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2023 DIGILAW 2076 (BOM)

Ashok T. Gemnani v. Prashant Murlidhar Rathi

2023-10-26

ANIL LAXMAN PANSARE

body2023
JUDGMENT/ORDER 1. Heard. Admit. By consent of the learned Counsel for both the sides, the matters are taken up for final hearing at the admission stage. 2. Since the facts in all Revisions are similar, these Revisions are decided by common Judgment. For convenience, the learned Counsels chose to refer to the facts of Civil Revision Application No. 3/2022. 3. The Applicants herein are the tenants of the Non-applicants/ landlords. The parties will be hereinafter referred to as tenants and landlords respectively. The landlords have filed suit for possession under Sec. 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1999'). The case of the landlords is that, the tenants are occupying suit shops since prior to 2000. Their relationship as landlord and tenant is governed by the provisions of the Act of 1999 with effect from 1/4/2000. The tenants are liable to pay rent and permitted increase at the rate of 4% per annum on rent of 250/- per month for the period from 1/4/2000 till 31/12/2020 along? with interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the arrears of rent which includes the permitted increase in terms of Sec. 7(14) read with Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999. 4. The tenants have filed application (Exhibit-9) for dismissal of suit on the ground that the suit cannot lie against them. The learned Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati vide order dtd. 17/12/2021 has rejected the application mainly on the ground that landlords had issued notice to the tenants demanding payment of rent and permitted increase and that the tenants have to meet the demand within 90 days of the receipt of notice in terms of Sec. 15(2) of the Act of 1999 and further that the tenants failed to pay the arrears of rent/permitted increase for the period from 1/4/2000 till 31/8/2020, despite receiving the notice. 5. Being aggrieved by the rejection of application (Exhibit-9), the tenants have approached this Court under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (In short, 'the Code'). 6. During the course of argument, the question arose whether the application filed by the tenants is an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code or is application simplicitor for dismissal of suit. 7. Mr. 6. During the course of argument, the question arose whether the application filed by the tenants is an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code or is application simplicitor for dismissal of suit. 7. Mr. R. M. Bhangde, learned Counsel for the tenants submits that though the application is titled "Application for dismissal of suit", the averments made therein coupled with the prayer would show that the plea put-forth by the tenants is that the suit is barred by law, and therefore, is not maintainable in terms of Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. He submits that it is well settled that the title of the application and further the absence of provisions, viz - Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code in the application, by itself will not change the substance of the application. It is the substance and not the form which has to be seen. 8. Mr. J. J. Chandurkar, learned Counsel for the landlords submits that though the nomenclature of an application may not be material and the substance is to be seen, but then the parties are duty-bound to refer to the appropriate provision and further to disclose the purpose of filing the application. In that sense, if one reads the application filed by the tenants, the purpose of filing application is dismissal of suit and not the rejection of plaint. 9. Mr. Chandurkar, has placed reliance upon the case of Jeet Mohinder Singh V/s Harminder Singh and Another, (2004) 6 Supreme Court Cases 26. wherein the Supreme Court held in paragraph Nos. 6 to 8 as under : "6. Though the nomenclature of an application is really not material and the substance is to be seen, yet it cannot be said that a party shall be permitted to indicate any provision and thereafter contend that the nomenclature should be ignored. Duty is cast on the parties to properly frame their applications and indicate the provisions of law applicable for making the application. Nomenclature may not be normally material. But there is a purpose in indicating the nomenclature in a clear and precise manner. Though it is the substance and not the form which is material but as indicated above, that cannot be a reason to quote an inappropriate provision of law and then say : "Don't look at the nomenclature". Nomenclature may not be normally material. But there is a purpose in indicating the nomenclature in a clear and precise manner. Though it is the substance and not the form which is material but as indicated above, that cannot be a reason to quote an inappropriate provision of law and then say : "Don't look at the nomenclature". The care and caution which is required to be taken cannot be diluted to absurd limits. The care and caution required to be observed while making an application in the highest court of the State are sadly missing in this case. Order 18 Rule 17 deals with recall and examination of a witness and reads as follows : "17. The court may at any stage of a suit recall any witness who has been examined and may (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) put such questions to him as the court thinks fit." 7. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham it was observed that it is not open to a court to compel a party to make a particular kind of pleading or to amend his pleading so also it is beyond its competence to virtually oblige a party to examine any particular witness. 8. In view of the accepted position that the application was not filed with care and caution and did not indicate the relevant provisions of law correctly, we think it would be proper to permit the appellant, if he so chooses, to file a fresh application in terms of order 18 Rule 17 of the Code and if any such application is filed, the same shall be considered on its own merits in accordance with law uninfluenced by the rejection of the application which was styled as one under Order 16 Rule 3 of the Code. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated with no order as to costs." 10. In the aforesaid case, the application filed was purported to be in terms of Order 16 Rule 3 of the Code, the prayer, however, was to recall PW- 31. The application was rejected by the trial court. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated with no order as to costs." 10. In the aforesaid case, the application filed was purported to be in terms of Order 16 Rule 3 of the Code, the prayer, however, was to recall PW- 31. The application was rejected by the trial court. The argument made was that though the application was styled as one "Under Order 16 Rule 3 of the Code", but in the essence it was under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code, and therefore, the prayer should have been accepted. In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court has made above observations. 11. Taking aid of the said rulings, Mr. Chandurkar, learned Counsel for the landlords submits that there is a difference between 'dismissal of suit' and 'rejection of plaint'. He submits that when an application is filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, only the contents of plaint has to be seen and not anything else including the written statement. As against, for dismissal of the suit or maintainability of the suit, the courts are entitled and liable to look into the entire documents including those furnished by the defendant. 