ORDER : Avinash G. Gharote, J. - Heard Mr. S.P. Dhole, learned counsel for the appellants in all appeals except Appeal No.5/2018, Mr. M.P. Khajanchi, learned counsel for the appellant in Appeal No.5/2018 and Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondents in all appeals. 2. This is a reference made by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on the request of the learned Division Bench (B. P. Dharmadhikari & Z. A. Haq, JJ.) in Commercial Appeal No.1/2018 [M/s. Sonali Power Equipment through its Managing Director v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Mumbai and others and other connected matters] by the judgment dated 24/08/2018, being unable to agree with the view taken by another learned Division bench (S.C. Dharmadhikari & Smt. Vibha Kankanwadi, JJ.) in M/s. Delton Electricals v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and others [Commercial Appeal No.38/2017 decided on 31/08/2017 at Bombay], which holds that the claims under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 ("MSMED Act, 2006" for short hereinafter) were not entertainable, if they were barred by the Limitation Act, 1963. The learned referring Bench found that in Delton Electricals (supra) several facets as indicated in para 46 of its judgment were not considered due to which Delton Electricals (supra) required reconsideration. 3. As no specific question was framed by the learned referral Bench in Sonali Power Equipment (supra) and the matter has been referred, on 20/09/2023, after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties we, had framed the following question : Q. "Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to proceedings initiated under Section 18 of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 ?" 4. The matter was thereafter heard on 20/09/2023 and 21/09/2023, wherein the following arguments were canvassed by Mr. S.P. Dhole, learned counsel for the appellants in all appeals except Appeal No.5/2018, Mr. M.P. Khajanchi, learned counsel for the appellant in Appeal No.5/2018 and Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 in all appeals. 5. Mr. S. P. Dhole, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that : 5.1. That judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of two judges in the matter of Silpi Industries Etc. M.P. Khajanchi, learned counsel for the appellant in Appeal No.5/2018 and Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondent no.1 in all appeals. 5. Mr. S. P. Dhole, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that : 5.1. That judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of two judges in the matter of Silpi Industries Etc. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and another 2021 SCC Online SC 439 on the issue of applicability of section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, "A & C Act, 1996, hereinafter) to the claims under MSMED Act 2006, is based on the Andhra Pradesh High Court order which has relied on the Apex Court order in the matter of Andhra Pradesh Power Co-ordination Committee and others v. M/s. Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited and others (2016) 3 SCC 468 : AIR 2016 SC 1925 , which has totally different dimension. 5.2. In Silpi Industries (supra) the matter of applicability of limitation under section 43 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (A & C Act, for short hereinafter), is considered. Though Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra) is discussed saying that Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996 is applicable in the arbitration under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006 it is on a different footing as Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited was not a Small Enterprise under the MSMED Act, 2006. The claim was under a contract referring to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 ("Limi. Act", for short hereinafter) and the claimant had no vested right conferred upon them. No statutory obligations were mandated upon the buyer to pay within a specific period and no vested rights conferred upon the supplier/seller, as provided for in Sections 15 and 16 of MSMED Act, 2006 and the matter related to reimbursement of MAT (Minimum Alternate Tax). 5.3. The MSMED Act, 2006 is for the "Liability fastened upon the buyer to pay interest to supplier on delayed payment and new vested legal rights conferred upon the supplier". This status of provision of MSMED Act, 2006 cannot be compared with the situation in Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra). 5.4. Being a social welfare enactment the MSMED Act, 2006 provides for self-contained mechanism of statutory conciliation to avoid the further litigation. If conciliation fails, the proceedings under Section 18(3) would be set in motion. This is not provided for in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 5.4. Being a social welfare enactment the MSMED Act, 2006 provides for self-contained mechanism of statutory conciliation to avoid the further litigation. If conciliation fails, the proceedings under Section 18(3) would be set in motion. This is not provided for in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Once arbitration is taken up under Section 18(3) by a legal fiction the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996 would apply to the proceedings, which would include Section 2(4). Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act 1996, expressly rules out application of Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996 to arbitration's under any other enactment. 5.5. In view of the above situation, observations in relation to Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996 are not applicable in the case of proceedings under Section 18 (3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. The issue of limitation is left to primary authority to go into and record its own findings on merit with detailed reasoning. It cannot be substituted by the appellate court. 5.6. Moreover, it is not the adjudication of dispute between the supplier and buyer as goods/services are duly accepted and payments are delayed. Therefore in the MSMED Act, 2006 the terms of reference are not to be identified and to be referred to arbitrator for adjudication of dispute. 5.7. In the given matter the statutory proceedings under Section 18(3) are already held. Section 21 of the A & C Act, 1996 where arbitration is deemed to have commenced has no applicability to the MSMED Act, 2006 and therefore there is no application of Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996. Hence, the issue referred in Silpi Industries (supra) is not applicable in the matter. Accordingly, the Primary Authority decided the issue on the merit in favour of the claimant. 5.8. The A & C Act, 1996 provides expressly for ruling out limitation in statutory arbitration by virtue of Section 2(4). In Sri Paravathi Parmeshwar Cables and Ors v. A.P. Transmission Corporation Ltd. and Ors. (2013) 10 SCC 693 since it has been held that in terms of section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 providing for 75% pre-deposit for filing appeal against the Award of the Council prevails, it confirms Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996 is not applicable to statutory Arbitration. (2013) 10 SCC 693 since it has been held that in terms of section 2(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 providing for 75% pre-deposit for filing appeal against the Award of the Council prevails, it confirms Section 43 of A & C Act, 1996 is not applicable to statutory Arbitration. Sri Paravathi Parmeshwar Cables (supra) is by a Bench of three judges and would therefore prevail over a smaller Bench of two judges. 5.9. Ganeshan Rep. by its Power Agent G. Rukmani Ganeshan v. The Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board, (2019) 7 SCC 108 wherein it has been held that a Commissioner functioning under the T.N. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, is a Statutory Authority cannot be treated as a Court, and therefore Limitation Act, would not be applicable to proceedings before it, is relied upon to contend that there is nothing under Section 18 of MSMED Act,2006, which indicates that Limitation Act, 1963 is made applicable to proceedings under it. 5.10. The law of limitation is not at all applicable to the proceedings before Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council. 5.11. Learned Counsel also relies upon the issues framed in para 46 of the judgment under reference in support of his submissions and the answers to them which are enumerated in his written notes of arguments. 5.12. Mr. S.P. Dhole, learned counsel for the appellants, in addition to those referred to above also relies upon the following decisions : (a) State of Bihar and another v. R.B. Motilal Chamaria and another 1969 (1) UJ666SC. (b) Union of India and others v. Exide Industries Limited and another Civil Appeal No.3545/2009 Decided on 24/04/2020. (c) Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of W.B. v. Abani Maity 1979 (4) SCC 85 . (d) State of Rajasthan and others v. Swaika Properties and another 1985 AIR 1289 SC (e) M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise 2015 (3) SCC (Civil) 510 (f) M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple v. Suresh Das, 2020 (1) SCC 1 6. Mr. M.P. Khajanchi, learned Counsel for the appellant in Appeal no.5/2018, submits as under : 6.1. The provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings initiated under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 6.2. Mr. M.P. Khajanchi, learned Counsel for the appellant in Appeal no.5/2018, submits as under : 6.1. The provisions of Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings initiated under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 6.2. Section 18 (1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 entitles any party to make reference in respect of any amount due under Section 17 to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. Thus a party can make a claim before the Facilitation Council in terms of Section 18 (1) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 mandates the Facilitation Council to conduct the conciliation and the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the A & C Act, 1996 shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of the A & C Act, 1996. Section 18 (3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 requires the Facilitation Council to either itself take up the dispute for Arbitration or refer it to any Institution for such Arbitration and the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996 shall "then" apply to the disputes as if the Arbitration was in pursuance of an Arbitration Agreement referred to in Section 7 (1) of the A & C Act, 1996. 6.3. Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 provides for overriding effect. It states that the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 shall have effect not withstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 6.4. Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 (which consists of sections 15 to 25) refers to delayed payments to Micro and Small Enterprises. There is no provision in Chapter-V of the MSMED Act, 2006 prescribing the limitation. 6.5. Section 43 (1) of the A & C Act, 1996 prescribes that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to Arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court. However, Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act, 1996 excludes the application of Section 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 to Arbitrations under any other enactment (MSMED Act, 2006 in the present case). 6.6. However, Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act, 1996 excludes the application of Section 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 to Arbitrations under any other enactment (MSMED Act, 2006 in the present case). 6.6. Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited v. PPN Power Generating Company Private Limited (2014) 11 SCC 53 (para 65), is relied upon to contend that rigours of Limitation Act contained in Section 43 of the Act of 1996 would not be applicable to Statutory Arbitrations by virtue of Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act, 1996. 6.7. Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra) (para 15) is relied upon to contend that for various reasons including Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act, 1996, Limitation Act would not be applicable to the Arbitration under any other enactment. Para 28 in which Section 175 of the Electricity Act is quoted which prescribes that the provisions of said Electricity Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force and it has been held that a plain reading of Section 175 of the Electricity Act leads to a conclusion that unless the provisions of the Electricity Act are in conflict with any other law, when this Act will have overriding effect as per Section 174 of the Electricity Act, the provisions of the Electricity Act will not adversely affect any other law for the time being in force. It has further held in same para 28 that the provisions of the Electricity Act will be additional provisions without adversely affecting or subtracting anything from any other law which may be in force. Such provision cannot be stretched to infer adoption of the Limitation Act for the purpose of regulating the varied and numerous powers under the Electricity Act, 2003. Para 30 is relied upon to contend that provisions of Section 175 of the Electricity Act have been relied to hold that Limitation Act would apply to the disputes under the Electricity Act whereas there is no such analogous provision in the MSMED Act, 2006. Therefore, provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted to the proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 6.8. Therefore, provisions of Limitation Act are not attracted to the proceedings under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 6.8. In Silpi Industries (supra) according to learned Counsel Section 2 (4) of the Act of 1996 or Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited (supra) which holds that provisions of Limitation Act made applicable vide Section 43 of the A & C Act of 1996 shall not apply to the Arbitrations under other enactments by virtue of Section 2 (4) of the A & C Act,1996, and so also Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra) were not considered and therefore would not be applicable. Silpi Industries (supra) therefore is a judgment sub-silentio and cannot be said to be a binding precedent and is also per incuriam Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra). 6.9. Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 623 , (para 19) is relied upon to contend that a decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the Court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of co-equal Bench and the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam. National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others reported at (2017) 16 SCC 680 (para 28) is also relied upon for the same purpose. 6.10. In any event, as per the scheme of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, even if the ratio of Silpi's case is taken into consideration, the same does not apply to Section 18 (1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, i.e. to a stage when a party raises claim for amount due by making a reference before the Facilitation Council. The ratio in Silpi Industries (supra) also does not apply to conciliation proceedings before the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Thus for the same reasons the ratio in Silpi Industries (Supra) would not be applicable to the proceeding under Section 18 (3) of MSMED Act 2006. The ratio in Silpi Industries (supra) also does not apply to conciliation proceedings before the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Thus for the same reasons the ratio in Silpi Industries (Supra) would not be applicable to the proceeding under Section 18 (3) of MSMED Act 2006. It is thus submitted that the reference may kindly be answered by holding that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings initiated under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. 6.11. Mr. M.P. Khajanchi, learned counsel for the appellant in Appeal No.5/2018 relies upon the following decisions : (a) M/s. Delton Electricals v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and others 2018 (4) ALLMR 578 . (b) Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited v. PPN Power Generating Company Private Limited (2014) 11 SCC 53 . (c) Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee and others v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited and others (2016) 3 SCC 468 . (d) Silpi Industries Etc v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and another 2021 SCC Online SC 439. (e) Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited (Unit 2) and another (2023) 6 SCC 401 . (f) Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 16 SCC 623 . (g) National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16 SCC 680 . 7. Mr. S. V. Purohit, learned Counsel, for the respondents makes the following submissions : 7.1. The issue/question framed by this Court in reference is squarely answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Silpi Industries (supra) as also Mahakali Foods (supra) Silpi Industries (supra) Para 13 -- Recites the issues which fell for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court. Paras 15- 17 - Gives background aspects of Interest on Delayed Payment Act, 1993 and the MSMED Act, 2006. Para 18 - Finding that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply to Arbitrations covered by Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006. This is supported by Mahakali Foods (supra) [Relevant Paras 4, 11, 16-26, 29, 30, 34] 7.2. Law laid down by Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India. Para 18 - Finding that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply to Arbitrations covered by Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006. This is supported by Mahakali Foods (supra) [Relevant Paras 4, 11, 16-26, 29, 30, 34] 7.2. Law laid down by Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India. Once Supreme Court decides an Issue by taking a particular decision, it cannot be said that the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court is per incuriam or the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not considered all relevant factors while delivering the judgment. Hon'ble High Court cannot hold that the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court is per incuriam. If this view is taken there would be total chaos in the country and that there would be no finality to the judgment/order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Moreover, by not following the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, High Court or the subordinate courts would be violating provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on South Central Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Employees Union v. B. Yashodabai and others 2015 (4) MhLJ 505 (Paras 9, 14-17). 7.3. The MSMED Act, 2006 does not bar applicability of Limitation Act, 1963. Council under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 exercises powers which are in the nature of Adjudicatory/Judicial powers. Hence claims coming for adjudication before Council cannot be entertained which are barred by law of limitation. Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra) Paras 15-18 and 22-31 are relied upon . 7.4. Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 provides that provisions of Arbitration Act will apply to the dispute. Section 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 provides that limitation Act will apply. Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 uses the word "decree" which means civil court can also decide the dispute. Therefore, Limitation Act Applies. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court is not to be readily inferred, unless specifically or impliedly barred. Once it is held that civil suit is maintainable it can't be said that Limitation Act will not apply to the reference made under MSMED Act, 2006. 