JUDGMENT : (Subhash Vidyarthi, J.) 1. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5389 of 2023 has been filed by the applicant Anil Kumar Singh challenging validity of (i) the Charge-sheet no. 6 arising out of Crime No. RC 216 2022 A 0012 dated 10.09.2022 under Sections 120-B, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station CBI/AC-I, New Delhi, so far as it relates to him (ii) prosecution sanction order dated 27.03.2023, (iii) the cognizance and summoning order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, C.B.I., West, Lucknow in Session Case No. 709 of 2023 and (iv) the consequential proceedings of Session Case No. 709 of 2023 pending in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I., West, Lucknow. 2. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5391 of 2023 has been filed by the applicants -(1) Bedram Sharma, (2) Parsuram Sharma and (3) Anand Mohan Sharma challenging validity of (i) the Charge-sheet no. 6 arising out of Crime No. RC 216 2022 A 0012 dated 10.09.2022 under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station CBI/AC-I, New Delhi, so far as it relates to them (ii) the cognizance and summoning order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, C.B.I., West, Lucknow in Session Case No. 709 of 2023 and (iii) the consequential proceedings of Session Case No. 709 of 2023 pending in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I., West, Lucknow. 3. As both the applications challenge the same proceedings on the same set of grounds, both the applications are being decided by a common judgment. 4. Heard Sri Raju Ramchandran Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Purnendu Chakravarty and Sri Anuj Tandon Advocates, the learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Anurag Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent -C.B.I. assisted by Sri Dharmendra Pratap Singh and perused the record. 5. 4. Heard Sri Raju Ramchandran Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Purnendu Chakravarty and Sri Anuj Tandon Advocates, the learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Anurag Kumar Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent -C.B.I. assisted by Sri Dharmendra Pratap Singh and perused the record. 5. The aforesaid case has been registered on the basis of an F.I.R lodged on 10.09.2022 alleging that Anil Kumar Singh operates from the local office of M/s Voyants Solution Pvt. Ltd. and the co-accused Bedram Sharma of M/s S.R.S.C Infra Pvt. Ltd. approached Anil Kumar Singh for clearing pending bills and Anil Kumar Singh assured him of favorable clearance in lieu illegal gratification demanded by him and in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy, certain bills of M/s S.R.S.C Infra Pvt. Ltd. were cleared by Anil Kumar Singh. 6. The F.I.R alleges commission of offence under Section 120-B I.P.C read with Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Act, 1988, by the named accused persons and other unknown public servants and private persons. 7. The charge-sheet submitted by the C.B.I. states that Anil Kumar Singh was performing public duties while functioning as the Resident Engineer for the project and he had the authority to certify payments of the contractors. Anil Kumar Singh dishonestly demanded and accepted bribe as a motive/reward for recommending interim payment of bills. 8. Sri Raju Ramchandran Senior Advocate, the learned Counsel for the applicants has submitted that the applicant in Application No. 5389 of 2023 Anil Kumar Singh, is not a ‘public servant’ as per the definition of the term given in Section 2(c) of the National Highway Authority of India Act (hereinafter referred as ‘N.H.A.I.’ Act) and, therefore, he cannot be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which contains provisions for offences committed by public servants only. 9. 9. The learned Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the applicants in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5391 of 2023 -(1) Bedram Sharma, (2) Parsuram Sharma and (3) Anand Mohan Sharma have been charged for commission of offences under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for entering into a criminal conspiracy with Anil Kumar Singh (the applicant in Application No. 5389 of 2023) and because Anil Kumar Singh is not a public servant and he cannot be tried for offences under Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, consequently the applicants (1) Bedram Sharma, (2) Parsuram Sharma and (3) Anand Mohan Sharma, cannot be charged for commission of offence of criminal conspiracy with Anil Kumar Singh. 10. A copy of the contract entered into between N.H.A.I and M/s Voyants Solutions Pvt. Ltd in joint venture with Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. and associate member Cho & Kim Engineering Pvt. Ltd. for “Supervision Consultancy Services for the Construction of Balance Works of two inning with paved shoulders of Sitarganj-Bareilly Section of NH-74 from 254.820 to 329.280 in the State of Uttar Pradesh & Uttarakhand” has been annexed. The Appendix to the aforesaid consultancy agreement mentions that N.H.A.I. would pay Rs. 3,47,31,000/-towards remuneration for local professional staffs and it specifically mentions payment of Rs.1,60,000/-to resident-cum -highway engineer of M/s Vyoants Solutions Pvt. Ltd. in joint venture with Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. 11. A copy of a retainer-ship letter dated 10.03.2020 issued by M/s Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. has been annexed with the affidavit which states that Anil Kumar Singh has been employed by M/s Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. for the project in question and his designation is Resident-cum-Highway Engineer and the Annexure to the aforesaid letter indicates that Anil Kumar Singh has been appointed on a monthly fixed retainer-ship fee of Rs. 1,31,000/-. 