12. Mr. Chandurkar, has then invited my attention to the application filed by the tenants. He submits that not only the nomenclature of the application is 'dismissal of suit', but the averments made in the application refers to the defence taken by the tenants. In paragraph No.10 of the application averments have been made that the defendant/tenant has already filed all the documents on record to show that he is not in arrears of rent, increase in the rent and GST. The tenants while concluding the application have pleaded that suit cannot lie under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, and therefore, is liable to be dismissed. These averments, according to Mr. Chandurkar, travel beyond the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 13. Mr. Chandurkar has, in support, taken aid of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Central Provident Fund Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. V/s Lala J. R. Education Society and Ors., (2016) 14 Supreme Court Cases 679. wherein the Apex Court has clarified the distinction between the application seeking rejection of plaint and dismissal of suit. Mr. Chandurkar has, in support, taken aid of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Central Provident Fund Commissioner, New Delhi and Ors. V/s Lala J. R. Education Society and Ors., (2016) 14 Supreme Court Cases 679. wherein the Apex Court has clarified the distinction between the application seeking rejection of plaint and dismissal of suit. The Supreme Court has held that the rejection of a plaint on institutional grounds is different from dismissal of suit at pre-trial stage on the ground of maintainability. For dismissal on a preliminary issue, the Court is entitled and liable to look into the entire documents including those furnished by the defendant. As regards application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the civil court can only see the pleadings in the plaint and not anything else including written statement. 14. Thus, the focus of the parties is to convince this Court that the application (Exhibit-9) is or is not filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. According to tenants, in essence the application is for rejection of the plaint. As against, according to the landlords, the application is for dismissal of suit. 15. I have gone through the application. As argued by Mr. Chandurkar, it appears that, not only the nomenclature of the application, but also in substance it is for dismissal of suit. The tenants have taken aid of their defence for seeking dismissal of suit. In that sense, the application may not be treated as one filed under Order 7 Rule 11. As argued by Mr. Chandurkar, it appears that, not only the nomenclature of the application, but also in substance it is for dismissal of suit. The tenants have taken aid of their defence for seeking dismissal of suit. In that sense, the application may not be treated as one filed under Order 7 Rule 11. The question, however, remains whether the plaint ought to have been rejected in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, which reads thus : "Order VII - Plaint - Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases : - (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to so correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; [(e) where it is not filed in duplicate; [(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:] [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.] 16. The use of the word "shall" under Rule 11 of Order 7, to my mind, leaves the court with no other alternative but to reject the plaint, once it is brought to the notice of the court that the plaint is hit by either of the clauses (a) to (f) mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. The use of the word "shall" under Rule 11 of Order 7, to my mind, leaves the court with no other alternative but to reject the plaint, once it is brought to the notice of the court that the plaint is hit by either of the clauses (a) to (f) mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. Upon reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that a duty is cast upon the court to reject the plaint in the cases covered in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. 17. In the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. V/s Assistant Charity Commissioner and Ors., 2004(3) SCC 137 . the Supreme Court has held that Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent remedy made available to the Defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. It was held that the word, "shall" is used to clearly imply that the duty is cast on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the Defendant. 18. In the case of Saleem Bhai and Ors. V/s State of Maharashtra and Ors, 2003(1) SCC 557 . the Supreme Court held that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the Defendant or before conclusion of the trial. 19. In the case of Dahiben V/s Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) THR L.Rs. and Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 366 . the Supreme Court while reiterating the principles of Order 7 Rule 11 has inter alia held that while deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. the Supreme Court while reiterating the principles of Order 7 Rule 11 has inter alia held that while deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. The Supreme Court has further held that while considering the application, the duty is cast upon the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 20. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the code may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, even before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant and the plaint may be rejected even without intervention of the defendant. The Supreme Court has further held that while deciding the application the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. Thus, the plea taken in the application seeking rejection of the plaint cannot be taken into consideration. The Supreme Court has further held that while determining whether the plaint discloses a cause of action the court shall consider the averments made in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon by the Plaintiff. 21. In addition and to further understand the significance of filing application under Order 7 Rule 11 or it's format/contents, I may refer to the relevant provisions of Civil Manual. 22. Chapter II of the Civil Manual deals with Institution of Suits. It provides for the procedure for presentation of the plaint, its examination and registration etc. Clause-7 provides that, a plaint, along with a copy thereof may be presented at any time during the Court hours to the Clerk of the Court or to such Officer as the Court appoints in this behalf under Order 4 Rule 1 of the Code or in the absence of such Officer, to the Judge himself. 22.1. Clause-7 provides that, a plaint, along with a copy thereof may be presented at any time during the Court hours to the Clerk of the Court or to such Officer as the Court appoints in this behalf under Order 4 Rule 1 of the Code or in the absence of such Officer, to the Judge himself. 