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2023 DIGILAW 2000 (ALL)

Amar Singh v. State of U. P.

2023-08-21

AJIT KUMAR

body2023
JUDGMENT : (Ajit Kumar, J.) : Heard Sri Anil Kumar Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Neeraj Tripathi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri R.D. Mishra, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 2. Petitioner, who was working as Additional Private Secretary in the State Secretariat of U.P. has prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 7th September, 2020 passed by the respondent No. 2 terminating him from service. 3. Briefly stated facts are that petitioner had a Whatsapp group with is Mobile No. 9454410505 as an administrator. He claimed to have received a message on 6th July, 2018 on aforesaid mobile that ''UGC ds fu;e ls vkschlh vkSj nfyrksa ds fy, njokts fcydqy cUn gks pqds gSaA jkejkT; esa CM Bkdqj vt; flag ;ksxh vkSj DyCM iafMr fnus'k 'kekZ us tkfrokn [kRe djrs gq, xksj[kiqj fo'ofo|ky; esa 71 esa 52 viuh tkfr dks lgk;d izksQslj cuk;kA^^ ''As per the UGC Regulations the doors for OBC and Scheduled class are closed. In these days of Ramrajya CM Thakur Ajay Singh Yogi and Deputy CM Pandit Dinesh Sharma in order to remove casteism have appointed 52 candidates of their caste out of total 71 candidates on the post of Assistant Professor in Gorakhpur University.'' (English translation by the Court) 4. This message which was quite an objectionable remark for State Government, petitioner wanted to delete the same but due to inadvertent mistake he pressed the key 'forward' and thus got the message forwarded to the whatsapp group. He made a request to the members of the whatsapp group to delete the message. Interestingly, nobody made a complaint to the State Government but petitioner himself expressed regret vide his letter on 9th July, 2018 addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. in following terms: ''To The Chief Secretary U.P. Government Sir, This is humbly submitted that on 06-07-2018 one objectionable message was received on my mobile No. 9454410505 which was related to the criticism of the Government. Considering this message to be objectionable, I had attempted to delete the aforesaid message, however, instead of being deleted, this message got circulated on whatsapp group due to accidental touch, for which a personal request was made by me to the concerned to delete the above-said message. Considering this message to be objectionable, I had attempted to delete the aforesaid message, however, instead of being deleted, this message got circulated on whatsapp group due to accidental touch, for which a personal request was made by me to the concerned to delete the above-said message. The above act took place inadvertently by me for which I express heart-felt apology and assure that I shall remain alert in future in this regard. Dated : 09-07-2018 Sincerely Yours Sd/illegible (Amar Singh-II) Additional Private Secretary'' (English translation done by the Court) 5. It is upon the aforesaid letter that State Government set up a departmental inquiry by issuing a charge-sheet to the petitioner on 24th July, 2018 with two charges: (a) You have forwarded objectionable remarks made to the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister on 6th July, 2018 upon your CUG Mobile No. 9454410505; and (b) The objectionable message, which was a serious remarks sent by you in the whatsapp group has lowered the prestige and respect of the State Government in public eyes and has also eroded its trust. Your above deed is against the U.P. Government Servant's Conduct Rule, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'Conduct Rules, 1956') and thus you are guilty of the same. 6. In support of the above two charges, the Government led four evidence out of which three were related to the provisions as contained under 3, 7 and 9 of the Conduct Rules, 1956 and the last one was the message which petitioner himself had reported to the Government. Petitioner submitted a letter of request on 6th September, 2018 to the Inquiry Officer for verification as to whether the person to whom message got forwarded, had read the message and had really caused damage to the prestige and respect of the Government and accordingly, he requested to be given opportunity to examine those reports to enable him to submit appropriate reply. 7. Petitioner made a reminder letter on 12th November, 2018 but when he did not receive any reply, he submitted a detailed reply to the charges levelled against him in the charge-sheet and denied the charges. He claimed in his reply that he had mistakenly forwarded the message and the time between forwarding the message and its deletion was too less but was quite possible that message might have got delivered to the members of the whatsapp group. He claimed in his reply that he had mistakenly forwarded the message and the time between forwarding the message and its deletion was too less but was quite possible that message might have got delivered to the members of the whatsapp group. He submitted reply that he never intended to forward any such message and, therefore, the second charge of lowering down the prestige and respect of the Government in the mind of the people and eroding its trust and credibility was all misconceived. 8. The Inquiry Officer wrote a letter to the petitioner on 29th July, 2018 in response to his request letter dated 12th November, 2018 in which petitioner had made request to cross-examine those members of the department who may have received message and read the same informing him that Special Secretary of the State Secretariat had intimated him vide letter dated 19th July, 2019 that no such information was available with the Government. Thus, there was no departmental witness available to be cross-examined and accordingly, petitioner was directed to appear before the Inquiry Officer for oral inquiry and hearing. The petitioner appeared before the Inquiry Officer on 30th July, 2019 and prayed that sympathetic approach be adopted and he may be exonerated from the charges. He submitted his written statement also before the Inquiry Officer on the said date. The Inquiry Officer concluded the inquiry and submitted a report and did not find either charge No. 1 or charge No. 2 to be proved. In respect of the charge No. 1 only this much findings came to be returned by the Inquiry Officer that there was admission on the part of the petitioner to have forwarded the message to the whatsapp group. Upon receiving such inquiry report dated 13th August, 2019, same was supplied to the petitioner vide letter dated 17th September, 2019 to offer his explanation, if any. 9. Petitioner again denied the charges by submitting his explanation on 4th October, 2019 and pleaded that whatsapp group message was deleted by him and that he had not authored the message and so for inadvertent mistake of forwarding the message to the whatsapp group, should be taken to be a sheer inadvertent mistake on his part without any intention to damage the prestige and respect of the Government. 10. 10. Surprisingly enough the State Government instead of passing any order upon seeking explanation of the petitioner on the basis of the inquiry report, further sought explanation from the Inquiry Officer to verify as to what was the date and time when the message was deleted and whether option 'delete for everyone' was exercised or only deleted for self. 11. In response to this letter the Inquiry Officer wrote back to the authority that the only option available to the petitioner on whatsapp group was 'delete' and so he deleted the message and for this the delinquent employee had offered an explanation that at that time there was old version of whatsapp and that he was not very technically sound so the only option available on the mobile was 'delete' and he touched the same. 12. The Inquiry Officer further explained in his inquiry report that he has recorded a categorical finding to the effect that none of the members of the whatsapp group have admitted to have received any such message nor, any such evidence was available and this was also proved from the report submitted by the administration of the Secretariat. The Inquiry Officer wrote that he had demanded evidence from the department but no such evidence was made available by the department and so it was sufficiently proved that before it could be delivered to Whatsapp group members, it got deleted. 13. The State Government instead of further passing any order on the basis of inquiry report, first constituted a two member technical Committee under its order dated 29th January, 2020 consisting of Sri Amrit Tripathi, Special Secretary, Secretariat (Administration) U.P. and Sri Raj Kumar Gupta, Technical Director (NIC) and Technical Advisor, Technical U.P. Secretariat Lucknow and it required the Technical Inquiry Committee to submit a report. 14. The Deputy Secretary, Government of U.P. wrote a letter to the Technical Director, NIC, a member of the Committee to submit report on four points: (i). In the matter concerned when the objectionable message was forwarded on 16th July, 2018 at around 11:26 pm in the night what was the time available within which the matter could have been deleted; (ii). At what time the delinquent employee had deleted the message; (iii). In the matter concerned when the objectionable message was forwarded on 16th July, 2018 at around 11:26 pm in the night what was the time available within which the matter could have been deleted; (ii). At what time the delinquent employee had deleted the message; (iii). Once the message has been forwarded in the chat group from a mobile then whether such a person can delete such message for himself or for the entire group; and (iv). What option was exercised by the petitioner for deleting the message whether delete for him or delete for everyone. 15. The technical team submitted report on 6th February, 2020 on above four points stating therein that the message could have been deleted after being forwarded within one hour eight minutes and 16 seconds (1 hours 8 minutes 16 seconds). It is for the delinquent employee to tell exact time when the message was deleted, message can be deleted from handset from which it was sent. A message in whatsapp group can be deleted only by pressing the option 'delete for everyone'. 16. It is after receiving the aforesaid report that the respondents proceeded to pass order dated 7th September, 2020 holding petitioner guilty of serious misconduct for forwarding objectionable message against the Government which sufficiently proved indiscipline, misconduct and despotism and, therefore, he deserved maximum punishment and consequently the order of termination from service was passed. 17. The arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner are : (i) the second inquiry conducted by technical Committee was de hors the procedure prescribed for under the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules, 1999') inasmuch as copy thereof having not been supplied to the petitioner, respondents were not justified in relying upon any such ex parte inquiry report; (ii) Petitioner was not made aware of the proposed inquiry to be held by two member Committee under the order of the State Government dated 29th January, 2020 as copy thereof was never supplied to the petitioner nor, the technical committee so formed permitted any participation of the petitioner by issuing notice to him during the inquiry. Thus, the principle of natural justice were absolutely violated and order impugned, therefore, is unsustainable on this count alone; (iii). Thus, the principle of natural justice were absolutely violated and order impugned, therefore, is unsustainable on this count alone; (iii). The serious charges of misconduct for circulation of objectionable message and that too with deliberate intention to cause damage to the prestige and respect of the State Government, having been found as not proved for want of sufficient evidence by Inquiry Officer, a mere allegation or part of the charge that petitioner forward the message from his mobile number was not grave enough to inflict upon him maximum penalty of termination from service. Thus, the argument is that punishment is disproportionate to the charge proved. 18. In support of the above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before this Court the report of Inquiry Officer dated 13th August, 2019 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition), the clarification sought from the Inquiry Officer by the State Government vide letter dated 18th November, 2019 (Annexure 13 to the writ petition), reply of the Inquiry Officer dated 16th December, 2019 (Annexure 14 to the writ petition), inquiry made from the petitioner by the Inquiry Officer and reply under letter dated 2nd December, 2019 and reply of the petitioner to the same dated 12th December, 2019 (Part of the Annexure 14 to the writ petition). Letter dated 29th January, 2020 (Annexure 15 to the writ petition) by the Deputy Secretary of Government of U.P. constituting two member technical inquiry Committee. A letter written to the Technical Advisor by the State Secretariat dated 5th February, 2020 asking him to submit a report on four points. The reply letter of the Technical Advisor dated 6th July, 2020 (Annexure 16 to the writ petition) has been submitted. 19. A letter written to the Technical Advisor by the State Secretariat dated 5th February, 2020 asking him to submit a report on four points. The reply letter of the Technical Advisor dated 6th July, 2020 (Annexure 16 to the writ petition) has been submitted. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680, judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 , Ram Kishan v. Union of India and others, (1995) 6 SCC 157 , Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (2017) 13 SCC 621 , judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Pushpak Jyoti v. State of U.P. and others, (2004) 1 UPLBEC 547 , Deen Dayal Shukla v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(3) ESC 1814 (All) and Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. and others v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Lucknow and others, 2019(8) ADJ 92 . 20. Countering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State submitted that admission is the best piece of evidence. As petitioner has himself admitted to have forwarded the objectionable message to the whatsapp group being administrator of the whatsapp group, it needed no further evidence to prove that such message was got circulated or not. He submits that even if a message stands deleted in a group, petitioner having failed to prove that the message got deleted for all the members and that they had not seen the message, the presumption would be raised that he circulated the message and thereby caused damage to the prestige and respect of the Government. On the issue of constitution of the technical Committee and further clarification sought from the Inquiry Officer who had submitted the inquiry report, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that it is always open for the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or even to seek clarification from the Inquiry Officer on certain points. On the issue of constitution of the technical Committee and further clarification sought from the Inquiry Officer who had submitted the inquiry report, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that it is always open for the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or even to seek clarification from the Inquiry Officer on certain points. He further argues that Technical Committee report was not such that required any further clarification or deliberations involving the petitioner and that was only in support of findings already returned by the Inquiry Officer in support of charge No. 1, may be partly, that petitioner had himself forwarded the message. The technical issue was whether petitioner had deleted the message or not and whether he deleted the message for himself or for all whatsapp group members. 21. He has sought to justify the order for the reasons assigned therein and submitted that the termination order is not such which may dis-entitle the petitioner from seeking appointment elsewhere. He further submitted that this Court may not sit in appeal over and above the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer and the decision taken by the disciplinary authority except, of course, in the event this Court comes to conclude that the procedure adopted was de hors the procedure prescribed for under the relevant service rules. 22. Learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 , Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and others, AIR 2006 SC 1748 , Government of India and another v. George Philip, AIR 2007 SC 705 , Deputy Commissioner, KVS and others v. J. Hussain, (2013) 10 SCC 106 , State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 , Muzaffar Husain v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2022 SC 2216 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . 23. 23. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and their arguments raised across the bar and having perused the record and the authorities cited above, I find two issues to be arising before this Court: (a) Whether the procedure adopted in conducting inquiry by constituting technical team was foreign to the concept of the regular inquiry as contemplated under the Rules, 1999 and, therefore, holding such inquiry was de hors the procedure prescribed for; and (b). Whether the punishment awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the guilt proved. 24. Coming to the first issue, it is necessary to go through the procedure prescribed under the Rules, 1999. Rule 7 of Rules, 1999 contemplate regular inquiry for the purposes of major penalty including the penalty of dismissal/termination from service. Rule 7 of Rules, 1999 is reproduced hereunder: ''7. Procedure for imposing major penalties.-Before imposing any major penalty on a Government servant, an inquiry shall be held in the following manner: (i) The disciplinary authority may himself inquire into the charges or appoint an authority subordinate to him as Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charges. (ii) The facts constituting the misconduct on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges to be called charge-sheet. The charge-sheet shall be approved by the disciplinary authority: Provided that where the appointing authority is Governor, the charge-sheet may be approved by the Principal Secretary or the Secretary; as the case may be, of the concerned department. (iii) The charges framed shall be so precise and clear as to give sufficient indication to the charged Government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. The proposed documentary evidence and the name of the witnesses proposed to prove the same alongwith oral evidence, if any, shall be mentioned in the charge-sheet. (iv) The charged Government servant shall be required to put in a written statement of his defence in person on a specified date which shall not be less than 15 days from the date of issue of charge-sheet and to state whether he desires to cross-examine any witness mentioned in the charge-sheet and whether desires to give or produce evidence in his defence. He shall also be informed that in case he does not appear or file the written statement on the specified date, it will be presumed that he has none to furnish and Inquiry Officer shall proceed to complete the inquiry ex parte. (v) The charge-sheet, alongwith the copy of the documentary evidences mentioned therein and list of witnesses and their statements, if any shall be served on the charged Government servant personally or by registered post at the address mentioned in the official records. In case the charge-sheet could not be served in aforesaid manner, the charge-sheet shall be served by publication in a daily newspaper having wide circulation: Provided that where the documentary evidence is voluminous, instead of furnishing its copy with charge-sheet, the charged Government servant shall be permitted to inspect the same before the Inquiry Officer. (vi) Where the charged Government servant appears and admits the charges, the Inquiry Officer shall submit his report to the disciplinary authority on the basis of such admission. (vii) Where the charged Government servant denies the charges, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed to call the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet and record their oral evidence in presence of the charged Government servant who shall be given opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. After recording the aforesaid evidence, the Inquiry Officer shall call and record the oral evidence which the charged Government servant desired in his written statement to be produced in his defence: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. (viii) The Inquiry Officer may summon any witness to give evidence or require any person to produce documents before him in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documents) Act, 1976. (ix) The Inquiry Officer may ask any question he pleases, at any time of any witness or from person charged with a view to discover the truth or to obtain proper proof of facts relevant to charges. (x) Where the charged Government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding inspite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. (x) Where the charged Government servant does not appear on the date fixed in the inquiry or at any stage of the proceeding inspite of the service of the notice on him or having knowledge of the date, the Inquiry Officer shall proceed with the inquiry ex parte. In such a case the Inquiry Officer shall record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet in absence of the charged Government servant. (xi) The disciplinary authority, if it considers it necessary to do so, may, by an order appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as ''Presenting Officer'' to present on its behalf the case in support of the charge. (xii) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner of the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits: Provided that this rule shall not apply in following cases: (i) Where any major penalty is imposed on a person on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied that for reason to be recorded by it in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an manner provided in these rules.'' (Emphasis added) 25. From bare reading of aforesaid rules it is apparent that the charge-sheet with definite charges with the approval of disciplinary authority shall be served upon delinquent employee and then charged Government servant shall be given opportunity to submit reply but the inquiry shall be held by the Inquiry Officer in the event Government servant denies the charges. It shall record oral evidence of the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet in presence of the charged Government servant, who shall have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Inquiry Officer shall call and record the oral evidence also which the charged Government servant desired in his written statement to be produced in his defence. It shall record oral evidence of the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet in presence of the charged Government servant, who shall have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Inquiry Officer shall call and record the oral evidence also which the charged Government servant desired in his written statement to be produced in his defence. The Inquiry Officer is also vested with the authority to call for witness to give evidence if so required or to produce the documents before him in accordance with the provisions of U.P. Departmental Inquiries (Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of Documents) Act, 1976. The disciplinary authority after recording evidence, perusing the documents, getting the oral testimony of the departmental witness and that of the defence witness, shall proceed to prepare the report. 26. After inquiry report is submitted as per Rule 9 of Rules, 1999, the disciplinary authority shall proceed to take action on the report. For its better appreciation Rule 9 is reproduced hereunder: ''9. Action on Inquiry Report.-(1) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-inquiry to the same or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation to the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the inquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority, according to the provisions of Rule 7. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer on any charge, record its own findings thereon for reasons to be recorded. (3) In case the charges are not proved, the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and inform him accordingly; (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of charges is of the opinion that any penalty specified in Rule 3 should be imposed on the charged Government servant, he shall give a copy of the inquiry report and his findings recorded under sub-rule (2) to the charged Government servant and require him to submit his representation if he so desires, within a reasonable specified time. The disciplinary authority shall, having regard to all the relevant records relating to the inquiry and representation of the charged Government servant, if any, and subject to the provisions of Rule 16 of these rules, pass a reasoned order imposing one or more penalties mentioned in Rule 3 of these rules and communicate the same to the charged Government servant.'' (Emphasis added) 27. From bare reading of the aforesaid Rule 9(1) it is clear that the disciplinary authority for the reasons to be recorded in writing, is entitled to remit the case for re-inquiry by the same Inquiry Officer or any other Inquiry Officer under intimation to the charged Government servant. The Inquiry Officer thereafter shall proceed to inquire from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 provides for disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings returned by the Inquiry officer at any charge and may record its own findings thereon for the reasons to be recorded. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 9 provides that in the event charges are not proved the charged Government servant shall be exonerated by the disciplinary authority of the charges and shall inform him accordingly. Sub-rule 4 of Rule 9 provides that if it comes to conclude that any penalty as proposed under Rule 3 of Rules, 1999 deserved to be imposed upon the charged Government servant, the authority shall give a copy of the inquiry report and its findings recorded under sub-rule (4) to the charged Government servant and shall require him to submit his representation within a specified time and then shall proceed to impose punishment as prescribed under Rule 3. 28. From the discussions as made above qua Rule 7, 8 & 9 three stages are clearly postulated under the Rules: (i). 28. From the discussions as made above qua Rule 7, 8 & 9 three stages are clearly postulated under the Rules: (i). Setting up a regular inquiry in the event of major penalty with the issuance of charge-sheet and appointment of Inquiry Officer and issuance of an approved charge-sheet by the disciplinary authority calling for reply; (ii) Disciplinary Inquiry Officer is to hold inquiry in detail both oral as well as requiring documentary evidence and then to submit report; (iii) With the submission of report it is open for the disciplinary authority to order inquiry de novo, or disagree with the Inquiry Officer for the reason on the findings by assigning reasons and in the event decides to propose major penalty under Rule 3, shall cause service to the inquiry report or his decision of the proposed punishment upon the delinquent employee requiring his representation within specified period; and then if charges are not proved, charged Government servant shall be exonerated by disciplinary authority. 29. From the perusal of the inquiry report in the instance case, I find that Inquiry Officer concluded that charge No. 1 insofar as the circulation of objectionable message by way of criticism of the Government as per the Rule 9 of Rules, 1956 was not proved at all. Since the intention of circulation of objectionable message which amounted to criticism of the Government by way of unauthorized communication or dissemination of information was not proved, the act and conduct of the petitioner amounting to misconduct by criticism of the Government and not conducting himself as the Government servant with disciplined behaviour as per Rules 3 and 7 of Rules, 1956 was also not proved. The Inquiry Officer found the charge to the extent of forwarding of message in question in the whatsapp group was proved only for the admission made by the petitioner himself. 30. Interestingly, the department had no witness to place before the Inquiry Officer to record his oral statement, nor had any documentary evidence to prove that such objectionable message stood circulated in the whatsapp group and that those members of the whatsapp group had read it or otherwise made it public. 31. 30. Interestingly, the department had no witness to place before the Inquiry Officer to record his oral statement, nor had any documentary evidence to prove that such objectionable message stood circulated in the whatsapp group and that those members of the whatsapp group had read it or otherwise made it public. 31. The enquiry report when got submitted to the Disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority in order to verify the correctness of intention and innocence as pleaded by the petitioner that though he wanted to delete the message but got it forwarded and then he subsequently deleted, made certain queries from the Inquiry Officer under letter dated 18th November, 2019. In turn on 26th November, 2019 the Inquiry Officer made certain further queries from the petitioner to which petitioner replied on 2nd December, 2019 and 12th December, 2019 and the Inquiry Officer submitted report that may be called as supplementary report on 16th December, 2019. This report again categorically recorded that as per the statement of the delinquent employee it was old version of Whatsapp where only option 'delete' as such was available which the delinquent employee had pressed and that despite demand raised for available evidence with the department in support of the charge, nothing was placed before the Inquiry Officer which sufficiently proved that the message stood deleted. 32. In support of this supplementary report I would like to refer to the letter of the Inquiry Officer written to the petitioner on 29th July, 2019 during pendency of the inquiry that despite letter written to the office of the Chief Minister regarding availability of any such material in support of the charge, he was informed vide letter dated 9th July, 2019 that no such document was available. After this supplementary report was submitted though it is not styled as a supplementary report to the disciplinary authority, State Government proceeded to constitute a Committee afresh, called as a 'Technical Committee' of two members to further seek clarification on four points. 33. This letter of Deputy Secretary dated 29th January, 2020 followed by 5th February, 2020 does not show any disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in his report exonerating the petitioner of the two charges, the only clarification instead, was sought as to the message being deleted or not in time. 33. This letter of Deputy Secretary dated 29th January, 2020 followed by 5th February, 2020 does not show any disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in his report exonerating the petitioner of the two charges, the only clarification instead, was sought as to the message being deleted or not in time. The technical committee also submitted a report that all this could have been disclosed only by delinquent employee himself whether he deleted the message for everyone or not, or whether he actually deleted the message or not. 34. This kind of constitution of inquiry committee without showing any disagreement on certain definite findings retuned by Inquiry Officer not finding any reason to bring home the charges, is not contemplated under Rule 9(2) of Rule, 1999. The defence taken by the learned Additional Advocate General that this was only clarificatory as the technical team could have submitted a better report, cannot find favour because the disciplinary authority had itself sought clarification from the Inquiry Officer under letter dated 18th November, 2019 and that was sufficient enough. The Inquiry Officer did submit report on 16th November, 2019, a report was quite supplementary in nature, which carried the statement of the petitioner that message was deleted. In absence of any disagreement with the same, decision to constitute any Technical Committee as such to further enquire into the matter, was totally uncalled for. 35. This administrative exercise of power is foreign to the concept of 'authority' vested with the disciplinary authority looking to the provisions as contained under Rule 9(2) of the Rules, 1999. There is no concept of second enquiry de novo by appointing any other Inquiry Officer under the Rules, 1999. Thus, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that entire second inquiry may be called a Technical Enquiry Committee was totally de hors the procedure prescribed for. I further find that the show-cause notice was already issued to the petitioner on 17th November, 2019 asking him to submit his representation, did not disclose any proposed punishment except to the extent that he had himself forwarded the objectionable message. I further find that the show-cause notice was already issued to the petitioner on 17th November, 2019 asking him to submit his representation, did not disclose any proposed punishment except to the extent that he had himself forwarded the objectionable message. It is after petitioner had submitted reply to the same that supplementary inquiry report was called for and, therefore, in these circumstances, the second technical inquiry held under the letter dated 29th January, 2020 was required to have due participation of the petitioner but unfortunately petitioner was not informed of any such inquiry held by the respondent concerned. 