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2023 DIGILAW 2013 (RAJ)

Rajaram v. Kadam

2023-10-19

GANESH RAM MEENA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Ganesh Ram Meena, J. Briefly stated facts of the case are that Bhoti and Kadam (respondent No.1) filed a suit for partition and permanent injunction under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act of 1955') before the Court of the Assistant Collector, Mahwa. 2. During the pendency of the suit the parties entered into an amicable settlement on 01.07.2000 and on the basis of the said compromise the trial court vide order dated 20.11.2001 passed a final decree. 3. Bhoti and Kadam (respondent No.1) feeling aggrieved by the final judgment and decree dated 20.11.2001 preferred an appeal before the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur (for short 'the First Appellate Authority'). The First Appellate Authority vide judgment dated 08.10.2002 allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the trial court for decision afresh. 4. The Court of Sub Divisional Officer, Mahwa (Dausa) [for short 'the trial court'] after being matter remitted back to it by the First Appellate Court heard the matter again and after making the scrutiny of the material available on the record issued a preliminary decree on 30.08.2006. Being aggrieved by the preliminary decree dated 30.08.2006, Ghisya preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority which was allowed vide judgment dated 02.01.2009 and set aside the judgment and decree dated 30.08.2006 and remanded the matter to the trial court to decide the matter afresh as per the directions dated 08.10.2002. 5. In view of the remand made, the arguments were heard again and on the basis of the compromise dated 01.07.2000 the trial court decreed the suit and issued the preliminary decree on 23.07.2010. 6. Against the preliminary decree dated 23.07.2010 the petitioners preferred an Appeal No.68/2010 before the First Appellate Authority. During the pendency of the appeal, the trial court on 23.09.2010 passed a final decree. 7. Against the final decree dated 23.09.2010 the petitioners preferred an appeal No. 90/2010 before the First Appellate Authority which was dismissed vide judgment dated 08.10.2015. 8. Against the judgment dated 08.10.2015 passed by the First Appellate Court in Appeal No. 68/2010, second Appeal No. 6575 was preferred before the Court of Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (for short 'the Second Appellate Authority') which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 27.02.2020 in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties. 9. 8. Against the judgment dated 08.10.2015 passed by the First Appellate Court in Appeal No. 68/2010, second Appeal No. 6575 was preferred before the Court of Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer (for short 'the Second Appellate Authority') which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 27.02.2020 in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties. 9. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners with the challenge to the orders of the Board of Revenue, the Revenue Appellate Authority so also the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer. 10. Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioners have been assigned less share though they were entitled for the equal share with the respondents. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as the orders of the Appellate Courts are illegal and perverse and deserve to be quashed and set aside. 11. Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the trial court passed the judgment and decree on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties and the Appellate Courts also after making scrutiny of the material, affirmed the judgment and decree. There are concurrent findings of all the three courts below. Since the petitioners could not point out any illegality or perversity, therefore, no interference is called for in exercise of powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Considered the submissions made by both the counsels for both the parties and scanned and scrutinized the entire material made available to the Court. 13. It is not in dispute that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is based on the compromise arrived at between both the parties and that too after making a detailed examination of the material available on the record. 14. This Court in Smt. Munni Devi v. The Rent Appellate Court, Jaipur Metriopolitan City and Anr., reported in 2023 (1) WLC 465 (Raj.), has clearly held that no review of consent order is permissible. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in paras 20 to 33 has observed as under:- "20. 14. This Court in Smt. Munni Devi v. The Rent Appellate Court, Jaipur Metriopolitan City and Anr., reported in 2023 (1) WLC 465 (Raj.), has clearly held that no review of consent order is permissible. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in paras 20 to 33 has observed as under:- "20. This Court finds that on 31.08.2021, when the matter was posted before the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, counsels who were appearing before the Court gave their consent that the matter may be disposed of by granting six months time to vacate the premise and further consent was given to vacate the premise by February, 2022 and rent @ 800/- was also required to be paid. 21. This Court finds that if counsel appearing for the petitioner had given his consent to decide the writ petition on the basis of agreement, which parties had in their mind, then such kind of petition of the petitioner cannot be entertained by the Court, whereby now an allegation is levelled against the lawyer that he did not have any instructions to enter into compromise on her behalf. 