22.1. Clause-8 provides for examination of the plaint in order to determine whether it should be - (a) admitted; or (b) rejected under Order 7, Rule 11; or (c) returned for presentation to the proper Court under Order 7, Rule 10; and so on. 22.2. Clause-9 provides that while examining the plaint, it is also necessary to verify compliance of Order 7, Rule 9, viz - verify the list of documents produced along with the plaint; and ascertain the correctness of the concise statements, if any, etc. 22.3. Clause - 10 provides that if the Officer examining the plaint finds that it complies with all the requirements and is correct in all respects, he shall make the endorsement on the plaint - "Examined and ordered to be registered" with date and his signature. It further provides that if he thinks that the plaint should be returned for amendment or for presentation to the proper Court, or be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, he should refer the matter to the Judge for order. 23. The subsequent clauses provide for further procedure. However, the conjoint reading of clauses 7 to 10 makes it explicitly clear that the court and its Officers are duty-bound to examine the plaint and if it is noticed that the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, the Court shall reject the plaint. The question of filing application does not arise at all, because at this stage the notice to the Defendant is not even issued. 24. The experience, however, shows that because of inability of the Clerk to notice the defect or because of clever drafting, the Court staff is unable to notice the infirmities, and thus, the plaint is not placed before the Court for its rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The Defendant after appearance then may, by filing application, bring it to the notice of the Court that the suit is barred by law. The Defendant after appearance then may, by filing application, bring it to the notice of the Court that the suit is barred by law. Upon which, the Court will examine the averments made in the plaint to satisfy itself whether it is indeed barred by law, and if found so, will have to reject the same. This being the procedure followed in terms of the provisions of the Code and the Civil Manual, the defect in the application, if any, filed by the Defendant in this regard will hardly be of any significance to ignore the infirmities brought to the notice of the Court by the Defendant which otherwise would bound the Court to go through the averments made in the plaint and examine whether it is hit by Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, considering the pronouncements of the Apex Court that a duty is cast on the Court to perform its obligations to reject the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the Defendant. 25. I am conscious of the fact that the provisions made in the Civil Manual are not statutory Rules but are instructions for the guidance of the Civil Courts and Officers subordinate to it. However, the High Court has published it to ensure uniformity in the Rules and practice in all Courts, and accordingly, the trial courts are observing these provisions in letter and spirit, even the High Court has recognised its importance. 26. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dagu Gangadhar Dongre V/s Gopinath Mahadu Thore through L.Rs. in Writ Petition No. 9882 of 2018 decided on 28/08/2018, while answering the issue as to whether in every case while granting amendment the concerned party has to necessarily file a fresh typed copy of the amended plaint/written statement/darkhast/counter claim etc., the Court considered provisions under Order 6 Rule 17 and 18 of the Code as also Chapter V of the Civil Manual of 1986. The Court held that while permitting amendment, the trial court may direct the party to carry out amendment and to file freshly typed copy embodying the amendment by saying that this approach would be in tune with Rule 79 of the Civil Manual which casts a duty on the Court to ensure that amendment is carried. The Court held that while permitting amendment, the trial court may direct the party to carry out amendment and to file freshly typed copy embodying the amendment by saying that this approach would be in tune with Rule 79 of the Civil Manual which casts a duty on the Court to ensure that amendment is carried. The Court proceeded to issue directions to all the courts, to which the Civil Procedure Code and the Civil Manual are applicable, to follow this procedure. 27. In the case of A-1 Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and Another V/s M/s. R. Jaikishan and Co. and Others,, 2005(1) Mh.L.J. 118 . the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court made a reference to the notification issued by the High Court on 11/12/2003, viz - the High Court in exercise of the powers under Articles 227 and 239 of the Constitution of India by which the provisions of Civil Manual, mutates mutandis were made applicable to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Courts. The Court held that the provisions of Civil Manual would certainly benefit to the Co-operative Courts while dealing with the dispute under Sec. 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Act, 1960. 28. Considering the authorities cited above coupled with the provisions of Civil Manual on the issue involved, the controversy whether the application (Exhibit-9) is/was an application under Order 7 Rule 11, will be immaterial. As stated above the Supreme Court has held that while deciding the application, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration and the plaint may be rejected even without intervention of the defendant. The provisions of Chapter 2 of Civil Manual support the theory of deciding the application without intervention of the defendant. In that sense the defects in the application filed by the defendant will not be fatal and can be ignored. Even otherwise, the court below has not rejected the application on the ground that the application has been not filed under Order 7 Rule 11. The court has rejected it on the ground that the landlords have complied with the provisions under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, and thus, the suit is maintainable. 29. Even otherwise, the court below has not rejected the application on the ground that the application has been not filed under Order 7 Rule 11. The court has rejected it on the ground that the landlords have complied with the provisions under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, and thus, the suit is maintainable. 29. Consequently, and to answer the question involved in the present case, whether the suit is barred by law, one will have to go through the averments made in the plaint as also the documents annexed therewith. 30. The suit is filed for seeking possession on the ground of arrears of rent including permitted increased. The cause of action for filing suit, as averred in paragraph No.8 read with paragraph No.6 of the plaint is that despite receiving the notice dtd. 26/8/2020, the tenants have within 90 days of its service not paid the permitted increase of the rent for the period from 1/4/2000 till 31/8/2020. The landlords have termed this payment of permitted increase for the aforesaid period as arrears of rent and accordingly valued the suit. The landlords have averred that the tenants have also not paid rent along with permitted increase for the period from 1/9/2020 till 31/12/2020. Thus, there are two parts in the claim, the first relates to permitted increase in the rent for the period from 1/4/2000 till 31/8/2020 and second relates to the rent with permitted increase in the rent for the period from 1/9/2020 till 31/12/2020. 31. As regards the first part, the landlords have issued notice dtd. 26/8/2020 under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 calling upon the tenants to pay permitted increase in the rent for the period from 1/4/2000 to 31/8/2020. As could be seen, the landlords have sought payment of permitted increase of rent and not the regular rent. In other words, and considering the averments made in the plaint, there appears no dispute that the tenants have regularly paid the rent for the period from 1/4/2000 to 31/8/2020. 