JUDGMENT : Rekha Borana, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 22.01.2019 passed by the Commercial Court, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Court below’) in Civil Misc. ‘A’ Case No.47/2018 (NCV No.31/2018) whereby the objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act of 1996’) preferred by the appellants against the award dated 30.07.2016 passed by learned Arbitrator have been rejected. Vide the award, the learned Arbitrator had proceeded on to pass an award for an amount of Rs.30,23,450/-in favour of the claimant-firm with interest @ 9% per annum till the date of award which, the non-claimant was directed to pay within 3 months failing which, further interest was awarded @ 9% per annum till the date of actual payment. The counter claim as preferred by the respondent State was rejected. 2. Before proceeding on merits of the present appeal, it is relevant to note that an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the present appeal and an application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC with a prayer for taking certain documents on record have been filed by the appellants. Replies to both the applications have been filed on behalf of the respondents. Vide order dated 01.04.2022, it was observed that both the applications would be considered at the time of admission/hearing of the appeal. 3. So far as the application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC is concerned, this Court does not find any ground to entertain the same for the following reasons : Firstly, the present is in effect an appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, assailing the order whereby the objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, as preferred by the appellant-State, had been rejected. As it is the settled position of law, the scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is very narrow and limited and that under Section 37 is far more narrower. When the scope of interference in the award as passed by the Arbitrator itself is limited to the extent of the grounds as provided under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the scope to permit amendment of the present appeal so as to add additional grounds qua the claims as raised by the claimant-contractor, cannot even be imagined of. When the scope of interference in the award as passed by the Arbitrator itself is limited to the extent of the grounds as provided under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the scope to permit amendment of the present appeal so as to add additional grounds qua the claims as raised by the claimant-contractor, cannot even be imagined of. Secondly, the new grounds as sought to be added in the present appeal vide the amendment application clearly pertain to the facts which were not pleaded during the arbitral proceedings. Further, all the grounds as sought to be raised now are totally factual in nature. The facts, in terms of law, are not only to be pleaded but even to be proved. Admittedly, the new facts/grounds sought to be added vide amendment application were not pleaded before the Arbitrator and hence were not proved on record. Therefore, the same cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. The application is therefore, rejected. 4. The application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC also cannot be entertained as the documents sought to be brought on record vide the said application are the ones which were although in possession of the Department during the arbitral proceedings, but were not placed on record at that point of time. It is not the case of the Department that these documents were not in their possession during the arbitral proceedings. The Department, having participated in and contested the complete arbitral proceedings and having even raised objections against the arbitral award before the Commercial Court, cannot, now at this stage, be permitted to place on record the documents which were never even a part of the arbitral proceedings. This Court, in its limited scope under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, cannot permit any such document to be taken on record in excess of jurisdiction. The application under Order 41 Rule 27, CPC is therefore, rejected. 5. Before proceeding on to the merits of the present appeal, having perused the judgment passed by the Commercial Court, it is relevant to take note of the fact that no reason worth the name has been indicated by the Commercial Court for not accepting the contentions raised by the appellants. 5. Before proceeding on to the merits of the present appeal, having perused the judgment passed by the Commercial Court, it is relevant to take note of the fact that no reason worth the name has been indicated by the Commercial Court for not accepting the contentions raised by the appellants. The judgments as relied upon by the Commercial Court while dealing with the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, no where prescribe that any order can be passed by the Court dealing with the objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 in a wholly cursory and slipshod manner without even dealing with any of the objections as raised by the objector. This Court is of the clear opinion that the manner in which the impugned judgment has been passed by the Commercial Court cannot be appreciated. 6. Coming to the merits of the present appeal, the facts of the case are as under: (A.) Agreement No.10 of 1995-96 was entered into between appellant no.1 and respondent firm for “Earth Work Excavation and Double Tile Lining of Sahwa Lift Canal from Km 54.750 – 56.200”. The stipulated date for commencement of work was 13.05.1995 and for completion of work was 12.02.1996. However, there was a delay and the actual date of completion of work was 20.08.2002 and the said delay gave rise to dispute between the parties. (B.) Claimant-firm invoked the arbitration clause of the contract and preferred an application under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996 before the High Court for appointment of arbitrator. For resolution of disputes as arisen, the sole arbitrator was appointed vide order dated 13.11.2013. (C.) The learned Arbitrator entered into reference and vide the Award dated 30.07.2016, proceeded on to allow six claims and reject two claims out of the eight claims raised by the claimant. The counter-claim as preferred by the appellants was rejected. (D.) Against Award dated 30.07.2016, the appellants preferred objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 which were dismissed vide order dated 22.01.2019 of the Commercial Court, Jodhpur against which the present appeal has been preferred. 7. The counter-claim as preferred by the appellants was rejected. (D.) Against Award dated 30.07.2016, the appellants preferred objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 which were dismissed vide order dated 22.01.2019 of the Commercial Court, Jodhpur against which the present appeal has been preferred. 7. A brief detail of the claims as raised and the amount as awarded, is reproduced herein: Claim No. Brief description of Claim Amount claimed Amount Awarded 1 Claim qua extra element for placement of excavated earth at distant place Rs.1,38,000/- Nil 2 Claim towards cartage of sand from ½ Km length Rs.33,38,240/- Rs.22,85,690/- 3 Claim towards hike in rates for execution of lining work in 600-meter length after 5/97 because department itself had increased the Basic Schedule of rates Rs.1,33,500 Rs.54,000 4 Claim on account of tiles consumed in 600-meter lining work done after 5/97 Rs.4,97,750 Nil 5 Claim for 82 MT coal which should have been given to claimant contractor in view of norms fixed by the Chief Engineer IGNP, Bikaner being old coal and found having less calorific value Rs.1,18,900 Rs.1,18,900 6 Claim for final bill amount duly passed and kept in deposit by non-claimant without any notice to claimant firm Rs. 2,88,272/- Rs. 2,88,272/- 7 Claim towards cartage of Bajri from distant source which was not available at site stipulated in agreement Rs. 12,900/- Rs. 7,334/- 8 Claim towards S.D. deductions made Rs. 2,69,254/- Rs. 2,69,254/- TOTAL Rs. 30,23,450/- 8. The sole ground raised by learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Pankaj Sharma appearing for the appellant State before this Court is that claim Nos.2 & 3 as awarded by learned Arbitrator are totally erroneous as while computing the amount of award qua the said claims, the learned Arbitrator applied BSR Rate approved by the department subsequently in the year 1997. Learned Arbitrator relied upon the BSR Rates of year 1997 whereby the rates were increased from 25% to 30% keeping in view the hike in basic rates. Learned AAG submitted that increased BSR Rates could not have been applied in the present matter as the agreement in question pertains to the year 1995-96 and the BSR Rates as applicable on the date of acceptance of the tender could only have been applied while computing the award qua the claims. The subsequent enhanced rates, if any, could not have been applied qua the agreement of year 1995-96. 9. The subsequent enhanced rates, if any, could not have been applied qua the agreement of year 1995-96. 9. Responding to the argument of learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that admittedly, there was a price escalation clause in the agreement being Clause No.45. The claimant contractor was very well entitled for the escalation amount due to hike in rates of labour. As the amount was not claimed by the contractor qua the price/labour escalation clause, it was very much entitled for the award amount keeping into consideration the enhanced BSR Rates. Learned counsel submitted that had the price escalation formula as provided under Clause 45 been applied, the award amount would have been far more than what has been awarded by learned Arbitrator applying the enhanced rates of BSR. Therefore, approach of learned Arbitrator was perfectly in consonance with law and the amount as awarded qua claim Nos.2 & 3 deserves to be affirmed. 10. In the alternate, learned counsel submitted that even if the ground as raised by learned counsel for the appellants is accepted, the award amount qua claim Nos.2 & 3 can only be modified to a certain extent but cannot be set aside as a whole. He submitted that the accepted rate for earth work excavation and cartage was Rs.29.97 per cum and calculating the amount for 62,000 cum excavation and cartage work, it would come to Rs.18,58,140/-whereas the claim as awarded by learned Arbitrator is for Rs.22,85,690/-. Therefore, the award amount qua claim No.2, even if to be modified, has to be affirmed for Rs.18,58,140/-. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 12. Admittedly, the agreement in question was entered into in the year 1995-96 (Agreement No.10 of 1995-96). The said agreement was executed after the bid/tender of the contractor being accepted on the rates as quoted by him. Meaning thereby, the work contract was granted to the contractor on the rates as specified in the agreement. If any contractor wishes to claim any amount qua increase in price of material/labour component, the same has to be raised in terms of Clause 45 of the agreement. Meaning thereby, the work contract was granted to the contractor on the rates as specified in the agreement. If any contractor wishes to claim any amount qua increase in price of material/labour component, the same has to be raised in terms of Clause 45 of the agreement. Once the claim qua price/labour escalation is raised, the entitlement for the same in terms of Conditions specified in Clause 45, has to be proved before the learned Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator, after reaching to a finding that the contractor is entitled to such escalation amount, would proceed on to award the same in favour of the contractor. Admittedly, in the present case, no claim for price/labour escalation in terms of Clause 45 of the agreement was raised before the learned Arbitrator. Once it is found that no claim qua the price escalation was raised, the learned Arbitrator could not have granted the same in the garb of the increased rates of BSR and that too, on the rates which came into effect only in the year 1997. 