JUDGMENT : (Ashutosh Shastri, J.) 1. The present Letters Patent Appeal is filed by the appellants-original respondents in the main petition being Special Civil Application No. 54 of 2020 decided on 04.11.2020 by the learned Single Judge whereby, the said petition came to be allowed. 2. The brief background of facts leading to rise of the petition are that respondent – original petitioner is a Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and carrying on business of stainless steel wire mesh cloth at plot no. 3211 situated at GIDC Industrial Estate at Chhatral, District Mehsana in the State of Gujarat. The aforementioned plot i.e. plot no. 3211 was allotted somewhere in the year 1989 initially to M/s. Multi Wires Pvt. Ltd., on lease basis and respondent no. 2 was issued allotment and letter of possession on 14.02.1989. Subsequently, the lease deed came to be executed between respondent no. 2 and M/s. Multi Wires Pvt. Ltd. It is the case of original petitioner that Mr. Jagdish Dubey and Ms. Madhu Kejriwal were the directors in petitioner Company and were associated with Jiten Choksey who was founder member of petitioner Company. At the relevant point of time, said Mr. Jagdish Dubey was having share holding to the extent of 64.07% share and Anay i.e. son of Jiten Choksey was holding 35.93% shares in the Company. Later on, petitioner Company changed its name from M/s. Multi Wires Pvt. Ltd., to M/s. Kumar Wire Mesh Pvt., Ltd., and Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued a certificate of change of name on 08.02.2011. Though, there was no transfer of plot no. 3211 in favour of any other entity, but it was merely a change of name of the company by virtue of Section 23 of the Companies Act, but still the petitioner was asked to pay an amount of Rs.62,100/- at the rate of Rs.18.95 per sq.,mtrs., as transfer fees. Petitioner at that point of time had no option but to pay the said transfer fees as demanded by the respondents. 2.1. It is further case of the original petitioner, that upon payment of such transfer fee, respondent no. Petitioner at that point of time had no option but to pay the said transfer fees as demanded by the respondents. 2.1. It is further case of the original petitioner, that upon payment of such transfer fee, respondent no. 2 – GIDC issued office order dated 14.10.2011 and transferred the said plot in the name of M/s. Kumar Wires Mesh Pvt. Ltd., and accordingly, even Supplementary Agreement was also executed between petitioner and GIDC with a view to avail financial assistance from financial Institution. Thereafter, petitioner applied for permission as per clause 2(r) of the lease deed to enable petitioner to create charge of lease hold land in favour of the SVC Bank. Somewhere in November, 2016, permission was accorded by respondent for a period of 84 months and at that point of time, respondent no. 2 had not demanded any transfer fee for such issuance of 2(r) permission. At that point of time, i.e. in the year 2016, Ms. Suneja Jhaveri, daughter of Mr. Jiten Choksey and Anay son of Jiten Choksey were directors and Ms. Suneja Jhaveri was holding 99.88% shares whereas, Ms. Madhu Kejriwal who happened to be associate of Mr. Jiten Choksey was holding 0.12% share in the Company. During continuance aforesaid permission, petitioner Company decided to change their bankers from SVC Bank to ICICI Bank somewhere in the June, 2019 and on 25.06.2019, ICICI Bank sanctioned working capital with a condition to create mortgage of lease hold rights in its favour and also put a condition that if security is not created then, the sanctioned timeline after 15 days would attract penalty @ 1% per annum payable on monthly basis and this constrained the petitioner to apply for permission under clause 2(r) of lease deed from respondent no. 2 on 27.08.2019 for permitting mortgage of lease hold rights in favour of ICICI Bank for collateral purpose of this plot no. 3211. Respondent no. 2 though not permissible generated the said application and treated the same as an application for transfer fee and based upon such noting respondent no. 2 granted transfer permission with condition that transfer feed of Rs.3,08,746/- (Rs.2,61,648 plus Rs.47,098-18% GST) plus additional transfer fees of Rs.3,08.746/- (Rs.2,61,648 plus Rs.47,098/- by way of 18% GST). 2.2. It is on account of such action of respondent no. 2 granted transfer permission with condition that transfer feed of Rs.3,08,746/- (Rs.2,61,648 plus Rs.47,098-18% GST) plus additional transfer fees of Rs.3,08.746/- (Rs.2,61,648 plus Rs.47,098/- by way of 18% GST). 2.2. It is on account of such action of respondent no. 2, petitioner requested the authority as to how additional transfer fees as well as transfer fees are claimed from petitioner. However, by way of e-mail dated 19.10.2019 it was informed that such demand is by virtue of policy of corporation and that all policies are on GIDC website. Since the site of GIDC is very big, it would be almost impossible for petitioner to go through the relevant clause and as such, requested respondent no. 2 to provide details about such policy. On 23.10.2019 respondent no. 2 informed petitioners to visit GIDC, office. Later on, a notice came to be issued by petitioner through its advocate on 25.10.2019 demanding particulars under which policy such demand of transfer fees as well as additional transfer fees are generated or demanded. Nothing was heard from the side of respondents and as such, again a request was made which was then responded to by way of communication dated 18.11.2019 which came to be received on 26.11.2019, whereby four resolutions of various dates were projected to justify the demand of transfer fees as well as additional transfer fees. Petitioner through its lawyer replied the said letter on 07.12.2019 indicating that said resolutions are not at all applicable to the facts of the case of petitioner and as such, requested to recall said demand and simultaneously it was also mentioned that on account of such delay in getting 2(r) permission, petitioner had to pay higher rate of interest to their respective bankers and on account such the petitioner had not been able to create security of plot no. 3211 and bankers have imposed penalty @ 1% per annum on monthly basis and had already deducted an amount of Rs.34,311/- for the period commencing from 11.08.2019 to 31.10.2019 and further amount of Rs.23,925/- for the month of September, 2019 and the said amount will continue to be charged. 3211 and bankers have imposed penalty @ 1% per annum on monthly basis and had already deducted an amount of Rs.34,311/- for the period commencing from 11.08.2019 to 31.10.2019 and further amount of Rs.23,925/- for the month of September, 2019 and the said amount will continue to be charged. As a result of this, left with no other alternate, petitioner had to approach this Court by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the reliefs which are set out in paragraph 9, which reads as under : “9(A) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order to the respondents to issue 2(r) permission as applied by Petitioner Company without demanding any transfer fees from Petitioner Company and further direct for reimbursement of amount of penal interest claimed by ICICI Bank, on account of withholding permission; AND (B) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, direct Respondents to issue 2(r) permission without demanding transfer fees from Petitioner Company upon such conditions as may be deemed fit and proper by this Hon’ble Court: AND (C) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 3. The aforementioned petition filed by respondent herein came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge who by way of order dated 04.11.2020 was pleased to allow the petition after due consideration of relevant circulars and its applicability and it is this order passed by the learned Single Judge which is made the subject matter of present Letters Patent Appeal before us under clause 15 of Letters Patent. 4. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court initially was pleased to issue notice by virtue of order dated 08.03.2022 and though the said notice has been served to the respondent, but none appears. The note made by Registry would indicate that the notice has been served through process of Court on the respondent. Respondent called out. None appears. Hence, we have placed respondent ex-parte. 4.1. Further, learned counsel appearing for appellant also submits that Counsel Mr. Vasim Mansuri who represented the first respondent before the learned Single Judge, refused to receive the copy on the ground that he had no instructions. Respondent called out. None appears. Hence, we have placed respondent ex-parte. 4.1. Further, learned counsel appearing for appellant also submits that Counsel Mr. Vasim Mansuri who represented the first respondent before the learned Single Judge, refused to receive the copy on the ground that he had no instructions. Since there is no rebuttal to said statement, we find no justifiable reason to disbelieve the statement made across the Bar. Hence, same is accepted. There being no representation on behalf of respondent, they have been placed ex parte as noted herein-above. Accordingly, upon request of learned advocate appearing for the appellant, we have heard this Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Mr. Ankit Shah, learned advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that order passed by the learned Single Judge is not only unjust and arbitrary, but contrary to the material on record and hence, same deserves to be quashed and set aside. It has been contended by Mr. Shah that the circulars which are tried to be pressed into service are very much applicable and the effect of the same has not been properly construed by the learned Single Judge and impugned order it is not in consonance with the relevant material on record, and same deserves