32. In context with above, Mr. Bhangde, learned Counsel for the tenants has taken me through the relevant provisions of Act of 1999 to contend that since the landlords have, for the first time, demanded the permitted increase in the rent vide notice dtd. 32. In context with above, Mr. Bhangde, learned Counsel for the tenants has taken me through the relevant provisions of Act of 1999 to contend that since the landlords have, for the first time, demanded the permitted increase in the rent vide notice dtd. 26/8/2020, they cannot and thus are precluded from demanding the permitted increase in the rent for the period prior to the month of August-2020. 33. The learned Counsel has invited my attention to Sec. 7(8) of the Act of 1999, which defines, "permitted increase" to mean an increase in rent permitted under the provisions of this Act. He has then invited my attention to Sec. 11, which provides for the permitted increase. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 provides that after the commencement of this Act a landlord shall be entitled to an increase of 4 percent per annum in the rent of the premises let for any of the purposes, referred to in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 2. 34. According to Mr. Bhangde, what is provided is that the landlord shall be entitled to make an increase of 4% per annum. He submits that merely because the landlord is entitled to make an increase of 4% per annum, that by itself will not automatically increase the rent by 4% per annum. According to him, the landlord may or may not choose to increase the rent in terms of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999. In the present case, admittedly the landlords have not made demand of increase of 4% per annum in the rent till 26/8/2020, and therefore, they cannot blame the tenants for not paying the aforesaid increase in the rent for the period prior to the date of issuance of the notice. 35. Mr. Bhangde, has referred to the Judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of New Laxmi Cycle Company, Akola V/s Jagdishchandra Amrutlal Vakharia, 2009(6) Mh.L.J. 906 . While dealing with Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999, this Court has held in paragraph No.19 as under : "19. Sec. 11 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act entitles landlord to increase rent by 4% per annum after its commencement. It is, therefore, apparent that said increase by 4% is not automatic, but at the discretion of landlord. While dealing with Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999, this Court has held in paragraph No.19 as under : "19. Sec. 11 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act entitles landlord to increase rent by 4% per annum after its commencement. It is, therefore, apparent that said increase by 4% is not automatic, but at the discretion of landlord. If particular landlord does not want to increase rent by 4%, law does not compel him to increase it. In other words, tenant is not voluntarily required to pay 4% more. The respondent- landlord has not pointed out that before issuing notice at Exh.29, he had after 1/4/2000 increased rent by 4%. It is to be noticed that said increase would then apply even for rent payable for period from Diwali 2000 to Diwali 2001. Such an increase or arrears on that account are not pointed out or pleaded by the respondent. In view of this position, it is apparent that effort to justify such 4% increase granted by lower Appellate Court as a part of standard rent or as a part of permissible increase must fail." 36. In the said case, the landlord therein had filed a suit for possession and recovery of arrears of rent. The trial court decreed the suit only on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. The first appellate court has, however, held that the tenant was in arrears of rent including permitted increase as also interest thereon. The first appellate court has further held that bona fide need was not established by the landlord. The decree of eviction was, however, granted on the ground of arrears of rent for the year 2001-2002 and also for causing nuisance. The landlord had issued notice on 11/8/2001 to the tenant seeking advance yearly rent as also rent for Adhik Mass and municipal taxes. One of the contentions raised by the tenant was that notice dtd. 11/8/2001 does not satisfy the requirement under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. It was pointed out to the Court that the first appellate court has granted eviction on the ground of arrears for non-payment of rent for the period from Diwali-2001 to Diwali-2002. It was argued that on 11/8/2001, which is prior to Diwali, the rent had not fallen due, and hence no notice could have been issued under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. It was argued that on 11/8/2001, which is prior to Diwali, the rent had not fallen due, and hence no notice could have been issued under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. The Court while allowing the Writ Petition has found that the notice therein cannot be interpreted to include demand for permissible increase of rent, and further that, even if it is presumed such demand would not have been sustainable. In doing so, the observations were so made in paragraph No.19 of the Judgment. Accordingly, it is argued that the permitted increase in the rent is not automatic, but is subject to demand. 37. Mr. Chandurkar, has opposed the submissions made by the tenants. He submits that the entire scheme of the Act of 1999 will have to be considered while deciding the issue. According to him, what is required under Sec. 15, is issuance of notice of the demand of the permitted increase to the tenant in writing. Once this notice is issued in terms of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, the tenant is duty-bound to pay the permitted increase or to show his readiness and willingness to pay the said increase within 90 days of the date of receipt of the notice, as provided under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15. He submits that there is no provision under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 to issue more than one notice. He then submits that the tenants have admittedly not paid the permitted increase demanded by the landlords nor have they shown readiness and willingness to pay the same, and therefore, the landlords are left with no other alternative but to file suit under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. 38. Mr. Chandurkar, has invited my attention to the sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 as well, which provides that the tenant may pay the arrears of rent and permitted increase within ninety days from the date of service of summons of the suit to escape the decree of eviction, which the tenants here have not paid or deposited in the court, and therefore, suit is maintainable. 39. Mr. Chandurkar, has relied upon the Judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Babulal Fakirchand Agrawal V/s Suresh Kedarnath Malpani and others, 2017(4) Mh.L.J.406. 