JUDGMENT Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J. Facts of present case in brief are that -: (a) Original petitioners and original respondents were recorded in basic year on land in dispute as co-sharer. (b) The petitioners filed an objection during consolidation proceedings claiming to be exclusively right on land in dispute on basis of entry being made in 1356-F and 1359-F, therefore, claimed to be adivasi and sirdar by virtue of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short "Act, 1950"). (c) The Consolidation Officer has allowed the objections of petitioners by an order dated 16.04.1974. (d) An appeal filed by respondents no. 6 and 7 was allowed vide order dated 02.04.1975. A revision thereof filed by petitioners was dismissed on 29.10.1976. 2. Sri Vishnu Singh, learned counsel for petitioner has referred relevant findings returned by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority that said Authorities have misread the evidence on record. 3. Learned counsel has further submitted that only basis on which claim of contesting respondents was accepted was outcome of a suit filed by erstwhile occupant of land wherein both petitioners and respondents were parties and claim of plaintiff that both petitioner and respondents have no right on land in dispute was rejected and it was wrongly interpreted by the two Authorities that right of petitioners as well as contesting respondents were on same footing, whereas on basis of revenue entries, only petitioners were recorded as occupant at the time of U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act came into force and accordingly, they became adivasi and later on sirdar. No such right was accrued to contesting respondents. 4. In this regard learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon the findings returned by the Consolidation Officer in its order and relevant part thereof is quoted below -: ^^ijarq dkxth lcwr ls mn; 'kadj vkfn dk dCtk ugha lkfcr gksrk vr% oa'kjkt ds c;ku i= ek= ls mn; 'kadj vkfn /kkjk 210 ds varxZr lhjnkj ugha gks ldrsA D;ksafd mudk dCtk fdlh dkxth lcwr ls lkfcr ugha gksrk mn; 'kadj us Lo;a c;ku fd;k fd yksx muds gks'k ds igys ls vyx gSA vr% oa'kjkt vkfn ds lkFk mudk eqLrjdk dCtk ugha gks ldrkA txjukFk vkfn izfroknh ds f[kykQ jsltqfMdsVk dk fl)kar vfjt gSA** 5. Per contra, Sri Rahul Jain, learned counsel for respondents has submitted that submission of the petitioners before the Authorities was that their names were entered in revenue records, however, they have not referred any document to dispute that respondents were co-sharers and there are concurrent findings of Settlement Officer of Consolidation and Revisional Authority in this regard, therefore, this Court may not interfere and since there was no perversity or order being passed beyond jurisdiction, therefore, interference under writ jurisdiction is not warrant. 6. Learned counsel has further submitted that case of petitioners and Banshraj was same and was arrayed as respondent, therefore, it was a case of co-tenancy, therefore, they are estoppel to raise any contrary submissions. 7. In rejoinder, learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Udai (dead) Ram Lakhan (dead) Karedin and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Varanasi and others, 1990 RD Page 9 and a judgment of Supreme Court in D.S. Lakshmaiah and another v. L. Balasubramanyam and another, (2003) 10 SCC 310 that -: "18. The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available." 8. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 9. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 9. Before adverting to rival submissions, it would be relevant to refer, relevant part of order passed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority that -: ^^blds i'pkr /kkjk 1810 dk ckn i{kx.kksa ds e/; pyk vkSj bl ckn esa vihydrkZx.k thr x;s rFkk ,d izkFkZuk i= okLrs n[ky izkIr djus ds fy;s fnukad 06-09-55 ls lc us izLRkqr fd,A fnukad 29-09-55 dks reke fMxzh gksYMj ds dCtk fn;k oa'kjkt us ,oa ;g dCtk dkj;nkj dh gSfl;r ls fy;s vr,o vc Jh oa'kjkt vkSj izfri{kx.k bl rF; dks ugha eqdj ldrs fd vihydrkZx.k dks dCtk lu~ 1955 esa gh feyk vkSJ bl rF; ls gh ugha eqdj ldrs fd lu~ 1953 esa ugha feyk eSa reke gh izfri{kx.k dks txjukFk us csn[ky dj fn;k ;fn vihydrkZx.k dk bu [ksrksa ij dCtk ugha Fkk rc oa'kjkt vkSj vU; yksxksa us feydj fnukad 29-09-55 dks fQj dCtk fy;kA bldk ;gh vkSj dsoy ,d gh rF; fl) gksrk gS fd vihydrkZx.k dk dCtk izfri{kx.kksa ds lkFk&lkFk 1356 Q0 esa Fkk vkSj bu lc yksxksa us lu 1955 iqu% dCtk ys fy;kA bruk gh udy c;ku rgjhjh varxZr /kkjk 180 esa fnukad 15-04-48 dh udy izLrqr dh xbZ ftlesa /kkjk 4 esa ;g Lo;a izfri{kx.kksa us Lohdkj fd;k fd lq[kuanu ikaMs; eqífyge f'kooa/kd ikaMs dk ckfyax eqlEeh nsolju ikaMs eqífyge x;k o lwjt ds ckfyn cynsoikaMs o jkelwjr ds cyfn;r f'koukFk ikaMs vkfn f'kotru FksA** xxxxx ^^mlh fu.kZ; ds vuqlkj oa'kjkt vkfn dks fookfnr Hkwfe dk dCtk n[ky okil fn0 29-09-55 dks fd;k x;k FkkA mDr eqdnesa esa oa'kjkt viuh rjQ ls vU; izfrokfnx.k dh vksj ls n[ky izkIr fd;k x;k FkkA vr% vc oa'kjkt fookfnr Hkwfe ds laiw.kZ jdcs ij vFkok mlds fdlh va'k ij rUgk dCts ds vk/kkj ij dksbZ LoRo dk nkok djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gS vkSj os mn; 'kadj vkfn dks lg[kkrsnkj ekeus ls badkj ugha dj ldrs gSaA fookfnr Hkwfe ij tks banjkt1356 Q0 rFkk 1359 Q0 esa oa'kjkt rFkk jkelwjr ds i{k esa fd;k x;k gS mudk ;g vFkZ ugha gksrk gS fd dsoy oa'kjkt rFkk jke lwjr