7.5. Provisions contained in Interest on Delayed Payment Act, 1993 specifically provided filing of Suit, approaching council or filing any other proceeding. Once it is held that civil suit is maintainable it can't be said that Limitation Act will not apply to the reference made under MSMED Act, 2006. 7.5. Provisions contained in Interest on Delayed Payment Act, 1993 specifically provided filing of Suit, approaching council or filing any other proceeding. Suit filed under the 1993 Act is maintainable and Limitation Act applies to it though as per Section 10 of the 1993 Act, Act is given overriding effect. M/s. Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. and another v. Assam State Electricity Board and others 2019 (1) SCALE 747 (Relevant Paras 69, 70, 76) is relied upon. 7.6. Sections 17 and 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 uses the word "Amount Due". Meaning of the word "Amount Due" are those amounts which the creditor/ supplier could have recovered had he filed a suit. State of Kerala and others v. V. R. Kalliyanikutty and another AIR 1999 SC 1305 (relevant paras 8-17) and Hansraj Gupta and others v. Dehra Dun-Mussorie Electric Tramway AIR 1933 Privy Council 63 (relevant P 66 C1). Hence, it is submitted that provisions of Indian Limitation Act are applicable to proceedings initiated under section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006. 7.7. Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned counsel for the respondents apart from those stated above also relies upon the following decisions. (a) Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, (Irrigation Department) and others AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 396 (b) State of Goa v. Western Builders (2006) 6 SCC 239 (c) South Delhi Municipal Corporation and another v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Private Limited and others (2020) 12 SCC 680 (d) Dhulabhai etc. v. State of M.P. and another AIR 1969 SC 78 (e) Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan (2002) 2 SCC 420 . 8. The relevant provisions, which fall for consideration are as under : (a) Sections 18 and 24 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. "Section 18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. "Section 18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. (3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the disputes as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of that Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. (5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference. Section 24. Overriding effect. - The provisions of sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. (b) sections 2 (4) and 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : "Section 2 (1)........ (2)...... (3)...... Section 24. Overriding effect. - The provisions of sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. (b) sections 2 (4) and 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : "Section 2 (1)........ (2)...... (3)...... (4) This Part except sub-section (1) of section 40, sections 41 and 43 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement, except insofar as the provisions of this Part are inconsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. Section 43. Limitations. - (1) The limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court. (2) For the purposes of this section and the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred in section 21. (3) -------------. (4) Where the Court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the dispute so submitted." (c) Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 "Section 29. (1)..... (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 9. The question to be answered in light of the fact that the language of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 contemplates two different situations, and will have to be answered in two parts. The question to be answered in light of the fact that the language of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 contemplates two different situations, and will have to be answered in two parts. The first part is relatable to the provisions of Section 18(1) and 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which requires the dispute to be referred to the Facilitation Council in respect of the 'amount due', under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. The second part is the Arbitration to be conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, where the conciliation under Section 18(2) stands terminated without any settlement, in which case the Facilitation Council may itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or center providing Alternate Disputes Resolution services, which then shall have to be conducted under the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996. Thus the question can be bifurcated as under for the sake of answering it properly : "(1) Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to conciliation proceedings initiated and conducted under Section 18 (1) & (2) of MSMED Act, 2006 ?" (2) Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006 ?" 10. In so far as question no.2, is concerned the language of Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006, as quoted above expressly gives an overriding effect to the provisions of Section 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act, 2006, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. This would clearly indicate that since MSMED Act, 2006, has been held to be a special enactment and a piece of beneficial legislation [see Silpi Industries (supra) and Mahakali Foods (supra)], the overriding effect of the provisions of Section 24 therein, have to be given full effect to, which would mean that the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act, 2006 will prevail, over all other laws, even if those laws, contain any provision, which can be said to be inconsistent with what has been enacted in Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act, 2006. Thus even if Section 2(4) of the A & C Act 1996, may create an embargo in applicability of Section 43 to statutory arbitration, however, since Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006, gives Sections 15 to 23 as contained therein, an overriding effect, it will have to be necessarily held that Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996 cannot come in the way of making the limitation Act, applicable to arbitrations to be held under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 10.1. This position is further reinforced by the language of Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, which uses the non-obstante clause 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force', in the context of a supplier approaching the Facilitation Council under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, failure of which leads to arbitration under Section 18(3), which non-obstante clause has to be given full effect to and therefore would indicate that any contrary/inconsistent provision in any other Statute, would have to be discarded while construing the meaning and applicability of the provision in which the non-obstante clause, has been used, meaning thereby that Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, will not have any effect in the applicability of the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996, while conducting arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 as its applicability will have to be held to have been expressly ruled out by the non-obstante clause as contained in Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006. [see : The majority view in the Constitution Bench in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237, which holds that the non-obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding "anything contained" in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment, although the draftsman may appear to have had primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting with the new Act. The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, even apart from such clause, a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it as is indicated by the maxim Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant ; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Narender, (2014) 13 SCC 100 which holds that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device to give effect to the enacting part of the section in case of conflict over the provisions mentioned in the non-obstante clause ; Union of India v. G.M. Kokil, 1984 Supp SCC 196 which holds that it is well-known that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. 10.2. The provisions of Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, 2006 yet again contains a non-obstante clause, when it says that 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the center providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India' . The MSMED Act, 2006 thus in Section 18 uses the non-obstante clause twice, once in Section 18(1) and secondly in Section 18(4), which would reiterate the intention of the legislature to give primacy to the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 over all other laws and for conduct of arbitrations under Section 18(3) therein under the aegis of the A & C Act, 1996, which would in turn make the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, applicable to arbitrations conducted thereunder, in term of Section 43(1) of the A & C Act, 1996. 10.3. Thus the overriding effect to Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 stands reiterated by the non-obstante clause as contained in Section 18(1), and reinforces the supremacy of the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 over that of the A & C Act, 1996. 10.3. Thus the overriding effect to Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 stands reiterated by the non-obstante clause as contained in Section 18(1), and reinforces the supremacy of the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 over that of the A & C Act, 1996. It is also material to note that Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 applies the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996 to the arbitration to be conducted thereunder and would therefore, since, to any arbitration to be conducted under the provisions of the A & C Act, 1996, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable by virtue of Section 43 as contained therein, the same will also have to be held to be applicable to the arbitration's to be conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Taking any other view, would open a pandora's box, by permitting claims, irrespective of when they have arisen, including time barred and stale claims, to be raised in arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which cannot be held to be the purpose and object for which the MSMED Act, 2006 has been enacted, which is to provide a platform for a speedy remedy for the supplier to recover his claims against the buyer. It is also material to note that had this been the intention of the legislature, to permit time barred claims being raised in arbitration to be conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 nothing prevented it from saying so. The very absence of such a provision, in the MSMED Act, 2006 would therefore also lead to the conclusion that the provisions of the Limitation Act, are applicable to claims as are required to be adjudicated in arbitration's under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 10.4. That a definite time frame is contemplated and provided for is clearly apparent from the language of Section 15, read with the definition of 'appointed day', as occurring in Section 2(b) of the MSMED Act, 2006. For the sake of ready reference these two provisions are quoted as under : "2 (b) "appointed day' means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. For the sake of ready reference these two provisions are quoted as under : "2 (b) "appointed day' means the day following immediately after the expiry of the period of fifteen days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance of any goods or any services by a buyer from a supplier. Explanation.--For the purposes of this clause,-- (i) "the day of acceptance" means,-- (a) the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; or (b) where any objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier; (ii) "the day of deemed acceptance" means, where no objection is made in writing by the buyer regarding acceptance of goods or services within fifteen days from the day of the delivery of goods or the rendering of services, the day of the actual delivery of goods or the rendering of services; 15. Liability of buyer to make payment.-Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day: Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance." A reading of the above provisions would indicate that while Section 15 of the MSMED Act, 2006 provides for the liability of the buyer to make payment, on or before the date agreed upon, in writing, or where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day, the proviso to Section 15, further restricts the time limit, to not more than 45 days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance, which would be so, irrespective of what has been agreed in writing between the supplier and the buyer. Explanation (i) to Section 2(b) defines 'day of acceptance', to mean the day of actual delivery of goods or rendering of services and in case any objection is made in writing by the buyer within fifteen days thereof, then the day on which such objection is removed by the buyer. Explanation (ii) to Section 2(b) defines 'deemed date of acceptance', to mean where no objection in writing is made by the buyer, the day of delivery of goods or rendering of services. Section 2(b) defines the 'appointed day', to mean a period of 15 days, from the 'day of acceptance', or 'day of deemed acceptance. Thus a definite time frame has been fixed for raising any claims by the supplier against the buyer, under the provisions of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. The fixing of a definite time also finds expression under Section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006, which permits charging of interest @ three times of the Bank rate notified by the Reserve bank of India, from the 'appointed day' as defined in Section 2(b) of the MSMED Act, 2006, in case of non-payment by the buyer. It is thus apparent that the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006, contemplate a definite period for the payment to be made by the buyer and in case of default, charging penal interest at three times the Bank rate, which in turn indicates to us, that the legislature did not intend any time barred or stale claims to be permitted to be raised in arbitration proceedings to be conducted under the provisions of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 10.5. It is also necessary to note that Section 18(5) of the MSMED Act, 2006, also provides for a time limit of 90 days for deciding any reference made under Section 18 thereof, which would apply equally to a reference before the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (2) and so also to arbitration conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, which would indicate the intention of the Legislature, that all claims made under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, were intended to be settled within a given time frame. 10.6. 10.6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Silpi Industries (supra) was called upon to answer two questions, specifically under the MSMED Act, 2006, namely : (i) Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to arbitration proceedings initiated under Section 18 (3) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 ?; and (ii) Whether, counter claim is maintainable in such arbitration proceedings ? The Hon'ble Apex Court noted the scheme of the MSMED Act, and answered them as under : "18. With regard to first issue, namely, applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to the arbitration proceedings initiated under provisions of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, we need to notice certain relevant sections of the Act. As per Section 15 of the said Act, where supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment on or before the agreed date between the parties in writing or where there is no agreement, before the appointed day. Section 16 deals with date from which and rate of interest payable in the event of not making the payment. The recovery mechanism for the amount due is covered by Sections 17 and 18 of the said Act. If any party has a dispute with regard to amount due under Section 17, a reference is required to be made to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. On such reference, the Council is empowered to conduct conciliation in the matter or seek assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such institution for conducting conciliation. If the conciliation is not successful, as contemplated under Section 18(2) of the said Act, same stands terminated under Section 18(3) of the said Act. Thereafter, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are made applicable as if the arbitration was in pursuance of arbitration agreement between the parties, under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to the arbitrations is covered by Section 43 of the 1996 Act. Applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to the arbitrations is covered by Section 43 of the 1996 Act. The High Court, while referring to abovesaid provisions and the judgment of this Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee v. Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. has held that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the arbitrations covered by Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. A reading of Section 43 itself makes it clear that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to the arbitrations, as it applies to proceedings in court. When the settlement with regard to a dispute between the parties is not arrived at under Section 18 of the 2006 Act, necessarily, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council shall take up the dispute for arbitration under Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act or it may refer to institution or centre to provide alternate dispute resolution services and provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 are made applicable as if there was an agreement between the parties under sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the 1996 Act. In view of the express provision applying the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as per section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, we are of the view that the High Court has rightly relied on the judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh Power Coordination Committee 3 and held that Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. Thus, we are of the view that no further elaboration is necessary on this issue and we hold that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to the arbitrations covered by Section 18(3) of the 2006 Act. We make it clear that as the judgment of the High Court is an order of remand, we need not enter into the controversy whether the claims/counter claims are within time or not. We keep it open to the primary authority to go into such issues and record its own findings on merits" It is necessary to note that while holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 will be applicable to arbitration covered by Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, Section 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 has also been relied upon. The Hon'ble Apex Court has delineated that there are fundamental differences in the settlement mechanism under the MSMED Act, 2006 and A & C Act, 1996. The first difference is, the Council constituted under the MSMED Act, 2006 to undertake mandatory conciliation before the arbitration which is not so under the A & C Act, 1996. Secondly, in the event of failure of conciliation under the 2006 Act, the Council or the center or institution is identified by it for arbitration. The A & C Act, 1996 allows resolution of disputes by agreed forum. The third difference is that, in the event of award in favour of seller and if the same is to be challenged, there is a condition for pre-deposit of 75% of the amount awarded. Such is not the case in the A & C Act, 1996. It has been thus held that the MSMED Act, 2006 is a special enactment and a piece of beneficial legislation. Thus an express declaration has been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the provisions of the Limitation Act, are applicable to arbitration's to be conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which declaration of law, is binding on all Courts in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. 