JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Being aggrieved by the directions issued by the Kerala Lok Ayukta dated 19.03.2014 in complaint No.885 of 2013, Special Secretary to the Government, General Education Department, Thiruvananthapuram, has filed the instant Writ Petition for the following reliefs:- “(i) Call for the records leading to Exhibit P1 order of the Hon’ble Lok Ayukta and quash the same; (ii) Issue such orders to set aside Exhibit P1 order of the Hon’ble Lok Ayukta; (iii) To declare that the petitioner had not caused any delay in disbursal of DCRG of the first respondent, over and above, time prescribed under the Service Rules entitling the petitioner to pay compensation by way of damages or interest.” 2. Short facts leading to the filing of the Writ Petition are as under:- 2.1. Petitioner is highly aggrieved by Ext. P1 order of the Lok Ayukta, directing the Government to pay the damages by way of interest on the gratuity amount @ 10% per annum for the period from 13.01.2013 to 13.06.2013, and subsequently giving liberty to fix the responsibility for the delay, and to recover the amount from the officers concerned, who are responsible for the delay in issuing NLC. 2.2. Petitioner has submitted that the Government is not a party in the complaint. Therefore, alleged delay at the hands of the Head Master and AEO is to be disregarded in view of disbursing DCRG within one year, which satisfactory period is fixed for issuing NLC to a retired employee of the Government. 2.3. Petitioner has further submitted that the Lok Ayukta has exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding compensation or fixing the same, other than forwarding recommendation to the competent authority after making investigation, that too to a party who is not arrayed in the complaint. The said act is illegal, unjustifiable and unlawful. 2.4. Petitioner has also submitted that it will also cause a precedent to demand interest on DCRG before fixing the liability after considering the audit objection to all the employees who retire from the Government service. Government has got every right to take reasonable time to determine the liability of retired employees and if interest is paid in one case alleging delay, it will have to be paid in almost all the cases causing huge loss to the Government. 3. Government has got every right to take reasonable time to determine the liability of retired employees and if interest is paid in one case alleging delay, it will have to be paid in almost all the cases causing huge loss to the Government. 3. Finding that there was delay in disbursement of DCRG benefits, Lok Ayukta, by order in complaint No.885 of 2013 dated 19.03.2014, has directed payment of interest on the gratuity amount at the rate of 10% per annum for the period from 13.01.2013 to 13.06.2013. 4. Reiterating the averments, Mr.V.Tekchand, learned Senior Government Pleader, submitted that though Government was not a party in the complaint filed by the 1st respondent herein, and in the absence of specific allegation against the Government, Lok Ayukta has directed the Government to pay the damages by way of interest on the gratuity amount. 5. He further submitted that gratuity was paid within one year from the date of retirement of the 1st respondent, and that there is no undue delay. He also submitted that no compensation by payment of interest can be ordered by the Lok Ayukta. 6. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material available on record. 7. Reading of the order made in complaint No.885 of 2013 dated 19.03.2014 shows that the respondent retired on 30.06.2012. Gratuity amount of Rs.5,95,076/- was disbursed to him pursuant to Ext. P12 NLC issued by the Assistant Educational Officer, Palode, to the Sub Treasury Officer, Attingal, on 28.06.2013. Delay of one year in disbursement of gratuity has occurred for the reason that Ext. P12 NLC was forwarded by the AEO to the Sub Treasury Officer, Attingal, only on 13.06.2013, i.e. nearly one year from the date of retirement. 8. Reading of the impugned order further shows that though the complainant retired on 30.06.2012, finalization of the audit report and the audit objection by the DPI was done only on 06.06.2013. There is no reason as to why the audit objection took one year. Audit objection only revealed a liability to remit Rs.6/- by way of sales tax mentioned in Ext.P3 therein. 9. Said amount has also been remitted under Receipt No.524 dated 01.01.2013. Despite the payment of the amount, gratuity was disbursed only on 28.06.2013. There is no acceptable and reasonable explanation for the delay in disbursement. 10. Audit objection only revealed a liability to remit Rs.6/- by way of sales tax mentioned in Ext.P3 therein. 9. Said amount has also been remitted under Receipt No.524 dated 01.01.2013. Despite the payment of the amount, gratuity was disbursed only on 28.06.2013. There is no acceptable and reasonable explanation for the delay in disbursement. 10. Though Mr.V.Tekchand, learned Senior Government Pleader, made submissions on the above, certainly, there is a delay in payment of gratuity, despite remitting Rs.6 by way of sales tax on 01.01.2013. There is also delay in completion of audit. For mere liability of Rs.6/-, gratuity has been withheld. In the abovesaid circumstances, Lok Ayukta has directed interest on the gratuity amount at the rate of 10% per annum for the period from 13.01.2013 to 13.06.2013. 11. Going through the impugned order, we do not find any jurisdictional error or other legal infirmities warranting our interference. 12. On the aspect of jurisdictional fact and jurisdictional error, reference an be made to a few decisions:- (i) In Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1621 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “19………………………..Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable “at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry’. (Rex v. Bolten (1841) I Q.B. 66. The question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable “at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry’. (Rex v. Bolten (1841) I Q.B. 66. Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine claims for compensation for loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determine any of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is empowered or required (i.e.) had jurisdiction to determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But there are other cases where Parliament when it empowers an inferior tribunal to enquire into certain facts intend to demarcate two areas of enquiry, the tribunal’s findings within one area being conclusive and with in the other area impeachable. “The jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it exists or not is logically prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to try. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not. The tribunal must itself decide as to the collateral fact when, at the inception of an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether it will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive at some decision on whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunals which, by virtue of legislation constitution them, have the power to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that an inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess.” (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol.11 page 59). The characteristic attribute of judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted as valid unless set aside on appeal…………………………” (ii) In Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign Compensation Commissioner, ((1969) 1 All ER 208), Lord Reid at pages 213 and 214 of the Report stated as under: “It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision is a nullity. But in such cases the words “jurisdiction has been used in a very wide sense, and I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to if for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly.” (iii) In Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros., (1971) 1 SCC 486 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 22, held thus:- “22. ....The word “jurisdiction” has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former, it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several aspects, one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act, and therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction.” (iv) In Shri. M.L. Sethi v. Shri R.P. Kapur, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 427 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 12, held thus:- “12. ...The “jurisdiction” is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, namely, the entitlement “to enter upon the enquiry in question”. ...The “jurisdiction” is a verbal coat of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Reid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, namely, the entitlement “to enter upon the enquiry in question”. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Denean in R. v. Bolton. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd. case (supra), Lord Reid said: “But there are many cases where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.” In the same case, Lord Pearce said: “Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or, in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. Or, in the intervening stage while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may depart from the rules of natural justice; or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its inquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the inquiry which the Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decision to be a nullity.” The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above case would show the extent to which ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of “jurisdiction”. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference ‘between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction it the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as “basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal”, “imposing an unwarranted condition” or “addressing themselves to a wrong question”. The majority opinion in the case leaves a Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will, give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow. In the end it can only be a value judgment (see H.W.R. Wade, “Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic case”, Law Quarterly Review, Vol.85, 1969, p.198). Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata ‘was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision ? It is difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. It is difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law was considered as vital by the Court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court.” (v) In Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur reported in (1973) 1 SCC 633 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “No authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assesses was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. It is incomprehensible to think that a quasi-judicial authority like the Income-tax Officer can erroneously decide a jurisdictional fact and thereafter proceed to impose a levy on a citizen. In our opinion the Appellate Bench is wholly wrong in opining that the Income-tax Officer can “decide either way”. (vi) In Shrisht Dhawan (SMT.) v. M/s. Shaw Brothers, (1992) 1 SCC 534 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 19, held thus:- “19....What, then, is an error in respect of jurisdictional fact? A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends assumption or refusal to assume jurisdiction by a Court, tribunal or an authority. In Black’s Legal Dictionary it is explained as a fact which must exist before a court can properly assume jurisdiction of a particular case. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Mistake of fact in relation to jurisdiction is an error of jurisdictional fact. No statutory authority or tribunal can assume jurisdiction in respect of subject matter which the statute does not confer on it and if by deciding erroneously the fact on which jurisdiction depends the court or tribunal exercises the jurisdiction then the order is vitiated. Error of jurisdictional fact renders the order ultra vires and bad. In Raza Textiles it was held that a court or tribunal cannot confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly.” (vii) After considering Anisminic’s case (cited supra) and several decisions, a learned single Judge of this Court has explained the word “Jurisdiction”, in Malayala Manorama Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner (KGST) ( 2006 (3) KLT 581 ), wherein the concept of jurisdiction has been drastically expanded after the decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic v. The Foreign Compensation Commissioner (1967 (2) AER 986). Now, every error of law if a jurisdictional error. If a decisive fact is wrongly understood, even then, the decision will be outside jurisdiction. This concept is best explained by K.S. Paripoornan, J., in his Lordship’s separate Judgment in Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536 . The relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as follows: “Opinions may differ as to when it can be said that in the ‘public law’ domain, the entire proceeding before the appropriate authority is illegal and without jurisdiction or the defect or infirmity in the order goes to the root of the matter and makes it in law invalid or void (referred to in Illuri Subbayya Chetty case and approved in Dhulabhai case). The matter may have to be considered in the light of the provisions of the particular statute in question and the fact-situation obtaining in each case. It is difficult to visualise all situations hypothetically and provide an answer. Be that as it may, the question that frequently arises for consideration, is, in what situation/cases the non-compliance or error or mistake, committed by the statutory authority or tribunal, makes the decision rendered ultra vires or a nullity or one without jurisdiction? If the decision is without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions for obtaining reliefs contained in the Act and the ‘ouster clauses’, the jurisdiction of the ordinary court is not excluded. So, the matter assumes significance. If the decision is without jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provisions for obtaining reliefs contained in the Act and the ‘ouster clauses’, the jurisdiction of the ordinary court is not excluded. So, the matter assumes significance. Since the landmark decision in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, the legal world seems to have accepted that any ‘jurisdictional error’ as understood in the liberal or modern approach, laid down therein, makes a decision ultra vires or a nullity or without jurisdiction and the ‘ouster clauses’ are construed restrictively and such provisions whatever their stringent language be, have been held, not to prevent challenge on the ground that the decision is ultra vires and being a complete nullity, it is not a decision within the meaning of the Act. The concept of jurisdiction has acquired ‘new dimensions’. The original or pure theory of jurisdiction means ‘the authority to decide’ and it is determinable at the commencement and not at the conclusion of the enquiry. The said approach has been given a go-by in Anisminic case as we shall see from the discussion hereinafter (See De Smith, Woolf and Jowell - Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995 Edn.) p.238, Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) p. 114, para 67, footnote (9). As Sir William Wade observes in his book, Administrative Law (7th Edn.), 1994, at p.229: “The tribunal must not only have jurisdiction at the outset, but must retain it unimpaired until it has discharged its task.” The decision in Anisminic case has been cited with approval in a number of cases by this Court: citation of a few such cases - Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. AIR 1971 SC 1558 at p.1565, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 at p.650, R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT), 1989 1 SCC 628 at p.634, N. Parthasararhy v. Controller of Capital Issues ( (1991) 3 SCC 153 at p.195), Associated Engineering Co. v. Govt. of A.P., (1991) 4 SCC 93 , Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161 at p.173). Delivering the Judgment of a two member Bench in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379 , Mathew, J., in paras 10 and 11 of the Judgment explained the legal position after Anisminic case to the following effect: “10. of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161 at p.173). Delivering the Judgment of a two member Bench in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1972 SC 2379 , Mathew, J., in paras 10 and 11 of the Judgment explained the legal position after Anisminic case to the following effect: “10. The word ‘jurisdiction is a verbal cost of many colours. Jurisdiction originally seems to have had the meaning which Lord Baid ascribed to it in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commissioner, namely, the entitlement ‘to enter upon the enquiry in question. If there was an entitlement to enter upon an enquiry into the question, then, any subsequent error could only be regarded as an error within the jurisdiction. The best known formulation of this theory is that made by Lord Dennan in ‘R. v. Boltan. He said that the question of jurisdiction is determinable at the commencement, not at the conclusion of the enquiry. In Anisminic Ltd., Lord Reid said: ‘But there are many cases, where, although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry, it has done for failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith, have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive.” In the same case, Lord Pearce said: “Lack of jurisdiction may arise in various ways. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may, at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. There may be an absence of those formalities or things which are conditions precedent to the tribunal having any jurisdiction to embark on an enquiry. Or the tribunal may, at the end make an order that it has no jurisdiction to make. Or in the intervening stage, while engaged on a proper enquiry, the tribunal may, depart from the rules of natural justice, or it may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed to take into account. Thereby, it would step outside its jurisdiction. It would turn its enquiry into something not directed by Parliament and fail to make the enquiry which Parliament did direct. Any of these things would cause its purported decisions to be a nullity.” 11. The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords, in the above case, would show the extent to which ‘lack’ and ‘excess’ of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of ‘jurisdiction’. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as ‘basing their decision in a matter with which they have no right to deal’, ‘imposing an unwarranted condition’ or ‘addressing themselves to a wrong question’. The majority opinion in the case leaves a court or tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute, which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the court is prepared to allow.........…” (viii) In Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju, AIR 1973 SC 2602 ), a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, stated thus: (SCC pp 423-24, para 28). “Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. “Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, we do not think that the distinction between the two has been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has arisen because the word ‘jurisdiction’ is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context (see per Diplock, J. at p.394 in the Anisminic case). Whereas the ‘pure’ theory of jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control to a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower meaning might result in a more useful legal concept even though the formal structure of law may lost something of its logical symmetry. ‘At bottom, the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for the purpose of judicial review has been one of the public policy rather than one of logic’. (S.A. Smith ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., p.98. (1968) Edn.) The observation of the learned author (S.A.De Smith) was continued in its 3rd Edn. (1973) at p.98 and in its 4th Edn.