fookfnr Hkwfe ij vyx&vyx rUgk dkfct Fks vkSj 'ks"k dk] tks Åij crk;s x;s /kkjk 180 ;w0 ih0 VsusUlh ,DV ds eqdnesa esa izfroknh Fks dksbZ dCtk fookfnr Hkwfe ij ugha FkkA bl izdkj oa'kjkt rFkk jke lwjr ds dCts dk banjkt vius&vius 'kk[k dks izfrfuf/k dks gSfl;r ls gh ekuk tk,xkA fo}ku ,0,p0vks0lh0 us vius fu.kZ; esa ;g er izdV fd;k gS fd vihydrkZ vkSj izfri{khx.k ds vf/koklh gksus dk dksbZ izHkko la;qDr fgUnw ifjokj ij ykxw ugha gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; dks ;g jk; bl iz'u ij vafre gks pqdh gS fd vf/koklh banjkt Hkh [kkunku ds drkZ ds :i esa ,d lnL; ds uke gks ldrh gSA fo}ku ,0,p0vks0lh0 ds mDr er esa dksbZ oS/kkfud =qfV ugha izrhr gksrk gSA** [emphasis supplied] 10. It would be apposite to refer paragraph 65-66 of a recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another v. Bikartan Das and others, 2023 SCC Online SC 996 wherein scope of writ of certiorari is reiterated. "65. Thus, from the various decisions referred to above, we have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that a writ of certiorari is a high prerogative writ and should not be issued on mere asking. For the issue of a writ of certiorari, the party concerned has to make out a definite case for the same and is not a matter of course. To put it pithily, certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory. 66. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, is issued by a superior court in respect of the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions by another authority when the contention is that the exercising authority had no jurisdiction or exceeded the jurisdiction. It cannot be denied that the tribunals or the authorities concerned in this batch of appeals had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. However, the argument would be that the tribunals had acted arbitrarily and illegally and that they had failed to give proper findings on the facts and circumstances of the case. We may only say that while adjudicating a writ-application for a writ of certiorari, the court is not sitting as a court of appeal against the order of the tribunals to test the legality thereof with a view to reach a different conclusion. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. If there is any evidence, the court will not examine whether the right conclusion is drawn from it or not. It is a well established principle of law that a writ of certiorari will not lie where the order or decision of a tribunal or authority is wrong in matter of facts or on merits. (See : King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., [1922] 2 A.C. 128 (PC))" [emphasis supplied] 11. In above factual and legal background, now this Court proceeds to consider rival submissions. It is the case of petitioners that they were sole occupants of the land and were recorded in same capacity in basic year. The Consolidation Officer has rightly accepted their submissions, however, the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority have interfered in above finding and erroneously held that on basis of orders and acts, the respondents were also in possession of land being co-sharer. 12. As referred above, the Consolidation Officer has returned a finding that the petitioner was recorded under Column-IX of land in dispute and in case area become lesser in pursuance of karar dated 29.09.1955, the same must have recorded in revenue record and, therefore, respondents were not in possession after 1955 and respondents were not able to prove their possession on basis of any document. However, aforesaid finding was set aside by Appellate Authority on the ground that in the proceedings under Section 180 of U.P. Tenancy Act, an application was filed by all parties and on 29.09.1955, possession was handed over to all decree-holders including respondents and this fact was not denied by petitioner i.e. appellants were handed over possession in the year 1955. In other words, if respondents were dispossessed, they were re-entered on 29.09.1955 along with others. Aforesaid findings were erroneously confirmed by the Revisional Authority. 13. I have carefully perused the order passed by all three Authorities and have found that findings returned by Appellate Authority are based on admitted documents and since there are factual findings do not appear to be perverse as well as that learned counsel for petitioner has not able to prove that they were beyond jurisdiction either, therefore, in light of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (supra) since there is no manifest error in the impugned order so that this Court could not interfere with concurrent findings. 14. 14. The judgment cited by learned counsel for petitioner would also not be helpful in the facts and circumstances of this case. 15. There are concurrent findings of Appellate Court and Revisional Authority in regard to effect of application dated 06.09.1955 and that on 29.09.1955, all decree holders were granted possession, which have not been disputed. 16. It was also substantiated by the statement of petitioner recorded in proceedings undertaken under Section 180 of U.P. Tenancy Act. 17. I have also perused the submissions of parties which are annexed along with this writ petition which also indicate that there was no perversity in the findings returned by the Appellate as well as Revisional Authorities. 18. In view of above, this writ petition, being sans merit, is dismissed.