10.7. The position has been further considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mahakali Foods (supra) where the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 and that of the A & C Act, 1996, in the light of Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996 fell for consideration. The questions which were framed for answer were as under : "(i) Whether the provisions of Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 would have an effect overriding the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996? (ii) Whether any party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from making a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the said Act, if an independent arbitration agreement existed between the parties as contemplated in section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1996? (iii) Whether the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, itself could take up the dispute for arbitration and act as an arbitrator, when the Council itself had conducted the conciliation proceedings under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 in view of the bar contained in section 80 of the Arbitration Act, 1996?" While considering the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006, the following silent features were noticed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. "40. Having regard to the purpose, intention and objects as also the scheme of the MSMED Act, 2006 and having regard to the unambiguous expressions used in Chapter-V thereof, following salient features emerge: 40.1 Chapter-V is "party-specific", in as much as the party i.e. the 'Buyer' and the 'Supplier' as defined in Sections 2(d) and 2(n) respectively are covered under the said Chapter. 40.2 A specific provision is made fastening a liability on the buyer to make payment of the dues to the supplier in respect of the goods supplied or services rendered to the buyer, as also a liability to pay compound interest at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank, if the buyer fails to make payment within the prescribed time limit. The said liability to pay compound interest is irrespective of any agreement between the parties or of any law for the time being in force. 40.3 A dedicated statutory forum i.e., Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council is provided to enable any party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 to make reference to such Council. 40.4 A specific procedure has been prescribed to be followed by the Facilitation Council after the reference is made to it by any party to the dispute. 40.5 The Facilitation Council or the centres providing alternative dispute resolution services have been conferred with the jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under Section 18(4), notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction. 40.6 The provisions of Arbitration Act, 1996 has been made applicable to the dispute only after the Conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) does not succeed and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties. 40.6 The provisions of Arbitration Act, 1996 has been made applicable to the dispute only after the Conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) does not succeed and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties. 40.7 Sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 18 starting with non obstante clauses have an effect overriding the other laws for the time being in force. 40.8 As per Section 24, the provisions of Section 15 to 23 have an effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force." In relation to the A & C Act, 1996 it was noticed as follows : "41. As against the above position, if the purpose, objects and scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1996 are considered, as stated hereinabove, the said Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and also to define the law relating to Conciliation. It was enacted taking into account the UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration. The main objectives amongst others of the said Act were to make provision for an arbitral procedure which was fair, efficient and capable to meet the needs of the specific arbitration and to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process, as also to permit arbitral tribunal to use mediation, conciliation or other procedures during the arbitral proceedings in the settlement of disputes etc 17. The Arbitration Act, 1996 focuses and covers the law relating to the Arbitration and Conciliation, providing for the requirements of the arbitration agreement, composition of arbitral tribunal, conduct of arbitration proceedings, finality and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards as well as of certain foreign awards, and covers the law relating to Conciliation. Having regard to the entire scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it appears that it is a general law relating to the domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and for conciliation. It does not specify any specific dispute or specific class or category of persons to which the Act shall apply, as has been specified in the MSMED Act, 2006." After noting the differences between the two Acts, it has been held as under : "42. It does not specify any specific dispute or specific class or category of persons to which the Act shall apply, as has been specified in the MSMED Act, 2006." After noting the differences between the two Acts, it has been held as under : "42. Thus, the Arbitration Act, 1996 in general governs the law of Arbitration and Conciliation, whereas the MSMED Act, 2006 governs specific nature of disputes arising between specific categories of persons, to be resolved by following a specific process through a specific forum. Ergo, the MSMED Act, 2006 being a special law and Arbitration Act, 1996 being a general law, the provisions of MSMED Act would have precedence over or prevail over the Arbitration Act, 1996. In Silpi Industries case (supra) also, this Court had observed while considering the issue with regard to the maintainability and counter claim in arbitration proceedings initiated as per Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 that the MSMED Act, 2006 being a special legislation to protect MSME's by setting out a statutory mechanism for the payment of interest on delayed payments, the said Act would override the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 which is a general legislation. Even if the Arbitration Act, 1996 is treated as a special law, then also the MSMED Act, 2006 having been enacted subsequently in point of time i.e., in 2006, it would have an overriding effect, more particularly in view of Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 which specifically gives an effect to the provisions of Section 15 to 23 of the Act over any other law for the time being in force, which would also include Arbitration Act, 1996. 43. The Court also cannot lose sight of the specific non obstante clauses contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 18 which have an effect overriding any other law for the time being in force. 43. The Court also cannot lose sight of the specific non obstante clauses contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (4) of Section 18 which have an effect overriding any other law for the time being in force. When the MSMED Act, 2006 was being enacted in 2006, the Legislative was aware of its previously enacted Arbitration Act, 1996, and therefore, it is presumed that the legislature had consciously made applicable the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 to the disputes under the MSMED Act, 2006 at a stage when the Conciliation process initiated under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 fails and when the Facilitation Council itself takes up the disputes for arbitration or refers it to any institution or centre for such arbitration. It is also significant to note that a deeming legal fiction is created in the Section 18(3) by using the expression 'as if' for the purpose of treating such arbitration as if it was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. As held in K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) 1 SCC 754 , a legal fiction presupposes the existence of the State of facts which may not exist and then works out the consequences which flow from that state of facts. Thus, considering the overall purpose, objects and scheme of the MSMED Act, 2006 and the unambiguous expressions used therein, this court has no hesitation in holding that the provisions of Chapter-V of the MSMED Act, 2006 have an effect overriding the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996." It was also held as under : "46. The submission therefore that an independent arbitration agreement entered into between the parties under the Arbitration Act, 1996 would prevail over the statutory provisions of MSMED Act, 2006 cannot countenanced. As such, sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is an enabling provision which gives the party to a dispute covered under Section 17 thereof, a choice to approach the Facilitation Council, despite an arbitration agreement existing between the parties. As such, sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is an enabling provision which gives the party to a dispute covered under Section 17 thereof, a choice to approach the Facilitation Council, despite an arbitration agreement existing between the parties. Absence of the word 'agreement' in the said provision could neither be construed as casus omissus in the statute nor be construed as a preclusion against the party to a dispute covered under Section 17 to approach the Facilitation Council, on the ground that there is an arbitration agreement existing between the parties. In fact, it is a substantial right created in favour of the party under the said provision. It is therefore held that no party to a dispute covered under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from making a reference to the Facilitation Council under Section 18(1) thereof, merely because there is an arbitration agreement existing between the parties. 47. The aforesaid legal position also dispels the arguments advanced on behalf of the counsel for the buyers that the Facilitation Council having acted as a Conciliator under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 itself cannot take up the dispute for arbitration and act as an Arbitrator. Though it is true that section 80 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 contains a bar that the Conciliator shall not act as an Arbitrator in any arbitral proceedings in respect of a dispute that is subject of conciliation proceedings, the said bar stands superseded by the provisions contained in Section 18 read with Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006. As held earlier, the provisions contained in Chapter-V of the MSMED Act, 2006 have an effect overriding the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The provisions of Arbitration Act, 1996 would apply to the proceedings conducted by the Facilitation Council only after the process of conciliation initiated by the council under Section 18(2) fails and the council either itself takes up the dispute for arbitration or refers to it to any institute or centre for such arbitration as contemplated under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 48. 48. When the Facilitation Council or the institution or the centre acts as an Arbitrator, it shall have all powers to decide the disputes referred to it as if such arbitration was in pursuance of the arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and then all the trappings of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would apply to such arbitration. It is needless to say that such Facilitation Council/institution/centre acting as an arbitral tribunal would also be competent to rule on its own jurisdiction like any other arbitral tribunal appointed under the Arbitration Act, 1996 would have, as contemplated in Section 16 thereof." The conclusion in Mahakali foods Supra, is as under : "52. The upshot of the above is that: 52.1 Chapter-V of the MSMED Act, 2006 would override the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 52.2 No party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from making a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, though an independent arbitration agreement exists between the parties. 52.3 The Facilitation Council, which had initiated the Conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be entitled to act as an arbitrator despite the bar contained in section 80 of the Arbitration Act. 52.4 The proceedings before the Facilitation Council/institute/centre acting as an arbitrator/arbitration tribunal under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006 would be governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996. 52.5 The Facilitation Council/institute/centre acting as an arbitral tribunal by virtue of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be competent to rule on its own jurisdiction as also the other issues in view of section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. 52.6 A party who was not the 'supplier' as per the definition contained in Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the date of entering into contract cannot seek any benefit as the 'supplier' under the MSMED Act, 2006. 52.6 A party who was not the 'supplier' as per the definition contained in Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the date of entering into contract cannot seek any benefit as the 'supplier' under the MSMED Act, 2006. If any registration is obtained subsequently the same would have an effect prospectively and would apply to the supply of goods and rendering services subsequent to the registration." Thus, even if the contention, that Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996 is not discussed in detail in Mahakali Foods (supra) is considered, however, in view of the fact that MSMED Act, 2006, has been considered to be a special statute, Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, in our considered opinion, cannot be pressed into service by the appellants to contend that the Limitation Act could not apply to arbitration held under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 and Section 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 which makes limitation applicable to arbitration proceedings will have to be held to be applicable to arbitration proceedings conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 as the arbitration thereunder, has to be carried out in terms of the A & C Act, 1996. The non-obstante clause in Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, itself, would also support this position as it states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute, may, with regard to any 'amount due' under Section 17 make a reference to the facilitation Council and in case of such failure of the conciliation, the Council may itself conduct arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, which in turn has to be done under the aegis of the A & C Act, 1996, specifically in the light of what has been held in Mahkali Foods (supra) that the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 have also overriding effect as contemplated in Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 when anything is inconsistent in any other law for the time being in force (para 44). This opinion has been rendered in Mahakali Foods (supra), after duly noticing Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, and therefore, reliance placed upon the said provision to contend that the Limitation Act would not be applicable to arbitration conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, would clearly be untenable in law. 10.8. Thus not only in Silpi Industries (supra) but in Mahakali Foods (supra) also the MSMED Act, has been held to be a special enactment, vis-a-vis the A & C Act, 1996, having an overriding effect upon the latter, in light of the non-obstante clauses as contained in Section 18(1) and (4) and Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 which give an overriding effect to the provisions of Sections 15 to 23 of the MSMED Act, 2006 notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, considering which Limitation Act, 1963, is clearly applicable to arbitration proceedings conducted under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 10.9. Sandeep Kumar Bafna (supra) and Pranay Sethi (supra) relied upon by the appellants would clearly not be attracted, as it cannot be said that the judgment in Silpi Industries (supra) and Mahakali Foods (supra) are per incuriam for having not noticed and considered Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, which in fact is noticed in Mahakali Foods (supra). Merely because the mechanism for conducing an arbitration, as provided in the A & C Act, 1996, is permitted to be used for the purpose of deciding a dispute between a supplier and buyer, under Section 18 (3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, the same being a special law in comparison to the A & C Act, 1996, which is a general legislation as indicated in Mahakali Foods (supra) (para 42), Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, cannot be pressed into service to contend inapplicability of the Limitation Act to arbitration proceedings held under Section 18(4) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 10.10. Though Silpi Industries (supra) is being tried to be distinguished by Mr. 10.10. Though Silpi Industries (supra) is being tried to be distinguished by Mr. Dhole, learned Counsel by contending that Lanco Kondapalli Power Corporation (supra) was a case for refund of the Minimum Alternate Tax, and Lanco Kodapalli Power Limited (supra) was not a Micro, Small or medium Enterprise, and therefore the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Silpi Industries (supra) was per incuriam, in our considered opinion, this is not a course of action which is permissible for us, in light of what has been held while considering a similar plea in South Central Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Employees Union (supra) which is as under : "12. Once in pursuance of a judgment delivered by this Court orders had been issued by the Society to its employees who had been wrongly promoted, the High Court could not have held that the orders were not valid because there were certain other factors which had made the promotions given to the employees concerned valid. 13. In our opinion, the High Court should not have considered any other factor especially when this Court had come to a final conclusion that the policy with regard to reservation in the matter of promotion to the employees was not legal and proper. 14. We are of the view that it was not open to the High Court to hold that the judgment delivered by this Court in South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies [South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees' Union v. Registrar of Coop. Societies, (1998) 2 SCC 580 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 703] was per incuriam. 