JUDGMENT : Shekhar B. Saraf, J. 1. The present review petition by Rumpa Ghosh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘applicant') arises from the order dated February 2, 2016 passed by Justice Ashoke Kumar Dasadhikari in C.O. No. 3315 of 2015. Facts 2. The factual matrix of the case is laid down below: a. Initially, a title suit no. 1337 of 2006 was filed with the City Civil Court at Calcutta by International Service Centre and Anr. (the plaintiff therein, hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondents') for eviction and recovery of Khass possession. The respondents then filed an application for amendment of the plaint, and by order dated February 18, 2010, the trial court allowed the said amendment. b. In response, an application was filed by the applicant for recalling the said order dated February 18, 2010. The prayer was granted by an order dated December 7, 2011 and the amendment stood rejected due to failure on the part of the respondents to comply with Order VI Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. c. Thereafter, in the said title suit, the applicant filed a written statement along with a counterclaim to the original plaint on March 16, 2012. In the meanwhile, a revisional application being C.O. 1635 of 2012 was filed by the respondents before this Court against the order dated December 7, 2011. d. By an order dated June 04, 2012, this Court disposed of the said application and permitted the respondents to apply for amendment of the plaint before the trial court, and directed that the same was to be decided in accordance with the law. e. Subsequently, on September 29, 2012 the amendment was allowed by the trial court, and a copy of the amended plaint was also served upon the applicant on November 29, 2012. f. By an order dated February 06, 2013, the applicant was given time till March 11, 2013, to file an additional written statement to the amended plaint. The same date was also fixed for submission of office report in respect of the counterclaim. Due to certain reasons, the applicant could not file the additional written statement on the said date. g. The office report was then put up for hearing before the trial court on May 24, 2013, and the date for filing the additional written statement was then fixed on July 3, 2013. Due to certain reasons, the applicant could not file the additional written statement on the said date. g. The office report was then put up for hearing before the trial court on May 24, 2013, and the date for filing the additional written statement was then fixed on July 3, 2013. However, even on this date, due to certain reasons, the applicant could not file the additional written statement and the matter was adjourned till November 12, 2013, for filing suggested issues and framing of issues. h. In any case, the applicant had reasons to believe that the order dated March 11, 2013 was required to be corrected and/or modified as certain words were subsequently deleted in the said order by criss-crossing on the order sheet. The same was also pointed to this Court by the applicant. i. By virtue of such subsequent deletions in the order sheet, it is the applicant’s case that she was deprived of her opportunity to file the additional written statement to the amended plaint. Therefore, the applicant filed an application on March 11, 2014 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for recalling and modification of order dated March 11, 2013 with a prayer to grant leave to the applicant to file an additional written statement. The applicant also prayed to keep the directions for framing of issues in abeyance. j. By an order dated May 5, 2015, the applicant’s application for waiver of costs imposed on March 23, 2015, was considered and rejected. In the said order, the application for recalling and/or modification of the order dated March 11, 2013, was allowed and the order dated March 11, 2013 / May 24, 2013, was set aside, and June 05, 2015 was fixed for filing additional written statement to the amended plaint. On June 05, 2015, the date to file additional written statement was further extended to July 23, 2015. k. On July 23, 2015, the applicant filed another application under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for modification of the order dated May 05, 2015 to the extent that the counter-claim to the original plaint should not be set aside and prayed for keeping the directions for filing of additional written statement in abeyance till modification of the said order. The trial court rejected the said prayer and also stated that the chapter of filing the written statement was now closed. l. The applicant challenged the said order by way of Civil Revision application being CO 3315 of 2015 before this Court. The applicant prayed for order dated July 23, 2015 passed by trial court to be set aside rejecting the prayer of the applicant for modification of order no. 65 dated May 5, 2015 of trial court to the extent of counter-claim of the applicant and to keep the said order in abeyance till disposal of the said revisional application. By a reasoned order dated February 2, 2016, this Court dismissed the said application. A special leave petition was preferred by the applicant against the said order before the Supreme Court and on July 08, 2016, the same was dismissed as withdrawn. m. Lastly, a review petition being R.V.W. 303 of 2016 has been filed against the order dated February 2, 2016 of this Court in C.O. 3315 of 2015. Submissions 3. Mr K.K. Maiti, counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, has put forth the following arguments: a. The counsel argued that the Court had misconstrued the facts of the case and proceeded on an erroneous presumption that the applicant in the revisional application was herself responsible for withdrawing her counterclaim and that on her prayer itself, the order dated March 11, 2013 was recalled by the trial court in its order dated May 05, 2015. The counsel further argued that the applicant, in its recalling application, merely sought modification of the order to the extent that the applicant is allowed to file an additional written statement to the respondent's amended plaint. b. The counsel submitted that the Court erroneously proceeded and committed an error apparent on the fact of the record by misconstruing the applicant’s submission with respect to counterclaim and additional written statement. He stated that this Court’s order dated February 2, 2016, contains