22. This Court finds that any lawyer, who appears before the Court and represents his party, takes the decision in best interest of his litigant and as such in order to plead a given case properly or to give consent on behalf of his client or to enter into compromise, no personal motive may be attached to such an act of a lawyer. 23. This Court finds that if such kind of practice or tactic is permitted to be adopted by a litigant against his lawyer, situation may arise, where even litigants will straightway allege that they had not authorized their counsel to argue the matter in a particular manner and yet the matter was argued in such a manner, which is against their interest or result of the case has gone against him. 24. The relationship between the litigant and his counsel is of utmost importance and litigant has to keep complete faith and trust in his counsel and it has to be borne in mind that whatever lawyer does, he does in the best interest of his client. 25. 24. The relationship between the litigant and his counsel is of utmost importance and litigant has to keep complete faith and trust in his counsel and it has to be borne in mind that whatever lawyer does, he does in the best interest of his client. 25. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has never instructed or given any consent to his counsel to enter into compromise, cannot be accepted by this Court, this Court finds that Order 3, Rule 1 and 4 of CPC provides for appearance of recognised agent or any pleader before the Courts of law. The Power-Vakalatnama, which is filed before the Court includes all the situations, where lawyers can act according to best interest of their client. The power of entering into compromise on behalf of a litigant is also specifically mentioned in the Power (Vakalatnama) and if the lawyer has entered into compromise on behalf of his client, as per instructions given to him, no motive can be attached to the lawyer that he has acted against interest of his client. 26. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had filed writ petition and even the dispute, which was referred to the mediation centre, 'failed' and there was a reversal of finding, as such, there was no occasion to enter into compromise on her behalf, suffice it to say by this Court that if at the time of making submissions, lawyer appearing for the petitioner thought to exercise the best available option and instead of having dismissal of the writ petition, if time was granted by the Court to vacate the premise, the same cannot be allowed to be reopened by way of review petition. 27. There is no quarrel on the proposition that any litigant, who engages Advocate on his behalf has to instruct him to plead on his behalf, however, the legal acumen required by his lawyer is displayed by him in the Court but later plea of a litigant that a particular point of law was required to be placed before the Court, the same cannot be accepted as it is the sole domain of a lawyer concerned to act in the best interest of his client. 28. 28. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner who is a poor and widow lady and as such in the interest of this Court is required to review the order passed by this Court dated 31.08.2021, this Court finds that if this kind of plea of a litigant will be accepted by the Court, the very foundation of legal system, where lawyers act on behalf of their client, will fall apart. 29. This Court finds that the order dated 31.08.2021 has been passed, as per instructions given to the counsel appearing for the parties and accordingly the case has been decided by this Court. 30. As regards, the reliance placed by counsel for the petitioner on the judgment passed by the Madras High Court in the case of Jagapathy Mudaliar v. Ekambara Mudaliar reported in (1898) 8 MLJ 40 , this Court finds that the Madras High Court has relied upon certain judgments passed by the England Court in the case of Mathews v. Munster reported in (1888) 20 Q. B.D.141. 31. This Court finds that Order 3, Rule 1 CPC provides for appearance of pleader and Rule 4 provides for appointment of a pleader by way of a document to be filed in a Court. The document of authorization or Vakalatnama includes various acts to be done by an Advocate including right to enter into compromise on behalf of his/her litigant. 32. This Court finds that Full Bench of Nagpur High Court in the case of Jiwibai v. Ramkumar reported in AIR 1947 Nagpur 17 has held that counsel has an inherent Implied authority to compromise the case in which he is engaged. 33. This Court finds that the Apex Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and Ors. Reported in 1991 AIR SC 2234, while relying upon the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra and Ors. v. Tarubala Dasi reported in AIR 1930PC 158, has held that the power to compromise a suit is inherently vested with the Advocates in India." 15. In the present case, the judgment and decree have been passed on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties which amounts to a consent order. Therefore, in view of the settled proposition, same cannot be reviewed. 16. In the present case, the judgment and decree have been passed on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties which amounts to a consent order. Therefore, in view of the settled proposition, same cannot be reviewed. 16. In view of the above referred case law and the settlement arrived at between the parties, this Court finds no ground to interfere in the order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the Court of Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer in Appeal No.6575, the order dated 08.10.2015 passed by the Court of Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur Camp, Dausa in Appeal No. 68/2010 and the judgment and decree dated 23.07.2010 passed by the Court of Sub Divisional Officer, Mahwa (Dausa) and therefore, the writ petition is dismissed. 17. Since the main petition has been dismissed, the stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed.