JUDGMENT : 1. A civil suit filed by Shri Munshi Lal Sethi, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants (for short-‘the plaintiff’) for eviction and arrears of rent on the ground of default in payment of rent was decreed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jaipur City (East), Jaipur (for brevity-`the learned trial court’) vide judgment dated 25.3.1998; however, the learned Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur City (for short-`the learned appellate court’) while allowing the civil regular appeal preferred by the respondents/defendants (for short-`the defendants’), set aside the decree of eviction vide its impugned judgment and decree dated 24.3.1999. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the plaintiff filed a suit as stated hereinabove stating therein that the suit property comprising of a shop, as described in para no.1 of the plaint, was taken on rent on 1.1.1971 by Shri Nauratanmal Sancheti, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants (hereinafter referred to as `the deceased tenant’). It was averred that on an earlier occasion, the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction and arrears of rent against the deceased tenant alleging default in payment of rent wherein, the learned trial court determined provisional rent for a period from 15.1.1977 to 3.11.1979 which was paid by the deceased tenant and a compromise dated 22.9.1987 was entered into between the parties whereunder, the tenant agreed to increase the rent by 20% from 1.1.1989 with further increase of 20% in the last paid rent after every three years besides house tax. It was stated that on payment of the provisional rent and in view of the compromise between the parties, the suit was decreed on 22.9.1987; but, protection was extended to the deceased tenant. It was stated that after death of Shri Nauratanmal, the defendants being his legal heirs, became tenant. It was further stated that as per the terms of the compromise decree, the defendants are under an obligation to pay rent @ Rs.535 per month from 1.1.1992; but, upto September, 1992, they have paid rent @ Rs.445 per month and have not paid any rent thereafter till filing of the suit. Alleging that the defendants have again committed default in payment of rent, the decree as aforesaid was prayed for 3. Alleging that the defendants have again committed default in payment of rent, the decree as aforesaid was prayed for 3. The defendants in their joint written statement admitted that the suit shop was taken on rent by the deceased tenant and the provisional rent determined in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff against the deceased tenant was paid. It was averred that plaintiff was not entitled for monthly rent over and above Rs.65 and the compromise was hit by Section 8 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short-`the Act of 1950’). It was stated that after death of their father on 2.3.1992, the rent for a period of five months from November, 1992 to February, 1993 amounting to Rs.1780 was sent through money order by the defendants which was not accepted by the plaintiff, whereupon, a legal notice under Section 19A of the Act of 1950 dated 4.8.1993 was served upon the plaintiff to furnish his bank account number but, it was also not furnished and in these circumstances, they were compelled to deposit the rent for the months from November, 1992 to October, 1993 with the Court under Section 19A on 16.9.1993 and thereafter, they deposited six months rent vide demand draft dated 1.3.1994. It was submitted that therefore, they have committed no default. Along with written statement, the defendants also filed a counter claim praying for fixation of standard rent of the suit shop @ Rs.65 per month. 4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed six issues including relief. The issue no.1 was as to whether the defendants have committed second default in payment of rent for a period of six months and if so, its effect on the suit. After recording evidence of the respective parties, holding that the deceased tenant was already extended benefit of first default and the defendants were guilty of second default in payment of rent, the learned trial court decreed the suit and dismissed the counter claim filed by the defendants vide judgment dated 25.3.1998. After recording evidence of the respective parties, holding that the deceased tenant was already extended benefit of first default and the defendants were guilty of second default in payment of rent, the learned trial court decreed the suit and dismissed the counter claim filed by the defendants vide judgment dated 25.3.1998. In the civil first appeal preferred thereagainst by the defendants, although, the learned appellate court affirmed the finding of the learned trial court that the deceased tenant was extended the benefit of first default as also that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent, held it to be their first default relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.S. Sulochana vs. Dharmalingam- AIR 1987 SC 242 wherein, it was held that the legal heirs/representatives of a deceased tenant who has availed the benefit of first default, cannot be deprived of this benefit if they again commit default. It was also held by the learned appellate court that in view of compromise dated 21.9.1987 entered into between the landlord and the tenant in the earlier suit whereby, monthly rent was enhanced, new tenancy came into vogue and the earlier default in payment of rent was rendered inconsequential. In view thereof, extending the defendants benefit of first default and partly allowing the appeal, the suit has been dismissed. 5. Assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.3.1999, the learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the judgment in the case of A.S. Sulochana (supra) has since been overruled by the Larger Bench judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside. 6. He further submitted that the learned appellate court has erred in recording a finding that enhancement of the monthly rent under the compromise dated 21.9.1987 created new tenancy in between the parties. He submits that mere enhancement of rent without any material change(s) in the terms and conditions of the lease, does not create a new tenancy in between the parties. He, therefore, prays that the civil second appeal be allowed, the judgment and decree dated 24.3.1999 be quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree dated 25.3.1998 be restored. He submits that mere enhancement of rent without any material change(s) in the terms and conditions of the lease, does not create a new tenancy in between the parties. He, therefore, prays that the civil second appeal be allowed, the judgment and decree dated 24.3.1999 be quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree dated 25.3.1998 be restored. The learned counsel in support of his submissions relies upon the following judgments: 1) Imdad Ali vs. Keshav Chand & Ors.- AIR 2003 SC 1863 ; 2) Parvinder Singh vs. Renu Gautam & Ors.- AIR 2004 SC 2299 3) M/s. K. Ganesh Shet vs. A.K. Jayarama Sheka & Ors.- AIR 2004 SC 4876 4) Gappulal vs. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji- AIR 1969 SC 1291 5) Madan Bansal vs. Ramnarayan Sharma, S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.458/2001 decided on 25.06.2012. 6) L.Rs. of Kanhaiya Lal vs. Gajendra & Ors., S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.161/2016 decided on 27.01.2017. 7. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the defendants, supporting the decree passed by the learned appellate court; but, assailing the findings recorded by it, contended that it erred in holding that in the earlier suit, the deceased tenant was extended benefit of first default. He submits that the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff seeking eviction was dismissed on the basis of compromise between the parties without recording a finding that either the tenant committed default in payment of rent for a period of six months or more or, he was extended benefit of first default. He further submits that the learned appellate court further erred in recording a finding that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent. He submitted that the plaintiff was not entitled for the rent at the enhanced rate on the basis of compromise and the due rent, as per the rent last paid by the deceased tenant, was duly tendered by them; but, on refusal by the plaintiff to accept the same, they remitted it through money order and on refusal by the plaintiff to accept it as well, they served a legal notice upon the plaintiff demanding his bank account number; but, on his failure to do so, they deposited the due rent with the court under Section 19A of the Act of 1950. He submits that in these circumstances, it is apparent that they did not commit default in payment of rent. He submits that in these circumstances, it is apparent that they did not commit default in payment of rent. Shri Ranjan further submits that after refusal by the plaintiff to receive the rent tendered through the money order once, the law did not require them to pay/tender the rent again to him and it was sufficient discharge of their obligation if they had deposited the due rent with the Court under Section 19A. He, therefore, prays that while maintaining the decree passed by the learned appellate court, its findings on the aforesaid two aspects be quashed and set aside. Learned senior counsel to buttress his submissions, relies upon the following judgments: 1) Smt. Manak Bai & Ors. vs. Kalyan Bux-RLR 1989 (2) 704 2) Shiv Dutt Jadiya vs. Ganga Devi- AIR 2002 SC 1163 3) Mahesh Bhatiya (Shri) & Anr. vs. Saraogi Mansion Estate Pvt. Ltd.-RLW 2004 (4) Rajasthan 2397. 8. Heard. Considered. 9. This Court has vide order dated 28.7.2006 admitted the appeal for hearing formulating following substantial question of law: “WHETHER, in view of the findings of the appellate Court that the deceased tenant had committed first default and had obtained benefit of the provisions of the Rajasthan Rent Control act, the heirs of the deceased tenant cannot be deemed to have committed one default and they are not entitled to protection from eviction?” 10. The occasion for formulation of aforesaid substantial question of law arose as the learned appellate court had held that the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants was extended benefit of first default in payment of rent and despite recording a finding that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent, declined to hold them guilty of second default relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A.S. Sulochana wherein, it was held that the legal heirs/representatives cannot be punished for wrong of their predecessor-in-interest. It was held in the aforesaid judgment that the sin under the Rent Act must be the sin of the tenant sought to be evicted and not that of his father or predecessor-in-interest. However, answer to this substantial question of law would not require much deliberation as subsequently, a three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in Imdad Ali (supra) held the judgment in the case of A.S. Sulochana not to be the good law. The Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “14. However, answer to this substantial question of law would not require much deliberation as subsequently, a three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in Imdad Ali (supra) held the judgment in the case of A.S. Sulochana not to be the good law. The Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “14. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx It matters not whether such default is made by the original tenant or by his successor inasmuch as the successor-in-interest of the original tenant continues to be a tenant within the meaning of the provisions thereof. By reason of death of the original tenant, a new tenancy is not created. A successor-in-interest of a tenant holds his tenancy right subject to rights and obligations of his predecessor. He does not and cannot claim a higher right than his predecessor. It is now well-settled that a person by reason of inheritance or assignment does not derive any better title than his predecessor, and, thus, the right which the original tenant did not possess cannot be passed on to his successor 15. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the view that once the father of the respondents had availed of the benefit of proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, the said benefit was not available to the respondent-tenants on committing a further default in payment of rent. 16. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that A.S. Sulochana's case AIR 1987 SC 242 is not applicable in the instant case having been rendered under a different statute wherein the right of the landlord to file a suit for eviction was, as indicated hereinbefore, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. We, however, do not subscribe to the general observations made in A.S. Sulachana's case (supra) and to the said extent, it cannot be held to have laid down a good law and is overruled accordingly.” 11. In the case of Parvinder Singh (supra), another three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying and referring to the judgment in the case of Imdad Ali, held as under: “6. Tenancy is a heritable right unless a legal bar operating against heritability is shown to exist. Thus, the one who inherits tenancy rights also inherits the obligations incurred by the deceased tenant along with the rights which he had. Tenancy is a heritable right unless a legal bar operating against heritability is shown to exist. Thus, the one who inherits tenancy rights also inherits the obligations incurred by the deceased tenant along with the rights which he had. It is difficult to accept a proposition that on death of the tenant his heirs inherit only rights and not obligations. If that be so, then the heirs would not be liable to pay any arrears of rent which were not paid by the deceased-tenant. 7. The judgments of the Controller, the appellate authority and the High Court which proceed on A.S. Sulochana's case ( AIR 1987 SC 242 ) cannot now be sustained and deserve to be set aside.” 12. Similar view has been subscribed by yet another three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s K. Ganesh Shet (supra). 13. In view of aforesaid three-Judges Bench judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India which have overruled the law laid down in the case of A.S. Sulochana, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in terms that the heirs of the deceased tenant, if found to have committed default in payment of rent, are not entitled for protection from eviction if the deceased tenant had already availed the benefit of first default. 14. Resultantly, the findings of the learned appellate court vide its judgment dated 24.3.1999 are set aside to this extent. 15. The learned appellate court has also held the defendants not liable for eviction assigning the reason that enhancement of rent under the compromise dated 21.9.1987 brought into existence a new tenancy in between the parties whereunder, the earlier default committed by the deceased tenant was rendered inconsequential. However, this Court does not countenance this view. It is an admitted position that except enhancing the rent, the compromise dated 21.9.1987 did not alter/modify any other condition of the lease between the parties. A perusal of the record reveals that it has never been the case of the defendants that enhancement of the rent has created a new tenancy between the parties. It is an admitted position that except enhancing the rent, the compromise dated 21.9.1987 did not alter/modify any other condition of the lease between the parties. A perusal of the record reveals that it has never been the case of the defendants that enhancement of the rent has created a new tenancy between the parties. Neither in the written statement nor, during the course of evidence, nor before the learned trial court or before the learned appellate court or, even before this Court, it has been case of the defendants that enhancement of the monthly rent under the compromise dated 22.9.1987 brought into existence a new tenancy in between the parties. Even otherwise also, it could not have been so in view of their counter claim set up in the written statement wherein, while admitting the averment in the plaint that the suit shop was let out on 1.1.1971, it was prayed that the standard rent of the subject premises be fixed @ Rs.65 per month as enhanced in the year 1974 from Rs.50 per month, initially agreed in the year 1971. Therefore, the learned appellate court committed jurisdictional error in making out a new case in favour of the defendants neither set up nor, born out from record of the case. Even otherwise also, it is a settled legal proposition that mere enhancement of the rent without alteration in the material terms of the lease, creates no new tenancy in between the parties. 