an error inasmuch as it records that the applicant has accepted the order dated March 11, 2013, and has never questioned the same and, on the contrary, records that the applicant has asked for recalling of the said order dated March 11, 2013. The counsel says that such an error is sufficient to set aside the impugned order. The counsel says that such an error is sufficient to set aside the impugned order. c. The counsel contended that the impugned order affirmed the mistake committed by the trial court based on misconception of facts. He went on to submit that the impugned order did not take into consideration the scope of the applicant's application for recalling the order of the trial court dated March 11, 2013 and, on the contrary, proceeded on the erroneous presumption that since such application was allowed and the order recalled, the applicant cannot, at that stage, seek to restore her counter claim. The learned counsel further argued that the impugned order gave rise to an alarming situation where the counter claim filed by the petitioner as long back as on March 16, 2012 along with the court fees has been disregarded due to an apparent misconception of fact by the trial court, which was further affirmed by the impugned order. Ergo, the review of the impugned order is necessary as it has caused severe prejudice to the applicant. d. The counsel, as a response to the contentions raised by the respondents with respect to the limitation point, argued that keeping in mind the Supreme Court order and in the absence of any time frame set by the Supreme Court, there is no requirement to file any Section 5 application for the purpose of filing this review petition. 4. Mr. Jahar Chakraborty counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents propounded the following arguments: a. The counsel contended that the amended plaint was filed long back and thereafter adequate opportunities were granted to the applicant but she abused the process of court and chose not to file the additional written statement despite grant of repeated extensions. b. The counsel argued that acceptance of counter–claim by order dated March 11, 2013 was recalled by the trial court only on the application made by the petitioner/defendant. The counsel further argued that the order dated May 5, 2015 was passed upon contested hearing and therefore, the petitioner is herself responsible for withdrawing her counter–claim and on her prayer the order passed on March 11, 2013 was recalled. c. The counsel submitted that no review applies in the present petition as the same is time barred and further, no Section 5 application for condonation of delay has been filed by the Applicant. Observations & Analysis 5. c. The counsel submitted that no review applies in the present petition as the same is time barred and further, no Section 5 application for condonation of delay has been filed by the Applicant. Observations & Analysis 5. I have heard the counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the materials on record. 6. In the interest of justice, I will straight away move to decide the present review application on merits without delving into the question of condonation of delay in filing of the same. That being said, this Court feels that it would be apt to discuss the jurisdiction of this Court to review its own judgments. 7. Often when one addresses judges as Lordships, they forget that judges are human too and therefore, are not infallible. In recognition of this principle, being a Court of Record under Article 215 of Indian Constitution, power of review is inherent in the High Court. However, this power is not without its own limitations and is subject to certain restrictions. The power to review is to be exercised only in a very limited category of circumstances and that too with extreme caution. 8. At this juncture, it is prudent to peruse Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which delineates the grounds on which a review can be sought: a. discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; b. such important matter or evidence which could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and c. on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient reason. [See Haridas Das -v- Usha Rani Banik (Smt) and Ors. reported in (2006) 4 S.C.C. 78 , para 15] 9. In Parsion Devi and Ors. -v- Sumitri Devi and Ors. reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Supreme Court held that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. There is clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Supreme Court held that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. There is clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of review jurisdiction as a review petition has a limited purpose. 10. In the recent case of S. Madhusudan Reddy -v-Narayana Reddy reported in 2022 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1034, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the grounds on which a review petition would be maintainable under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The relevant paragraphs have been extracted below :– “18. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the Applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason. * 20. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, stating that an error that is not self-evident and the one that has to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers of review, this Court held as under: 7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. this Court opined: 11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 C.P.C. it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'." [emphasis added] 11. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs. –vs- Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 28150 of 2017 reiterated the principles of review. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below – 7. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below – 7. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement". It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. In the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi vs. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (19 71) 3 SCC 844, this Court has held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. 