JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Krishna Agarawal, learned counsel for respondents-petitioners and Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel for applicant-respondent. 2. The writ petition is directed against the final order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad in Original Application No. 330 of 00079 of 2015, Mohd. Yunush v. Union of India and Another. By that order, the Tribunal has allowed the original application and directed the respondents-petitioners for payment of Rs. 2,16,947/-to the applicant-respondent that had been deducted at the time of payment of retiral dues to the applicant-respondent consequent to his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.07.2010. 3. The undisputed facts of the case are, the applicant-respondent retired on the post of J.E.-II, from the East Central Railway, Mughalsarai. During his years in service, the applicant-respondent suffered a medical condition, for which, he was hospitalized at the Railway Hospital, Mughalsarai and thereafter referred to higher medical centre. Consequent to his recovery, he was categorized in the lower medical category C-1 grade on 29.07.2010, just three days before his attaining the age of superannuation. While preparing his pension papers, the Central Railway Authorities realised, excess payment had been made to the applicant-respondent month to month, totaling Rs. 2,16,947/-. That was deducted. 4. Being aggrieved, the applicant-respondent first approached the departmental authority, who rejected his claim. Being aggrieved, the private-respondents filed the Original Application, giving rise to the present petition. It is true that a counter affidavit had been filed by the Union of India and plea of delay had been raised therein. However, on perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it appears that no such plea was pressed at the stage of hearing. Paragraph 3 of the order of the Tribunal contains the contentions raised by the Union of India, which reads as below :- "Per contra, the respondent's counsel stated that the letter dated 07.07.2014 cannot be an impugned order as this is an information, received by the applicant, through Right to Information Act hence on this account only the O.A. deserves to be dismissed. Counsel for the respondents stated that the respondents have constituted the medical board, which found the applicant unfit in B-1 and B-2 category and fit in C-1 category and below with glass for D.V/NV. Counsel for the respondents stated that the respondents have constituted the medical board, which found the applicant unfit in B-1 and B-2 category and fit in C-1 category and below with glass for D.V/NV. Counsel for the respondent stated that the applicant has no leave balance in his account hence the question of leave salary does not arise." 5. Consequently, the Tribunal has not dealt with the issue of delay. 6. On the merit issue, the Tribunal has found that no show cause notice was ever issued to the applicant-respondent during his years in service, seeking to reverse the alleged excess payment made to the applicant-petitioner. Considering the loss suffered, calling for sympathetic consideration of his case, the Tribunal has allowed the Original Application and provided for refund of the wrongly deducted amount Rs. 2,16,947/-. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, we find no good ground to interfere in the facts of the present case. In the first place, the issue of delay and laches that may have been available to the Union of India, though raised before the learned Tribunal, was not pressed at the stage of oral hearing. Consequently, the Tribunal has not dealt with this. 8. Once the Union of India had thus waived its right to press the objection as to limitation before the Tribunal, it may not be allowed to resurrect the ground of delay, in the present proceedings that arise by way of judicial review of the order of the Tribunal. 9. In State of Punjab v. Madan Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 90 , where, issue of delay and laches had not been raised before the High Court, the issue was not allowed to be raised before the Supreme Court. It was observed :- "5. It was urged on behalf of the State that the High Court should not have granted any relief in the writ petitions as the petitioners were guilty of laches inasmuch as they approached the Court after a long delay. This contention does not appear to have been urged before the High Court. The High Court having exercised its discretion in granting the reliefs asked for, we see no reason to interfere with its discretion." 10. This contention does not appear to have been urged before the High Court. The High Court having exercised its discretion in granting the reliefs asked for, we see no reason to interfere with its discretion." 10. In the context of writ jurisdiction of the High Court (where delayed writ proceeding had been entertained on merits), the Supreme Court in Dayal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593 , observed as below :- "41. It was submitted that the respondents having filed a writ petition after a period of eight years, the same ought not to have been entertained. Primarily a question of delay and latches is a matter which is required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its jurisdiction despite delay and latches on the part of the respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable." 11. Also, we see no fact pleaded by the Union of India and therefore, we find no error was committed by the Tribunal in not considering the issue of delay. The ground of delay or laches may be a ground available to oppose a judicial proceeding before any Court of law or Tribunal. However, it remains an objection to the remedy sought. It may be waived by the party in whose favour it may work, either explicitly or impliedly. 