JUDGMENT : 1. By way of filing of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the impugned punishment order dated 04.08.2020 by which penalty of 10% deduction in pension for two years has been imposed. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner stood retired on 31.07.2012 after attaining the age of superannuation, but just five days before his retirement, he was served with a charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeals) Rules, 1958 (for short ‘the Rules of 1958) with the charge that at the time of his transfer less plants were counted due to which the department has sustained loss of Rs.50,460/-. Counsel submits that the alleged misconduct pertains to the year 2002 and the respondents were sleeping over the matter for a decade and just five days before this retirement, the aforesaid charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner. Counsel submits that even in the year 2005, an enquiry was conducted, wherein no fault of the petitioner was found and fault of one Praveen Kumar Mathur was found and charge-sheet was served upon him under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958. Counsel submits that finally no action was taken against the said Praveen Kumar Mathur and he got retired after attaining the age of superannuation and only a penalty of Rs.6,485 was imposed upon him. Counsel submits that charge-sheet was issued with a malafide intention to deprive the petitioner for getting the pensionary benefits and the disciplinary enquiry remain pending against the petitioner for a considerable time i.e. for eight years and finally the punishment order was passed on 04.08.2020. Counsel submits that the respondents have acted in an arbitrary and illegal manner to destroy the image of the petitioner. 3. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance upon a recent judgment passed by this court in Ramanuj Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5731/1999). Counsel submits under these circumstances, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside and appropriate directions may be issued to the respondents to refund the amount of pension deducted by the respondents. 4. Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5731/1999). Counsel submits under these circumstances, the impugned order may be quashed and set aside and appropriate directions may be issued to the respondents to refund the amount of pension deducted by the respondents. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the misconduct was committed by the petitioner due to which the department sustained loss of Rs.50,460/-and departmental action was taken against the petitioner immediately after getting information of the said misconduct of the petitioner and charge-sheet was issued to him under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. Counsel submits that after providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after appreciating the evidence available on record finally, the impugned punishment order was passed against the petitioner. Counsel submits that finding of the fact has been recorded at the time of passing of the punishment order and this Court should not re-appreciate the finding of the fact while exercising its powers for judicial review contained under Section 226 of the Constitution of India. Counsel submits that the punishment is just and proper looking to the misconduct of the petitioner, hence interference of this Court is not warranted. 5. Heard rival submissions made at bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Admittedly, the date of retirement of the petitioner was 31.07.2012 and this fact was well within the knowledge of the respondents. Even in the year 2002 when the alleged incident occurred for which an enquiry was conducted by them in the year 2005, wherein no fault of the petitioner was found and it was found that one Praveen Kumar Mathur was responsible for which he was served charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 but finally, no punishment order was passed against him. At the verge of the retirement of the petitioner just five days before the retirement, impugned charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1958 was served upon him for the alleged misconduct occurred in the year 2002. It is worthy to note hear that the departmental enquiry was not completed for a considerable time i.e. more than 8 years of retirement of the petitioner and finally he has been punished with the punishment of withholding of 10% pension for two years. 7. It is worthy to note hear that the departmental enquiry was not completed for a considerable time i.e. more than 8 years of retirement of the petitioner and finally he has been punished with the punishment of withholding of 10% pension for two years. 7. The legal principles governing the issue of delay in initiating departmental proceeding and its effect has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1995 (2) SCC 570 State of Punjab V/s. Chaman Lal Goyal wherein following principles were laid down. “It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the fact-, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing.” 8. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 1998 (4) SCC 154 State of Andhra Pradesh V/s. N. Radhakishan, while dealing with the issue of quashing the enquiry proceedings on the ground of delay laid down the following general proposition of law. “It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. “It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any default on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on that account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from his path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” 9. In the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after 6 years and continuation of the same for a period of 7 years prejudiced the delinquent officer and quashing the proceedings, it has been held in para 16 as under: “16. In the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that initiation of disciplinary proceedings after 6 years and continuation of the same for a period of 7 years prejudiced the delinquent officer and quashing the proceedings, it has been held in para 16 as under: “16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the Appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how and in what manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the Appellant. The appellate authority in its order stated that the Appellant was not required to prepare the ACE-8 Register twice. The Appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and it continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent officer.” 10. Similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra), in para 11 which reads as under:- “11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 12. Likewise in the case of UCO Bank Vs. Rajendra Kumar Shukla reported in 2018 (14) SCC 92 , it has been held in para 12 as under:- “12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by learned Counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance.” 13. Similarly the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhupendra Pal Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 6073, has culled out certain principle and the same are summarized as under in para 32: “32. The principles that can be culled out from the aforesaid decisions may be summarized as below: a. It would always be desirable to initiate disciplinary proceedings immediately after the alleged misconduct is detected but if charge-sheet is issued after a considerable length of time has passed since such detection, it would be unfair to the charged officer to proceed against him on the basis of stale charges. b. Disciplinary proceedings may not be interdicted at the stage of charge-sheet and should be allowed to proceed according to the relevant rules since a charge-sheet does not affect any legal right of the delinquent unless, of course, it suffers from an invalidity that strikes at the root of the proceedings. c. If there is delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings by drawing up charges against the delinquent and such proceedings are challenged, the disciplinary authority is under an obligation to explain the reasons for the delay; and, depending upon the worth of such reasons, the Court may proceed to decide one way or the other. d. There cannot be any exact measurement of the length of delay by reference to years to fall into the category of 'too long a delay', and what would amount to the same has to be decided depending upon the facts of a given case. e. Should the delay be found to be too long and unexplained, that would definitely have a bearing on the seriousness of the disciplinary authority to pursue the charges against the charged officer and the Court may, in a fit and proper case, quash the proceedings because prejudice to the officer in such case would be writ large on the face of it. f. Even if, in a given case, the delay is satisfactorily explained, the charge-sheet could still be quashed if the charged officer proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he would be severely prejudiced if the proceedings were allowed to continue, a fortiori, lending credence to the claim of unfair treatment. g. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating disciplinary proceedings, the charged officer should not be made to suffer. h. Delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings per se may not be a vitiating factor, if the charges are grave and in such case the gravity of the charges together with the factors, for and against the continuation of the proceedings, need to be balanced before arriving at a just conclusion.” 14. h. Delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings per se may not be a vitiating factor, if the charges are grave and in such case the gravity of the charges together with the factors, for and against the continuation of the proceedings, need to be balanced before arriving at a just conclusion.” 14. The respondents have failed to satisfy this Court that why no disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner for a considerable time and why they have waited for a considerable period of ten years and why the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner on 26.07.2012 just five days before his retirement which was due on 31.07.2012 such action of the respondent is quite arbitrary. 18. The departmental enquiry was completed after retirement of the petitioner and it took a considerable period of eight years. The petitioner has been punished for the alleged misconduct which is occurred 18 years back, therefore, such action of the respondents is quite unjustified. 19. In view of the above, the impugned punishment order is not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is quashed and set aside. The amount deducted from the pension of the petitioner be refunded to the petitioner with interest @9% per annum within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.