39. Mr. Chandurkar, has relied upon the Judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Babulal Fakirchand Agrawal V/s Suresh Kedarnath Malpani and others, 2017(4) Mh.L.J.406. wherein the entire scheme of Act of 1999 has been considered. The following question fell for consideration of the Full Bench: "If the tenant complies the notice issued by the landlord demanding arrears of rent and pays the entire amount as demanded within the time stipulated under Sec. 15(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, then whether the landlord can still file a suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and whether the eviction can be ordered by invoking provisions of Sec. 15(3) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act ?" The Full Bench has, before dealing with Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, considered the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which are pari materia the provisions of the Act of 1999, as also the Judgment passed thereon, and further considered the preamble of the Act of 1999 and held in paragraph Nos. 17, 20 and 21 as under : "17. On consideration of provisions of Sec. 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act which provide for relief against forfeiture to the tenant, it is clear that the tenant has been extended protection from eviction so long as he performs his obligation in respect of payment of rent as well as observance and performance of other conditions of the tenancy. The provisions, thus, protect the tenant who is paying rent or has established his readiness and willingness to pay. Further protection is also provided in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 15 if the tenant pays entire arrears of rent on receipt of notice within contemplation of sub- Sec. (2) of Sec. 15 before the period prescribed under sub- Sec. (2) together with interest and cost as may be ordered by the Court and continues to pay rent and the permitted increases regularly until the decision in the suit. If the tenant does not pay rent regularly and offers to pay only after issuance of notice within contemplation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 and does not observe the other terms and conditions which include regular payment of rent, the landlord is not disabled from proceeding against such tenant. If the tenant does not pay rent regularly and offers to pay only after issuance of notice within contemplation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 and does not observe the other terms and conditions which include regular payment of rent, the landlord is not disabled from proceeding against such tenant. In nutshell, to derive that if tenant offers or pays the amount recorded in the notice issued in pursuance to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15, together with permitted increases, the landlord is disabled from proceeding against the tenant is not within contemplation of Sec. 15 of the Act. The right to seek remedy and claim possession of the premises owned by the landlord is inherent in him however, initiation of such proceedings is subject to fulfillment of certain preconditions such as issuance of notice in accordance with Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as provided under Sec. 15(2). It is, thus, clear that the tenant who disobeys the provisions of Sec. 15(1) can be evicted independently though such tenant may not necessarily pay any arrears of rent on the date of institution of the suit. Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 15 shall have to be construed independently and if the tenant does not observe the mandate of sub-sec. (3) in respect of payment of amount of rent and permitted increases regularly till disposal of the proceedings before the Court, is also liable to be evicted. 20. On the analysis of the provisions of Sec. 15 as well as various judgments, it must be concluded that the provisions of sub-sec. s (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 15 shall be read independently. In order to claim relief against forfeiture, the tenant must satisfy all the conditions in respect of payment of rent or tender in Court all the arrears then due on the first day of hearing of the suit or within contemplation of provisions of law and to deposit the rental liability regularly in the Court till the suit is finally decided and there is no extinction of the cause of action by reason of payment of existing arrears by the tenant. It is, thus, clear that in order to avoid decree, once the notice is issued within contemplation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act by the landlord, the tenant shall have to fulfill the conditions laid down under sub-sec. It is, thus, clear that in order to avoid decree, once the notice is issued within contemplation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act by the landlord, the tenant shall have to fulfill the conditions laid down under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 15 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and there is no escape therefrom. 21. It would be inappropriate to infer something which is not specifically recorded in the provision and to read the restrictions on the entitlement of the landlord to present proceeding for eviction of a tenant on payment of the amount of rent or permitted increases, if any, as demanded by the landlord under a notice within contemplation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15, without considering the impact of sub- Sec. (3) of Sec. 15. It would amount to adding to the provisions in place and making violation and thereby putting unnecessary restrictions on the right of the landlord. The principle that the Statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same Sec. . The Sec. must be construed as a whole whether or not one part is a saving clause. Similarly, "elementary rule of construction of Sec. is to be made of all the parts together" and that "it is not permissible to omit any part of it; the whole Sec. must be read together". The words of Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense and phrases and sentences are constructed according to their grammatical meaning unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in special sense different from their ordinary grammatical meaning." 40. The emphasis of Mr. Chandurkar is that once the suit is filed under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, the tenant has to comply the provisions under sub-sec. s (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 15. The emphasis of Mr. Chandurkar is that once the suit is filed under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999, the tenant has to comply the provisions under sub-sec. s (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 15. Mere showing willingness to pay rent is not sufficient, the tenants will have to pay or tender in the court not only the arrears of rent due on the first day of hearing of suit, but also to continue payment of rent and permissible increase during the pendency of suit, and therefore, there is no question of extinguishing cause of action by reason of payment of existing arrears by the tenants. Accordingly, it is argued that the cause of action will continue against the tenants, and therefore, the suit will be maintainable. 