36. In paragraph 42 it has been categorically stated that the technical inquiry report was ex parte. This paragraph 42 has been replied vide paragraph 42 of the counter-affidavit with the remarks that ''it need no comments being matter of record and thus can be verified from the same''. 37. Thus, it is absolutely clear that the inquiry report was obtained in gross violation of principles of natural justice and it is a fair admission on the part of the respondent, inasmuch as the procedure adopted being de hors the rules, is liable to be held arbitrary and illegal and so resultant action is liable to be held void. When a thing is required to be done in a manner that must be done in that manner alone. (Taylor v. Taylor (L.R.) 1 Ch. 426). 38. This above principle is based upon the legal maxim ''Expressio unius est exclusio alterius'', meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following some other course is not permissible. 426). 38. This above principle is based upon the legal maxim ''Expressio unius est exclusio alterius'', meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following some other course is not permissible. This maxim has consistently been followed in a number of decisions to begin with in Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266 ; Haresh Dayaram Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 6 SCC 179 : AIR 2000 SC 2281 ; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296 ; Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 4 SCC 9 : AIR 2001 SC 1512 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, (2002) 1 SCC 633 ; Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 2 SCC 56 : AIR 2004 SC 486 ; and Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, (2004) 2 SCC 759 : AIR 2004 SC 1657 . 39. In Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, (1973) 1 SCC 409 , Supreme Court has observed that ''the ratio is that the rules or the regulations are binding on the authorities''. Again in the case of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 , Supreme Court has observed that ''the statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard''. Recently, citing its an earlier decision Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Rai (Dead) through legal representatives v. Banaras Hindu University and others, (2022) 8 SCC 713 , reiterated the principle ''that there can be no estoppel against law. If the law requires something to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner, and if it is not done in that manner, then it would have no existence in the eye of the law.'' 40. The first argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, holds merit and the impugned order deserves to be quashed on this count alone. 41. The first argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, holds merit and the impugned order deserves to be quashed on this count alone. 41. Coming to the second argument regarding disproportionate punishment to the guilt proved, I find that except for petitioner's own admission both by writing to the Government voluntarily on 9th January, 2018 and his reply submitted to the Inquiry Officer and the statement recorded before the Inquiry Officer to the effect that he had himself got forwarded the message in the whatsapp group by mistake and when he realized, he deleted the same, there was no material or substantial piece of evidence available with the State Government to be either placed before the Inquiry Officer or before the technical committee subsequently constituted, by which it could be concluded that petitioner was guilty of such serious misconduct that he deliberately got the message circulated to cause damage to the prestige and respect of the Government. 42. In both the inquiry report and the technical committee report, which I have discussed above, it has very clearly come to be recorded as finding of fact that the message got deleted by the petitioner and in the absence of department coming with the evidence that such message was read and got circulated amongst people and the other Government servants and it was due to such circulation it came to its knowledge and thereby damage was caused to the prestige and respect of the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister and credibility of the State Government, it was too hypothetical to believe that such damage was really got caused. 43. In the case of J. Ahmed (supra) Supreme Court held that it is to be seen whether Government servant conducted himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service by way of a motive or it can be said to be an act of sheer negligence. The Court upheld the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary quoted by the High Court as ''Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.'' 44. The Court upheld the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary quoted by the High Court as ''Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.'' 44. The judgment has been cited to buttress the point that there was no motive which could be attached to the petitioner in the present case to have intended deliberately to circulated the whatsapp message so as to achieve the object of getting image in respect of the Government tarnished. 45. Thus in cases of misconduct, in the first instance, it is to be seen whether it has been deliberate one and then, has been serious enough to hold that such act and conduct of the Government servant is unbecoming of his office or position in the Government and, therefore, such Government servant deserves to maximum punishment. The disciplinary authority while passing the order imposing the penalty of termination from service, has referred to the report of the Inquiry Officer and also the technical committee report and records that the Inquiry Officer found the charge No. 1 to be proved in part i.e to the extent that petitioner had forwarded the message in whatsapp group. Inquiry Officer has not been able to record any finding as to whether petitioner did it deliberately with an intention to malign the image of the Government and then, as to whether the petitioner can be held guilty of such misconduct so as to hold him to have not conducted himself in accordance with the rules in order to maintain integrity qua Government and in regulating such behaviour and so resultantly he was to say deliberately constituted such a way to hold him guilty of unauthorized communication/dissemination of such information which amounted to criticism of the Government. The disciplinary authority has assumed that since the petitioner had forwarded the message in whatsapp group and when he realized that considering the seriousness of his act and conduct, an action was likely to be taken against him that he deleted the message and showed his regrets for such conduct. 46. This above finding returned in the order of termination from service is thoroughly misplaced for want of evidence much less an intrinsic one. It has come to be established very categorically that the timing when message was forwarded to the whatsapp group was 11:26 pm on 6th July, 2018. 46. This above finding returned in the order of termination from service is thoroughly misplaced for want of evidence much less an intrinsic one. It has come to be established very categorically that the timing when message was forwarded to the whatsapp group was 11:26 pm on 6th July, 2018. The message was claimed to have been deleted within 2-3 minutes though the time then available to delete it was within one hour eight minutes and sixteen seconds as per the report of technical advisor dated 6th July, 2020. So it all happened in midnight hours and there was no question of this message being read by everyone in the whatsapp group or getting further circulated in other whatsapp group in that midnight hour. As a matter of fact until petitioner had himself expressed his regret, the Government had no knowledge of any such message and so it was definitely out of question for the Government to have decided to take action within 24 hours. Findings to the contrary are liable to be held as perverse for want of requisite material. 