to be corrected. It has been submitted that while demanding the transfer fees and additional transfer fees, appropriate justification was already made considering the situation projected by original petitioner and based upon the policy, transfer fee has been demanded and as such, it cannot be said that any illegitimate demand was made by respondent from the original petitioner. In fact, there was a transfer of interest over the plot and as such, based upon the policy, a demand was generated, and there was no definite change in the share holding of petitioner company after 2011 and simply because at the relevant point of time, GIDC did not levy transfer fee while initially granting permission as per clause 2 (r) of lease deed in the year 2016, the appellant may not be precluded for all time to come not to adhere to the policy and demanded transfer fee from original petitioner. In fact, there are circulars to the effect as specifically indicated before the learned Single Judge which would clearly indicate that there was justification in levying of transfer fees as also additional transfer fees. In fact, there are circulars to the effect as specifically indicated before the learned Single Judge which would clearly indicate that there was justification in levying of transfer fees as also additional transfer fees. However, the detailed affidavit-in-reply was filed before the learned Single Judge, but still same has not been properly considered and order came to be passed and as such, same being not in consonance with the relevant material, on that count alone, order deserves to be quashed. Mr. Shah has further submitted that there was a transfer of shares to the extent of more than 51% and the said request was based upon transfer of share holding, the GIDC was definitely justified in demanding the transfer fees as well as additional transfer fees and as such, order passed by the learned Single Judge is not justified and hence requested to set aside the same. No further submissions have been made. 6. Having heard the learned advocate appearing for the appellant and having perused the order passed by the learned Single Judge, apparent look at the order under challenge would clearly indicate that not only there appears to be proper application of mind by the learned Single Judge while examining the controversy, but it also appears that all the relevant circulars have been considered and keeping in view the terms of lease deed as well as extant policies, the order came to be passed allowing the petition and as such, under no circumstances, the order can be said to be suffering from vice of non-application of mind or perverse in any form and it was passed after granting full opportunity to both the sides and as such, it is not possible for us to construe said order suffering from any infirmity. 6.1. 6.1. Apart from that conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge if closely perused, it would emerge from records that it was an admitted position that actually there is no transfer of shares of more than 51% any time after 2015 in case of petitioner and if that be so, there is hardly any reason for respondent to claim any transfer fee and as such, we are also of the opinion that view taken by the learned Single Judge is a possible view based upon examination of relevant circulars, and hence, we see no reason to set aside said order in the absence of any distinguishable material. We also deem it proper to quote the relevant observations made by the learned Single Judge while allowing petition and it reads : “18. Having considered the rival submissions and having gone through the material on record, it appears that the respondent – GIDC has applied the Circular dated 10th September, 1996 with retrospective effect to levy the transfer fee in view of the change in shareholding, which took place in the year 2015 without considering the fact that the respondent–GIDC has granted 2(r) permission of the lease deed on 8/9th November, 2016. For this purpose, it would be germane to refer to clause 2(r) of the lease deed, which reads thus :- (r) That he will not transfer, assign underlet or part with the possession of the demised premises or any part thereof or any interest therein without the previous permission of the lesser for the purpose of this covenant, any change in the constitution of the lessee shall be demised to be a transfer by the lessee of his interest in the demises premises in favour of another person. Provided that where the lessee is a body corporate, a change in its Board of Directors, Managing Committee by whatever name called shall not be deemed to be a change in the constitution of the lessee provided further the where the lessee, for the purpose of constructing a building on the demised premises, is obtained loan from a bank or other financial Institution by mortgaging his leasehold interest in the demised premises in favour of such bank or institution, permission of the lessor shall be deemed to