12. Even, in the context of a rigid period of limitation prescribed under Section 132(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation) v. Pooran mal & Sons, (1975) 4SCC 568, it was found to be waived by the party / assessee to whose benefit, it otherwise applied. It was observed :- "10. But the most important principle on the basis of which the order of the Income-tax Officer should be upheld is that it is in pursuance of an agreement between the parties which has obtained the imprimaturs of the Court that this order has been made. The period of limitation is one intended for the benefit of the person whose property has been seized. It is open to him to waive it. The period of limitation is one intended for the benefit of the person whose property has been seized. It is open to him to waive it. We consider that to hold that the period of ninety days which is mentioned in 132(5) is an immutable one would cause more injury to the citizen than to Revenue. It is, therefore, open to the aggrieved person, as happened in this case, to agree to a fresh disposal of the case by the Income-tax Officer and thereby waive the period of limitation." 13. Since in the present case, the objection as to limitation was raised in the counter affidavit filed before the Tribunal but was not pressed at the stage of oral hearing, the same is treated to have been waived, by necessary implication. Even in the present writ petition, no pleading has been raised to assert that the ground of delay, though pressed at the stage of oral hearing before the Tribunal, was not considered by it. 14. Therefore, we cannot accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner that there was gross delay on the part of the applicant-respondent in approaching the Tribunal. 15. As to merits, no reliance may be placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Others v. Jagdev Singh, (2016) 14 SCC 267 , inasmuch as the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court, in that case (from the preexisting ratio in State of Punjab and Others v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Another, (2015) 4 SCC 334 ), is wholly inapplicable to the present facts. That distinction arose on the own undertaking given by the employee at the stage of the disputed excess payment being paid out to him, first i.e. when it was disbursed. 16. Seen in that light, in High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Others v. Jagdev Singh, (2016) 14 SCC 267 , it was observed : "10. In State of Punjab & Ors etc. vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc. this Court held that while it is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship where payments have mistakenly been made by an employer, in the following situations, a recovery by the employer would be impermissible in law: "(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service). this Court held that while it is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship where payments have mistakenly been made by an employer, in the following situations, a recovery by the employer would be impermissible in law: "(i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service). (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover." (emphasis supplied). 11. The principle enunciated in proposition (ii) above cannot apply to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay scale. He is bound by the undertaking." (emphasis supplied) 17. Any amount that may have been thus paid out in excess against such an undertaking -that it may be reversed in future would, remain provisional and/or a conditional payment that may remain contingent to an event, in future. Such is not the case here. 18. In the present case, according to the respondent-petitioner, the excess amount of Rs. 2,16,947/-was not paid in lump-sum. Rather it came to be wrongly paid out to the applicant-respondent by way of excess payment of salary, paid month to month from 17.06.2009 to 31.07.2010. 19. Seen in that light, there is absolutely no pleading or allegation that the petitioner, who was recovering from his medical condition, had played any role in obtaining such excess payment. Rather it came to be wrongly paid out to the applicant-respondent by way of excess payment of salary, paid month to month from 17.06.2009 to 31.07.2010. 19. Seen in that light, there is absolutely no pleading or allegation that the petitioner, who was recovering from his medical condition, had played any role in obtaining such excess payment. Therefore, only this much may be concluded in the present facts that excess payment came to be made to the applicant-respondent owing to the mistake committed by the employer. 20. Then it may also not lost sight, the employee is not claiming any payment from this Court. That relief was claimed before the Tribunal. It has been granted. The total amount paid to the applicant-respondent is not more than Rs. 2,16,947/-. It is too small and not deserving to warrant any interference by this Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. No patent error of law shown to have been committed by the Tribunal as may require that interference to be made. 21. For the reasons given above and the order of Tribunal being based on facts and law, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction. 22. In view of above, the present petition is dismissed. No order as to cost.