(1980) at p.112 of the book. The observation aforesaid was based on the then prevailing academic opinion only as is seen from the footnotes. It should be stated that the said observation is omitted form the latest edition of the book De Smith, Woolf and Jowell - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - 5th Edn. (1995) as is evident from p.229; probably due to later developments in the law and the academic opinion that has emerged due to the change in the perspective. 335. After 1980, the decision in Anisminic case came up for further consideration before the House of Lords, Privy Council and other courts. The three leading decisions of the House of Lords wherein Anisminic principle was followed and explained, are the following: Racal Communications Ltd., In re (1981 AC 374), O’ Reilly v. Mackman (1983 (2) AC 237), Re. v. Hull University Visitor (1993 AC 682). It should be noted that Racal, In re case, the Anisminic principle was held to be inapplicable inn the case of (superior) court where the decision of the court is made final and conclusive by the statute. v. Hull University Visitor (1993 AC 682). It should be noted that Racal, In re case, the Anisminic principle was held to be inapplicable inn the case of (superior) court where the decision of the court is made final and conclusive by the statute. (The superior court referred to in this decision is the High Court) (1981 AC 374 (383, 384, 386, 391)). In the meanwhile, the House of Lords, in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service ( 1985 AC 374 ), enunciated three broad grounds for judicial review, as ‘legality’, ‘procedural propriety’ and ‘rationality’ and this decision had its impact on the development of the law in post-Anisminic period. In the light of the above four important decisions of the House of Lords, other decisions of the court of appeal, Privy Council etc., and the later academic opinion in the matter, the entire case-law on the subject has been reviewed in leading text books. In the latest edition of De Smith on Judicial Review of Administrative Action - edited by Lord Woolf and Jowell, Q.C. (Professor of Public Law, 5 Edn. - 1995) in Chapter 5, titled as ‘Jurisdiction, Vires, Law and Fact’ (pp-223-204), there is exhaustive analysis about the concept ‘Jurisdiction’ and its ramifications. The authors have discussed the pure theory of jurisdiction, the innovative decision in Anisminic case, the development of the law in the post-Anisminic period, the scope of the ‘finality’ clauses (exclusion of jurisdiction of courts) in the statutes and have laid down a few propositions at pp-250-256 which could be advanced on the subject. The authors have concluded the discussion thus at p.256: ‘After Anisminic, virtually, every error of law, is a jurisdictional error, and the only place left for non-jurisdictional error is, where the components of the decision made by the inferior body included matters of fact and policy as well as law or where the error was evidential (concerning for example, the burden of proof or admission of evidence). Perhaps the most precise indication of jurisdictional error is that advanced by Lord Diplock in Raccal Communications, when he suggested that a tribunal is entitled to make an error when the matter ‘involves, as many do interrelated questions of law, fact and degree’. Perhaps the most precise indication of jurisdictional error is that advanced by Lord Diplock in Raccal Communications, when he suggested that a tribunal is entitled to make an error when the matter ‘involves, as many do interrelated questions of law, fact and degree’. Thus, it was for the county court Judge in Pearlman, to decide whether the installation of central heating in a dwelling amounted to a ‘structural alternation, extension or addition’. This was a typical question of mixed law, fact and degree which only a scholiast would think it appropriate to dissect into two separate questions, one for decision by the superior court, viz., the meaning of these words, a question which must entail considerations of degree and the other for decision by a country court viz., the application of words to the particular installation, a question which also entails considerations of degree. It is however, doubtful whether any test of jurisdictional error will prove satisfactory. The distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error is ultimately based upon foundations of sand. Much of the superstructure has already crumbled. What remains is likely quickly to fall away as the courts rightly insist that all administrative action should be, simply, lawful, whether or not jurisdictionally lawful.’ 336. The jurisdictional control exercised by superior courts over subordinate courts, tribunals or other statutory bodies and the scope and content of such power has been pithily stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England - 4th Edn. (Reissue), 1989 Vol. 1(1), p.113 to the following effect: The inferior court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction if it has no power to enter upon an enquiry into a matter at all and it exceeds jurisdiction if it nevertheless enters upon such an enquiry or, having jurisdiction in the first place, it proceeds to arrogate an authority withheld from it by perpetrating a major error of substance, form or procedure or by making an order or taking action outside its limited area of competence. Not every error committed by an inferior court or tribunal or other body, however, goes to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to decide a matter imports a limited power to decide that matter incorrectly. Not every error committed by an inferior court or tribunal or other body, however, goes to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to decide a matter imports a limited power to decide that matter incorrectly. A tribunal lacks jurisdiction if (1) it is improperly constituted or (2) the proceedings have been improperly instituted or (3) authority to decide has been delegated to it unlawfully, or (4) it is without competence to deal with a matter by reason of the parties, the area in which the issue arose, the nature of the subject-matter, the value of that subject-matter, or the non-existence of any other prerequisite of a valid adjudication. Excess of jurisdiction is not materially distinguishable from lack of jurisdiction and the expression may be used interchangeably. Where the jurisdiction of tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of, the issue, or as jurisdictional. There is a presumption in construing statutes which confer jurisdiction or discretionary powers on a body, that if that body makes an error of law while purporting to act within that jurisdiction or in exercising those powers, its decision or action will exceed the jurisdiction conferred and will be quashed. The error must be one on which the decision or action depends. An error of law going to jurisdiction may be committed by a body which fails to follow the proper procedure required by law, which takes legally irrelevant considerations into account, or which fails to take relevant considerations into account, or which asks itself and answers the wrong question. The presumption that error of law goes to jurisdiction may be rebutted on the construction of a particular statute, so that the relevant body will not exceed its jurisdiction by going wrong in law. Previously the courts were more likely to find that errors of law were within jurisdiction; but with the modern approach errors of law will be held to fall within a body’s jurisdiction only in exceptional cases. The courts will generally assume that their expertise in determining the principles of law applicable in any case has not been excluded by Parliament. Previously the courts were more likely to find that errors of law were within jurisdiction; but with the modern approach errors of law will be held to fall within a body’s jurisdiction only in exceptional cases. The courts will generally assume that their expertise in determining the principles of law applicable in any case has not been excluded by Parliament. (p.120) Errors of law include misinterpretation of statute or any other legal document or a rule of common law; asking oneself and answering the wrong question, taking irrelevant considerations into account or failing to take relevant considerations into account when purporting to apply the law to the facts; admitting inadmissible evidence or rejecting admissible and relevant evidence; exercising a discretion on the basis of incorrect legal principles; giving reasons which disclose faulty legal reasoning or which are inadequate to fulfil an express duly to give reasons and misdirecting oneself as to the burden of proof. (pp.121-122). 337. H.W.R.Wade and C.F.Forsyth in their book-Administrative Law 7th Edn.(1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior courts over subordinate courts and tribunals under the head ‘jurisdiction over Fact and Law’ in Chapter 9, pp.284 to 320. The decisions before Anisminic and those in the post-Anisminic period have been discussed in detail. At pp.319-320, the authors give the Summary of Rules thus: ‘Jurisdiction over fact and law: Summary At the end of a chapter which is top-heavy with obsolescent material it may be useful to summarise the position as shortly as possible. The overall picture is of an expanding system struggling to free itself from the trammels of classical doctrines laid down in the past. It is not safe to say that the classical doctrines are wholly absolute and that the broad and simple principles of review, which clearly now commend themselves to the judiciary, will entirely supplant them. A summary can therefore only state the long-established rules together with the simpler and broader rules which have now superseded them, much for the benefit of the law. Together they are as follows: Errors of fact Old rule: The court would quash only if the erroneous fact was jurisdictional. New rule: The court will quash if an erroneous and decisive fact was - (a) jurisdictional (b) found on the basis of no evidence; or (c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored. Together they are as follows: Errors of fact Old rule: The court would quash only if the erroneous fact was jurisdictional. New rule: The court will quash if an erroneous and decisive fact was - (a) jurisdictional (b) found on the basis of no evidence; or (c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored. Errors of law Old rule: The court would quash only if the error was - (a) jurisdictional (b) on the face of the record. New rule: The court will quash for any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictional.” (ix) In Arun Kumar v. Union of India reported in (2007) 1 SCC 732 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at Paragraphs 74, 80 to 84, held as under: “74. A “jurisdictional fact” is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or nonexistence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency’s power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. ....