12. The respondent – C.B.I. has filed a counter affidavit inter alia stating that Anil Kumar Singh had demanded undue advantage from Anand Mohan Sharma, an employee of M/s SRSC Infra Pvt. Ltd. for clearance of some bills of the company. Anand Mohan Sharma informed Bedram Sharma, a Director of the Company and Bedram Sharma directed Anand Mohan Sharma to deliver the amount to Anil Kumar Singh. Anand Mohan Sharma informed Bedram Sharma, a Director of the Company and Bedram Sharma directed Anand Mohan Sharma to deliver the amount to Anil Kumar Singh. C.B.I. received a reliable information of the demand/delivery and acceptance of bribe, registered an F.I.R. and laid a trap in presence of two independent witnesses and it arrested Anil Kumar Singh and Anand Mohan Sharma when the latter had handed over the amount to the former at his residence and the former had returned Rs.1,00,000/- to the latter as his share/commission. Rs.1,00,000/-were recovered from a pocket of Anand Mohan Sharma and he was taken to the house of Anil Kumar Singh, from where Rs.14,00,000/-were recovered 13. Sri Raju Ramchandran, the learned Senior Advocate for the applicants, has submitted that Anil Kumar Singh is a Resident Engineer appointed on a fixed retainership fee by a private company M/s Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. -the consultancy agency engaged appointed by the Authority. Anil Kumar Singh is not paid any remuneration by the Government or by the N.H.A.I. He has submitted that the advisers/consultants have been expressly excluded from the definition of ‘public servant’ given in Section 27 of the N.H.A.I. Act by virtue of Regulation 20 falling under Chapter III of the N.H.A.I (Recruitment, Seniority and Promotion) Regulations, 1996, which provides that the provision of Section 27 relating to public servant shall not apply to an advisor or a consultant appointed by the authority. 14. The learned counsel for the applicants has further submitted that it is a settled principle of law that a special statutory provision over-rides the general provisions. His submission is that the National Highway Authority of India and the statutory regulations framed there under are special provisions and the definition of ‘public servant’ under the aforesaid Act would override upon the definition of ‘public servant’ given in the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which are general laws. 15. The learned Counsel for the applicants has further submitted that the N.H.A.I. Act was enacted subsequent to the Prevention of Corruption Act and yet it contains a definition of the term ‘public servant’ which is different from the definition of the term given in the Prevention of Corruption Act and, therefore, the definition given in the latter special Act will prevail upon the definition given in the former Act. 16. Per contra, Sri. 16. Per contra, Sri. Anurag Kumar Singh, the learned Counsel for the respondent – C.B.I. has submitted that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a special law which contains special provisions for prevention of corruption and prosecution of persons committing the offence of corruption whereas the definition of the term given in N.H.A.I. Act would be relevant for the general purposes of conditions of employment only. His submission is that the definition of the term ‘public servant’ given in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 would prevail for the purpose of applicability of the law relating to prevention of corruption upon the definitions given in any other law. 17. Before proceeding any further, it would be appropriate to have a look at the relevant provisions of different Statutes, which have been placed by the learned Counsel for the parties. 18. The term ‘public servant’ is defined in Section 21 of the Penal Code, and the relevant part of Section 21 reads as follows: - “21. “Public servant”.—The words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:— * * * Twelfth.—Every person— in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government; * * * Explanation 1.—Persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not. Explanation 2.—Wherever the words “public servant” occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation. * * *.” 19. Thus all persons remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government are ‘public servants’, whether appointed by the Government or not. A person performing a public duty, who is being paid retainership fee by the Government will be a public servant, even if he has been employed by a private company, and he will be a public servant irrespective of any legal defect in his right to hold that situation. 20. However, Section 5 of the I.P.C. specifically states that: - “5. 20. However, Section 5 of the I.P.C. specifically states that: - “5. Certain laws not to be affected by this Act.—Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the provisions of any special or local law.” 21. Therefore, the definition given in Section 21 of the I.P.C. will give way to the definition given in any special law. 22. Section 27 of the N.H.A.I. Act, 1988 provides that the employees of the Authority shall be deemed to be ‘public servants’. It reads as follows: 27. Employees of the Authority to be public servants.—All members, officers and employees of the Authority shall, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of the provisions of this Act or of any rule or regulation made thereunder, be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). 23. The word ‘employee’ is defined in Section 2 of the N.H.A.I. Act as follows: - “2.