15. If the view taken by the High Court is accepted, in our opinion, there would be total chaos in this country because in that case there would be no finality to any order passed by this Court. When a higher court has rendered a particular decision, the said decision must be followed by a subordinate or lower court unless it is distinguished or overruled or set aside. The High Court had considered several provisions which, in its opinion, had not been considered or argued before this Court when CA No. 4343 of 1988 was decided [ South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees' Union v. . Registrar of Coop. Societies, (1998) 2 SCC 580 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 703] . The High Court had considered several provisions which, in its opinion, had not been considered or argued before this Court when CA No. 4343 of 1988 was decided [ South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees' Union v. . Registrar of Coop. Societies, (1998) 2 SCC 580 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 703] . If the litigants or lawyers are permitted to argue that something what was correct, but was not argued earlier before the higher court and on that ground if the courts below are permitted to take a different view in a matter, possibly the entire law in relation to the precedents and ratio decidendi will have to be rewritten and, in our opinion, that cannot be done. Moreover, by not following the law laid down by this Court, the High Court or the subordinate courts would also be violating the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India." A similar proposition has also been laid down in Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan (2002) 2 SCC 420 in which in relation to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh (1988) 4 SCC 551 a learned Single Judge in Rajendran v. Jose (2001) 3 KLT 431 , had directed that the judgment in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh is not to be followed as the Apex Court had laid down the said legal proposition without adverting to Section 431 of the Code and it has been held as under : "9. It is impermissible for the High Court to overrule the decision of the Apex Court on the ground that the Supreme Court laid down the legal position without considering any other point. It is not only a matter of discipline for the High Courts in India, it is the mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141 that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. It was pointed out by this Court in Anil Kumar Neotia v. Union of India [ (1988) 2 SCC 587 : AIR 1988 SC 1353 ] that the High Court cannot question the correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court even though the point sought before the High Court was not considered by the Supreme Court." We are bound by what has been held in South Central Railway Employees Coop. Credit Society Employees Union (supra) and Suganthi Suresh Kumar (supra) and thus the contention that Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra) has been incorrectly relied upon in Silpi Industries (supra) on account of which it cannot be held to be laying down a good law, or that Silpi Industries (supra) is a judgment sub-silentio, is not a proposition which is acceptable to us. In our considered opinion, Silpi Industries (supra) and Mahakali Foods (supra) which lay down that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings held under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006, are binding precedents and govern the field. Question No.2 has therefore to be answered by holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the arbitration proceedings held in terms of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Question No.1 11. That takes us to the consideration of question no.1. 11.1. Insofar as question no.1 is concerned, admittedly there is no provision in the MSMED Act, 2006, which applies the provisions of the Limitation Act to conciliation proceedings to be held under Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. Could it therefore be said that, any claim for an amount due as contemplated by Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006, irrespective of the limitation as provided by the Limitation Act, 1963, could also be laid before the Facilitation Council, under Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 11.2. In this context, it is necessary to note, that in Mahakali Foods (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court after noticing the provisions of the Interest of delayed payments to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and analyzing the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 has held that the conciliation to be conducted under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 is a statutory conciliation. Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, provides that for conducting such conciliation the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the A & C Act, 1996, shall apply. What is also necessary to note is that Section 18 (2) excludes the applicability of Sections 61 to 64 of the A & C Act, 1996 in the matter of conciliation to be held under the MSMED Act, 2006. What is also necessary to note is that Section 18 (2) excludes the applicability of Sections 61 to 64 of the A & C Act, 1996 in the matter of conciliation to be held under the MSMED Act, 2006. The provisions of Sections 61 to 64 of the A & C Act, 1996 contemplate commencement of any conciliation proceedings only on a written invitation sent by one party to another for the said purpose and therefore, contemplate conciliation only by consent of the parties. By excluding these provisions, for the purpose of conducting conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, the question of consent, has been done away with and therefore, the conciliation to be conducted under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, is a statutory conciliation, in which there is no question of consent being called for or being given by the buyer. Thus once an application under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, is made by a supplier to the Facilitation Council, the other party/buyer, has no choice but to participate in such conciliation proceedings which are to be conducted by the Facilitation Council in terms of the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the A & C Act, 1996. It would, therefore, be apparent that once request for conciliation has been received by the Facilitation Council under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006, it is not permissible or open for the other party/buyer, to contend that he does not agree to conciliation, for conducting of conciliation is a statutory mandate flowing from Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. In case the conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 fails, then under Section 18(3) thereof, the Facilitation Council has to take up the dispute for arbitration, either itself or refer it to any Institution or Center providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration. This would also in turn indicate, that conducting of arbitration proceedings, either by the Facilitation Council itself or by the Institution to which it is referred to by the Facilitation Council, upon failure of the settlement, is mandatory which would point out, that the other party/buyer in such a situation, has no freedom of choice but has to perforce participate in the conciliation as well as the arbitration. Thus, whereas under the A & C Act,1996, there is a choice between the parties, in view of Section 7 of the said Act, on the other hand, under the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006, in view of the language of Section 18(1), (2), (3) there is no choice with the other party/ buyer, than to participate in the conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) and on its failure in the arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3). The other party/buyer, may have a choice not to participate at all, however, in that case, it runs the risk of facing an adverse order in the arbitration proceedings, which in many a cases, may be detrimental to its interest, for a challenge to the same on any grounds, could not be entertained, in terms of Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 unless the appellant/buyer has deposited 75% of the amount in terms of the award. Thus, when participation in the conciliation proceedings is not out of the choice of the other party/buyer, but is compulsory in view of the mandate of Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, which perforce has to lead to arbitration, can it be said, that any defence which may be open, to such party/buyer under the law of limitation can be said to be not available, in such conciliation proceedings. 11.3. It cannot be disputed that the Facilitation Council as constituted under Section 20 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is a composition of three to five members to be appointed from the categories as indicated in Section 21(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 and, therefore, cannot be construed to be a body having any judicial, quasi judicial or adjudicatory function. It is also necessary to note that while conducting conciliation under Sections 65 to 81 of the Act of 1996, the Facilitation Council does not function in any judicial, quasi judicial or adjudicatory capacity. It however remains a fact that under Section 73(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, the Conciliator has a power to authenticate the settlement agreement, which in terms of Section 75 thereof, has been given the status and effect of an arbitral Award, which then, would be enforceable under Section 36 of the A & C Act, 1996. It however remains a fact that under Section 73(4) of the A & C Act, 1996, the Conciliator has a power to authenticate the settlement agreement, which in terms of Section 75 thereof, has been given the status and effect of an arbitral Award, which then, would be enforceable under Section 36 of the A & C Act, 1996. It is, therefore, necessary to consider while answering question No.1, as to whether claims which may be barred by the general law of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963, are permissible to be raised before the Facilitation Council under Section 18 (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 11.4. In this regard, Sections 15 & 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006 have already been quoted above. The statement of objects and reasons, Sections 17, 19, 22 and 23 being relevant are quoted as under: "Statement of Objects and Reasons. - Small scales industry is at present defined by notification under section 11B of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. Section 29B of the Act provides for notifying reservation of items for exclusive manufacture in the small scale industry sector. Except for these two provisions, there exists no legal framework for this dynamic and vibrant sector of the country's economy. Many Expert Groups of Companies appointed by the Government from time to time as well as the small scale industry sector itself have emphasised the need for a comprehensive Central enactment to provide an appropriate legal framework for the sector to facilitate its growth and development. Emergence of a large services sector assisting the small scale industry in the last two decades also warrants a composite view of the sector, encompassing both industrial units and related service entities. The world over, the emphasis has now been shifted from "industries" to "enterprises". Added to this, a growing need is being felt to extend policy support for the small enterprises so that they are enabled to grow into medium ones, adopt better and higher levels of technology and achieve higher productivity to remain competitive in a fast globalisation area. Thus, as in most developed and many developing countries, it is necessary, that in India too, the concerns of the entire small and medium enterprises sector are addressed and the sector is provided with a single legal framework. As of now, the medium industry or enterprise is not even defined in any law. 2. Thus, as in most developed and many developing countries, it is necessary, that in India too, the concerns of the entire small and medium enterprises sector are addressed and the sector is provided with a single legal framework. As of now, the medium industry or enterprise is not even defined in any law. 2. In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, the Bill aims at facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises and seeks to - (a) provide for statutory definitions of "small enterprise" and "medium enterprise"; (b) provide for the establishment of a National Board for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, a high-level forum consisting of stakeholders for participative review of and making recommendations on the policies and programmes for the development of small and medium enterprises; (c) provide for classification of micro, small and medium enterprises on the basis of investment in plant and machinery, or equipment and establishment of an Advisory Committee to recommend on the related matter; (d) empower the Central Government to notify programmes, guidelines or instructions for facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium enterprises; (e) make provisions for ensuring timely and smooth flow of credit to small and medium enterprises to minimise the incidence of sickness among and enhancing the competitiveness of such enterprises, in accordance with the guidelines or instructions of the Reserve Bank of India; (f) empower the Central and State Governments to notify preference policies in respect of procurement of goods and services, produced and provided by small enterprises, by the Ministries, departments and public sector enterprises; (g) empowering the Central Government to create a Fund or Funds for facilitating promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of small enterprises and medium enterprises; (h) make further improvements in the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993 and making that enactment a part of the proposed legislation and to repeal that enactment. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. Section 17. Recovery of amount due.-For any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16. Section 19. 3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. Section 17. Recovery of amount due.-For any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16. Section 19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.-No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any Court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent. of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the Court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose. Section 22. Requirement to specify unpaid amount with interest in the annual statement of accounts .- Where any buyer is required to get his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force, such buyer shall furnish the following additional information in his annual statement of accounts, namely:- (i) the principal amount and the interest due thereon (to be shown separately) remaining unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each accounting year; (ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer in terms of section 16, alongwith the amount of the payment made to the supplier beyond the appointed day during each accounting year; (iii) the amount of interest due and payable for the period of delay in making payment (which have been paid but beyond the appointed day during the year) but without adding the interest specified under this Act; (iv) the amount of interest accrued and remaining unpaid at the end of each accounting year; and (v) the amount of further interest remaining due and payable even in the succeeding years, until such date when the interest dues as above are actually paid to the small enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance as a deductible expenditure under section 23. Section 23. Section 23. Interest not to be allowed as deduction from income.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the amount of interest payable or paid by any buyer, under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall not, for the purposes of computation of income under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), be allowed as deduction." 11.5. As pointed out above, Section 15 of the MSMED Act mandates that where goods are supplied or services rendered, the buyer has to make payment within the time frame agreed between the parties in writing and where there is no such agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day, as defined in Section 2(b) of the MSMED Act, 2006, which contemplates a period of 15 days from the day of acceptance of the actual delivery of the goods or the rendering of services and in case there is an objection in writing by the buyer within 15 days from the day of delivery of goods or rendering of services, the day on which such objection is removed by the supplier. The proviso to Section 15 puts an outer limit of 45 days to such period for making payment for the goods supplied or services rendered. Section 16 contemplates payment of interest upon failure by the supplier to make payment within the time frame as contemplated by Section 15 which has to be a compound interest with monthly rests. Section 17 contemplates the quantum of recovery due, with interest as provided under Section 16. It would, therefore, be apparent, that Sections 15 to 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 prescribe a special procedure for recovery of payment from a buyer, of "amount due" or "services rendered" by a supplier, for which a time frame has been specified, which, if not adhered to, has to carry interest as indicated in Section 17. 11.6. Thus for non-payment consequent to supply made/ services rendered, a supplier can approach the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, in case such supplier has filed a memorandum under Section 8(1) with the authority as specified under Sub-Section 4 thereto, in view of the definition of "supplier" as contained in Section 2(n) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 11.7. 11.7. The right to claim an 'amount due' by a supplier from a buyer, as contemplated by Sections 15 to 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006, is not a right, which is created by the MSMED Act, 2006. No such provisions in the MSMED Act, 2006 indicates so. It is a right available to the supplier, by virtue of the very nature of the transaction, and would be a right which would be permissible to be enforced even otherwise, under the Sale of Goods Act or the Contract Act, under the common law, by filing a civil suit, in the Court of competent jurisdiction, which would have jurisdiction, even to award interest as contemplated by Section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006. All pleas regarding defect in the quality of goods or which are otherwise permissible in law, including the plea of the claim being barred by limitation are then available, to the buyer in such suit. Such a suit/counter-claim, is even permissible to be filed by the buyer also, alleging defect in the supply of goods or any other plea which is permissible. Even the buyer, in the case of services rendered, can approach the Consumer Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, for deficiency and defect in services rendered. It is thus apparent, that the Facilitation Council, is not the only remedy available to the supplier, in respect of any amount due, on account of any supply of goods or services rendered, for such a claim is also entertainable before the other Fora as indicated above. It is thus apparent, that the MSMED Act, 2006, by enacting Sections 15 to 17, has not created any special right in favour of the supplier to recover money for the supply/services rendered. All that it does, is to provide a platform and a mechanism by fixing a time frame for the payment of the money or amount due, for such supply/services rendered and in case of delay, provides for charging compound interest, for speedy recovery of the amount due. 11.8. The object and purpose of the MSMED Act, 2006 also has to be taken into consideration and in fact can be so taken for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions which prevailed at that time which necessitated the making of the law [see: State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sundar and Ors. 11.8. The object and purpose of the MSMED Act, 2006 also has to be taken into consideration and in fact can be so taken for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions which prevailed at that time which necessitated the making of the law [see: State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sundar and Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 737 -paras 66 to 68]. The very purpose for enacting the MSMED Act, 2006 was to provide a more robust mechanism for the recovery of 'amount due', to the supplier, than was extant under the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the precursor of the MSMED Act, 2006 under which delays in realising claims of the supplier were proving disastrous to the financial health of the Small Scale Industries. The following comparative table will demonstrate that the MSMED Act, 2006 has retained the essential features of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and has merely improved the mechanism of recovery by reducing the time lines and also ensuring provisions for measures for promotion and development of the enterprises, closure of the business of the enterprises, etc. : Sr. No. Interest On Delayed Payments To Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 MSMED Act 01. 