… 80. The Court relied upon a decision in White & Collins v. Minister of Health (1939) 2 KB 838 = 108 LJ KB 768), wherein a question debated was whether the court had jurisdiction to review the finding of administrative authority on a question of fact. The relevant Act enabled the local authority to acquire land compulsorily for housing of working classes. But it was expressly provided that no land could be acquired which at the date of compulsory purchase formed part of park, garden or pleasure-ground. An order of compulsory purchase was made which was challenged by the owner contending that the land was a part of park. The Minister directed public inquiry and on the basis of the report submitted, confirmed the order. 81. An order of compulsory purchase was made which was challenged by the owner contending that the land was a part of park. The Minister directed public inquiry and on the basis of the report submitted, confirmed the order. 81. Interfering with the finding of the Minister and setting aside the order, the Court of Appeal stated: “The first and the most important matter to bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to make the order is dependent on a finding of fact; for, unless the land can be held not to be part of a park or not to be required for amenity or convenience, there is no jurisdiction in the borough council to make, or in the Minister to confirm, the order. In such a case it seems almost self-evident that the Court which has to consider whether there is jurisdiction to make or confirm the order must be entitled to review the vital finding on which the existence of the jurisdiction relied upon depends. If this were not so, the right to apply to the Court would be illusory.” (See also Rex v. Shoredich Assessment Committee; ((1910) 2 KB 859 = 80 LJ KB 185).” 82. A question under the Income Tax Act, 1922 arose in Raza Textiles Ltd., v. Income Tax Officer, Rampur, ( (1973) 1 SCC 633 = AIR 1973 SC 1362 ). In that case, the ITO directed X to pay certain amount of tax rejecting the contention of X that he was not a non-resident firm. The Tribunal confirmed the order. A single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad held X as nonresident firm and not liable to deduct tax at source. The Division Bench, however, set aside the order observing that “ITO had jurisdiction to decide the question either way. It cannot be said that the Officer assumed jurisdiction by a wrong decision on this question of residence”. X approached this Court. 83. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Division Bench, this Court stated: “The Appellate Bench appears to have been under the impression that the Income-tax Officer was the sole judge of the fact whether the firm in question was resident or nonresident. This conclusion, in our opinion, is wholly wrong. X approached this Court. 83. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Division Bench, this Court stated: “The Appellate Bench appears to have been under the impression that the Income-tax Officer was the sole judge of the fact whether the firm in question was resident or nonresident. This conclusion, in our opinion, is wholly wrong. No authority, much less a quasi judicial authority, can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is a question that is open for examination by the High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari. If the High Court comes to the conclusion, as the learned single Judge has done in this case, that the Income-tax Officer had clutched at the jurisdiction by deciding a jurisdictional fact erroneously, then the assessees was entitled for the writ of certiorari prayed for by him. It is incomprehensible to think that a quasi-judicial authority like the Income-tax Officer can erroneously decide a jurisdictional fact and thereafter proceed to impose a levy on a citizen.” (emphasis supplied) 84. From the above decisions, it is clear that existence of ‘jurisdictional fact’ is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of ‘jurisdictional fact’, it can decide the ‘fact in issue’ or ‘adjudicatory fact’. A wrong decision on ‘fact in issue’ or on ‘adjudicatory fact’ would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present.” (x) In Carona Ltd v. M/s. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, (2007) 1 SCC 559, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at para.Nos.21 to 24 and 31, held thus:- 21. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority depends can be said to be a ‘jurisdictional fact’. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. 22. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol.1, para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol.1(1), para.68, pp.114-15, it has been stated: “Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not conclusive”. 23. The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal. JURISDICTIONAL FACT AND ADJUDICATORY FACT 24. But there is distinction between ‘jurisdictional fact’ and ‘adjudicatory fact’ which cannot be ignored. An ‘adjudicatory fact’ is a ‘fact in issue’ and can be determined by a Court, Tribunal or Authority on ‘merits’, on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties. It is no doubt true that it is very difficult to distinguish ‘jurisdictional fact’ and ‘fact in issue’ or ‘adjudicatory fact’. Nonetheless the difference between the two cannot be overlooked. ..........… 31. It is thus clear that for assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or a Tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the Court or Tribunal has power to decide adjudicatory facts or facts in issue.” (xi) In Harpal Singh v. State of Punjab (2007) 13 SCC 387 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “9. At this stage it will be useful to refer to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘Jurisdiction’: Black’s Law Dictionary: “Court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”. At this stage it will be useful to refer to the dictionary meaning of the word ‘Jurisdiction’: Black’s Law Dictionary: “Court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”. Words and Phrases - Legally defined - Third Edition (p.497): “By ‘jurisdiction’ is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by the statute, charter, or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which the particular court has cognizance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction extends.” Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar - 2nd Edn. Reprint 2000 : “An authority or power, which a man has to do justice in causes of complaint brought before him (Tomlin’s Law Dic). The power to hear and determine the particular case involved; the power of a Court or a judge to entertain an action, petition, or other proceeding; the legal power of hearing and determining controversies. As applied to a particular claim or controversy, jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the controversy. Jurisdiction, therefore, means the authority or power to entertain, hear and decide a case and to do justice in the case and determine the controversy. In absence of jurisdiction the court has no power to hear and decide the matter and the order passed by it would be a nullity.” (xii) In Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement, reported in ( (2008) 14 SCC 58 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 68 to 70, held thus:- “68. A ‘jurisdictional fact’ is one on existence of which depends jurisdiction of a Court, Tribunal or an Authority. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court or Tribunal cannot act. If an inferior Court or Tribunal wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, a writ of certiorari lies. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess. 69. If an inferior Court or Tribunal wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, a writ of certiorari lies. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess. 69. The counsel referred to a recent decision of this Court in Arun Kumar v. Union of India. Speaking for the Court, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) observed: (SCC p.758, para.74) “74. A ‘jurisdictional fact’ is a fact which must exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court, a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which an administrative agency’s power to act depends. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court, authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or authority wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of certiorari. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of such jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses”. It was further observed: (SCC p.759, para.76) 76. “The existence of jurisdictional fact is thus sine qua non or condition precedent for the exercise of power by a court of limited jurisdiction”. 70. Drawing the distinction between ‘jurisdictional fact’ and ‘adjudicatory fact’, the Court stated: (Arun Kumar case, SCC p.761, para.84) “84.... it is clear that existence of ‘jurisdictional fact’ is sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed with the case and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. Once the authority has jurisdiction in the matter on existence of ‘jurisdictional fact’, it can decide the ‘fact in issue’ or ‘adjudicatory fact’. A wrong decision on ‘fact in issue’ or on ‘adjudicatory fact’ would not make the decision of the authority without jurisdiction or vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact as to existence of jurisdiction is present”. The principle was reiterated in Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Ors., ((2007) 1 SCC 559).” 13. From the foregoing decisions, it could be deduced that existence of jurisdictional fact is a sine qua non for exercise of power. The principle was reiterated in Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Ors., ((2007) 1 SCC 559).” 