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— “employee” means a person in the full-time service of the Authority; 24. Section 35 of the N.H.A.I. Act empowers the Authority to make regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act. In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for the terms and conditions of service, method of recruitment and the remuneration of officers and other employees appointed by the Authority. Section 37 of N.H.A.I Act provides that, every rule and every regulation made under the Act shall be laid before each House of Parliament. 25. In exercise of the aforesaid power conferred under Section 35 of the N.H.A.I Act, the N.H.A.I. has framed the National Highway Authority of India (Recruitment, Seniority and Promotion) Regulations, 1996. Chapter II of the aforesaid regulation deals with ‘Terms and Conditions of Employment of Officers and Employees’ and Chapter III thereof deals with ‘Terms and Conditions of Employment of Advisers/Consultants’. Regulations 20 and 21 falling under Chapter III provide as follows:- “20. Advisers/consultants not to be public servants Provision of section 27 of the Act, relating to public servants shall not apply in case of an adviser or a consultant appointed by the Authority. 21. Regulations 20 and 21 falling under Chapter III provide as follows:- “20. Advisers/consultants not to be public servants Provision of section 27 of the Act, relating to public servants shall not apply in case of an adviser or a consultant appointed by the Authority. 21. Provisions of Chapter-II not to apply-No provision of Chapter-II of these regulations shall apply to an adviser or a consultant appointed by the Authority under this Chapter.” 26. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, Sri. Raju Ramchandran has submitted that the N.H.A.I has entered into an agreement with M/s Voyants Solutions Pvt. Ltd in joint venture with Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. and associate member Cho & Kim Engineering Pvt. Ltd. for supervision and consultancy services for the construction of a highway. The consultancy agreement stipulates that N.H.A.I. would pay Rs. 3,47,31,000/-towards remuneration for local professional staffs and it specifically mentions payment of Rs.1,60,000/-to Resident-cum-Highway engineer of M/s Vyoants Solutions Pvt. Ltd in joint venture with Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. M/s Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. has retained Anil Kumar Singh as the Resident-cum-Highway Engineer for the project on a monthly fixed retainer-ship fee of Rs. 1,31,000/-. His submission is that Anil Kumar Singh is not an employee of the N.H.A.I. as per Section 2 (c) of the N.H.A.I. Act and, therefore, Anil Kumar Singh is not a public servant under Section 27 of the N.H.A.I. Act. He submits that this situation is further fortified by Regulation 20 aforesaid which provides that the provision of Section 27 of the Act, relating to public servants shall not apply in case of an adviser or a consultant appointed by the Authority. 27. The submission appears to be prima facie impressive and on the basis of the aforesaid submission, interim orders were passed in favour of the applicants in both the applications on 04.07.2023 staying proceedings of the trial. However, a closer scrutiny reflected by the following discussion would reveal that the submission is misconceived. 28. 27. The submission appears to be prima facie impressive and on the basis of the aforesaid submission, interim orders were passed in favour of the applicants in both the applications on 04.07.2023 staying proceedings of the trial. However, a closer scrutiny reflected by the following discussion would reveal that the submission is misconceived. 28. N.H.A.I. Act, 1988 is an Act “to provide for the constitution of an Authority for the development, maintenance and management of national highways and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act states that the development and maintenance of national highways is fully financed by the Central Government as this function comes within Entry 23 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Section 5 of the National Highways Act, 1956 provides that the Central Government may direct that any function in relation to the development or maintenance of national highways shall also be exercisable, among others, by any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government. Under this provision, the function of execution of the activities had been delegated to the State Governments. Since the Central Government had no direct administrative control over the executing agencies, several problems were being faced. For this reason, National Highways Authority was created to take over development and maintenance of the national highway system. The main function of the Authority is to develop and maintain national highways whose management and operation is vested in the Central Government. 29. On the other hand, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is “An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith”. The statement of objects and reasons of the Statute states that: “Statement of Objects and Reasons—1. The Bill is intended to make the existing anti-corruption laws more effective by widening their coverage and by strengthening the provisions. 2. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was amended in 1964 based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee. There are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code to deal with public servants and those who abet them by way of criminal misconduct. There are also provisions in the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, to enable attachment of illgotton wealth obtained through corrupt means, including from transferees of such wealth. There are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code to deal with public servants and those who abet them by way of criminal misconduct. There are also provisions in the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, to enable attachment of illgotton wealth obtained through corrupt means, including from transferees of such wealth. The Bill seeks to incorporate all these provisions with modifications so as to make the provisions more effective in combating corruption among public servants. 