JUDGMENT : Challenging the common judgment and award dated 02.01.2002 passed by the learned Judge, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as the learned Tribunal for short) in MACT Cases Nos.105/1996, 68/1996 and 66/1996 the appellant-Insurance Company has preferred three separate civil misc. appeals. 2. As the facts as well as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties are common, therefore, all the three appeals are being decided by this common judgment. 3. The facts in nutshell are that an accident occurred on 02.10.1995 at a place situated about 2 kms from Dhirera on the way to Lunkaransar. In the said accident, Sharda Sharma and Madanlal expired and other claimants sustained injuries. The deceased and the claimants were travelling in a Jeep bearing no.RNF-1145 (hereinafter referred to as the offending vehicle for short) which was owned by Gora Devi, who is impleaded as respondent in all the civil misc. appeals. The learned Tribunal while holding that the appellant-Insurance Company failed to produce any evidence in its favour, held the appellant-Insurance Company liable and awarded compensation to the claimants. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and award, the appellant-Insurance Company filed the present appeals. 4. Mr. Sanjeev Johari, learned Senior Counsel at the outset submits that on the basis of the evidence oral as well as documentary available on record, it is proved by the appellant-Insurance Company that the offending vehicle was insured for the personal use and not for carrying the passengers for hire and reward. It is submitted that the policy was exhibited before the learned tribunal and a bare perusal of the same would reveal that no premium was taken by the appellant-Insurance Company for carrying passengers. Learned Senior Counsel submits that in view of the above, there is violation of the terms and conditions of the policy by the owner of the offending vehicle, but the learned Tribunal has not considered this aspect of the matter. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal fastened the liability upon the appellant-Insurance Company only on the basis that the appellant-Insurance Company has not raised any specific plea regarding violation of the terms and conditions of the policy, whereas if the written statement of the appellant-Insurance Company is minutely seen, then it is amply clear that the appellant-Insurance Company specifically stated that there has been a violation of the terms and conditions of the policy. Thus, it is submitted that the findings of learned Tribunal that the appellant-Insurance Company failed to prove the violation of the policy conditions is not correct. Learned Senior Counsel submits that in view of the above, the present appeals deserve to be allowed and the appellant-Insurance Company be exonerated from its liability. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Meena Variyal & Ors. reported in (2007) 5 SCC 428 and judgment of this Court in the case of Leeladhar Vs. Mahendra Singh & Ors (SBCMA no.211/2002), decided on 18.2.2021. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-owner while opposing the prayer made by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-Insurance Company submits that the learned Tribunal after considering each and every aspect of the matter, has rightly passed the impugned judgment and award and therefore, the same does not call for any interference. It is submitted that at the relevant point of time, the offending vehicle was not plying on hire basis and no fare was taken from the claimants. It is submitted that even the appellant-Insurance Company failed to prove that there was any violation of terms and conditions of the policy. Therefore, it is submitted that all the three appeals preferred by the appellant-Insurance Company may be rejected. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the entire record. 