13. From the foregoing decisions, it could be deduced that existence of jurisdictional fact is a sine qua non for exercise of power. A jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non-existence of which depends upon jurisdiction on a Court or tribunal or authority, as the case may be. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court, authority or officer cannot act. If a court or authority has wrongly assumes the existence of such fact, the order can be quashed by a writ of certiorari. If the jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed further and exercise his power and take a decision in accordance with law. No Court or tribunal or statutory authority can assume jurisdiction, in respect of a matter which the statute does not confer on it. Error on jurisdictional fact, renders the order, ultra vires and bad. 14. On the aspect of payment of interest by way of compensation ordered in delay in disbursement of DCRG or pension, reference can be made to a few decisions:- (i) In State of Kerala & Ors. v. M. Padmanabhan Nair ( (1985) 1 SCC 429 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “Prompt payment of retirement benefits is the duty of the Government and any failure in that direction will entail the Government liable to pay penal interest to the Government Servant. It was further held that gratuity should be paid on the date of retirement or on the following day and pension should be paid at the expiry of the following month. In that case, the Supreme Court, finding that there was delay in disbursement of the terminal benefits, directed the respondents therein to disburse the pensionary benefits with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Applying the ratio laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the above cases to the facts of this case, there is a delay of around 16 years in settling the terminal benefits payable to the petitioner. Such a delay is not attributable on the part of the respondents. It is contended by the respondents that the delay has occurred due to an audit objection. Such a contention on the part of the respondents cannot be countenanced. Such a delay is not attributable on the part of the respondents. It is contended by the respondents that the delay has occurred due to an audit objection. Such a contention on the part of the respondents cannot be countenanced. This Court is of the view that the delay on the part of the respondents in settling the withheld portion of the DCRG and pension payable to the petitioner for about 16 years purportedly due to audit objection cannot be accepted. Further, Rule 45A of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules as amended from 20th February 1995 provides for granting interest at the rate of 12% per annum if the terminal benefits are delayed. Therefore, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled for payment of interest for the belated disbursement of the terminal benefits at the rate of 12% per annum. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed and a Mandamus is issued to the respondents directing them to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum for the belated disbursement of 25% of DCRG and Pension payable to the petitioner from the date of his retirement till 17-11-2014, the date on which the amount thereof have been disbursed to the petitioner. No costs. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner is aged 75 years, the respondents are directed to pay the interest as indicated above to the petitioner within a period of two months from me date of receipt of a copy of this order.” (ii) In Dr. Uma Agarwal v. State of U.P. & Anr. ( (1999) 3 SCC 438 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, when there is delay in disbursement of pensionary benefits, the department is liable to pay interest thereof. In Para Nos.5 to 7 of the said case, it was held as under: “5. We have referred in sufficient detail to the Rules and instructions which prescribe the time-schedule for the various steps to be taken in regard to the payment of pension and other retiral benefits. This we have done to remind the various governmental departments of their duties in initiating various steps at least two years in advance of the date of retirement. This we have done to remind the various governmental departments of their duties in initiating various steps at least two years in advance of the date of retirement. If the Rules/instructions are followed strictly, much of the litigation can be avoided and retired government servants will not feel harassed because after all, grant of pension is not a bounty but a right of the Government servant. The Government is obliged to follow the Rules mentioned in the earlier part of this order in letter and in spirit. Delay in settlement of retiral benefits is frustrating and must be avoided at all costs. Such delays are occurring even in regard to family pensions for which too there is a prescribed procedure. This is indeed unfortunate. In cases where a retired government servant claims interest for delayed payment, the court can certainly keep in mind the time-schedule prescribed in the Rules/instructions apart from other relevant factors applicable to each case. 6. The case before us is a clear example of departmental delay which is not excusable. The petitioner retired on 30-4-1993 and it was only after 12-2-1996 when an interim order was passed in this Writ Petition that the respondents woke up and started work by sending a special messenger to various places where the petitioner had worked. Such an exercise should have started at least in 1991, two years before retirement. The amounts due to the petitioner were computed and the payments were made only during 1997-98. The petitioner was a cancer patient and was indeed put to great hardship. Even assuming that some letters were sent to the petitioner after her retirement on 30-3-1993 seeking information from her, an allegation which is denied by the petitioner, that cannot be an excuse for the lethargy of the Department inasmuch as the Rules and instructions require these actions to be taken long before retirement. The exercise which was to be completed long before retirement was in fact started long after the petitioner’s retirement. 7. Therefore, this is a fit case for awarding interest to the petitioner. We do not think that for the purpose of the computation of interest, the matter should go back. The exercise which was to be completed long before retirement was in fact started long after the petitioner’s retirement. 7. Therefore, this is a fit case for awarding interest to the petitioner. We do not think that for the purpose of the computation of interest, the matter should go back. Instead, on the facts of this case, we quantify the interest payable at Rs.1 lakh and direct that the same shall be paid to the petitioner within two months from today.” (iii) In Vijay L. Mehrotra v. State of U.P. & Ors. ( (2000) 2 SLR 686 ), the Hon’ble Apex Court held under: “The appellant therein retired from service on 31st August, 1997. The retiral benefits, such as, GPF, GIS, Encashment of Leave, Arrears of pay, Gratuity and Commuted value of Pension, were paid long after she retired. Observing that in case of an employee, retiring after having rendered service, it is expected that all the payments of the retiral benefits should be paid, on the date of retirement or soon thereafter, if for some unforeseen circumstances, the payments could not be made on the date of retirement, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the respondent therein to pay to the retired employee, interest at the rate of 18% on the belated payment from the date of retirement, till the actual payment was made.” (iv) In Gorakhpur University & Ors. v. Dr. Shitla Prasad Nagendra & Ors. ( (2001) 6 SCC 591 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “The retiral benefits of the respondent therein were withhold to adjust certain disputed amounts from a Professor for overstaying in the University, during his appointment as Vice Chancellor in another University. After completion of his tenure as Vice-Chancellor, he assumed his original post, i.e., as Professor in the University, in which, he had worked earlier and continued to service till 11-1-90, the date, on which he attained the age of superannuation. During his overstay, nominal rent was accepted from him and no legal action was taken to recover possession of the quarters. No notice was issued, fixing his liability for payment of penal rent. When disbursement of retiral benefits, including fixation and disbursement of pension, was delayed, a Writ Petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court and that the same was opposed by Gorakhpur University, the appellant before the Apex Court. No notice was issued, fixing his liability for payment of penal rent. When disbursement of retiral benefits, including fixation and disbursement of pension, was delayed, a Writ Petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court and that the same was opposed by Gorakhpur University, the appellant before the Apex Court. It was the contention of the appellant that the professor had not vacated the quarters held by him, when he retired and within the permissible extended period and therefore, he was liable for payment of penal rent in respect of such accommodation and as a matter of fact, the Finance Controller, Officer of Directorate of Higher Education, U.P., who examined his pension papers, ordered on the recommendation of the university-authorities, adjustment of Rs.3,20,638.04 from the amounts due, towards the retiral benefits. Applying the principles of Som Prakash v. Union of India reported in ( 1981 (1) LLJ 79 (SC)) and R. Kapur v. Director of Inspector (Printing and Publication) Income Tax and another reported in ( (1995) 1 LLJ 884 (SC)), the High Court overruled the objections of the University, holding that the pension and other retiral benefits cannot be withheld or adjusted or appropriated for the satisfaction of any other dues outstanding against the retired employee. It was further held that the action of the university authorities was illegal and while allowing the claim of the first respondent-Professor, a direction was also issued to pay the entire pension and Provident Fund etc., due to him, with penal interest @ 18% within two months from the date of the order. While testing the correctness of the