47. This finding of disciplinary authority would have been genuine one had the department led any evidence before the Inquiry Officer by producing such witnesses who had read the message and got further forwarded to other whatsapp group or individual cell phone number, and those records were available to the department to show that there has been circulation of such message. Like calls detail records message records, are also retrievable and so respondents ought to have got examined mobile sets of all the group members in which many of them were also employees of the department but nothing of the sort was done. 48. In view of the above, therefore, it cannot appeal to even a man of ordinary prudence that in absence of any charge being proved, the delinquent employee can be inflicted with maximum penalty of termination from service. 49. In the case of Ram Kishan (supra) the Court dealt with an issue of nature of punishment imposed and whether it was commensurate to the gravity of the charge or too harsh to be approved of. vide paragraphs 11 and 12 the Court has observed thus: ''11. It is next to be seen whether imposition of the punishment of dismissal from service is proportionate to the gravity of the imputation. vide paragraphs 11 and 12 the Court has observed thus: ''11. It is next to be seen whether imposition of the punishment of dismissal from service is proportionate to the gravity of the imputation. When abusive language is used by anybody against a superior, it must be understood in the environment in which that person is situated and the circumstances surrounding the event that led to the use of the abusive language. No straight jacket formula could be evolved in adjudging whether the abusive language in the given circumstances would warrant dismissal from service. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. What was the nature of the abusive language used by the appellant was not stated. 12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the imposition of punishment of dismissal from service is harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of charge imputed to the delinquent constable. Accordingly, we set aside the dismissal order. We hold that imposition of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect would be an appropriate punishment. So, we direct the disciplinary authority to impose that punishment. However, since the appellant himself is responsible for the initiation of the proceedings, we find that he is not entitled to back wages; but, all other consequential benefits would be available to him.'' 50. It was a fair admission on the part of the petitioner that he had got the message forwarded inadvertently. For this, in my considered view, a lesser punishment like adverse entry in service records could have been inflicted, even a censure entry could have been awarded because the Government servant even while receiving such message was required to be very careful as the remarks were indeed very objectionable. 51. It is worth pertinent to refer here the pleadings raised by the petitioner to this effect vide paragraph 67, according to which, U.P. Public Service Commission on the proposed punishment had taken the contrary view and, therefore, it was for the State Government to have supplied copy to the U.P. Public Service Commission by way of show-cause notice but that was not supplied to him. So, according to the petitioner he had no opportunity to context the the proposed punishment. 52. So, according to the petitioner he had no opportunity to context the the proposed punishment. 52. In reply to the paragraph 67 of the writ petition, it has been stated that vide paragraph 67 of the counter-affidavit that a detailed reply has already been given in the preceding paragraphs of the affidavit, but I do not find any such reply in any of the preceding paragraphs to paragraph 67 of the counter-affidavit. 53. Yet another pleading that deserves consideration is with regard to one employee, namely, Jagdish Prasad Yadav, a Commercial Inspector who had made certain comments on Chief Minister on social media and which had gone viral and resultantly Jagdish Prasad Yadav was suspended and subjected to the disciplinary proceedings. He challenged the suspension order before Lucknow Bench of this Court in Service Single No. 10868 of 2017. The Court with certain remarks directed that the matter of instituting inquiry be reconsidered at the highest level under its order dated 18th May, 2017 and in the said case the Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Government of Uttar Pradesh recalled the suspension order reinstating the petitioner and dropped the disciplinary proceedings by issuing only a warning to him vide order dated 9th February, 2018. These two orders of High Court and Commissioner, Food and Civil Supplies, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, were brought to the notice of the Inquiry Officer in reply to the charge-sheet. Thus, it is pleaded that it is a case of discrimination. 54. I do not find that case to be identically circumstanced as to that of the petitioner but it is worth noticing that in this case also circulation of message was not proved except petitioner's own regret for getting message forwarded inadvertently at that too almost in midnight hours and, therefore, the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the charge, proved by way of admission of a mistake. 55. When we talk of morality and self conscience which a Government servant must possess, we should bear in mind that it required one to have a very strong will for one to hear to his/her inner voice to realize the guilt that he/she acted immorally and then to make a fair confession. 55. When we talk of morality and self conscience which a Government servant must possess, we should bear in mind that it required one to have a very strong will for one to hear to his/her inner voice to realize the guilt that he/she acted immorally and then to make a fair confession. This moral or ethical sense if leads a Government servant to make such a fair confession and express his words of regret or penance, should weigh the mind of decision making authority with positivity in approach by condoning such a conduct by issuing warning to remain careful in future so as not to repeat such act and conduct and further to improve himself to give his best to the establishment, instead of firing such a Government servant from the employment. This approach of condoning the act and conduct will be in consonance with conceptualized rule of reasonableness. Imposition of punishment is well within the discretion of employer but there are certain recognised principles that must be borne in mind while exercising such discretion. 56. It is apt here to refer to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Pushpak Jyoti (supra) wherein the bench referred to a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Indian Railway Company Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206 . The Court in this judgment laid down three grounds for interference by way of judicial review, namely, illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety and also referred to the observations made by Lord Diplock in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1984 (3) All ER 935, that ''By irrationality, I mean what can be now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it''. 57. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it''. 57. On the question of proportionality of punishment as to the charge in the case of Deen Dayal Shukla (supra) a coordinate Bench of this Court referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others v. Samarendra Kishore Endow and another, (1994) ILLJ 872 SC, wherein it was held that punishment awarded to an employee should be commensurate with an offence and, therefore, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will ensure that an individual receives fair treatment. vide paragraph 16 the Court has held thus: ''16. In the case of State Bank of India and others v. Samarendra Kishore Endwo and another (supra) it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the punishment awarded to an employee should be commensurate with the offence and accordingly held while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India High Court have to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that authority after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself. Relevant portion from the said judgment is reproduced as under : ''10. On the question of punishment, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the punishment awarded is excessive and that lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice. It may be noticed that the imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the. disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it but not to the High Court or to the Administrative Tribunal for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the powers of the High Court under Article 226. The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review. It ''is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.'' [Per Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans and H.B. Gandhi Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopinath and Sons]. The power under Article 226 is one of judicial review. It ''is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made.'' [Per Lord Brightman in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans and H.B. Gandhi Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopinath and Sons]. In other words the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.'' Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering the other judgments of Apex Court arrived to the conclusion that punishment awarded to the delinquent employee was too harsh and remitted the matter again to disciplinary authority to reconsider for imposition of appropriate punishment.'' 58. The Court also referred to the various authorities on the principle of applying Wednesbury test to an administrative order vide paragraph 67 thus: ''67. But where as administrative action is challenged as ''arbitrary'' under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is ''rational'' or ''reasonable'' and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which a reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalqaon Municipal Council, SCC at p. 111. Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that ''reasonableness'' of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, SCC at pp. 679-80; Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, SCC at p. 6910; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, SCC at pp. 679-80; Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, SCC at p. 6910; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, SCC at p. 2410 and U.P. Financial Corporation v. Gem Cap (India; (P) Ltd., SCC at p. 307, while judging whether the administrative action is ''arbitrary'' under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always. 59. The coordinate Bench then referred to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCR 377 , that the Court will interfere in the matters of punishment when it is shockingly disproportionate. Judgment has been cited to demonstrate that the punishment imposed in the present case is shockingly disproportionate as to the guilt proved. 60. Another judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is of the coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills (supra). In the said case the Court observed that while the question of choice of quantum punishment lay within the jurisdiction of employer but where the penalty awarded is found to be shockingly disproportionate the Court would certainly interfere. 61. Coming to the authorities cited by Sri Neeraj Tripathi, learned Additional Advocate General firstly the judgment of this Court in the case of Rajendra Upadhyay v. State of U.P. and others 2018(8) ADJ 686 , wherein the Court refused to interfere with the order of punishment placing reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) and George Philip (supra). While in the case of Narinder Mohan Arya (supra) the Court held that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the departmental proceedings as the disciplinary authority was the sole judge of the fact and in case of appeal the appellate authority and these authorities being fact finding inquiry the High Court could not have sit as an appellate forum over and above the findings meet by these authorities of fact. 62. 62. Paragraph 9 of the George Philip's case (supra) has been cited to demonstrate that the Court would normally be not intending to interfere in the matters of domestic inquiry and resultant punishment if awarded holding that it was the sole domain of administrative authority as an primary authority to decide as to the nature of punishment to be awarded. Paragraph 9 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: ''''9. It is trite that the Tribunal or the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution are not hearing an appeal against the decision of the disciplinary authority imposing punishment upon the delinquent employee. The jurisdiction exercised by the Tribunal or the High Court is a limited one and while exercising the power of judicial review, they cannot set aside the punishment altogether or impose some other penalty unless they find that there has been a substantial noncompliance of the rules of procedure or a gross violation of rules of natural justice which has caused prejudice to the employee and has resulted in miscarriage of justice or the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravamen of the charge. The scope of judicial review in matters relating to disciplinary action against employees has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court and reference to only some of them will suffice. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 , it was observed as under in para 18 of the reports : ''18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.'' In Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 , after considering large number of cases, the principle was summarized as under in para 71 of the reports : ''71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as ''arbitrary'' under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and in such extreme or rare cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.'' In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and another v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005) 10 SCC 84 , it was observed that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. The Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. The Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade, (2005) 3 SCC 134 , the respondent was dismissed from service on the charge of having used abusive and filthy language against his supervisor. The labour Court on the finding that the punishment of dismissal was harsh and improper, directed his reinstatement with continuity of service and two-third back wages. The writ petition filed by the employer was dismissed both by the learned Single Judge and also by the Division Bench of the High Court. In appeal a three Judge Bench of this Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and also the award of the labour Court and upheld the order of the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service. In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate, (2005) 2 SCC 489 , the respondent workman was found sleeping at about 11.40 a.m. while he was on duty in the first shift. On some earlier occasions also he was found guilty of similar misconduct. After domestic enquiry wherein he was found guilty, he was dismissed from service. The labour Court held that the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate and no reasonable employer could impose such punishment for the proved misconduct and accordingly directed reinstatement with fifty per cent back wages. There was a revision to the Industrial Tribunal and then a writ petition and finally in letters patent appeal the Division Bench of the High Court modified the award of the labour Court by directing the employer to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- to the workman. In appeal this Court, after referring to large number of earlier decisions, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored the order passed by the employer.'' 63. On above principle another authority cited is of State of Karnataka and another v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 , to demonstrate that certain discrepancies in evidence would not render the case to be of no evidence. On above principle another authority cited is of State of Karnataka and another v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423 , to demonstrate that certain discrepancies in evidence would not render the case to be of no evidence. Citing the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , vide paragraph 9 the Court held thus: ''8. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a three Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as under: ''7. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.'' 