41. Mr. Chandurkar has then relied upon the Judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Fehameeda Begum w/o Mahamood Khan Pathan V/s Abdul Hafiz s/o Sheikh Anwar, 2013(2) Mh.L.J. 524 . to contend that the notice issued by the landlord under Sec. 15(2) of the Act of 1999 cannot be said to be bad in law, even if the higher rent or inadmissible rent is demanded, because it would be open to the tenant to pay or deposit the arrears of rent and to challenge the rest of the part of the notice. This Court while dealing with the challenge to the notice under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 has found that the landlady claimed arrears of rent higher than the admitted rent. The tenant, however, did not pay the admitted rent, as well, but challenged the notice on the count that it is bad in law. This Court by referring to the various Judgments has held that the tenant had not deposited the admitted arrears of rent at the agreed rate within ninety days from the receipt of the suit summons of the trial court and the trial court has, thus, rightly held that the landlady was entitled to possession under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. The Court held that it was open for the tenant to deposit the admitted arrears of rent while challenging the notice issued by the landlady and that the notice itself cannot be said to be bad in law. 42. Mr. The Court held that it was open for the tenant to deposit the admitted arrears of rent while challenging the notice issued by the landlady and that the notice itself cannot be said to be bad in law. 42. Mr. Chandurkar, has then referred to the Judgment in the case of Chase Bright Steel Limited V/s Shantaram Shankar Sawant and Another, (1994) 4 Supreme Court Cases 89. In the said case notice by landlord came to be issued on 27/7/1977 stating therein that the tenant is in arrears of rent from February-1976 and was called upon to pay entire arrears of rent on receipt of notice. The tenant failed to pay the arrears. The Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case held that the permitted increase were claimed for the period between February- 1976 till filing of suit in 1979. The tenant continued to deposit the amount of rent and claimed protection. The Court held that the arrears of rent would include permissible increase and merely because rent has been deposited pending suit, the protection as envisaged under the provisions of the Act of 1999 will not be attracted. 43. The next Judgment that has been relied upon has been passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ujwalabai @ Meena Shantaram Apte since married now Mrs. Swati Rahul Datay and others V/s Namdeo Dnyanoba Shingare, 2001(4) Mh.L.J. 545 . In the said case, the landlord demanded arrears of permitted increase for more than six months i.e. for the period from April-1976 to December-1976 and further for the period from January-1977 to March-1977 vide notice dtd. 1/3/1977. Accordingly, Mr. Chandurkar has argued that the permissible increase for the period previous to the issuance of notice can well be demanded. He would contend that once notice under Sec. 15(2) of the Act of 1999 is issued, the tenant is duty- bound to pay the arrears of rent, which includes permitted increase, within ninety days from the date of receipt of notice, failing which, the suit for eviction of the tenant is maintainable. 44. Mr. Chandurkar, has then relied upon the Judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chandiram Dariyanumal Ahuja V/s Akola Zilla Ashram Wahtuk Sahakari Sanstha, Akola1, 2013(1) Mh.L.J. 28 . 44. Mr. Chandurkar, has then relied upon the Judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chandiram Dariyanumal Ahuja V/s Akola Zilla Ashram Wahtuk Sahakari Sanstha, Akola1, 2013(1) Mh.L.J. 28 . wherein it is held that if the tenant wants to enjoy protection under Sec. 15(1) of the Act, he has to prove that he has been paying rent voluntarily and not when coerced. The Court further held that the tenant who disobeys provisions of Sec. 15(1) can be evicted independently though such tenant may not necessarily be in arrears of rent on the date of institution of the suit. 45. As regards the Judgment cited by the Applicant in the case of New Laxmi Cycle Company (cited supra), Mr. Chandurkar, learned Counsel for the Non-applicants would distinguish the same by submitting that the observations made by this Court in paragraph No.19 is not the ratio decidendi. The question before the Court was whether the tenant could be said to be in arrears of rent in August-2001, when the suit was decreed for arrears of rent for the period from Diwali-2001 to Diwali-2002. The Court held that the rent that will be due in future cannot be termed as arrears of rent in the notice issued prior thereto. In other words, the Court has held that in the notice demanding arrears of rent, the rent must be due on the date when notice has been issued. Accordingly, he argued that the observations made in paragraph 19 cannot be taken aid of to dislodge the plaint herein. 46. In support of above argument, Mr. Chandurkar, has relied upon the case of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Others V/s MD. Illiyas, (2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases 275. as also in the case of Bihar School Examination Board V/s Suresh Prasad Sinha, (2009) 8 Supreme Court Cases 483. wherein the Supreme Court held that words in judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament and further every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved. The Court also held that while applying precedent, the courts should guard against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made. 47. The Court also held that while applying precedent, the courts should guard against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made. 47. Having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by both the sides and having gone through the Judgments cited, I am of the considered view that the plaint under question is barred by the provisions under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The question, in the present case, is whether on the date of issuance of notice i.e. on 26/8/2020 the tenants were in arrears of permitted increase at the rate of 4% per annum of the rent of 250/- per month. The answer would be certainly in the negative for the? following reasons. 48. The averments made in the plaint, if read with the documents annexed with it, would show that the landlords have issued aforesaid notice stating therein that the tenants are liable to pay the rent and permitted increase at the rate of 4% on the rent of 250/- per month for the period of? 1/4/2000 to 31/8/2020 along with interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the arrears of rent including permitted increase. It is then averred that the tenants have not paid permitted increase of the rent for a period from 1/4/2000 till 31/8/2020. The tenants have been called upon to pay the arrears of permitted increase within ninety days from the date of receipt of the notice. The notice is admittedly received by the tenants on or about 1/9/2020. 49. In reply to the notice of landlords, the tenants have categorically mentioned that they (landlords) have never demanded the increase at the rate of 4% per annum in the rent prior to issuing notice. The tenants have also mentioned that they have paid rent of August-2020 as well. The tenants have then stated that they are liable to pay 4% increased rent only from August- 2020, and accordingly, the tenants have assured that they will pay and are willing to pay the rent regularly. In fact, the tenants have sent a cheque towards monthly rent of August and September to the landlords, which includes permitted increase. 50. The notice dtd. 26/8/2020 issued by the landlords and the reply dtd. In fact, the tenants have sent a cheque towards monthly rent of August and September to the landlords, which includes permitted increase. 50. The notice dtd. 26/8/2020 issued by the landlords and the reply dtd. 21/9/2020 to the said notice being the documents annexed with the plaint, can well be considered to ascertain whether the plaint is hit by Rule 11 of Order 7. 51. As stated, the plaint and the notices exchanged between the parties would clearly establish that the tenants have paid monthly rent regularly upto August-2020. It is not the case of the landlords that prior to 26/8/2020, they have ever demanded the permitted increase in the rent. In that sense, it is an admitted fact that till August-2020 the tenants have paid regular rent at the rate of 250/- per month.? 52. Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999 provides that landlord shall be entitled to make an increase at the rate of 4% per annum in the rent of the premises let to the tenant. This entitlement will always be subject to demand by the landlord. There is a difference between entitlement of landlord to increase the rent and the decision of landlord to increase the rent. Sec. 11 of the Act of 1999 does not provide for the statutory increase in the rent, which then can be said to be an automatic increase in the rent and which then will not require landlord to demand the increase in the rent. 53. In the present case, it is neither the case of the landlords that such increase is automatic nor does Sec. 11 support such theory. The increase in the rent will be, thus, at the discretion of the landlord. The landlord may choose, depending on the relationship or otherwise with the tenant, to increase the rent or let go the said increase. What is important is that landlord must convey, to the tenant, his intention to seek increase in the rent. He may make such demand either orally or in writing which he will have to prove, if such demand is disputed by the tenants. Unless such demand is made and since there is no automatic increase in the rent, the landlord will not be permitted to raise retrospective demand. He cannot, therefore, blame tenants for non-payment of permissible increase in the rent for the months previous to the date of making such demand. Unless such demand is made and since there is no automatic increase in the rent, the landlord will not be permitted to raise retrospective demand. He cannot, therefore, blame tenants for non-payment of permissible increase in the rent for the months previous to the date of making such demand. 54. I may deal here with the contentions of Mr. Chandurkar that under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 only one notice can be issued and it does not provide for issuance of second notice. The submission is correct, but the learned Counsel has mixed demand and notice together. What is required under the provisions of the Act is to demand permitted increase in rent first and if the demand is not fulfilled, to issue notice under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999. There arises no question of issuing two notices. The argument, therefore, is unacceptable. 55. In the present case, the landlords, by notice dtd. 26/8/2020, alleged that the tenants are in arrears of permitted rent for the period from April-2000 till August-2020. In absence of demand in April-2000, it will not lie in the mouth of the landlords to say that the tenants have not paid permissible increase for the month of April-2000 and similarly for subsequent months, till August-2020. This notice, therefore, will have to be declared bad in law for the simple reason that the law does not permit to seek increase in rent without demand. In absence of statutory increase in rent, logically 'demand will follow increase' and not otherwise. The notice dtd. 26/8/2020 is, therefore, bad in law. 56. There is another reason why the permitted increase in the rent cannot be said to be automatic. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 provides that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increase, if any. The useof the words 'if any' would have no doubt that permitted increase is not automatic, but will be subject to demand by the landlord. 57. The useof the words 'if any' would have no doubt that permitted increase is not automatic, but will be subject to demand by the landlord. 57. The Judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the landlords are not applicable to this case for the reason that in each case, which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel, either there is a demand prior to the increase in the rent or the terms of contract were such that the tenant has agreed for permissible increase in the rent. In the case of Fehameeda Begum (cited supra) this Court held that the notice demanding higher rent is not bad in law and it was open to the tenant to deposit the admitted arrears of rent, which the tenant failed to deposit. In that context, the notice demanding higher rent was held to be not bad in law. 58. In the present case, the landlord has made a demand with retrospective effect which is not permissible, and therefore, the notice will be bad in law. It will have to be further noted that the tenants herein were never in arrears of rent and have not only showed willingness to pay permitted increase from the date of receipt of notice but have in fact paid the rent along with permitted increase in the rent for the month of August-2020 onward. 59. In the case of Chase Bright Steel Limited (cited supra), though the permitted increase was claimed for a period from February-1976 to April-1979, the case of the landlord was that despite there being demand time and again for the arrears of rent, the tenant failed to pay the same. Thus, the case of the landlord was that despite demand the permissible increase in rent has not been paid. This demand is absent in the present case. 60. In the case of Ujwalabai @ Meena Shantaram Apte (cited supra) the case of the landlord was that the contractual rent was 35/- per month? and the tenant was also liable to pay other charges towards permitted increase on month to month basis. Thus, there was a contract which included contractual rent as also the permitted increase on month to month basis. The permitted increase having been made term of the contract of tenancy, the issuance of notice on subsequent date is well permissible, may is what's required. Thus, there was a contract which included contractual rent as also the permitted increase on month to month basis. The permitted increase having been made term of the contract of tenancy, the issuance of notice on subsequent date is well permissible, may is what's required. The Judgment does not recognize the principle of retrospective demand of permissible increase in the rent. 61. In the case of Chandiram Ahuja (cited supra) the grievance of landlord was that the tenant did not pay or is not ready or willing to pay the rent regularly. Accordingly, it is held that tenant, in such cases, will be required to prove that he was/is ready and willing to pay the rent and that he has been paying rent voluntarily and not when coerced. In the present case, the exchange of notice between the parties would clearly show that the tenants have regularly paid the rent and were also paying the permissible increase in the rent from August-2020. 62. Mr. Chandurkar, by relying upon the Judgments in the case of State of Orissa and Bihar School Examination Board (cited supra) made an attempt to argue that this Court may not rely upon the observations made in paragraph No.19 in the case of New Laxmi Cycle Company (cited supra). The Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases has commented upon well settled principles of law that while applying the precedent, court should avoid mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made. There cannot be any dispute that the facts of each case will have to be considered before applying the law laid down in the case. 63. The facts in New Laxmi Cycle Company's case have been already noted above where this Court was testing the judgment of the first appellate court which had decreed the suit on the ground of arrears of rent for the period quoted in the notice which was to come in future. The Court while considering provisions under Sec. 15 of the Act of 1999 held that the provision does not envisage future period for the purpose of seeking eviction on arrears of the rent with permissible increase. In that context, the observations have been made that the increase in rent under Sec. 11 is not automatic, but is at the discretion of the landlord. 