order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at Paragraph 5, held as follows: “5. We have carefully considered the submissions on behalf of the respective parties before us. The earlier decision pertaining to this very university reported in S.N.Mathur is that of a Division Bench rendered after considering the principles laid down and also placing reliance upon the decisions of this R.Kapur which, in turn, relied upon earlier decisions in State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair and Som Prakash. The earlier decision pertaining to this very university reported in S.N.Mathur is that of a Division Bench rendered after considering the principles laid down and also placing reliance upon the decisions of this R.Kapur which, in turn, relied upon earlier decisions in State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair and Som Prakash. This Court has been repeatedly emphasizing the position that pension and gratuity are no longer matters of any bounty to be distributed by Government but are valuable rights acquired and property in their hands and any delay in settlement and disbursement whereof should be viewed seriously and dealt with severely by imposing penalty in the form of payment of interest. Withholding of quarters allotted, while in service, even after retirement without vacating the same has been viewed to be not a valid ground to withhold the disbursement of the terminal benefits. Such is the position with reference to amounts due towards Provident Fund, which is rendered immune from attachment and deduction or adjustment as against any other dues from the employee. In the context of this, mere reliance on behalf of the appellant upon yet another decision of a different Division Bench of the very High Court rendered without taking note of any of the earlier decisions of this Court but merely proceeding to decide the issue upon equitable considerations of balancing conflicting claims of respective parties before it does not improve the case of the appellant any further. Reliance placed for the appellant university on the decision reported in Wazir Chand does not also sound well on the facts and circumstances of this case. It is not clear from the facts relating to the said decision as to whether the person concerned was allowed to remain in occupation on receipt of the normal rent as in the present case. As noticed earlier, the case of the contesting respondent in this case is that the university authorities regularly accepted the rent at normal rates every month from the petitioner till the quarters was vacated and that in spite of request made for the allotment of the said quarters in favour of the son of the respondent, who is in the service of the university, no decision seems to have been taken and communicated though it is now claimed in the Court proceedings that he is not entitled to this type of accommodation. Further, the facts disclosed such as the resolutions of the university resolving to waive penal rent from all Teachers as well as that of the Executive Council dated 18-7-1994 and the actual such waiver made in the case of several others cannot be easily ignored. The lethargy shown by the authorities in not taking any action according to law to enforce their right to recover possession of the quarters from the respondents or fix liability or determine the so-called penal rent after giving prior show-cause notice or any opportunity to him before ever even proceeding to recover the same from the respondents renders the claims for penal rent not only a seriously disputed or contested claim but the university cannot be allowed to recover summarily the alleged dues according to its whims in a vindictive manner by adopting different and discriminatory standards. The facts disclosed also show that it is almost one year after the vacation of the quarter and that too on the basis of certain subsequent orders increasing the rates of penal rent, the applicability of which to the respondent itself was again seriously disputed and to some extent justifiably too, the appellant cannot be held to be entitled to recover by way of adjustment such disputed sums or claims against the pension, gratuity and provident fund amounts indisputably due and unquestionably payable to the respondent before us. The claims of the university cannot be said to be in respect of an admitted or conceded claim or sum due. Therefore, we are of the view that no infirmity or illegality could be said to be vitiated the order, under challenge in this appeal, to call for our interference, apart from the further reason that the disbursements have already been said to have been made in this case as per the decision of the High Court.” (v) In H. Gangahanume Gowda v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. ( (2003) 3 SCC 40 ), at para.7, 8 and 10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. It is evident from Section 7(2) that as soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer, whether any application has been made or not, is obliged to determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity. It is evident from Section 7(2) that as soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer, whether any application has been made or not, is obliged to determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity. Under Section 7(3), the employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within 30 days from the date it becomes payable. Under sub-section (3)(A) of Section 7, if the amount of gratuity is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), he shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long term deposits; provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on that ground. From the provisions made in Section 7, a clear command can be seen mandating the employer to pay the gratuity within the specified time and to pay interest on the delayed payment of gratuity. No discretion is available to exempt or relieve the employer from payment of gratuity with or without interest as the case may be. However, under the proviso to Section 7(3A), no interest shall be payable if delay in payment of gratuity is due to the fault of the employee and further condition that the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on that ground. Under Section 8, provision is made for recovery of gratuity payable under the Act, if not paid by the employer within the prescribed time. The Collector shall recover the amount of gratuity with compound interest thereon as arrears of land revenue and pay the same to the person entitled. A penal provision is also made in Section 9 for non-payment of gratuity. Payment of gratuity with or without interest as the case may be does not lie in the domain of discretion but it is a statutory compulsion. Specific benefits expressly given in a social beneficial legislation cannot be ordinarily denied. A penal provision is also made in Section 9 for non-payment of gratuity. Payment of gratuity with or without interest as the case may be does not lie in the domain of discretion but it is a statutory compulsion. Specific benefits expressly given in a social beneficial legislation cannot be ordinarily denied. Employees on retirement have valuable rights to get gratuity and any culpable delay in payment of gratuity must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest was the view taken in State of Kerala & Ors. v. M.Padmanabhan Nayyar ( 1985 (50) FLR 145 ). Earlier there was no provision for payment of interest on the delayed payment of gratuity. Sub-section (3A) was added to Section 7 by an amendment, which came into force with effect from 1st October, 1987. In the case of Charan Singh v. M/s. Birla Textiles & Anr. ( 1988 (57) FLR 543 SC), this aspect was noticed in the following words: ‘There was no provision in the Act for payment of interest when the same was quantified by the Controlling Authority and before the Collector was approached for its realization. In fact, it is on the acceptance of the position that there was a lacuna in the law that Act 22 of 1987 brought about the incorporation of sub-section (3)(A) in Section 7. That provision has prospective application.’ 8. In the background of this legal position, now we turn to the facts of the present case. The appellant was under suspension from 15-3-1999 to 21-5-1999. On attaining the age of superannuation, he retired from services of the respondent-Corporation on 1-1-2000. The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival contentions, disposed of the Writ Petition issuing directions to the respondent-Corporation to settle the full salary and allowances for the period of suspension, gratuity, cash equivalent to leave salary, deferred leave, concession amount etc. As regards the claim of interest on gratuity, the learned Single Judge held as under: ‘Since there was a doubt as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the gratuity, cash equivalent of leave salary etc., in view of the divergent opinion of the Courts during the pendency of an enquiry proceeding of a retired employee, in my view, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief of interest for the belated payment of gratuity and other amounts.’ 10. In the light of what is stated above, the learned Single Judge could not refuse the grant of interest exercising discretion as against the mandatory provisions contained in Section 7 of the Act. The Division Bench, in our opinion, committed an error in assuming that the learned Single Judge could exercise the discretion in the matter of awarding interest and that such a discretion exercised was not arbitrary. In the light of the facts stated and for the reasons aforementioned, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Consequently, it is set aside. The respondent is directed to pay interest @ 10% on the amount of gratuity to which the appellant is entitled from the date it became payable till the date of payment of the gratuity amount. The appeal is allowed accordingly with cost quantified at Rs.10,000.” (vi) In S.K. Dua v. State of Haryana & Anr. ( (2008) 3 SCC 44 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that the appellant retired from service on June 30, 1998. It is also undisputed that at the time of retirement from service, the appellant had completed more than three decades in Government Service. Obviously, therefore, he was entitled to retiral benefits in accordance with law. True it is that certain charge-sheets/show cause notices were issued against him and the appellant was called upon to show cause why disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated against him. It is, however, the case of the appellant that all those actions had been taken at the instance of Mr.Quraishi against whom serious allegations of malpractices and misconduct had been levelled by the appellant which resulted in removal of Mr.Quraishi from the post of Secretary, Irrigation. The said Mr.Quraishi then became Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister. Immediately thereafter chargesheets were issued to the appellant and proceedings were initiated against him. The fact remains that proceedings were finally dropped and all retiral benefits were extended to the appellant. But it also cannot be denied that those benefits were given to the appellant after four years. 14. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well-founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. But it also cannot be denied that those benefits were given to the appellant after four years. 14. In the circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that the grievance voiced by the appellant appears to be well-founded that he would be entitled to interest on such benefits. If there are Statutory Rules occupying the field, the appellant could claim payment of interest relying on such Rules. If there are Administrative Instructions, Guidelines or Norms prescribed for the purpose, the appellant may claim benefit of interest on that basis. But even in absence of Statutory Rules, Administrative Instructions or Guidelines, an employee can claim interest under Part III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, that retiral benefits are not in the nature of bounty is, in our opinion, well-founded and needs no authority in support thereof. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the High Court was not right in dismissing the petition in limine even without issuing notice to the respondents.” (vii) In Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. N. Asokan ( (2009) 16 SCC 758 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “3. Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (in short, ‘the Act’) deals with determination of the payment of gratuity. Since the gratuity amount has already been paid, Section 7(3A), which deals with payment of interest for delayed payment of gratuity, would be necessary only to be dealt with in this appeal and to consider whether interest on delayed payment of gratuity can be directed to be paid by the appellant to the respondent in compliance with Section 7(3A) of the Act. 4. For this reason, we like to reproduce Section 7(3A) of the Act, which runs as under: “7. 4. For this reason, we like to reproduce Section 7(3A) of the Act, which runs as under: “7. (3A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delay payment on this ground.” On a plain reading of this provision, as noted hereinabove, it is absolutely clear that if any amount of gratuity, which is payable under Section 7 is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer is liable to pay interest from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, but on those delayed payments, where the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for delayed payment, in that case, no such interest shall be payable to the employee. So far as the present case is concerned, no such permission was obtained by the employer in writing from the controlling authority and, therefore, sub-section (3A) and its term would be squarely applicable in the facts of this case. 5. In the present case, eight years had passed after the retirement of the respondent but gratuity amount was not paid and, therefore, there was a delay of eight years in payment of gratuity amount, which is payable with interest at the rate specified in Section 7(3A) of the Act. The Corporation sought to explain the delay of eight years before the Court saying that its financial condition was such that it was not in a position to pay gratuity amount to the respondent. The Corporation sought to explain the delay of eight years before the Court saying that its financial condition was such that it was not in a position to pay gratuity amount to the respondent. However, considering the aforesaid mandatory provision of Section 7(3A) of the Act and considering the fact that more than eight years have elapsed since the retirement of the respondent, we are of the view that the High Court was perfectly justified in dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which also directed payment of interest to the respondent.” (viii) In P. Nagarathna Pandian v. The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board ( (2010) 7 MLJ 577 ), the High Court of Madras held as under: “The issue which came up for consideration before this Court was whether the Government servant is entitled to interest for belated payment of retirement benefits, after he was permitted to retire by dropping the charges. The reason stated by the respondents therein was that only due to the pendency of the charge against the petitioner therein, payment of terminal benefits was delayed. There was a delay of six years in disbursement of the retiral benefits. In the above reported case, when the petitioner therein was holding the post of General Manager (Technical) in Tamil Nadu Adi Dravidar Housing Development Corporation on deputation, a charge memo was issued on 18-11-1998, alleging that he had rejected a tender submitted by the Government of India, during the process of pre-qualification bid. The petitioner therein submitted his explanation to the same. Enquiry was conducted and that a report was also submitted, holding that the charge levelled against him as not proved. The Housing Board accepted the Enquiry Officer’s report and passed a resolution on 27-11-2003 to drop the charge framed against him and also resolved to allow him to retire from service with effect from 30-11-1998. The Board resolution was sent to the Government for its approval. After nearly six years, the Government granted approval through G.O.(ID) No.164 Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 14-4-2004. Thereafter, by proceedings, dated 25-5-2004, the Board passed final orders, allowing the petitioner to retire from service, with effect from 30-11-1998 and also ordered that the period of suspension would be treated as duty period. Subsequently, DCRG, Commutation of Pension, Spl. After nearly six years, the Government granted approval through G.O.(ID) No.164 Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 14-4-2004. Thereafter, by proceedings, dated 25-5-2004, the Board passed final orders, allowing the petitioner to retire from service, with effect from 30-11-1998 and also ordered that the period of suspension would be treated as duty period. Subsequently, DCRG, Commutation of Pension, Spl. Provident Fund, Provident Fund and Surrender of Earned Leave, were disbursed to the petitioner, even though the same were due from 30-11-1998, the date on which, he attained the superannuation. The request for sanction of interest for belated payment of Provident Fund was rejected and hence, the petitioner therein preferred a Writ Petition. The opposition of the respondent therein was that since the charge was dropped only on 25-5-2004, the petitioner’s request for payment of interest for the belated retiral benefits, is not maintainable. After considering G.O.Ms.No.510, Finance Department, dated 27-6-1995 and the following decisions, viz., Vijay L.Mehrotra v. State of U.P., reported in ( 2000 (2) SLR 686 ), Gorakhpur University v. Dr.Shitla Prasad Nagendra reported in ( (2001) 6 SCC 591 ), Government of A.P. v. C. Purushotham reported in (2002 (7) SLR 760 (DB)), H. Gangahanume Gowda v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., reported in (2003 (H) LLJ 1119), Union of India v. M.S. Abdulla reported in ( (2006) 6 SCC 455 ), R. Lakshmikanthan v. Government of Tamil Nadu reported in 2006 (III) LLJ 523 ), S.K. Dua v. State of Haryana reported in (2008) 3 SCC 44 ) and Govt., of T.N. v. M. Deivasigamani reported in 2009 (3) MLJ 1 ), a learned Single Judge, at Paragraphs 11 and 12, held as follows: “11. The reason stated by the respondents that only due to the pendency of the charge against the petitioner payment of terminal benefits was delayed, cannot be accepted as the charge, which was found not proved was ultimately dropped. The delay in completing the disciplinary proceeding has already caused mental agony to the petitioner after reaching the age of superannuation. The retirement benefits payable as on 30-11-1998 was delayed for about six years for which the petitioner cannot be blamed. It is not the case of the respondents that the disciplinary proceeding was delayed at the instance of the petitioner. The retirement benefits payable as on 30-11-1998 was delayed for about six years for which the petitioner cannot be blamed. It is not the case of the respondents that the disciplinary proceeding was delayed at the instance of the petitioner. From the perusal of the typed set of papers filed, it is evident that the enquiry officer submitted his report stating that the charge was not proved. The said Enquiry Officer’s report was submitted as early as on 31-8-1999. Even assuming that the pendency of the charge was not the reason for not paying the terminal benefits, there was unreasonable delay in dropping the charge, though the delay is explained in the counter-affidavit. For no fault on the part of the petitioner, petitioner cannot be penalised by denying interest for the belated payment of retirement benefits. 