3. The Bill, inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression “public servant”, incorporation of offences under Sections 161 to 165-A of the Indian Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory orders have also been included. 4. Since the provisions of Sections 161 to 165-A are incorporated in the proposed legislation with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary saving provision. 5. The notes on clauses explain in detail the provisions of the Bill.” (Emphasis Supplied) 30. Thus it is clear that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a Special Statute which has been enacted with the specific object of consolidating and amending the law relating to the prevention of corruption, to make the existing anti-corruption laws more effective by widening their coverage and by strengthening the provisions so as to make the provisions more effective in combating corruption among public servants and to widen the scope of the definition of the expression “public servant”. N.H.A.I. Act is also a Special Statute enacted with the object of regulating construction and management of National Highways only. It does not contain any provision for imposing any punishment for commission of any offence, particularly the offence of corruption. 31. N.H.A.I. Act is also a Special Statute enacted with the object of regulating construction and management of National Highways only. It does not contain any provision for imposing any punishment for commission of any offence, particularly the offence of corruption. 31. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court enunciated the principle of interpretation that in the case of inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both of which can be regarded as special in nature, the conflict has to be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein. 32. In Essa @ Anjum Abdul Razak Memon versus The State of Maharashtra, through STF, CBI Mumbai, 2013 SCC OnLine SC 255, the question was as to whether the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as of Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 provide for over-riding effect on any other law for the time being in force; and as to whether the provisions of JJ Act would be applicable in case of TADA. Admittedly, the TADA Act 1985/1987 and JJ Act, 1986/2000, both contained provisions providing over-riding effect on any other law for the time being in force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “where there is inconsistency between the provisions of two statutes and both can be regarded as special in nature, the conflict has to be resolved by reference to the purpose and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment of the legislature conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein”. 33. In State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the object of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 thus: - “10. The Act was intended to make effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing with the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [ (1984) 2 SCC 183 ] held: “18. It is a social legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing with the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [ (1984) 2 SCC 183 ] held: “18. The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mischief when the statute was enacted and to remove which the legislature enacted the statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it.” 11. Procedural delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public interest and the social object is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various provisions of the Act and deciding cases under it.” 34. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: - “68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the rule of law. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: - “68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the rule of law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the Court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it.” (emphasis supplied) 35. N.H.A.I. Act, 1988 is an Act to provide for the constitution of an Authority for the development, maintenance and management of national highways and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, and it does at all deal with corruption and punishment therefor. Section 2 of the N.H.A.I. Act specifically states that the definitions given in that section are for the purposes of the N.H.A.I. only and, therefore, those definitions are not to be read in other enactments and the definitions under the N.H.A.I. Act would certainly not be relevant for the purpose of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 36. On the other hand, the relevant part of Definitions contained in Section 2 of the Prevention Act, 1988 provides that: 2. 36. On the other hand, the relevant part of Definitions contained in Section 2 of the Prevention Act, 1988 provides that: 2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— (b) “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest; Explanation.—In this clause “State” includes a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (c) “public servant” means— (i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty; * * * (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty; * * * Explanation 1.—Persons falling under any of the above sub-clauses are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not. Explanation 2.—Wherever the words “public servant” occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation. 