7. The learned Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment and award held that the appellant-Insurance Company failed to raise any specific plea that there was violation of the policy conditions. For this purpose, I perused the written statement of the appellant-Insurance Company, precisely para no.29 of the additional submissions, which reads as under: ^^29- ;g fd chek /kkjh us chek 'krksZ dk mYy?kau fd;k gSa blfy, mRrjnkrk ds eqvkots dh jk’kh pqdkus gsrq mRrjnk;h ugha gSA^^ I have also perused the statements of the witness of the appellant-Insurance Company as well as the statements of the claimants. AW-1 Smt. Gayatri, in her statements recorded on oath has stated as under: ^^thi geus fdjk;s ij yh Fkh vkSj thi MªkbZoj dks fdjk;s esa ls 1]000@& ¼,d gtkj :i;s½ Mhty Hkjkus ds fn;s FksA ------- ;g lgh gS fd thi dk fdjk;k ,d gtkj :i;s vfxze fn;k FkkA^^ AW-2 Mahendra Kumar in his statements recorded on oath has stated as under: ^^;g ckr lgh gS fd thi dks geus iSls nsdj fdjk;s ij ;k=k dh FkhA vFkkZr thi fdjk;s ij djds mles ;k=k dh Fkh^^ So far as the witness of the appellant-Insurance Company i.e., NAW-1 Indraj Singh, who was the then Assistant Administrative Officer, Divisional Office, National Insurance Company Ltd., Bikaner is concerned, he in his Court statements stated that: ^^mi;ksx lacaf/kr 'krZ izn’kZ&11 es , ls ch es vafdr gS vkSj izn’kZ ,u-,-&1 ikWfylh esa Hkh , ls ch esa vafdr gSA mDr 'krZ ds vuqlkj ;fn okgu dks fdjk;s ij lokjh ढksus ds fy;s iz;qDr fd;k tkrk gS rks gekjk dksbZ nkf;Ro ugha curk gSA^^ I have also perused the Insurance Policy. A perusal of the same makes it clear that the same is ‘A Policy for Act Liability’ and is a personal policy. The condition no.(b) of ‘Limitations as to use’ is relevant for the purpose of present controversy, which reads as under: “(b) Private service Vehicle & non transport Vehicle (For Act Cover) The Policy Covers use for any purpose other that (a) hire or reward (b) organised or (c) Speed testing.” 8. In view of the above, it is clear that the appellant-Insurance Company has specifically pleaded and proved by way of oral and documentary evidence that there was breach of policy conditions as even the claimants in their statements have stated that they travelled in the offending vehicle after paying the fare. The learned Tribunal has not considered this vital aspect of the matter while directing the appellant-Insurance Company to indemnify the award amount. 9. In National Insurance Company Limited v. Sahidan Bano reported in 2015 (2) RAR 892 (Raj.), it was held that: “11. In view of the settled legal position, as aforesaid, it remains no longer res integra that the impugned direction of the learned Tribunal in the impugned order dated 08.03.2006 to the appellant-Insurance Company to pay and recover, cannot be sustained. In National Insurance Company Limited v. Sahidan Bano reported in 2015 (2) RAR 892 (Raj.), it was held that: “11. In view of the settled legal position, as aforesaid, it remains no longer res integra that the impugned direction of the learned Tribunal in the impugned order dated 08.03.2006 to the appellant-Insurance Company to pay and recover, cannot be sustained. The insurance cover in question was admittedly, "ACT ONLY POLICY" and did not cover the risk of fare paying passenger, like deceased Kursheed @ Khursheed, who admittedly hired the Jeep alongwith 4-5 persons for Rs.200/-on the fateful day of accident on 15/16.12.1998. He therefore, could not be said to be a 'third party' covered by the said policy in question, as rightly found by the learned Tribunal in the order dated 08.03.2006. The learned Tribunal has however, fallen into error in applying the judgment in the case of Swaran Singh (supra), in which the direction to pay and recover is given only for the compensation awarded to a third party and this decision was clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the later decision in the case of Meena Variyal (supra) vide aforesaid quoted portions. Therefore, the impugned direction in the order dated 08.03.2006 deserves to be set aside. The owner and driver of the Jeep will however, continue to be liable to pay the compensation payable to the legal representatives of the deceased Kursheed @ Khursheed. Nobody has represented them before this Court, despite service. ” 10. Accordingly, all the three appeals are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment and award dated 02.01.2002 is quashed and set aside to the extent of holding the appellant-Insurance Company liable and it is held that the appellant-insurance Company is exonerated from its liability and the respondent-owner is liable to pay the award amount to the claimants. It is also held that the appellant-Insurance Company is entitled to recover amount of award from the respondent-owner, if already paid by it to the claimants. 11. All the interlocutory applications as well as stay applications stand disposed of accordingly.