JUDGMENT Vipin Sanghi, CJ. - The present Special Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 05.05.2021, rendered by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 977 of 2021. The appellant preferred the said writ petition to seek direction to the respondents to award him compensation, in respect of his alleged land, which the respondent-State allegedly took over without due process of law, for construction of a road. 2. The learned Single Judge noticed that according to the writ petitioner, his land was allegedly taken over way back in the year 1990 for construction of road called Tirathpur, Dhanpur Motor Road. 3. The writ petition itself was preferred 31 years after the alleged takeover of the said land for construction of the road. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner placed on record his representation dated 13.02.2021, claiming compensation at current rates. The averment made in the writ petition, touching upon the aspect of delay and laches, is found in para 9 of the writ petition, wherein, the petitioners stated that they have moved several representations before the respondents, requesting therein, that they may be given compensation at the present circle rate, or they may be given some other land in place of their land, but till date, no action has been taken in this regard and the representations moved by the petitioners are still pending undecided before the respondents. 4. However, no particulars or details of the representations, earlier sent, were disclosed by the appellants. As aforesaid, the only representation placed on record was of 13.02.2021, which was made about 31 years after the alleged takeover of the petitioners' land. Consequently, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of delay and laches. 5. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court entertained the claim of the land owner after 24 years of the illegal takeover of the land of the appellant in Tukaram Kana Joshi & others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & others, (2013) 1 SCC 353 . 6. We have perused the said judgment, and heard learned counsel for the appellants. We have also perused the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. A perusal of the judgment in Tukaram Kana Joshi (Supra) shows that the same is founded upon the facts of that case.
6. We have perused the said judgment, and heard learned counsel for the appellants. We have also perused the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. 7. A perusal of the judgment in Tukaram Kana Joshi (Supra) shows that the same is founded upon the facts of that case. In that case, the Supreme Court, had the relevant record before it to conclude that the immovable property indeed belonged to the appellant; that it was taken over by the State without acquisition and without payment of compensation, and that the appellant had been representing for grant of compensation, but to no avail. In fact, perusal of the said judgment shows that the earlier acquisition proceedings undertaken in respect of the land, which had lapsed, were noticed and there was complete record available before the Court, as to when the land of the appellant had been taken over. The said judgment also shows that the Supreme Court recognized the position that the question of condonation of delay is one of discretion, and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. 8. As noticed hereinabove, there is no explanation furnished by the appellants for the delay of 31 years in making the representation and, thereafter, approaching the Court. Though the appellants claimed that they have been representing to the respondent authorities over the years, but no particulars have been provided, and no other representations have been placed on the record. 9. Para 22 of the aforesaid judgment also shows that the said judgment was rendered on the concession made by the Senior State Counsel. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the said decision does not come to the aid of the appellants. The concept of delay and laches is found in the principles of equity. When a party approaches the Court, in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction after prolong delay, that party disables the opposing State authorities from effectively contesting the claim made by the petitioner, as, with passage of time, the officers would not be available and even the official record may not be available. Thus, there would be no way that the state instrumentality would be able to controvert or meet the averments and the allegations that the writ petitioner may make. 11.
Thus, there would be no way that the state instrumentality would be able to controvert or meet the averments and the allegations that the writ petitioner may make. 11. In our view, the present is a fit case, which deserves dismissal on account of extreme delay and laches on the part of the appellants in approaching the Court. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and the same is accordingly dismissed.