64. Supreme Court also cited its earlier decision with approval in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein vide paragraph 13 the Court laid down the guiding principle for interference in exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Supreme Court also cited its earlier decision with approval in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein vide paragraph 13 the Court laid down the guiding principle for interference in exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The Court dealt with the argument of the respondent in the case of N. Gangaraj (supra) vide paragraph 14 to conclude that it was not a case of no evidence rather it was a case where discrepancies in the evidence was cited to vitiate the conclusion drawn in the departmental inquiry and decision taken by the disciplinary authority. The Court observed that once the Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence it was beyond the scope of the authority of High Court to have re-appreciated the same. The Court further observed vide paragraph 15 that once the evidence had been accepted by the departmental authority the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of the fact. vide paragraph 14 and 15 the Court held thus: ''14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 , wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct. 15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by re-appreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.'' 65. Having gone through the authorities cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, I am of the view that the propositions as discussed in those judgments are not contradictory to each other. 66. The principle of law is well-settled that interference by the High Court or Tribunal in the judicial exercise of power would not extend to appreciating the evidence and coming to a different conclusion than what Domestic Tribunal has already arrived at but the question is as to whether this decision making process was sound and was not vitiated and that a man of ordinary prudence would have arrived at a decision/conclusion which could be said to be a rational one on the material available. It is a case where the department failed to present any evidence whatsoever in support of the charge that petitioner circulated the message to defame the Government. 67. In the case of Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618 , the Court held very clearly that any statement made in a criminal trial would have been said to be admissible had the persons who gave the statement were produced by the department before the Inquiry Officer to be cross-examined by the delinquent employee and having failed to do so the department could not have complained of the Inquiry Officer not appreciating the same. 68. 68. Coming to the authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner first in the case of Wednesbury Corporation (supra) I find that in the said case the Court of appeal has held that it is entitled to investigate the action of local authority in order to find out whether it had taken relevant material into consideration while arriving at a finding or conversely refused to take into account or neglected it even though available. The Court, therefore, held that the answer to the question if goes to the authority or in other words like in the present case, one can conclude that authority's action is within the four corners of the matter which they ought to consider but even such a decision if tested on the IQ of a reasonable man and the Court concludes that such a reasonable man could not come to such a conclusion, the Court would still interfere. So not only decision taking process even the conclusion arrived at for the decision is open to judicial review. 69. In the case of Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai (supra) the Court discussed in detailed the Wednesbury unreasonableness on the point of power of judicial review. The Court held that the irrationality of a decision making power would account to akin of 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'. In support of this, the view taken by Lord Diplock was reiterated and it was observed that the decision should be so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that given an application of mind by a reasonable man, it may not be approved of. 70. In the present case I find that second charge was not at all proved by the Inquiry Officer. The first charge was proved partly only and that too on the ground that petitioner had himself made an admission, fair enough, that while trying to delete the message he got the same forwarded in whatsapp group by wrongly touching the icon. This also happened in the midnight hours, therefore, applying the definition of misconduct given in Strout's dictionary (supra) there was nothing to demonstrate that the petitioner did it intentionally. It was a case where petitioner did delete the message in the midnight hours before anybody could have read it, however, by way of precaution he messaged other whatsapp group members to delete the message wrongly got sent by him. It was a case where petitioner did delete the message in the midnight hours before anybody could have read it, however, by way of precaution he messaged other whatsapp group members to delete the message wrongly got sent by him. The department would have been justified in bringing home the charge, had it produced the persons who might have read the message or shown to others or had complained against the petitioner. That being not the case, the charge itself did not stand proved and, therefore, punishment of dismissal from service is held to be shockingly disproportionate. Fact position admitted on record is that petitioner had made a fair admission and upon the said fair admission the department sets up an inquiry and did not find a single employee or the member of the group message who were the employees to have read the message before it was deleted in the midnight hours. This being the admitted factual position, I do not see petitioner to deserve such a harsh punishment of dismissal from service. In my considered view, in the absence of evidence as to circulation of message to pollute mind of people towards the Government, the Government should have appreciated his courage to show admission and should have warned him to be careful in future. 71. Coming to the argument advanced by learned Additional Advocate General that admission is the best piece of evidence and delinquent employee having admitted that he had forwarded the message, nothing more required to bring home the charge, I find that admission was only to the extent that he got the message forwarded due to inadvertence as he was trying to delete the same and further I find that admission was also that petitioner had asked everyone to delete the message. So admission was as to the inadvertent mistake and not as to the intention to forward the message to defame the Chief Minister or his Government. Eventually he wanted and honestly attempted to delete the questionable message. The admission is to be read contextually and not in isolation and so in my considered view there was no admission as to the charge levelled against the petitioner. 72. The principles as discussed in authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Additional Advocate General herein this above judgment, I find that the order of dismissal deserves interference. 73. 72. The principles as discussed in authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Additional Advocate General herein this above judgment, I find that the order of dismissal deserves interference. 73. Thus the second argument as to quantum of punishment being shockingly disproportionate to the guilt proved though partly also holds merit and impugned order deserves to be quashed. 74. In view of the above, writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 7th September, 2020 is hereby quashed. Petitioner shall be reinstated in service and shall be entitled to all consequential benefits. 75. The matter is remitted to the extent that the respondent authority may impose any minor punishment in its discretion taking into consideration that admission of the petitioner and his fairness in reporting to the Government that he got objectionable message forwarded in the whatsapp group in the midnight hours mistakenly and deleted the same within 2-3 minutes and messaged others in whatsapp group to delete the message and also the fact that there was no evidence available that the message was got circulated and was read by members of the whatsapp group or any other member on his mobile through whatsapp message. He can only be just issued with a warning for his such conduct if otherwise his career has been blotless but for this solitary incident. 76. Appropriate order shall be passed by the State Government within 30 days from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 77. Cost made easy.