have been subject to the conditions:- a. that such mortgage shall not affect the rights and powers of the lessor under this lease deed and b. that the lessor before exercising his rights and powers under this lease deed will consult that bank or as case may be the financial institution concerned. c. The lessor will sent to the said financial institution concerned or as the case may be a copy of the notice, of not less than 90 days that may be served upon the lessor for rectification of the breach of any covenants of the said lease deed.” 19. On perusal of the above clause 2(r) of the lease deed, it is clear that the same is applicable for three purposes i.e. – (i) transfer, (ii) assignment or (iii) when the lessee is a body corporate for the purpose of creating charge on the land to avail the financial assistance for the purpose of constructing building on the premises by mortgaging the lease hold property interest in the property. The petitioner in the year 2016 was granted permission under Clause 2(r) of the lease deed for availing the financial assistance from SVC bank for Rs.461 Lacs. It appears that thereafter, the petitioner wanted to avail financial assistance from ICICI bank as per the sanctioned letter produced at Annexure-I page no.113 of the petition and for further financial assistance for Rs.32,00,000/-. The petitioner, therefore, applied for permission under Clause 2(r) of the lease deed on 27th August, 2019 as the petitioner wanted to shift the mortgage of SVC bank to ICICI bank and accordingly the application was preferred online with the respondent – GIDC. 20. The petitioner, therefore, applied for permission under Clause 2(r) of the lease deed on 27th August, 2019 as the petitioner wanted to shift the mortgage of SVC bank to ICICI bank and accordingly the application was preferred online with the respondent – GIDC. 20. However, the respondent – GIDC without considering the facts on record suo motu registered another application for transfer on 9th September, 2019 without intimation to the petitioner recording the incorrect facts in the said application, which is produced at Annexure-K, page 132 of the petition. The respondent GIDC, thereafter, passed the impugned order on 21st September, 2019 for levy of transfer fees and additional transfer fees. The petitioner thereafter, sought clarification for levy of the transfer fee and additional transfer fee, which was provided by the respondent – GIDC by letter dated 18th November, 2019 along with the copies of the Circulars dated 6th July, 2017, 13th June, 2019, 17thJune, 1997 and 6th May, 2015. On perusal of the Circulars, which are provided by the GIDC along with the letter dated 18th November, 2019, it appears that none of the Circulars is applicable to the facts of the case, because there is nothing on record to show that when the petitioner made an application on 27thAugust, 2019, for permission under clause 2(r) of the lease deed there was a change in the shareholding more than 51% as per the Circular dated 10th September, 1996, which is relied upon by the respondent – GIDC in its affidavit-in-reply for the first time before this Court. On perusal of the 21. In view of the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 21st September, 2019 passed by the respondent – GIDC for levy of transfer fee, as well as, additional transfer fee being illegal and contrary to the facts and materials on record, the same is hereby quashed and set aside. 7. At this stage, we may remind ourselves of well settled proposition of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company reported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 while examining the appellate jurisdiction especially in intra-court appeal and held that merely another view is possible cannot be ground to reverse the finding. We deem it proper to quote hereunder the relevant observations: “5. We deem it proper to quote hereunder the relevant observations: “5. Once the learned Single Judge having seen the records had come to the conclusion that the industry was not functioning after January 1995, there is no justification in entering a different finding without any further material before the Division Bench. The Appellate Bench ought to have noticed that the statement of MW 3 is itself part of the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.” 8. On the basis of aforesaid situation, the view expressed by the learned Single Judge while allowing petition is a possible view and learned advocate appearing for the appellant has not been able to point out any distinguishable circumstance to take a different view. Hence, we are not inclined to exercise appellate jurisdiction since the order passed by the learned Single Judge is a well reasoned order in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India and after considering every material placed before the Court. Hence, appeal lacks merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed with no order as to costs.