37. Section 2 (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest; 38. Development and maintenance of national highways is fully financed by the Central Government and this function comes within the purview of Entry 23 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Section 5 of the National Highways Act, 1956 provides that the Central Government may direct that any function in relation to the development or maintenance of national highways shall also be exercisable by any authority. The N.H.A.I. has been created under the N.H.A.I. Act, 1988 for discharge of the Central Government’s duty of construction and maintenance of National Highways, which is a public duty. The N.H.A.I. has engaged Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. for performing supervision and providing consultancy services regarding construction of a Highway and Anil Kumar Singh is discharging the duty of the Resident Engineer in the Project as an employee of the Company. The N.H.A.I. has engaged Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. for performing supervision and providing consultancy services regarding construction of a Highway and Anil Kumar Singh is discharging the duty of the Resident Engineer in the Project as an employee of the Company. Therefore, Anil Kumar Singh is performing a public duty, as defined under Section 2 (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 39. Any person remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty or who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty, is a ‘public servant’ within the meaning of the term given in Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Anil Kumar Singh is a person remunerated for the performance of the public duty by the fees paid by the Government to Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. -the company, which has engaged him and he is authorised and required to perform a public duty and, therefore, he is a public servant within the meaning of the term given in Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 40. This position is further clarified by the Explanations appended to Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which provide that for deciding whether the person is a ‘public servant’ or not, it is not relevant whether he has been appointed by the Government or not and only this much is relevant whether he is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant. Thus for the purpose of applicability of Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it is wholly irrelevant that Anil Kumar Singh has been appointed by Yongma Engineering Company Ltd. and not by the Government and what is relevant is that Anil Kumar Singh is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, as he has the authority to approve bills for payments regarding construction of National Highways. 41. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the judgment was reserved on 17.08.2023. 41. After hearing the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the judgment was reserved on 17.08.2023. The case was listed on 22.08.2023 for delivery of judgment, but on the said date, before pronouncement of the judgment, the learned counsel for the applicants supplied his written submissions along with a compilation of photocopies of case-laws and, therefore, pronouncement of judgment was deferred and the case laws submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants subsequently were also taken into consideration. 42. The learned Counsel for the applicants has relied upon the judgment in the cases of State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360 . Brief facts of that case were that an FIR was filed against four accused persons, including the respondent Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, alleging he had demanded bribe for allowing the complainant's daughter to take the M.B.B.S. examination. A charge-sheet was filed against several persons, including the respondent, for offences under Sections 7, 8, 10 and 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent filed a discharge application under Section 227 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which was rejected by the Session Court, but the High Court of Gujarat allowed the revision filed against that order and discharged the Respondent on the ground that Section 2(c) (xi) was inapplicable as the said Institution was a “deemed to be university”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court and restored the order rejecting the discharge application of the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: - “44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted by the learned senior Counsel for the Appellant-State, it cannot be stated that a “Deemed University” and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein. 45. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted by the learned senior Counsel for the Appellant-State, it cannot be stated that a “Deemed University” and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein. 45. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was incorrect in holding that a “Deemed University” is excluded from the ambit of the term “University” Under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.” 43. The judgment in Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (Supra) does not render any support to the applicants’ case, rather it supports the respondent. 44. The learned Counsel for the applicants next relied upon the judgment in the case of Gopinath versus The Superintendent of Police and Others, 2014 (2) Kar.L.J. 216 = 2014 (4) KCCR 3668 . 