3. Liability of buyer to make payment Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefore on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day: Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed one hundred and twenty days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. 15. Liability of buyer to make payment Where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make payment therefor on or before the date agreed upon between him and the supplier in writing or, where there is no agreement in this behalf, before the appointed day: Provided that in no case the period agreed upon between the supplier and the buyer in writing shall exceed forty-five days from the day of acceptance or the day of deemed acceptance. 02. 4. 02. 4. Date from which and rate at which interest is payable Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 3, the buyer shall notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay interest to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at one and a half time of Prime Lending Rate charged by the State Bank of India. 16. Date from which and rate at which interest is payable Where any buyer fails to make payment of the amount to the supplier, as required under section 15 , the buyer shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between the buyer and the supplier or in any law for the time being in force, be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on that amount from the appointed day or, as the case may be, from the date immediately following the date agreed upon, at three times of the bank rate notified by the Reserve Bank. 17. Recovery of amount due For any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16 . 03. 5. Liability of buyer to pay compound interest Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement between a supplier and a buyer or in any law for the time being in force, the buyer shall be liable to pay compound interest (with monthly interests) at the rate mentioned in section 4 on the amount due to the supplier. 04. 6. Recovery of amount due (1) The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. 04. 6. Recovery of amount due (1) The amount due from a buyer, together with the amount of interest calculated in accordance with the provisions of section 4 and 5, shall be recoverable by the supplier from the buyer by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force. [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any party to a dispute may make a reference to the Industry Facilitation Council for acting as an arbitrator or conciliator in respect of the matters referred to in that sub-section and the provisions of the A&C act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such dispute as if the arbitration or conciliation were pursuant to an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act. 18. Reference to MSE Facilitation Council (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17 , make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. (3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section(1) of section 7 of that Act (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. (5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference. 05. 7. Appeal No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any Court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five percent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority. 19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent. of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose. 06. [7-A. Establishment of Industry Facilitation Council. 06. [7-A. Establishment of Industry Facilitation Council. The State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, establish one or more Industry Facilitation Councils at such places exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas, as may be specified in the notification. 20. Establishment of MSE Facilitation Council. The State Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Councils, at such places, exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas, as may be specified in the notification. 07. 7-B. Composition of Industry Facilitation Council. (1) The Industry Facilitation Council shall consist of one or more members to be appointed from amongst the following categories:- i. Director of industries by whatever name called or any other officer not below the rank of such director, of the State Government, ii. Representatives of the bank and financial institutions, iii. Office bearers or representatives of the State Industry Associations, and iv.Person having special knowledge in the field of industry, finance, law, trade & commerce. (2) The person appointed under clause (i) of sub-section (1) shall be the Chairperson of the Industry Facilitation Council. (3)The composition of the Industry Facilitation Council, the manner of filing vacancies among, and the procedure to be followed in the discharge of their functions by, the members shall be such as may be prescribed by rules by the State Government 21. Composition of MSE Facilitation Council. (1) The Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council shall consist of not less than three but not more than five members to be appointed from amongst the following categories, namely:-- (i) Director of Industries, by whatever name called, or any other officer not below the rank of such Director, in the Department of the State Government having administrative control of the small scale industries or, as the case may be, micro, small and medium enterprises; and (ii) one or more office-bearers or representatives of associations of micro or small industry or enterprises in the State; and (iii) one or more representatives of banks and financial institutions lending to micro or small enterprises; or (iv) one or more persons having special knowledge in the field of industry, finance, law, trade or commerce. (2) The person appointed under clause (i) of sub-section (1) shall be the Chairperson of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) The person appointed under clause (i) of sub-section (1) shall be the Chairperson of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (3) The composition of the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, the manner of filling vacancies of its members and the procedure to be followed in the discharge of their functions by the members shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government. 08. 8. Requirement to specify unpaid amount with interest in the annual statement of accounts. Where any buyer is required to get his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force, such buyer shall specify the amount together with the interest in his annual statement of accounts as remains unpaid to any supplier at the end of each accounting year. 22. Requirement to specify unpaid amount with interest in the annual statement of accounts. Where any buyer is required to get his annual accounts audited under any law for the time being in force, such buyer shall furnish the following additional information in his annual statement of accounts, namely:-- (I) the principal amount and the interest due thereon (to be shown separately) remaining unpaid to any supplier as at the end of each accounting year; (ii) the amount of interest paid by the buyer in terms of sec tion 16, along with the amount of the payment made to the supplier beyond the appointed day during each accounting year; (iii) the amount of interest due and payable for the period of delay in making payment (which have been paid but beyond the appointed day during the year) but without adding the interest specified under this Act; (iv) the amount of interest accrued and remaining unpaid at the end of each accounting year; and (v) the amount of further interest remaining due and payable even in the succeeding years, until such date when the interest dues as above are actually paid to the small enterprise, for the purpose of disallowance as a deductible expenditure under section 23 . 09. 9. Interest not to be allowed as deduction from income. 09. 9. Interest not to be allowed as deduction from income. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Income tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the amount of interest payable or paid by any buyer, under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall not, for the purposes of computation of income under the Income tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), be allowed as deduction. 23. Interest not to be allowed as deduction from income. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), the amount of interest payable or paid by any buyer, under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall not, for the purposes of computation of income under the Income-tax Act, 1961, be allowed as deduction. 10. 10. Overriding effect. The provisions of this act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 24. Overriding effect. The provisions of sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 25. Scheme for closure of business of micro, small and medium enterprises Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the Central Government may, with a view to facilitating closure of business by a micro, small or medium enterprise, not being a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), notify a Scheme within one year from the date of commencement of this Act. The above comparative table would thus demonstrate the retention of the basic features of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, in the MSMED Act, 2006; shortening of the time lines and creating a more robust mechanism for recovery of the money due and payable to the supplier. This would also demonstrate that no special right is created in the supplier, and the right to recovery available to the supplier is one which is even otherwise available to him, under the Common law. 11.9. In M/s Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Assam State Electricity Board & Ors. This would also demonstrate that no special right is created in the supplier, and the right to recovery available to the supplier is one which is even otherwise available to him, under the Common law. 11.9. In M/s Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Assam State Electricity Board & Ors. 2019 (1) Scale 747 , : 2019 SCC Online 68, the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the overriding provision of Section 10 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the predecessor of the MSMED Act, 2006, while considering a plea of non applicability of Limitation Act in view of Section 10 therein has held as under : "68. Plaintiff themselves in the plaint as noted above has pleaded that limitation will not apply by virtue of Section 10 which submission was accepted by the Trial Court. The provision of Section 10 of 1993 Act gives overriding effect to "the provisions of Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent herewith contained in any other law for the time being in force". The overriding effect was given to the provisions of the Act which were contained in the Act. Section 10 provided that overriding effect is given to the provisions of the Act over any inconsistent law for the time being in force. It simply meant that if there is anything inconsistent in any other law to the provisions of the Act, the provisions of the Act shall prevail and override any inconsistent law. For example, when Section 4 requires payment of interest at particular rate on delayed payment the said rate shall have overriding effect to rate of interest provided in any other law. 69. Further, as per Section 7 no appeal can be filed against the decree or other order passed regarding recovery of amount due without depositing 75 % of the amount. Thus in a suit if a decree is passed on amount due of interest appeal has to be entertained after depositing 75% or as per any other order passed by the Court. Normal right of appeal shall be overridden by virtue of Section 7 of 1993 Act. The Trial Court fell in error in reading overriding effect given in Section 10 to the Limitation Act also. Normal right of appeal shall be overridden by virtue of Section 7 of 1993 Act. The Trial Court fell in error in reading overriding effect given in Section 10 to the Limitation Act also. There is no provision in 1993 Act pertaining to limitation, the provision of Limitation Act pertaining to filing suit shall continue to operate there being nothing contrary or overriding under 1993 Act. Section 10 will operate only with regard to expressed provisions contained in 1993 Act which shall be given overriding effect but reading Section 10 to the effect that it shall override Limitation Act is not correct interpretation of Section 10 and Trial Court fell in error in relying on Section 10 in holding that Limitation Act will not apply. 70. We thus are of the view that Limitation Act, 1963 is fully applicable with regard to money suit filed by the appellant hence, the question of limitation has to be answered as per Limitation Act 1963. -------'. It was also held that the right to sue accrued not on the date of the agreement but on the day of supply, considering which it was held that the claim was barred by time. It is necessary to note that Section 10 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 gave the provisions thereof an overriding effect. No doubt true that the claims under the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, mandated the recovery to be made by way of a suit or other proceeding under any law for the time being in force, by virtue of Section 6(1) therein, that however does not in any way deter from the fact that even for claims under the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the law of limitation was held to be applicable, in spite of there being nothing in the said Act of 1993 to indicate its applicability and the overriding effect of Section 10 thereof was held to mean not to override the Limitation Act. The language of Section 10 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is identical. The language of Section 10 of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is identical. Thus the purpose and object of the Interest on Delayed Payment to the Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 and of the MSMED Act, 2006, being similar and the earlier Act, being the predecessor of the MSMED Act, 2006, what has been said in respect of Section 10 of the Act of 1993, ought to hold good for the MSMED Act, 2006 too. 11.10. In V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) what came for consideration was whether a debt, time barred by the law of limitation, could be recovered by resorting to recovery proceedings under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968 which was made applicable to recovery of loans by the Kerala Financial Corporation and so also by banks. The expression 'amount due', as occurring in Section 71 of the said Act, was specifically considered. Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway (supra) which held that the phrase 'money due', would only refer to claims which were not time barred and Section 186 of the Companies Act 1913, which dealt with recovery of money due to the Company from a contributory, created a special procedure for obtaining payment of money and was not a section which purported to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment and it creates no new rights and the power of the Court to order payment under the section being discretionary the respondent under the procedure of Section 186 could not be deprived of a defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys, was relied upon, to hold that the same reasoning would apply to claims for money made under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, as it did not create any new right but merely provided for a process for speedy recovery of moneys due. This is what has been held : "9. In the case of Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1933 PC 63 : 60 IA 13] the Privy Council was required to interpret the words "money due" under Section 186 of the Companies Act, 1913. Section 186 dealt with the recovery of any money due to the company from a contributory. In the case of Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1933 PC 63 : 60 IA 13] the Privy Council was required to interpret the words "money due" under Section 186 of the Companies Act, 1913. Section 186 dealt with the recovery of any money due to the company from a contributory. Interpreting the words "money due", the Privy Council said that the phrase would only refer to those claims which were not time-barred. It noted that the section is concerned only with moneys due from a contributory. A debtor who is not a contributory is not affected by it. Moneys due from him can be recovered only by a suit in the company's name. Secondly, the section creates a special procedure for obtaining payment of moneys. It is not a section which purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim for payment. It creates no new rights. Thirdly, the power of the court to order payment under that section is discretionary. It may refuse to act under that section, leaving the liquidator to sue in the name of the company. Therefore, the respondent under the procedure of Section 186 cannot be deprived of some defence or answer open to him in a suit for the same moneys. 10. The same reasoning would apply in the present case also. The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act does not create any new right. It merely provides a process for speedy recovery of moneys due. Therefore, instead of filing a suit, (or an application or petition under any special Act), obtaining a decree and executing it, the bank or the financial institution can now recover the claim under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Since this Act does not create any new right, the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a debtor in a suit or other legal proceeding be taken away under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. Since this Act does not create any new right, the person claiming recovery cannot claim recovery of amounts which are not legally recoverable nor can a defence of limitation available to a debtor in a suit or other legal proceeding be taken away under the provisions of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act. In fact, under Section 70 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, it is provided that when proceedings are taken under this Act against any person for the recovery of any sum of money due from him, such person may, at any time before the commencement of the sale of any property attached in such proceedings, pay the amount claimed and at the same time deliver a protest signed by himself to the officer issuing the demand or conducting the sale as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 provides that when the amount is paid under protest, the officer issuing the demand or the officer at whose instance the proceedings have been initiated, shall enquire into the protest and pass appropriate orders. If the protest is accepted, the officer disposing of the protest shall immediately order the refund of the whole or part of the money paid under protest. Under sub-section (3) of Section 70, the person making a payment under protest shall have the right to institute a suit for the refund of the whole or part of the sum paid by him under protest. 