8. What can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the proceedings has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of T.C. Basappa vs T.Nagappa, A.I.R. 1954 SC 440. It is held that such an error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 SC 233, it is observed as under: "It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere record? Learned counsel on either side was unable to suggest any clear cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated.” 12. In addition to the above principles, I am of the view that while considering review applications we must also keep in mind the principles of natural justice wherein the Courts must not forget that the end goal of such power is to correct the wrongs committed and ultimately prevent miscarriage of justice. I firmly believe that principles of natural justice must take centre place in every possible situation and that they are to be kept in mind whenever a Court renders its decision in any review application. As guardian of citizens’ rights and liberties, the Courts must realise that they are not unerring and should always be open to correcting their wrongs in the interest of justice. 13. As guardian of citizens’ rights and liberties, the Courts must realise that they are not unerring and should always be open to correcting their wrongs in the interest of justice. 13. Coming to the facts of the present case, it appears that, in reality, it was not the applicant's plea to recall the order dated March 11, 2013, but rather her plea was limited to the extent of allowing her to file an additional written statement at a later date. This Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record in coming to the conclusion that there was no merit in the revisional application filed against the trial court’s order dated July 23, 2015 which had set aside its own order dated March 11, 2013/May 24, 2013. 14. At this juncture, I feel it is important to point out that in effect, while I pronounce this judgment, the order which has been challenged before me is not just the one dated February 02, 2016 by this Court but also the trial court order dated July 23, 2015 which will be affected by my order today. While perusing the latter, it appears that while the trial court was right in extending the time to file additional written statement but by setting aside the entire order dated March 11, 2013, for all practical purposes, the written statement and the counter claim of the applicant to the original plaint also got set aside. This Court, while pronouncing its judgment in the revisional petition against the said trial court order, concurred with the findings of the trial court that the applicant was herself responsible for obtaining an order to set aside the entire order dated March 11, 2013, but in doing so this Court disregarded the misinterpretation of the applicant’s plea by the trial court. 15. I do concur that adequate time and opportunity has been provided to the applicant for filing her additional written statement and at the same time it is also true that more than seven years since the trial court’s order in question was passed and that the original suit itself is now pending for over sixteen years. The end goal of our judicial system is not just to ensure that justice is achieved but that it is achieved in a timely manner so as to not nullify its objectives. The end goal of our judicial system is not just to ensure that justice is achieved but that it is achieved in a timely manner so as to not nullify its objectives. However, just to glance at the other side of the coin, achieving justice quickly should never result in giving decisions in haste. While delay in filing of the additional written statement by the applicant despite grant of multiple opportunities by the trial court is significant and cannot be overlooked, yet nullifying the applicant’s counter claim first by the trial court and then by this Court, in my view, goes against the principles of justice. 16. Before moving towards the concluding portion of this judgment, I feel it would be apt to refer to M/s Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd -vs- Lt. Governor of Delhi reported in 1980 2 SCC 167 in which the Supreme Court held the following – “8. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1965 SC 845 ]. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [ (1971) 3 SCC 189 ]. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi [ (1971) 3 SCC 5 ]. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. Judge, Delhi [ (1971) 3 SCC 5 ]. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order XL Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility”: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib [ (1975) 1 SCC 674 ].” 17. It is clearly evident from the facts of the present case that a patent mistake has been committed by this Court in the impugned order under challenge wherein it failed to recognise the error committed by the trial court, and in fact, proceeded to repeat the same error. While the delay in filing of the additional written statement cannot be ignored, one cannot also neglect the fact that the applicant’s prayer was for modification and not for recalling the order dated March 11, 2013 as was mis-interpreted by both the trial court and this Court in concluding that the applicant’s plea was to set aside the entire order dated March 11, 2013. Therefore, I am of the view that this Court erred in misconstruing the facts and that the impugned order falls within the grounds of the review as delineated in the aforementioned judgments. 18. In view of the above findings, this review petition being R.V.W. 303 of 2016 is allowed and the order dated February 2, 2016, passed by this Court in C.O. 3315 of 2015, is set aside and effectively, the trial court’s order dated July 23, 2015 is also set aside. Resultantly, the trial court’s order dated May 5, 2015 is modified to the extent that the counterclaim to the original plaint is not set aside. Resultantly, the trial court’s order dated May 5, 2015 is modified to the extent that the counterclaim to the original plaint is not set aside. I also direct the trial court to provide the applicant with a last opportunity to file her additional written statement to the amended plaint. Keeping in view the delay in the suit, the trial court (in case of non-availability, the judge-in-charge) is directed to fix strict time limits and endeavour to complete the trial within six months from date. 19. There shall be no order as to costs. 20. Urgent photostat-certified copy of this order, if applied for, should be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.