64. In that context, the observations have been made that the increase in rent under Sec. 11 is not automatic, but is at the discretion of the landlord. 64. I do not find any reason why this interpretation should not be taken aid of, merely because the facts are different. The interpretation of the provision under Sec. 15 of the Act in the said Judgment is independent of the facts of the case, and therefore, can well be taken aid of. In any case, even in absence of the aforesaid interpretation, if one goes through Sec. 11, it is obvious that the entitlement of landlord for the increase in rent is not automatic and will be subject to his demand. The reasons for which, I have already quoted above. 65. The facts narrated above, which are culled out of the averments made in the plaint, would clearly show that the tenants have regularly paid the monthly interest. The landlords have not made demand of permissible increase in the rent until 26/8/2020. The law does not permit the landlords to raise such demand retrospectively for the reason that the increase is not automatic and is subject to demand. The tenants have paid permitted increase for the period from August-2020. The notice itself indicates that the tenants have paid rent till August-2020. Thus, the tenants were not in arrears of rent or permitted increase in the rent till August-2020. 66. As regards the second part of the claim, the landlords have averred in the plaint that the tenants have not paid rent with permitted increase for the period from 1/9/2020 till 31/12/2020. This pleading in paragraph No.6 is found to be incorrect upon own showing of the landlords. The reply-notice annexed with the plaint would clearly show that the tenants have paid the rent, as agreed, till August-2020. The tenants, in the reply-notice have further mentioned of a cheque number and amount of the rent paid for the period of August-2020 and September-2020 to show that the rent along with permitted increase in the rent has been paid to the landlords. The tenants have also expressed their willingness to continue to pay the rent. In the rejoinder-notice dtd. 8/10/2020 the landlords do not dispute issuance of cheque. Thus, the averments made in the plaint read with annexures would demonstrate that the tenants have regularly paid agreed rent till August-2020. The tenants have also expressed their willingness to continue to pay the rent. In the rejoinder-notice dtd. 8/10/2020 the landlords do not dispute issuance of cheque. Thus, the averments made in the plaint read with annexures would demonstrate that the tenants have regularly paid agreed rent till August-2020. Thereafter, on receiving demand notice, they have paid rent including permitted increase with effect from August-2020. In that sense, there is no cause to file the suit, and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 67. The ruling in the case of Babulal Agrawal (cited supra) will be of no help to the landlords, in as much as, the suit therein was filed by the landlords on the grounds of bona fide need, using suit premises for the purpose other than for which it was given, the tenant has committed default in payment of rent etc. Thus, the suit was filed on various counts, of which arrears of rent was one. As such, the tenant therein had deposited rent in compliance to the notice issued by the landlord therein under Sec. 52 of the Act of 1999, however, the suit continued on other grounds. Pending suit, the tenant, however, committed defaults in payment of rent. The trial court, though did not find merit in the claim of the landlords as regards bona fide need of the premises as also use of the suit premises, it took cognizance of the default in payment of rent committed by the tenant pending suit, and accordingly, decreed the suit on the count of arrears of rent. 68. In the aforesaid facts, the Full Bench has held that the tenant has to comply the provisions under sub-sec. s (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 15 and further held that mere showing willingness to pay rent is not sufficient, the tenant will have to pay or tender in the court not only the arrears of rent due on the first day of hearing of suit, but also to continue the payment of rent and permissible increase during the pendency of the suit. The finding that there arises no question of extinguishing cause of action by reason of payment of existing arrears by the tenant has been recorded in context with the grounds on which the eviction of tenant was sought and also the defaults committed by the tenant, pending suit. 69. In the present case, the cause for filing suit is solely default in payment of arrears of rent and nothing else. In other words, the suit has not been filed on the ground of bona fide need of the tenanted premises or on the ground of using the tenanted premises for the purpose other than for which it was given or on any other ground. In such circumstances, if the tenant has already paid the rent and has further shown willingness to pay the rent with permitted increase and where the tenant, in compliance to the notice under Sec. 15(2), has in fact, paid the rent with permitted increase from the month of issuing of notice, there would be no cause for filing suit. The Defendant has rightly brought this fact to the notice of the Court by filing application but under incorrect title, which cannot be said to be fatal considering the law on this point. 70. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that though the application (Exhibit-9) filed by the tenants was in substance and in form 'Dismissal of Plaint', the Defendant having brought to the notice of the Court that the plaint is barred by law, which indeed is so for the reasons stated above, the court was duty-bound to reject the plaint in terms of Order 7 Rule 11, more particularly, in terms of sub-clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7. The trial court has erred in not applying the law to facts of the case, and thus, passed incorrect order. The impugned order, therefore, is liable to be set aside. Hence, the following order is passed. ORDER: A) All the Civil Revision Applications are allowed. B) The orders dtd. 17/12/2021 passed by 7 thJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-9 in Special Civil Suit No. 6/2021; dtd. 2/5/2022 passed by 3 rdJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-17 in Special Civil Suit No. 4/2021; dtd. 3/1/2022 passed by 4 thJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-10 in Special Civil Suit No. 3/2021; dtd. 17/12/2021 passed by 7 thJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-9 in Special Civil Suit No. 6/2021; dtd. 2/5/2022 passed by 3 rdJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-17 in Special Civil Suit No. 4/2021; dtd. 3/1/2022 passed by 4 thJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-10 in Special Civil Suit No. 3/2021; dtd. 6/12/2021 passed by 6th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-10 in Special Civil Suit No. 5/2021; dtd. 14/12/2021 passed by 9thJoint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-8 in Special Civil Suit No. 7/2021; and dtd. 19/1/2023 passed by 10th Joint Civil Judge Senior Division, Amravati below Exhibit-10 in Special Civil Suit No. 34/2022 are quashed and set aside. C) The plaints in Special Civil Suit Nos. 6/2021, 4/2021, 3/2021, 5/2021, 7/2021 and 34/2022 are hereby rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. All the Civil Revision Applications are disposed of accordingly.