14. In our view if such a wide interpretation is put on the words "amount due" under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, there is every likelihood of the provisions of Article 14 being attracted. This Court in the case Director of Industries, U.P. v. Deep Chand Agarwal [ (1980) 2 SCC 332 : AIR 1980 SC 801 ] justified the special procedure for recovery of certain debts under the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 on the ground that the amounts which were advanced by the State or by the financial institutions were for the economic betterment of the people of that State. Speedy recovery of these amounts was necessary so that these amounts could be reutilized for the same public purpose. It is doubtful if this public purpose would extend to granting exemption to these claims from the statute of limitation. The law of limitation itself rests on the foundations of public interest. Speedy recovery of these amounts was necessary so that these amounts could be reutilized for the same public purpose. It is doubtful if this public purpose would extend to granting exemption to these claims from the statute of limitation. The law of limitation itself rests on the foundations of public interest. The courts have expressed at least three reasons for supporting the existence of statutes of limitation: (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim; and (3) that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605.) In Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1961 SC 1704 ] the statutes of limitation have been considered as statutes of repose and statutes of peace. The generally accepted basis for such statutes is that they are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose. Whether public purpose of speedy recovery would outweigh public purpose behind a statute of limitation is a moot point. But we need not examine this aspect any further in view of our interpretation of the words "amounts due" in Section 71. 15. It has been submitted before us that the statute of limitation merely bars the remedy without touching the right. Therefore, the right to recover the loan would remain even though the remedy by way of a suit would be time-barred. Reliance was placed on Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Ram Chandraji Virajman Mandir [ (1978) 1 SCC 44 ] in this connection. The Court there observed that though a debt may be time-barred, it would still be a debt due. The right remains untouched and if a creditor has any means of enforcing his right other than by action or set-off, he is not prevented from doing so. In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha [1993 Supp (1) SCC 499, 503-504 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 149] (SCC at pp. 503-504) this Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. 503-504) this Court held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. Section 3 of the Limitation Act only bars the remedy but does not destroy the right which the remedy relates to. Excepting cases which are specifically provided for, as for example, under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, the right to which the remedy relates subsists. Though the right to enforce the debt by judicial process is barred, that right can be exercised in any manner other than by means of a suit. For example, a creditor's right to make adjustment against time-barred debts exists. 16. There is no question, however, in the present case of any payment voluntarily made by a debtor being adjusted by his creditor against a time-barred debt. The provisions in the present case are statutory provisions for coercive recovery of "amounts due". Although the necessity of filing a suit by a creditor is avoided, the extent of the claim which is legally recoverable is not thereby enlarged. Under Section 70(2) of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act the right of a debtor to file a suit for refund is expressly preserved. Instead of the bank or the financial institution filing a suit which is defended by the debtor, the creditor first recovers and then defends his recovery in a suit filed by the debtor. The rights of the parties are not thereby enlarged. The process of recovery is different. An Act must expressly provide for such enlargement of claims which are legally recoverable, before it can be interpreted as extending to the recovery of those amounts which have ceased to be legally recoverable on the date when recovery proceedings are undertaken. Under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act such a process of recovery would start with a written requisition issued in the prescribed form by the creditor to the Collector of the district as prescribed under Section 69(2) of the said Act. Therefore, all claims which are legally recoverable and are not time-barred on that date can be recovered under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act." The MSMED Act, 2006 also does not create any new right in the supplier, which is already not vested in him, by the Common law. Therefore, all claims which are legally recoverable and are not time-barred on that date can be recovered under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act." The MSMED Act, 2006 also does not create any new right in the supplier, which is already not vested in him, by the Common law. Such a right to recover money, as indicated above can be enforced by the supplier by filing a suit against the buyer and so also by adopting the mode of recovery as contemplated by Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006. Thus Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, does not create a right to recover the money in the supplier, but only provides for a mechanism for its recovery. 11.11. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra), while considering the provisions of Section 34(3) of the A & C Act, 1996 which provides for a limitation of 3 months extendable by another 30 days for filing an application for setting aside the award, and 43 of the A & C Act, 1996 it was held that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stood excluded because of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, however principles underlying Section 14 therein would be applicable and more particularly when no provision was found in the A & C Act, 1996 which excluded the applicability of Section 14, otherwise Section 34 of the A & C Act would become unduly oppressive. The same view is reiterated in State of Goa v. Western Builders (supra). 11.12. M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise (supra), was a case in which a bank guarantee given for difference of tonnage, which was disputed was encashed by the Superintendent of Customs, Central Excise, challenge to which and the order of the Collector, before the CEGAT, was allowed. In an appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court, it was held that the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128 of the Customs Act, would have jurisdiction, resultant to which an appeal was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals). Since there was delay, the same came to be rejected. In an appeal before the Hon'ble Apex Court, it was held that the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 128 of the Customs Act, would have jurisdiction, resultant to which an appeal was filed before the Commissioner (Appeals). Since there was delay, the same came to be rejected. Before the Hon'ble Apex Court it was contended that the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable, and even if it was held not to be so, principles laid down therein would be applicable and the appellant would be entitled to the benefit for deduction of the time spent in litigation in a wrong forum, under principles akin to Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. While holding that Limitation Act, applies to the established judicial system of Courts and not to tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies. It however also held that this has nothing to do with "civil proceedings" referred to in Section 14 which may be filed before other courts or authorities which ultimately do not answer the case before them on merits but throw the case out on some technical ground. Obviously the word "court" in Section 14 takes its colour from the preceding words "civil proceedings". Civil proceedings are of many kinds and need not be confined to suits, appeals or applications which are made only in courts stricto sensu. This is made even more clear by the explicit language of Section 14 by which a civil proceeding can even be a revision which may be to a quasi-judicial tribunal under a particular statute. It also held as under : "38. We have already held that the Limitation Act including Section 14 would not apply to appeals filed before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the Collector (Appeals) mentioned in Section 128 of the Customs Act. However, this does not conclude the issue. There is authority for the proposition that even where Section 14 may not apply, the principles on which Section 14 is based, being principles which advance the cause of justice, would nevertheless apply. We must never forget, as stated in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux [ (1969) 2 SCC 481 : (1970) 2 SCR 10 ] that justice and reason is at the heart of all legislation by Parliament. This was put in very felicitous terms by Hegde, J. as follows: (SCC p. 485, para 9) 9. We must never forget, as stated in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux [ (1969) 2 SCC 481 : (1970) 2 SCR 10 ] that justice and reason is at the heart of all legislation by Parliament. This was put in very felicitous terms by Hegde, J. as follows: (SCC p. 485, para 9) 9. "Before considering the meaning of the word 'held' in Section 9, it is necessary to mention that it is proper to assume that the lawmakers who are the representatives of the people enact laws which the society considers as honest, fair and equitable. The object of every legislation is to advance public welfare. In other words as observed by Crawford in his book on 'Statutory Constructions' that the entire legislative process is influenced by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and reason constitute the great general legislative intent in every piece of legislation. Consequently where the suggested construction operates harshly, ridiculously or in any other manner contrary to prevailing conceptions of justice and reason, in most instances, it would seem that the apparent or suggested meaning of the statute, was not the one intended by the lawmakers. In the absence of some other indication that the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by the legislature, there is little reason to believe that it represents the legislative intent." J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan (2009) 12 SCC 175 was also relied upon for the above proposition. It was then held that principles as contained in Section 14 of the Limitation, will have to be held to be applicable to an appeal under Section 128 of the Customs Act, for deducting time spent in proceedings not maintainable. 11.12.1. In Ganesan (supra) on which much reliance has been placed by learned Counsel Mr. Dhole, the following questions were framed : "8.1.(1) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act, is a court? 8.2.(2) Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application to be filed only in a court or Section 29(2) can be pressed in service with regard to filing of a suit, appeal or application before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in special or local laws? 8.2.(2) Whether applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application to be filed only in a court or Section 29(2) can be pressed in service with regard to filing of a suit, appeal or application before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in special or local laws? 8.3.(3) Whether the Commissioner while hearing the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is entitled to condone a delay in filing an appeal applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963? 8.4.(4) Whether the statutory scheme of the 1959 Act indicate that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to proceedings before its authorities?" In so far as question no.1, is concerned it was answered holding that the Commissioner under the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 was not a Court. Questions 2 and 3 were answered as under : 59.1. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed in a court. 59.2. The suits, appeals and applications referred to in the Limitation Act are not the suits, appeals and applications which are to be filed before a statutory authority like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.3. Operation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is confined to the suits, appeals and applications referred to in a special or local law to be filed in court and not before statutory authorities like Commissioner under the 1959 Act. 59.4. However, special or local law vide statutory scheme can make applicable any provision of the Limitation Act or exclude applicability of any provision of the Limitation Act which can be decided only after looking into the scheme of particular, special or local law. 60. We, thus, answer Questions (2) and (3) in the following manner: 60.1. The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a court. 60.2. Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. The applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is with regard to different limitations prescribed for any suit, appeal or application when to be filed in a court. 60.2. Section 29(2) cannot be pressed in service with regard to filing of suits, appeals and applications before the statutory authorities and tribunals provided in a special or local law. The Commissioner while hearing of the appeal under Section 69 of the 1959 Act is not entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal, since, provision of Section 5 shall not be attracted by strength of Section 29(2) of the Act. Question no.4, was answered as under : "68.The above provision clearly indicates that provision for only computation of limitation has been made applicable to the proceedings under the 1959 Act. Section 115 cannot be read in a manner as to providing applicability of Section 5. There is no other provision in the scheme from which it can be inferred that the 1959 Act intended applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings of appeal before the Commissioner. We, thus, conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable as per the scheme of the 1959 Act." The answer to question no.4, would indicate that the Hon'ble Apex Court was not considering the applicability of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, for the purposes of raising claims in their original form, nor was any plea regarding entertainment of a stale claim under consideration. Rather the issue was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to proceedings under the Act of 1959, which has been answered in the negative. It is also necessary to note that in the proceedings under the 1959 Act it has been held that provision for only computation of limitation has been made applicable. 11.13. In Lanco Kondapalli Power Limited (supra), while considering the plea of applicability of the limitation Act, to proceedings before the Commission under the Electricity Act, 2003, in which there was no provision applying the limitation Act, 1963, to proceedings under it, it was held as under : "28. Coming back to the issues relating to limitation, in view of law noticed above and for the reasons noted in M.P. Steel Corpn. [M.P. Steel Corpn. Coming back to the issues relating to limitation, in view of law noticed above and for the reasons noted in M.P. Steel Corpn. [M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510], we respectfully concur and hold that by itself the Limitation Act will not be applicable to the Commission under the Electricity Act, 2003 as the Commission is not a court stricto sensu. The further stand of the respondents that the Commission being a statutory tribunal, cannot act beyond the four walls of the Electricity Act also does not brook any exception. In PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd. [T.N. Generation & Distribution Corpn. Ltd. v. PPN Power Generating Co. (P) Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 53 ] this Court examined the issue of limitation in a very summary manner and without referring to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, at the end of para 64 it was observed in a single sentence that the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding before the State Commission. But in view of detailed discussion in M.P. Steel Corpn. [M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015) 7 SCC 58 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 510], we have held above that by itself the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding or action brought before the State Commission. However, the Electricity Act, 2003 requires a further scrutiny to find out whether by virtue of Section 175 of the Electricity Act or otherwise it can be inferred that the provisions of the Limitation Act will govern or curtail the powers of the Commission in entertaining a claim under Section 86(1)(f) of the Electricity Act. Section 175 reads thus: "175. Provisions of this Act to be in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.-The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force." A plain reading of this section leads to a conclusion that unless the provisions of the Electricity Act are in conflict with any other law when this Act will have overriding effect as per Section 174, the provisions of the Electricity Act will not adversely affect any other law for the time being in force. In other words, as stated in the section the provisions of the Electricity Act will be additional provisions without adversely affecting or subtracting anything from any other law which may be in force. Such provision cannot be stretched to infer adoption of the Limitation Act for the purpose of regulating the varied and numerous powers and functions of the authorities under the Electricity Act, 2003. In this context it is relevant to keep in view that the State Commission or the Central Commission have been entrusted with large number of diverse functions, many being administrative or regulatory and such powers do not invite the rigours of the Limitation Act. Only for controlling the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission under Section 86(1) (f), it will not be possible to accept the contention of the appellants that by Section 175 the Electricity Act, 2003 adopts the Limitation Act either explicitly or by necessary implication." T.N. Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited v. PPN Power Generating Company (P) Ltd. (supra) was considered and it was clarified that therein the Hon'ble Apex Court had examined the issue of limitation in a very summary manner and without referring to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, as at the end of para 64 it was observed in a single sentence that the Limitation Act is inapplicable to proceeding before the State Commission, however in view of the detailed discussion in M.P. Steel Corporation (supra) it was held that by itself the Limitation Act was inapplicable to proceeding or action brought before the State Commission. It was however also held in Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. (supra) relying upon V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) and New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram (1976) 3 SCC 407 as under : "30. In such a situation it falls for consideration whether the principle of law enunciated in State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty [State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 ] and in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram [New Delhi Municipal Committee v. Kalu Ram, (1976) 3 SCC 407 ] is attracted so as to bar entertainment of claims which are legally not recoverable in a suit or other legal proceeding on account of bar created by the Limitation Act. On behalf of the respondents those judgments were explained by pointing out that in the first case the peculiar words in the statute-"amount due" and in the second case "arrears of rent payable" fell for interpretation in the context of powers of the tribunal concerned and on account of the aforesaid particular words of the statute this Court held that the duty cast upon the authority to determine what is recoverable or payable implies a duty to determine such claims in accordance with law. In our considered view a statutory authority like the Commission is also required to determine or decide a claim or dispute either by itself or by referring it to arbitration only in accordance with law and thus Sections 174 and 175 of the Electricity Act assume relevance. Since no separate limitation has been prescribed for exercise of power under Section 86(1)(f) nor this adjudicatory power of the Commission has been enlarged to entertain even the time-barred claims, there is no conflict between the provisions of the Electricity Act and the Limitation Act to attract the provisions of Section 174 of the Electricity Act. In such a situation, on account of the provisions in Section 175 of the Electricity Act or even otherwise, the power of adjudication and determination or even the power of deciding whether a case requires reference to arbitration must be exercised in a fair manner and in accordance with law. In the absence of any provision in the Electricity Act creating a new right upon a claimant to claim even monies barred by law of limitation, or taking away a right of the other side to take a lawful defence of limitation, we are persuaded to hold that in the light of nature of judicial power conferred on the Commission, claims coming for adjudication before it cannot be entertained or allowed if it is found legally not recoverable in a regular suit or any other regular proceeding such as arbitration, on account of law of limitation. We have taken this view not only because it appears to be more just but also because unlike labour laws and the Industrial Disputes Act, the Electricity Act has no peculiar philosophy or inherent underlying reasons requiring adherence to a contrary view." 31. We have taken the aforesaid view to avoid injustice as well as the possibility of discrimination. We have taken this view not only because it appears to be more just but also because unlike labour laws and the Industrial Disputes Act, the Electricity Act has no peculiar philosophy or inherent underlying reasons requiring adherence to a contrary view." 31. We have taken the aforesaid view to avoid injustice as well as the possibility of discrimination. We have already extracted a part of para 11 of the judgment in State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty [State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 ] wherein the Court considered the matter also in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that case the possibility of Article 14 being attracted against the statute was highlighted to justify a particular interpretation as already noted. It was also observed that it would be ironic if in the name of speedy recovery contemplated by the statute, a creditor is enabled to recover claims beyond the period of limitation. In this context, it would be fair to infer that the special adjudicatory role envisaged under Section 86(1)(f) also appears to be for speedy resolution so that a vital developmental factor - electricity and its supply is not adversely affected by delay in adjudication of even ordinary civil disputes by the civil court. Evidently, in the absence of any reason or justification the legislature did not contemplate to enable a creditor who has allowed the period of limitation to set in, to recover such delayed claims through the Commission. Hence we hold that a claim coming before the Commission cannot be entertained or allowed if it is barred by limitation prescribed for an ordinary suit before the civil court. But in an appropriate case, a specified period may be excluded on account of the principle underlying the salutary provisions like Section 5 or Section 14 of the Limitation Act. We must hasten to add here that such limitation upon the Commission on account of this decision would be only in respect of its judicial power under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and not in respect of its other powers or functions which may be administrative or regulatory. We must hasten to add here that such limitation upon the Commission on account of this decision would be only in respect of its judicial power under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and not in respect of its other powers or functions which may be administrative or regulatory. Thus, it has been held that even if the Limitation Act, 1963 is not attracted, since there is an obligation to decide in accordance with law, and the power to be exercised in doing so, is a judicial power, a claim which would otherwise be barred by limitation in a suit or arbitration proceedings, would not be permissible to be raised, however a defence on that count would be permissible, as such a claim would not be legally recoverable. It was also held that principles akin to the provisions of Section 5 or 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to proceedings before the Commission, exercising its judicial power. 11.14. It also necessary to consider the heading of Section 17 Recovery of amount due', in the MSMED Act, 2006 and its import. When a Statute mandates the recovery of any amount due, it would necessarily mean that such amount, is legally recoverable, by due process of law. Leaving conciliation aside for the sake of argument, could it be said that the amount due, would be recoverable, dehor's the law of limitation? If Conciliation as contemplated under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006, was not there, the option available to the supplier, under the MSMED Act, 2006, would only be Arbitration under Section 18(3) thereof, which would mean that the ' amount due', would not be recoverable, if it was barred by the law of Limitation, in view of our answer to question no.2 above. Thus under the aegis of the MSMED Act, 2006, under the above circumstances, if a claim by a supplier was time barred, such a claim could not have been recovered. The other options available to the supplier, would then be the common law remedy of filing a civil suit, where again the matter would be governed by the law of limitation and a time barred claim would not be permissible. 11.15. The other options available to the supplier, would then be the common law remedy of filing a civil suit, where again the matter would be governed by the law of limitation and a time barred claim would not be permissible. 11.15. The expression 'amount due', has been considered in V. R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) to mean a claim recoverable legally, meaning thereby that an Act must expressly provide for such enlargement of claims which are legally recoverable, before it can be interpreted as extending to the recovery of those amounts which have ceased to be legally recoverable on the date when recovery proceedings are undertaken. The expression 'amount due from a buyer' and 'together 'as occurring in Section 6 (2) of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, in Modern Industries v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 44 , has been held to mean not only the principal amount but also the interest and an action under Section 6(2) thereunder could be maintained for the recovery of either of them or both, for goods supplied or services rendered. 11.16. In B. K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 a case under the Insolvency Code, the expression 'debt due', fell for consideration, in respect of applications to be filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Code. Upon consideration of the principle that limitation bars the remedy but not the right, and a series of judgments including V. R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) and Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd. (supra) it was held as under : 34. ------- This case is most apposite. As in the present case, and as is reflected in the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March 2018, the legislature did not contemplate enabling a creditor who has allowed the period of limitation to set in to allow such delayed claims through the mechanism of the Code. The Code cannot be triggered in the year 2017 for a debt which was time-barred, say, in 1990, as that would lead to the absurd and extreme consequence of the Code being triggered by a stale or dead claim, leading to the drastic consequence of instant removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor permanently, and which may ultimately lead to liquidation and, therefore, corporate death. This being the case, the expression "debt due" in the definition sections of the Code would obviously only refer to debts that are "due and payable" in law i.e. the debts that are not time-barred. 38. It will be seen from a reading of Section 8(2)(a) that the corporate debtor shall, within a period of 10 days of the receipt of the demand notice, bring to the notice of the operational creditor the existence of a "dispute". We have seen that "dispute" as defined in Section 5(6) includes a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to certain matters. Again, under Section 8(2) (a), the corporate debtor may, in the alternative, disclose the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings filed before the receipt of the demand notice. It is clear therefore, that at least in the case of an operational creditor, "default" must be non-payment of amounts that have become due and payable in law. The "dispute" or pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings would necessarily bring in the Limitation Act, for if a suit or arbitration proceeding is time-barred, it would be liable to be dismissed. This again is an important pointer to the fact that when the expression "due" and "due and payable" occur in Sections 3(11) and 3(12) of the Code, they refer to a "default" which is non-payment of a debt that is due in law i.e. that such debt is not barred by the law of limitation. It is well settled that where the same word occurs in a similar context, the draftsman of the statute intends that the word bears the same meaning throughout the statute (see Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay [Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya v. State of Bombay, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 310 : AIR 1959 SC 356 : 1959 CriLJ 389], Supp SCR at pp. 313-14). It is thus clear that the expression "default" bears the same meaning in Sections 7 and 8 of the Code, making it clear that the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor can only be initiated either by a financial or operational creditor in relation to debts which have not become time-barred. 313-14). It is thus clear that the expression "default" bears the same meaning in Sections 7 and 8 of the Code, making it clear that the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor can only be initiated either by a financial or operational creditor in relation to debts which have not become time-barred. B.K. Educational Services Private Limited (supra) has been followed in Sagar Sharma v. Phoenix Arc (P) Ltd., (2019) 10 SCC 353 ; Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries (P) Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 1 and Tech Sharp Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Sanghvi Movers Ltd., (2023) 2 SCC 531 . In context of what has been held in B. K. Educational Services Private Limited (supra), it would be apposite to consider that Section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006 provides for charging of compound interest with monthly rests at three times the Bank rate notified by the RBI, from the appointed day or the date immediately following the date agreed upon. Consider a case that if a claim of the year 2010 was sought to be raised in 2023, on account of the plea of the law of limitation not being applicable, then though such a claim would not have been maintainable under the common law to the supplier, such a claim then would have to be held maintainable before the Facilitation Council, for compulsory conciliation. Such a claim would then necessarily include interest in terms of Section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006, for the entire period of 13 years in the above example and in case of non-settlement would then be arbitrable under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006. This would clearly mean that though under the common law, the supplier had lost a right to raise such a claim, however under the MSMED Act, such a claim would be permissible. As indicated above, if the legislature had intended for time barred, stale and dead claims to be permitted under the MSMED Act, 2006, then nothing prevented it from enacting a provision, making such claims permissible under the MSMED Act, 2006, even under Section 18(2) thereunder. As indicated above, if the legislature had intended for time barred, stale and dead claims to be permitted under the MSMED Act, 2006, then nothing prevented it from enacting a provision, making such claims permissible under the MSMED Act, 2006, even under Section 18(2) thereunder. The fact that this has not been so done, would again be a pointer to the fact that only claims which are not barred by the law of limitation, would be permissible to be raised, which would be the position in all forums, which follow due process of law. This is more so, considering the compulsory nature of conciliation and arbitration under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, where the buyer has no say in the matter, of declining to either the conciliation or arbitration. Even otherwise, any plea in defence to a claim on the basis of the law of limitation, would not be permissible to be ruled out as held in V. R. Kalliyanikutty (supra), as that would then lead to absurd consequences by permitting stale, dead and time barred claims being permitted to be raised leading to disastrous financial results, which is not a position which can be said to be intended to be ensured by the legislature. 11.17. That a claim under Section 18, both for conciliation and arbitration has to be decided within a definite time frame is apparent from the language of Section 18(5) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which is to the effect that every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference. The expression 'This section', as occurring in Section 18(5) would necessarily include a reference for conciliation made under Section 18(1) in pursuance to which conciliation has to be taken up under Section 18(2), as well as an arbitration to be commenced on failure of such conciliation under Section 18(3) thereof and therefore an outer limit of 90 days has been put for the completion of conciliation under Section 18(2) and the same time frame for completing arbitration under Section 18(3), too. This being the position it is inconceivable that by virtue of Section 18(1) & (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 the Legislature intended to permit for stale and dead claims to be raised even in conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) & (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 12. This being the position it is inconceivable that by virtue of Section 18(1) & (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 the Legislature intended to permit for stale and dead claims to be raised even in conciliation proceedings under Section 18(1) & (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 12. The referring Bench has expressed several concerns and issues in the referral order which find place in para 46 thereof. It is necessary for us to address them too. We propose to deal with them one by one. (i) Issue A : Whether in view of more comprehensive scheme in MSMED Act, 2006, and improvement made by it over the Act, No. 32 of 1993, jurisdiction of Civil Court is taken away by 2006 Act ? - The jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 9 of the CPC, is all pervading, unless it is shown to be barred by an express provision contained in any statute or is held to be impliedly barred. [see : Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (supra) and South Delhi Municipal Corpn. v. Today Homes & Infrastructure (P) Ltd. (supra)]. Admittedly there is no express provision of ouster of the Civil Courts jurisdiction in the MSMED Act, 2006. As indicated above the MSMED Act, 2006, does not create any right in the supplier for recovery of the money due to it, but only creates a mechanism for speedy recovery of such monies. The right to recover such money as pointed out above, is under the Common Law based upon a contract which may exist for supply made/services rendered, which is equally enforceable by filing of a suit or approaching the Consumer Commission. The MSMED Act, 2006 thus does not state that proceedings under Section 18 is the only remedy available. This being the position merely because a speedy mechanism is created under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 that by itself cannot be held to indicate the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The MSMED Act, 2006 thus does not state that proceedings under Section 18 is the only remedy available. This being the position merely because a speedy mechanism is created under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 that by itself cannot be held to indicate the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. All that the MSMED Act, 2006 does is provide an alternate mode of recovery, to the supplier, claimed to be speedier, which may be chosen by him, in preference to the common law remedy of a civil suit being also available to him, in which also a claim for interest as provided in Section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be entertainable, as section 34 of CPC would not restrict the power of the Civil Court to award a higher rate of interest, if that is provided in a Statute, applicable to the claim before it. It is also pertinent to note that a cause of action can give rise to multiple remedies and thus it is open for the litigant to choose one which according to him, would be the most apt for him. The MSMED Act, 2006, thus does not debar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court even impliedly. (ii) Issue B : Whether an incongruous situation perceived in Para no. 71 of its judgment by the Division Bench in Delton Electricals (Supra) can emerge due to reading of Section 6 of Act No.32 of 1993 (not in force) and Section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 :- We have already discussed above, that such an incongruous situation as contemplated in para 71 of Delton Electricals (supra) does arise and have also pointed out the consequences. (iii) Issue C : Whether the period of limitation runs from the appointed dates only to find out limitation for the cause of action to approach Council under Section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 ? (iii) Issue C : Whether the period of limitation runs from the appointed dates only to find out limitation for the cause of action to approach Council under Section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 ? - The proviso to Section 15, of the MSMED Act, 2006 gives the starting point of limitation, for any cause of action which may be claimed to have accrued in favour of the supplier, considering which the approach to the Council