13. As it is the settled position of law, arbitration is an outcome of the agreement executed between the parties. The Arbitrator, who derives its authority from the contract, is bound by the terms of the same. The arbitral proceedings are governed by the conditions of the contract as entered into between the parties and the Arbitrator is also bound by the same. The Arbitrator cannot travel beyond the contract and scope of his jurisdiction is limited to the conditions of the contract which govern the parties. 14. In the matter of Steel Authority of India Limited vs. J.C. Budharaja ; (1999) 8 SCC 122 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under : "It was not open to the arbitrator to ignore the said conditions which are binding on the contracting parties. By ignoring the same, he has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon him. It is settled law that arbitrator derives the authority from the contract and if he acts in manifest disregard of the contract, the award given by him would be arbitrary one. This deliberate departure from the contract amounts not only to manifest disregard of the authority or misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to mala fide action." 15. It is settled law that arbitrator derives the authority from the contract and if he acts in manifest disregard of the contract, the award given by him would be arbitrary one. This deliberate departure from the contract amounts not only to manifest disregard of the authority or misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to mala fide action." 15. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Annapurna Construction; (2003) 8 SCC 154 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under : "22. There lies a clear distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, the role of the arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contracts. If he has travelled beyond the contract, he would be acting without jurisdiction, whereas if he has remained inside the parameter of the contract, his award cannot be questioned on the ground that it contains an error apparent on the face of the records." 16. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, as observed above, although there was a price escalation clause in the agreement, no claim qua the same was raised by the claimant. The claim, when not raised in terms of the contract, would be deemed to have been waived. There was no other term/clause available in the agreement which could entitle the claimant for payment at enhanced rates. Therefore, in absence of any term/clause in the agreement, there was no reason whatsoever available to the Arbitrator to award the claim qua work done at the escalated rates. Moreover, the rates as applied by the Arbitrator came into effect in the year 1997 and the said rates could definitely not have been applied qua the agreement executed in the year 1995-96. In the specific opinion of this Court, the award qua claim Nos.2 & 3 on enhanced BSR Rates by the Arbitrator was definitely beyond the terms of the contract and hence cannot be affirmed to that extent. The award in question qua claim Nos.2 & 3, hence, deserves to be modified as the same could have been awarded only at the accepted rates i.e. Rs.29.97 per cum. 17. In view of the above analysis, amount of Rs.22,85,690/-as awarded by the Arbitrator qua claim No.2 deserves to be modified to Rs.18,58,140/-. The award in question qua claim Nos.2 & 3, hence, deserves to be modified as the same could have been awarded only at the accepted rates i.e. Rs.29.97 per cum. 17. In view of the above analysis, amount of Rs.22,85,690/-as awarded by the Arbitrator qua claim No.2 deserves to be modified to Rs.18,58,140/-. So far as the award amount of Rs.54,000/- qua claim No.3 is concerned, the same is set aside and the award amount qua claim No.3 is quantified to be NIL. So far as the award qua other claims and award of interest is concerned, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the same and are hence affirmed. 18. No ground qua the rejection of the counter claim of the appellant State has been raised before this Court and hence, the award to that extent is hereby, affirmed. 19. As observed at the inception, the Commercial Court passed the order impugned dated 22.01.2019 without assigning any reason whatsoever. The agreement in question relates to the year 1995-96 and the arbitral proceedings pertain to the year 2013, hence this Court, instead of remanding the matter back to the Commercial Court, in the interest of justice, proceeded on to modify the award in question. 20. In view of above analysis, the present appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 22.01.2019 and award dated 30.07.2016 are hereby modified to the extent that the claimant-contractor would be entitled for an amount of Rs.18,58,140/-qua claim No.2 and an amount of NIL qua claim No.3. The award qua other claims and the interest amount is hereby affirmed. The award qua rejection of the counter claim of the appellant State is also affirmed. 21. The stay petition and the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.