46.1 The question in that case was “with respect to the petitioner who is a Project Manager of Nirmithi Kendra which is neither enunciated by the State Government or Central Government, except a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act and the case of the petitioner does not fall within the definition of Section 2(12) of Lokayukta Act, so as to initiate action under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 46.2 The Court found that “except a provision that has been made in the bye-laws of Nirmithi Kendra to receive the funds etc., by the State Government or Central Government, in the absence of any such fund being received from the State Government or Central Government and without there being any misuse of power or misuse of the amount so available with the society, there was no scope for the investigation officer to file a complaint to the Lokayukta and the said complaint even if it filed, is non-est.” 46.3 S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 20494 of 2014 filed against the aforesaid order was dismissed by the following order: - “Special Leave Petition is dismissed.” 45. The aforesaid decision of an Hon’ble Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court is based on the peculiar facts of the case noted above, where the petitioner was employed in a co-operative society which did not receive any funds from the Government and where the Government did not exercise any control over the society. The aforesaid decision of an Hon’ble Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court is based on the peculiar facts of the case noted above, where the petitioner was employed in a co-operative society which did not receive any funds from the Government and where the Government did not exercise any control over the society. The present case arises out of allegation of demand and acceptance of bribe for approval of bills for certain works regarding construction of a National Highway on behalf of the N.H.A.I., which is State within the meaning of the term used in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, Gopinath versus The Superintendent of Police and Others (Supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. 46. The next judgment placed by the learned Counsel for the applicants is UPSC v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC 482 . Facts of that case were that the respondent 1 Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela was appointed as Drugs Inspector on 11.03.1996 on short-term contract basis on a fixed salary for a period of six months from the date of joining or till the date the candidate selected by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) joined duty on regular basis, whichever was earlier. The appointment of respondent 1 was renewed after every six months with short breaks and it continued for over five years. An advertisement was issued by UPSC on 24-3-2001 for making regular selection on the post of Drugs Inspector. Under the relevant recruitment rules made in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the upper age-limit for making direct recruitment is 30 years, which is relaxable for government servants up to five years in accordance with the instructions or orders issued by the Central Government. Respondent 1 had become overage by two years at the time when the advertisement was issued and he submitted an application seeking age relaxation and thereafter he filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the Administrator to decide the representation made by the respondent 1. Meanwhile, the respondent 1 was provisionally allowed to appear in the interview. Nearly 5 months after the interview, UPSC cancelled the candidature of respondent 1 and his contract appointment came to an end on 30-9-2002. The Tribunal directed the Administrator to decide the representation made by the respondent 1. Meanwhile, the respondent 1 was provisionally allowed to appear in the interview. Nearly 5 months after the interview, UPSC cancelled the candidature of respondent 1 and his contract appointment came to an end on 30-9-2002. The Bombay High Court allowed his Writ Petition and directed to issue an age relaxation certificate to the respondent 1 and UPSC was directed to consider the claim of the respondent 1 and to make a recommendation for his appointment as Drugs Inspector. Allowing the appeal filed against the order passed by the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: - “19. It, therefore, follows that employment under the Government is a matter of status and not a contract even though the acquisition of such a status may be preceded by a contract, namely, an offer of appointment is accepted by the employee. The rights and obligations are not determined by the contract of the two parties but by statutory rules which are framed by the Government in exercise of power conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution and the service rules can be unilaterally altered by the rule-making authority, namely, the Government. 20. There is no dispute that Respondent 1 was engaged or hired on contract to work as Drugs Inspector for a period of six months from the date of joining or till a candidate selected by UPSC joined on regular basis, whichever was earlier. The contract further stipulated that even if a regularly selected candidate did not join, Respondent 1 shall stand relieved on the expiry of six months. In Director, Institute of Management Development v. Pushpa Srivastava (1992) 4 SCC 33 , it was held that where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end, the person holding such post can have no right to continue in the post. It was further held that this is so even if the person is continued from time to time on ad hoc basis for more than a year… … It is, therefore, clear that Respondent 1 did not have any right to continue as Drugs Inspector after expiry of the six months’ period for which he had been appointed.” 47. It was further held that this is so even if the person is continued from time to time on ad hoc basis for more than a year… … It is, therefore, clear that Respondent 1 did not have any right to continue as Drugs Inspector after expiry of the six months’ period for which he had been appointed.” 47. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the applicants relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185 , wherein also it was held that: - “It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hallmark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The emolument of the Government servant and his terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Governor under Article 310. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. The matter is clearly stated by Salmond and Williams on Contracts as follows: “So we may find both contractual and status-obligations produced by the same transaction. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. The matter is clearly stated by Salmond and Williams on Contracts as follows: “So we may find both contractual and status-obligations produced by the same transaction. The one transaction may result in the creation not only of obligations defined by the parties and so pertaining to the sphere of contract but also and concurrently of obligations defined by the law itself, and so pertaining to the sphere of status. A contract of service between employer and employee, while for the most part pertaining exclusively to the sphere of contract, pertains also to that of status so far as the law itself has seen fit to attach to this relation compulsory incidents, such as liability to pay compensation for accidents. The extent to which the law is content to leave matters within the domain of contract to be determined by the exercise of the autonomous authority of the parties themselves, or thinks fit to bring the matter within the sphere of status by authoritatively determining for itself the contents of the relationship, is a matter depending on considerations of public policy. In such contracts as those of service the tendency in modern times is to withdraw the matter more and more from the domain of contract into that of status.” 48. Both the aforesaid cases related to service law claims of employees and in none of the aforesaid cases cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants, the question as to whether the employee was a “public servant within the meaning of the term given in Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was involved and the aforesaid cases are not at all relevant for the point involved in the present case. 49. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts, more particularly when the facts are not even remotely similar. 49. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts, more particularly when the facts are not even remotely similar. In the present case, there is a world of difference between the facts of the present case and the facts of the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel for the applicants, which related to service disputes and where the question of interpretation of Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was not even remotely involved. By citing absolutely irrelevant cases, the learned Counsel for the applicants has wasted the precious time of the Court. 50. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered view that Anil Kumar Singh is a public servant for the purpose of the Prevention Act, 1988 and he is being rightly prosecuted for commission of offences under the Act. 51. As the plea of the applicants in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5391 of 2023 (1) Bedram Sharma, (2) Parsuram Sharma and (3) Anand Mohan Sharma, who have been charged with the offences under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for entering into a criminal conspiracy with Anil Kumar Singh is based on the plea that Anil Kumar Singh is not a public servant, which plea has already been turned down, consequently the Application No. 5389 of 2023 also has no merit. 52. There is no illegality in the charge-sheet no. 6 arising out of Crime No. R.C. 2162022A0012 dated 10.09.2022 under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Act, 1988, Police Station C.B.I. AC-1, District New Delhi, or the prosecution sanction order or the cognizance order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti Corruption, C.B.I., West, Lucknow in Session Case No. 709 of 2023 summoning the applicants to face trial for offences under Section 120-B I.P.C. and Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Prevention of Act, 1988. There is no ground for quashing the proceedings of Session Case No. 709 of 2023 pending in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I., West, Lucknow. 53. There is no ground for quashing the proceedings of Session Case No. 709 of 2023 pending in the court of Special Judge, C.B.I., West, Lucknow. 53. Both the applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – 5389 of 2023 and 5391 of 2023, are misconceived and the same are dismissed and the interim order dated 04.07.2023 is vacated. 54. Keeping in view the fact that the proceedings of the trial remained stayed because of the interim orders dated 04.07.2023 passed in these applications and also that precious time of the Court has been wasted in deciding the misconceived applications and going through voluminous irrelevant judgments cited on behalf of the applicants, the applicant Anil Kumar Singh in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5389 of 2023 and the applicants -(1) Bedram Sharma, (2) Parsuram Sharma and (3) Anand Mohan Sharma in Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. No. 5391 of 2023, are ordered to pay Rs.25,000/-each as the cost of the litigation, which shall be deposited with the registry of this Court within a period of 30 days, failing which the Senior Registrar shall initiate proceedings for recovery of the amount by sending a Recovery Certificate to the Collector concerned, who shall recover the amounts as arrears of land revenue and shall remit the same to this Court within a period of three months from the date of issuance of the Recovery Certificate.