the house of Ghulam Mohammad Rather had snapped and fallen on the water hand pump which caused electric short-circuit. The father of the deceased lodged a report in this regard with Police Station, Awantipora, on 8th August, 2007, and simultaneously moved an application before Tehsildar concerned. The police investigated the matter and came to the conclusion that the live electric wire which was passing through the compound of the father of the deceased had incidentally snapped and fallen on the water hand pump which caused short-circuit and claimed life of the deceased Shabir Ahmad Bhat. The father of the deceased having lost his son to electrocution did not get any response from the administration and, therefore, filed the instant petition claiming, inter alia, an amount of Rs. 15.00 lacs a compensation. 2. On being put on notice, the respondents have filed their objections which are supported by an affidavit sworn in by Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Power Development Department. The respondents have, though denied any negligence in the matter, yet submitted that it is true that on the fateful day electric line had got snapped during night due to wind storm. It is submitted that the department was very prompt to undertake the repair work of the snapped line. It is further case of the respondents that the deceased got electrocuted not because of any negligence of the respondents but because of the fact that the deceased had tried to fiddle with the electric line by himself connecting the same. The incident, which is admitted by the respondents, led to the filing of an FIR by the family of the deceased. The incident, which is admitted by the respondents, led to the filing of an FIR by the family of the deceased. The claim of the petitioners for payment of a lump sum amount of Rs. 15.00 lacs has also been denied by the respondents. It is submitted that vide Government Order No. 25-PDD of 2011, dated 24.01.2011, the respondents have extended ex-gratia relief/compensation scheme applicable to the employees of the Power Development Department to the civilians also who are killed or injured resulting in their partial or total disability subject to the explicit condition that the accident is not attributable to them but to the lapses of the department as verified by the Director, Training, Inspection and Commissioning (DTI&C). The Government Order provides for payment an ex-gratia relief of Rs. 1.00 lac in case of death. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, the following question arise for consideration in this case: 1. Whether the writ petition seeking relief in the nature of compensation for electrocution, which involves determination of disputed questions of fact, is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; 2. Whether in the given facts and circumstances, the respondents can be held negligent in maintaining the electric wires so as to fasten liability upon them to compensate Next of Kin of the deceased; 3. To what amount the petitioners can be held entitled to in the light of pleadings and the documentary evidence on record. 4. Indisputably, the cause of death of the deceased is shock due to electrocution. The death allegedly took place due to shock by a live electric wire that fallen on the ground because of its snapping in a wind storm. It is true that the respondents, in their reply affidavit, have denied any negligence in the matter but the fact remains that the duty to maintain electric wires in a manner that it does not pose any danger to the life and property of the citizens lies solely on the Power Development Department. It is true that the respondents, in their reply affidavit, have denied any negligence in the matter but the fact remains that the duty to maintain electric wires in a manner that it does not pose any danger to the life and property of the citizens lies solely on the Power Development Department. Although, the pleadings are deficient and it is difficult for this Court to adjudicate and determine the disputed questions of fact yet by the aid of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, this Court can safely say that had the respondents taken care of switching off the mains in anticipation or immediately after the damage had been caused by the wind storm, the incidents of such nature could have been averted. The Court may agree with the respondents that the live electric wires got snapped due to wind storm but nothing prevented them to act immediately and snap the electricity by switching off the mains. Nothing of the sort appears to have been done by the respondents. The accident took placed only in the morning. The manner in which the accident has happened and a young boy got trapped into the live electric wire that had fallen due to its snapping from the electric pole, one could safely say that there was a lack of reasonable care on the part of respondents, though I agree with the respondents that this Court may not be in a position to determine complicated disputed questions of fact in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. As is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari & Ors. [ (2002) 2 SCC 162 ], the responsibility to supply electric energy to its citizens lies with the State acting either through its Department of Power or Statutory Electricity Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it, the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension, the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Power Development Department or the Electricity Board, as the case may be, that somebody committed mischief which resulted in electrocution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case strongly relied upon the doctrine of 'strict liability' propounded in English Common Law in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330]. 5. The rule of 'strict liability' propounded in the aforesaid case has been approved and followed in various subsequent judgements in England. The principle, however, gained approval in India in various judgments, in particular, the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, [ AIR 1990 SC 1480 ] and a Division Bench judgment in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [ 1987 ACJ 561 ]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court even went beyond the rule of 'strict liability' in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ AIR 1987 SC 1086 ], by holding that 'where the enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused to anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions of the principle of 'strict liability' under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 6. Undoubtedly, the rule of 'strict liability' is not without exceptions. There are in as many as six exceptions carved out to the rule of 'strict liability' propounded by Rylands v. Fletcher. The plaintiff's own fault, act of God, consent of the plaintiff, act of third party etc. etc. are some of the exceptions carved out to the rule. 6. Undoubtedly, the rule of 'strict liability' is not without exceptions. There are in as many as six exceptions carved out to the rule of 'strict liability' propounded by Rylands v. Fletcher. The plaintiff's own fault, act of God, consent of the plaintiff, act of third party etc. etc. are some of the exceptions carved out to the rule. However, having regard to the distance we have traveled evaluating the aforesaid doctrine and the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, it is no longer res Integra that the exceptions carved out to the general principle of 'strict liability' propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher have been considerably diluted. The principle of 'strict liability' and the exceptions thereto and its impact in the Indian context is explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 8 to 14 of the judgement in Shail Kumari's case (supra), which, for facility of reference, are reproduced hereunder:- "9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330: (1861-73) All ER Rep 1]. Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F) "[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape." 10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this:"Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply." (Vide p. 535, Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn.) 11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A recent decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather plc. The said principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, had followed with approval the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330] By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31) Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident; such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) being "an act of stranger". The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage. 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry, that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high-tension current found its way through the low-tension cable into the premises of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road." 7. In view of the aforesaid legal position, I am of the considered opinion that notwithstanding the respondents have disputed their liability to compensate on the ground that the accident has not happened due to any negligence or lapse attributable to the Power Development Department, the respondents are still liable to compensate the petitioners for the loss of life of their kin on the principle of 'strict liability' propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher and explained and applied in M.C. Mehta. 8. It is not debated before me, whether this Court under Article 226 can award compensation where act of commission or omission resulting in injury to a citizen is attributable to the State or its officer. Legal position is well explained in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [ (1993) 2 SCC 746 ], Sube Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 3 SCC 178 ], Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [ (1985) 4 SCC 677 ], D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [ (1997) 1 SCC 416 ] etc. etc. 9. Legal position is well explained in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [ (1993) 2 SCC 746 ], Sube Singh v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 3 SCC 178 ], Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [ (1985) 4 SCC 677 ], D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [ (1997) 1 SCC 416 ] etc. etc. 9. It is equally an unexceptionable proposition of law that the Constitutional court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction can award suitable compensation against state instruments or corporations engaged in an activity which is inherently dangerous and has potential of affecting life and health of citizens. (See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1987) 1 SCC 395 ]). 10. In the instant case facts are not much in dispute and issues raised can be resolved on the basis of material on record and in the light of settled legal principles. If in case of deprivation of fundamental right of life and liability guaranteed by Article 21 of Constitution of India. Such claims for compensation are public law claims distinguished from private law claims for damages. Ordinarily writ petition for adjudication of complicated disputed questions of fact requiring evidence, documentary or oral, may not be entertained; however, where facts are not much in dispute and claim is based on "strict liability" principle, the Constitutional Courts do not hesitate to entertain writ petitions and grant relief in public law jurisdiction. 11. The aforesaid discussion answers first two questions appropriately. 12. This takes us to the Question No. 3. In the absence of proper pleadings, I feel a little bit helpless to compute the exact compensation that may be payable to the petitioners on account of loss of life of their kin. The petitioners have not even indicated the age of the deceased at the time of accident nor is it pleaded anywhere that the deceased, who was a student at the relevant point of time, was earning anything. The age of the deceased, the income which he was earning or could have earned had he remained alive, number of dependents etc. are some of the questions which can only be determined on the basis of evidence on record. Admittedly, neither there are pleadings nor is there any evidence on any of these aspects. The age of the deceased, the income which he was earning or could have earned had he remained alive, number of dependents etc. are some of the questions which can only be determined on the basis of evidence on record. Admittedly, neither there are pleadings nor is there any evidence on any of these aspects. Sans such minimum pleadings supported by some documentary evidence, it may not be possible for me to compute the compensation on the basis of parameters and principles laid down under Motor Vehicles Act. 13. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the deceased is deprived of his life by the act of negligence attributable to the State and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be left high and dry at this point of time when many years have passed after the accident. It would be highly undesirable to relegate the petitioners to the remedy under civil law without providing them succour. I am told that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, in the Department of Power Development, has been coming up with Government Orders from time to time providing for payment of ex-gratia relief in favour of legal heirs of the deceased or to the injured, as the case may be. From the reply affidavit filed by the respondents, it appears that there was a Government Order bearing No. 25-PDD of 2011, dated 24.01.2011 providing for payment of Rs. 1.00 lac ex-gratia relief in favour of legal heirs of the deceased who died of electrocution attributable to the lapse on the part of Power Development Department. Since I have already held that the accident, which consumed the life of the deceased, took place due to serious lapse on the part of the respondents, as such, by the aid of Government Orders issued by the respondents from time to time, particularly the latest one issued in the year, 2019 under No. 454-F of 2019 dated 24.10.2019, which provides for compensation of Rs. 10.00 lacs in case of death, I am inclined to allow this petition and award a lump sum amount of Rs. 10.00 lacs in favour of the petitioners. 14. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the petitioners are held entitled to a lump sum amount of Rs. 10.00 lacs in case of death, I am inclined to allow this petition and award a lump sum amount of Rs. 10.00 lacs in favour of the petitioners. 14. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and the petitioners are held entitled to a lump sum amount of Rs. 10.00 lacs to be paid by the respondents within a period of two months, failing which the entire amount shall become payable along with interest @ 6% per annum to be calculated from the date of judgment till its final realization. The amount of compensation shall be shared in the following manner- (I) Mother of the deceased = 50% (II) Brother of the deceased = 25% (III) Sister of the deceased = 25% 15. Disposed of as above.