under Section 18(1) has to be within a reasonable period of time from it, and it cannot be left to the sweet will and choice of the supplier, to approach the Council, anytime the supplier chooses, which in cases may even be decades after. The statement of object and reasons of the MSMED Act, 2006 also indicate a mechanism for speedy recovery, which otherwise would be frustrated. As explained above Section 15 to 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 do not create any right in favour of the supplier, but only create a mechanism, which is claimed to be speedier, to recover its dues, which is on account of the implied contract created due to the supply of goods /services rendered. Right to recover the money for goods supplied/ services rendered, in already vested in the supplier under the common Civil law. There is no vesting of any right in terms of what has been contemplated in Bibi Sayeeda v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 516 , relied upon by Mr. Dhole, learned Counsel for some of the appellants. (iv) Issue D : Whether Section 21 of 1996 act has any relevance in scheme of Section 18 of MSMED Act, 2006 ? Since conciliation and arbitration under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, are statutory upon a reference being received from a supplier under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 Section 21 of the A & C Act, 1996 has no relevance whatsoever. (v) Issue E : Whether the peculiar provision like "thrice the bank rate of interest", interest compounded monthly, direction to mention principal, interest and amount unpaid in balance sheet by buyer, step by step approach adopted in Section 18 and overriding effect in Section 24 of the MSMED Act, 2006, all are sufficient to exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 ? As indicated above all these provisions, would in fact indicate the applicability of the Limitation Act, for the reason that if this was not so, then it would be open for a supplier who had made the supply say in the year 2007, to lay a claim before the Council anytime thereafter without any time limit, and maybe even in the year 2023, or even decades thereafter, thereby also permitting such supplier to claim interest, on the amount due, in terms of section 16 of the MSMED Act, 2006, which on account of the passage of time would have exponentially spiraled, making such recovery, if ordered, destructive to the business of the buyer. For e.g. an unscrupulous supplier, in a case where supply was made on 01/01/2007, and the amount thus in light of the proviso to Section 15 became due on 14/02/2007, would wait for years, maybe decades, charging interest in terms of Section 16 thereof, and then one fine day make a reference under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which then would, in case of non-settlement, have to be referred to arbitration, the interest in terms of Section 16, by then having spiraled exponentially, making it financially unviable for the buyer to pay, thereby reducing his business to shatters, in case he was forced to do so. Such a situation cannot be held to be contemplated by the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006, for that would be injustice visited on the buyer, on account of the supplier, not raising his claim, within a reasonable period to time. It is order to ensure that the remedy as provided in Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is actually a speedy remedy, that the provisions of Section 22 which requires the entries thereof to be taken in its books of account, for then the mere production of the books of account would be conclusive proof of the liability of the buyer and the penal provision as contained in Section 23, which makes interest payable under the amount paid to the supplier, as indicated in Section 22, not to be allowed to be deducted from income, appears to have been enacted. These provisions on the contrary, would support a plea of the applicability of the limitation Act and not otherwise. The continuity of the cause of action as alleged by Mr. These provisions on the contrary, would support a plea of the applicability of the limitation Act and not otherwise. The continuity of the cause of action as alleged by Mr. Dhole, learned Counsel for some of the appellants, cannot be indefinite. (vi) Issue F : Whether the mention of "unpaid amount" in balance sheet of the buyer must include " time barred" claims ? (vii) Issue G : What is the legislative intent in mandating the mention of "Unpaid amount" or even time-barred recoveries separately ? Answering issues F & G together it is pertinent to note that though the language of Section 22 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is open ended and does not provide for any outer limit, and would indicate the liability of the buyer, whose accounts are required to be audited, to make entries as indicated therein, without any time frame, the same cannot be held to mean that it would be an indicator of even stale, dead and time barred claims being permitted, for reasons already indicated above. The concept of a continuous cause of action cannot be stretched to an absurd period of time, where its enforcement would make it an engine of oppression and not of providing justice to one. The intention of the legislature, can never be presumed to create a provision, which causes injustice or oppression. (viii) Issue H : Whether such disclosure of "unpaid principal amount" or the "compound interest quantum" separately gives rise to the fresh or repeated annual causes of action for recovery of the principal and /or interest amount ? The cause of action for approaching the Council under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 as indicated above starts on the expiry of 45 days from the date of / deemed date of supply of goods services rendered. The liability of the supplier to approach under Section 18 is thus immediate, which then has to decide within 90 days in terms of the mandate of Section 18(5). The liability of the supplier to approach under Section 18 is thus immediate, which then has to decide within 90 days in terms of the mandate of Section 18(5). The purpose and intent of Section 16 and the charging of interest on compound basis, with monthly rests, read with the mandate of Sections 22 and 23 of the MSMED Act, 2006 appears to dissuade the buyer, from delaying in making the payments and not to be used as a tool for oppression by the supplier by letting time lapse, and inflating the claim by charging interest, in terms thereof and then approaching the Facilitation Council, for availing the remedy provided for after lapse of an unreasonable period of time. The law does not permit lapse of an indefinite or unreasonable period of time to a party to apply for a remedy available to it, rather it contemplates the availing of such remedy all post haste, without any delay. Thus the cause of action has already arisen on the date of completion of 45 days from the day of/deemed day of supply of goods /rendering of services. The charging of interest under Section 16, would not amount to a fresh cause of action, at the end of every month on account of the provision permitting charging of interest at monthly rest, for then there would be no time limit for a supplier to raise a claim, for each month would then given him a fresh cause of action, and any claim, then could be sought to be applied for years, nay even decades after, which cannot be said to have been the intention of the legislature, which enacted the MSMED Act, 2006 as a speedy mechanism for recovery of the amount due to the supplier. Putting such an interpretation, would clearly frustrate the very purpose for which the MSMED Act, 2006 has been enacted. (ix) Issue I : Whether the present controversy need to be viewed independent of the Act No. 32 of 1993 ? The MSMED Act, 2006 is a successor to the Act. No.32 of 1993. The comparative table enumerated above would indicate that except for making the recovery mechanism, more robust and reducing the time lines for making payment, more severe rates of interest, and so also time lines for completion of the conciliation and arbitration, the basic provisions and intent remains the same. No.32 of 1993. The comparative table enumerated above would indicate that except for making the recovery mechanism, more robust and reducing the time lines for making payment, more severe rates of interest, and so also time lines for completion of the conciliation and arbitration, the basic provisions and intent remains the same. Even the language of the provision regarding overriding effect being given to the provisions of both the Acts, remains the same. Thus what has been considered and held in respect of the provisions of the Act. No.32 of 1993, will generally hold good in respect of the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006 unless a contra intention appears from the use of the language of the MSMED Act, 2006. Silpi Industries (supra) has already been discussed above and does not require any reiteration. 13. Though State of State of Bihar v. R.B. Motilal Chamaria (supra) has been relied upon by Mr. Dhole, learned Counsel for some of the appellants, it would be necessary to state that this was a case on an individual claim, of paddy being supplied in 1946, bill whereof was submitted on 17/01/1947, where on refusal to accept the claim for the first time on 22/09/1951, a suit was filed, in which both the Trial Court as well as the High Court held the claim not to be barred by limitation, which view was confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, holding that the refusal to accept the claim, would give rise to the cause of action. The Limitation Act 1908, has since then been replaced by the Limitation Act, 1963 and therefore much water has flown thereafter, so as to make the proposition applicable. Exide Industries Limited (supra) was considering a challenge to the constitutional validity to Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as inserted by the Finance Act, 2001, wherein it was held that to hold a provision as violative of the Constitution on account of failure of the legislature to state the Objects and Reasons would amount to an indirect scrutiny of the motives of the legislature behind the enactment and such a course of action, is unwarranted and the Court cannot venture into hypothetical spheres while adjudging the constitutional validity of a duly enacted provision. In our considered opinion, We have not been called upon to consider any challenge to the constitutional validity of the MSMED Act, 2006 or any of its provisions and therefore the propositions enunciated in Exide Industries Limited (supra) are of no assistance in answering the questions framed. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs (supra) holds that a statute is not to be interpreted merely from the lexicographer's angle. The Court must give effect to the will and inbuilt policy of the legislature as discernible from the object and scheme of the enactment and the language employed therein and a construction which furthers the object of the Statute and preserves its validity is preferable. There cannot be any dispute with this proposition, and in fact in the present case, the object behind enacting the MSMED Act, as indicated have been duly considered, by us as indicated above, for the purpose of discerning the legislative intent. State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties (supra) deals with what is meant by a 'cause of action', and where it arises in the context of territorial jurisdiction and thus is of no assistance. M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das (supra) has been relied upon to contend that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be extended by analogy or implication. As indicated, We have not said that the limitation Act, 1963, per se, is applicable to the proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 rather it has been said that the Facilitation Council is not a Court and therefore it follows that the Limitation Act, 1963, would not be attracted, however, that does not mean that stale and dead claims can be permitted to be made under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 for the reasons as already indicated above. In fact M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das (supra) also notes in para 522, what has been held in Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project (2008) 17 SCC 448 that the law of limitation is embodied in a statute which is based on the principles of repose or peace and an unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. It also refutes the contention that the law of limitation was not applicable as the deity was a minor by holding that the applicability of the law of limitation cannot be ruled out on the basis of the theory of perpetual minority. Sri Paravathi Parmeshwar Cables and Ors v. A.P. Transmission Corporation Ltd. and Ors. (supra) was a case in which the question of the applicability of the provisions as contained in Section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 to an award which came to be challenged under Section 34 of the A & C Act, 1996 was in consideration. Considering the earlier judgment in Snehadeep Structures (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd., (2010) 3 SCC 34 , which held that the condition of pre-deposit of 75% of the amount awarded, would equally apply to an application under Section 34 of the A & C Act, 1996, in which a challenge was raised to the award as passed under the provisions of the Act of 1993, the same view was taken. The contextual background in which Section 2(4) of the A & C Act, 1996 was considered therein does not have any bearing upon the questions under consideration. 14. Thus legal claims, and specifically claims for money's unpaid for goods supplied or services rendered, would be claims which have to be raised and filed within a reasonable period of time and cannot be left to be agitated at the sweet will and choice of the supplier, at a point of time, in the future, without any restriction of time. 15. As rightly observed in Delton Electricals (supra) depriving the buyer of a defence/ plea of limitation would lead to an incongruous situation in which in a suit which can be filed on the same cause of action by the supplier, the defence of limitation would be available to the buyer, but such a plea would not be available in a conciliation proceeding under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 which in turn leads to a compulsory arbitration. Permitting this would mean that though in a suit which can be filed by the buyer the plaint could be rejected on the ground of limitation, however in proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 any claim for any supply, made at any time could be entertained, after any number of years after the supply, and without the defence of the claim being a stale/dead claim or a claim barred by law being available to the buyer. Such a situation in our considered opinion was clearly not intended to be brought about by the legislature while enacting the MSMED Act, 2006 for had it been the intention of the legislature to permit stale, dead and time barred claims being permitted to be raised under the MSMED Act, 2006 it would clearly have stated so, by enacting a provision in that regard, the absence of which would be an indication of its intention not to do so. 16. Further incongruity would be that a defence of limitation would not be available to proceedings under Section 18(2), as it is applicable to proceedings under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act as held above, meaning thereby that though a claim by a supplier would be time barred when it comes to Arbitration under Section 18(3), however such a claim could be entertained in conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 whose failure would lead to compulsory arbitration. These two situations clearly cannot be reconciled, where one part of the statutory provision permits a time barred claim to be raised, whereas another part of the same provision does not do so. 17. Since the conciliation under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 is not voluntary but is compulsory, at the behest of the supplier, failure of which leads to compulsory arbitration, the buyer cannot be deprived of the defence of limitation in such proceedings, as a conciliation and consequent arbitration under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006 is not the only forum available to the supplier and a suit under the common law can also be maintainable at the behest of the supplier where the plea of limitation would be clearly available to the buyer. That apart even the buyer can file a counter claim in any such suit, apart from which he can also approach the Consumer Commission in case of services rendered, in which case also a plea of limitation would be available to such buyer. We are therefore in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Division Bench in Delton Electricals (supra). 18. In that view of the matter as held in V.R. Kalliyanikutty (supra) the provisions of Section 18(1) and (2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 may fall foul to the vice of incongruity and arbitrariness vis-a- vis entertainment of the same claim by two different fora's namely the Civil Court on the one hand and the Facilitation Council under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 on the other, in which in the former a defence based on limitation would be available to the buyer, whereas it would not be so in the latter. 19. It will therefore have to be held that though the limitation Act by itself would not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 the Facilitation Council however cannot entertain a stale or dead claim at the behest of the supplier. Since a claim under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, 2006, is a claim for money, the principles of the Limitation Act, governing money claims would be the criteria, for determining whether the claim is a stale/dead claim. It would therefore be obligatory upon the Facilitation Council, upon receipt of a claim by a supplier under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 to examine the same and determine whether it is a stale/dead claim and if it so, decline to entertain the claim. 20. To sum up our answers to the above questions are as under : 1. Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to conciliation proceedings initiated and conducted under Section 18 (1) & (2) of MSMED Act, 2006 ? Though the limitation Act by itself would not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 the Facilitation Council, however, cannot entertain a stale/dead claim at the behest of the supplier. Though the limitation Act by itself would not apply to conciliation proceedings under Section 18(2) of the MSMED Act, 2006 the Facilitation Council, however, cannot entertain a stale/dead claim at the behest of the supplier. It would therefore be obligatory upon the Facilitation Council, upon receipt of a claim by a supplier under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act, 2006 to examine the same and determine whether it is a stale/ dead claim and if it is so, decline to entertain the claim. 2. Whether the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to arbitration proceedings under Section 18(3) of MSMED Act, 2006 ? The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the arbitration proceedings held in terms of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006. 21. Before we part, we record our appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered to us by Mr. S.P. Dhole, Mr. M.P. Khajanchi and Mr. S.V. Purohit, learned Counsels for the parties, which has helped us in formulating our answers to the questions referred. 22. We make it clear that we are aware that the judgment in Delton Electricals (supra) has been challenged before the Hon'ble Apex Court and any opinion which we have expressed, would obviously be subject to what the Hon'ble Supreme Court may hold while deciding Delton Electricals (supra) before it. 23. We now request the Registry to place our opinion on the above questions before the concerned Division Bench, to decide the appeals/petitions before it, in light thereof.