12. In view of the above findings and decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The second respondent is directed to pay the statutory interest for the gratuity amount, provident fund, special provident fund. For commutation of pension and surrender of earned leave, the second respondent is bound to pay interest for the belated payment as per the Government Order referred above. The second respondent is directed to comply with this order within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petition is closed.” (ix) In D.D. Tewari (dead) through legal representatives v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. ( (2014) 8 SCC 894 ), the Hon’ble Apex Court, at Paragraphs 5 to 8, held as under: “5. The said legal principle laid down by this Court still holds good in so far as awarding the interest on the delayed payments to the appellant is concerned. This aspect of the matter was adverted to in the judgment of the learned Single Judge without assigning any reason for not awarding the interest as claimed by the appellant. That is why that portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was aggrieved of by the appellant and he had filed L.P.A. before Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court has passed a cryptic order which is impugned in this appeal. That is why that portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was aggrieved of by the appellant and he had filed L.P.A. before Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court has passed a cryptic order which is impugned in this appeal. It has adverted to the fact that there is no order passed by the learned Single Judge with regard to the payment of interest and the appellant has not raised any plea which was rejected by him, therefore, the Division Bench did not find fault with the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the appeal and the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed. The correctness of the order is under challenge in this appeal before this Court urging various legal grounds. 6. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31-10-2006 and the order of the learned Single Judge after adverting to the relevant facts and the legal position has given a direction to the employer-respondent to pay the erroneously withheld pensionary benefits and the gratuity amount to the legal representatives of the deceased employee without awarding interest for which the appellant is legally entitled, therefore, this Court has to exercise its appellate jurisdiction as there is a miscarriage of justice in denying the interest to be paid or payable by the employer from the date of the entitlement of the deceased employee till the date of payment as per the aforesaid legal principle laid down by this Court in the judgment referred to supra. We have to award interest at the rate of 9% per annum both on the amount of pension due and the gratuity amount which are to be paid by the respondent. 7. It is needless to mention that the respondents have erroneously withheld payment of gratuity amount for which the appellants herein are entitled in law for payment of penal amount on the delayed payment of gratuity under the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to do that in the case in hand. 8. For the reasons stated above, we award interest at the rate of 9% on the delayed payment of pension and gratuity amount from the date of entitlement till the date of the actual payment. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to do that in the case in hand. 8. For the reasons stated above, we award interest at the rate of 9% on the delayed payment of pension and gratuity amount from the date of entitlement till the date of the actual payment. If this amount is not paid within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the same shall carry interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date the amount falls due to the deceased employee. With the above directions, this appeal is allowed.” (x) In M.R. Kokan v. The Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, Health and Family Welfare Department & Ors. 2017 (2) WLR 392), a Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madras High Court, at Paras.13, 14, 18 and 19 held as follows: “13. Then the question with regard to contribution to be made for the period of five years was examined by the Office of the Accountant General. As per R.115(a) of the Fundamental Rules, while a Government servant is in foreign service, contribution towards the cost of his pension must be paid to consolidated fund on his behalf, while Clause (b) thereof sets out that if the foreign service is in India, contribution must be paid on account of the cost of the leave salary also and Clause (c) sets out that contributions due under Clause (a) and (b) above were required to be paid by the Government servant himself unless the foreign employer consents to pay the same. Rule 116 of the Fundamental Rules prescribes the rate of contributions payable on account of pension and leave salary and furnishes the data in a tabulated form. The data has worked out separate percentages for Group ‘A’, Group ‘B’, Group ‘C and Group ‘D’ Officers. For Group ‘A’ Officers, for a period of four to five years, 9% has been prescribed as the rate of contribution in R.116 of the Fundamental Rules. Therefore, in effect, the writ petitioner/appellant before us, could have calculated, on his own, the contributions payable by him for the period of five years, for the period he was absent from the service of the State, but he has not made any such contributions on his own. Therefore, in effect, the writ petitioner/appellant before us, could have calculated, on his own, the contributions payable by him for the period of five years, for the period he was absent from the service of the State, but he has not made any such contributions on his own. The contributions were admittedly paid by him, as was noticed by the learned Single Judge, only on 22-9-1998’ and that was the reason why the learned Single Judge ordered for payment of interest on delayed pension for the period beyond thereafter. 14. Though in principle, we are in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge, but however, we are left wondering as to why, for the delay that was caused in forwarding the pension papers by the Office of the Dean, Government Mohan Kumaramangalam Medical College, Salem, one should not be awarded compensatory costs in the matter. While it may be true that the orders passed by the State Government contained in their G.O.Ms.No.517, Finance (Pension) Department, dated 12-6-1987 talk of payment of interest on delayed payment of Gratuity only and consequently, does not cover the event of any delayed payment of pension, but none-the-less, some amount ought to have been awarded as compensatory cost for the delay in settling the provisional pension, to begin with till July, 2000......... 18. Payment of pension is no act of grace or bounty on the part of anyone. That is a right earned by the Government servant, in recognition of his past services. That is the reason why payment of pension to the Government servants has come to be recognized as a event of deferred payment for the quality of services rendered by such men. After all, the State Government promises certain services to its citizens and secures delivery of such services to the citizens by employing Government servants. Therefore, in recognition of such services rendered to the citizens, the State undertakes to pay monthly pension to such retired Government servants, also as a measure of social security. Any delay in settling such terminal benefits has to be viewed seriously. 19. The maximum period of six months is considered as a reasonable outer limit for sanction of pension and other terminal benefits. At any rate settling the pensionary benefits beyond a period of one year can never be appreciated and it must necessarily result in some kind of compensation. 19. The maximum period of six months is considered as a reasonable outer limit for sanction of pension and other terminal benefits. At any rate settling the pensionary benefits beyond a period of one year can never be appreciated and it must necessarily result in some kind of compensation. Since the State Government has taken a Policy decision to award interest on delayed settlement of Gratuity-which in fact is in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 7(3-A) of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1978-but at the same time, the State Government, as a Policy has not authorized any payment of interest on delayed pension. In the absence of any Policy decision on the part of the State Government, we are not denuded to come to the rescue of a hapless and helpless retired servant of the State. We can properly mould the relief and award compensatory cost which are capable of being recovered from the identified/identifiable persons responsible for the malady. The Government servants are accountable for both what they do and don’t do.” (xi) In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Dhirendra Pal Singh ( (2017) 1 SCC 49 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “9. In State of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, ( (1985) 1 SCC 429 = 1985 SCC (L & S) 278), this Court has held that pension and gratuity are no longer any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on the retirement but are valuable rights in their hands, and any culpable delay in disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest. In the said case the Court approved 6% p.a. interest on the amount of pension decreed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court. As to the rate of interest on amount of gratuity, in Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, it is provided that if the amount of gratuity payable is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may by notification specify. It further provides that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in payment is due to the fault of the employee, and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground. In the present case, there is no plea before us that the appellants had sought any permission in writing from the controlling authority. As to the delay on the part of the employee, it has come on the record that he made representations, whereafter he filed a suit in respect of withheld amount of gratuity and pension. In Y.K. Singla v. Punjab National Bank ( (2013) 3 SCC 472 = (2013) 1 SCC (L & S) 640), this Court, after discussing the issue relating to interest payable on the amount of gratuity not paid within time, directed that interest @ 8% p.a. shall be paid on the amount of gratuity.” 15. Contention that the order of the Lok Ayukta would be a precedent is liable to be rejected for the reason that decisions apposite to similar facts and law, should be made as precedent. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, we are of the considered view that the Lok Ayukta has not exceeded in exercising its jurisdiction. Interest as directed by the Lok Ayukta in the impugned order shall be paid within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Accordingly, Writ Petition is dismissed.