16. A three-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Gappulal (supra) held as under: 5. A mere increase or reduction of rent does not necessarily import the surrender of the existing lease and the grant of a new tenancy. As stated in Hill and Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant, 14th Ed., Art. 385, p. 493 :- "But a surrender does not follow from a mere agreement made during the tenancy for the reduction or increase of rent, unless there is some special reason to infer a new tenancy, where, for instance, the parties make the change in the rent in the belief that the old tenancy is at an end." 17. This Court has also, in the case of Madan Bansal (supra), after appreciating a catena of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India as also of this Court, held as under: “The well settled legal position in respect of creation of a new tenancy appears to be that although such tenancy can be created even by implied surrender of the existing tenancy and it is not essential that in each and every case possession of the tenanted premises is delivered back to the tenant and after creation of the new tenancy the possession be again handed over to the landlord but there should be clear intention and understanding between the parties for creation of a new tenancy between them. In fact in most of the cases the implied surrender of existing tenancy is by creation of a new relationship or by relinquishment of the possession. If there is material-change in the terms and conditions of the two tenancies, creation of a new tenancy may be presumed but only increase or decrease in the rate of monthly rent is not an indication of the fact that a new tenancy has been created between the parties. There should be some special reason to infer a new tenancy. For instance the parties make the change in the rate of rent in the belief that the old tenancy is at an end. In the present case, merely by the reason that some alterations and modifications have been effected in the suit shop, the monthly rent was increased and a new rent note was executed do not indicate that there was intention and understanding of the appellant and respondent to create a new tenancy between them.” 18. Therefore, in the backdrop of aforesaid authoritative judicial pronouncements, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the finding of learned appellate court as to creation of new tenancy in between the parties suffers from jurisdictional error and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 19. The aforesaid findings of this Court would have been sufficient for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate court; but, learned senior counsel for the defendants have also assailed the findings recorded by it while supporting the impugned decree. 19. The aforesaid findings of this Court would have been sufficient for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate court; but, learned senior counsel for the defendants have also assailed the findings recorded by it while supporting the impugned decree. The contention of Shri Ranjan has been that in absence of any finding by the learned trial court in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff against the deceased tenant that he had committed default in payment of rent and was extended benefit of first default, the learned appellate court erred in holding that he had availed such benefit merely on the basis of compromise decree. This Court finds the contention to be wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. It is categorically stated in the plaint that in the earlier suit filed against the deceased tenant for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, the learned trial court had determined the provisional rent for a period from 15.1.1977 to 3.11.1979 on payment of which by the deceased tenant, a compromise decree was passed on 22.9.1987 protecting him from eviction. In the written statement filed by the defendants, although, it is stated that the plaintiff had filed the earlier suit against the late tenant without any basis for enhancing the rent; but, it was specifically admitted that the provisional rent determined therein was paid by the deceased tenant and the suit was decided on the basis of compromise between the parties. Section 13(3) of the Act of 1950 provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground under Section 13(1)(a), i.e., default in payment of rent, the court shall provisionally determine the amount of rent to be paid by the tenant to the landlord and sub-section (6) of Section 13 provides that if a tenant makes the payment or deposits the provisional rent so determined, no decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent shall be passed against him provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to such protection having obtained such benefit, if he again makes a default in payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. 20. 20. Since, in the earlier suit filed by the plaintiff for the same accommodation on the ground of default in payment of rent, the learned trial court had determined the provisional rent for a period exceeding six months which was deposited by the deceased tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act of 1950, disposal of the suit thereafter even without recording a specific finding that the tenant had committed default and he was being extended benefit of first default, it has to be held that the deceased tenant has already availed the benefit of first default. This Court has, in the case of Bhikam Chand vs. Jugal Kishore-RLW 1979 137, involving identical controversy, has held as under: “10. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the defendant had neither taken advantage of Sec. 13A, as it stood then, in the earlier suit nor has he taken advantage of Sec. 13A of the Act in this suit, which has given rise to this revision. It was urged that the words ‘such benefit or benefit,’ used in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13, refer to benefit or benefits under Sec. 13A of the Act. The expression ‘such benefit’ according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, does not refer to the benefit available to the tenant under Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act. The contention in this regard is futile. Sub-secs. (4) and (5) of Sec. 13(old) were introduced for the benefit of the tenant so that in case of first default he may protect himself against the eviction by making the required deposit or payment, as provided therein. But in case a tenant who has committed a second default, as mentioned in the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 13(old), no such benefit is available. Therefore, in my considered opinion, ‘such benefit’ used in the proviso to sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 13 (old) refer to the benefit which the defendant-tenant could take under Sec. 13(7) (old) by making the required deposit or payment as provided in sub-secs. (4) and (5) of Sec. 13(old). This view of mine stands fortified by a decision in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal-(1973 WLN 626). ‘Such benefit’ used in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act, refer to the benefit which the tenant can avail of by making deposit of payment as required by sub-sec. (4) and (5) of Sec. 13(old). This view of mine stands fortified by a decision in Hanuman Prasad v. Gaindi Lal-(1973 WLN 626). ‘Such benefit’ used in the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 of the Act, refer to the benefit which the tenant can avail of by making deposit of payment as required by sub-sec. (4) of sec. 13 of the Act. This proviso applies in the following circumstances:— (1) That the same tenant has previously obtained the benefit either (i) under Sec. 13(7) of the Act, or (ii) under Sec. 13-A of the Act, (2) Such a tenant repeatedly commits defaults in paying the rent for six months or more, (3) The demised premises being the same. It may be stated here that whole of sub-sec. (6) was substituted for the previous sub-sec. (7) by Sec. 8(iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Amendment Ordinance, 1975 (Raj. Ordinance No. XXVI of 1975) w.e.f 29-10-1975 now replaced the Rajasthan Amending Act No. 14 of 1976. 11. In Ram Chandra v. Ramesh Chandra-( 1977 WLN 431 ), Modi J. held that the proviso to sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 13 clearly provides that a tenant shall not be entitled to any relief under Sec. 13(4) if he having obtained such benefit again makes a default in the payment of rent of that accommodation for six months. In Ramchandra's case (supra), the tenant-defendant had not paid any rent to the landlord for more than six months. He became defaulter within the meaning of Sec. 13(1)(a) of the Act. He subsequently deposited arrears of rent under Sec. 19A of the Act. A suit had also been previously filed against him for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent under Sec. 13(1)(a) of the Act but that suit was dismissed because the tenant took advantage of Sec. 13(4) (old) of the Act by depositing arrears of rent and interest thereon on the first date of hearing. In respect of the same premises, second suit was filed for eviction and arrears of rent. In these circumstances the learned Judge observed:— “The subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent by the defendant under Sec. 19A of the Act would have protected him from eviction under Sec. 13(4) of the Act, if he had not taken benefit of sec. In respect of the same premises, second suit was filed for eviction and arrears of rent. In these circumstances the learned Judge observed:— “The subsequent deposit of the arrears of rent by the defendant under Sec. 19A of the Act would have protected him from eviction under Sec. 13(4) of the Act, if he had not taken benefit of sec. 13(4) of the Act in the earlier suit.” This clearly shows that ‘such benefit’ used in proviso to Sec. 13(7)(old) or 13(6) of the Act refer to the benefit availed of by the tenant under Sec. 13(7)(old) or 13(6) of the Act. The use of the word ‘such’ before the word ‘benefit’ has a significance and it (such) refers to the benefit availed of by the tenant as contemplated in Sec. 13(7)(old) or Sec. 13(6) of the Act. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge has not committed any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of his jurisdiction when he held that the defendant-petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of Sec, 13(6) of the Act as he had already availed of the benefit of Sec. 13(7)(old) in the earlier Suit.” 21. The second limb of submission of learned senior counsel for the defendants that the learned appellate court erred in holding them guilty of default in payment of rent for a period of six months inasmuch they had tendered the rent at the rate last paid by the deceased tenant and the plaintiff was not entitled for the rent at the enhanced rate, does not merit acceptance. 22. Indisputably, the earlier suit field by the plaintiff against the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants was decided on the basis of compromise between the parties wherein, it was agreed that the rent would be payable at the 20% enhanced rate from 1.1.1989 which would be increased by 20% of the last paid rent after every three years and in pursuance thereof, the enhanced rent along with house tax @ Rs.445 per month was paid by the deceased tenant with effect from 1.1.1989 till September, 1992. In these circumstances, they are estopped and it does not lie in their mouth to contend that they were not liable to pay the rent at the enhanced rate under the compromise deed dated 22.9.1987. In these circumstances, they are estopped and it does not lie in their mouth to contend that they were not liable to pay the rent at the enhanced rate under the compromise deed dated 22.9.1987. Since, under the terms of compromise decree, they were liable to pay enhanced rent @ Rs.535 per month with effect from 1.1.1992 which, indisputably, they have neither paid nor tendered either through the money order or through deposition in the court under Section 19A of the Act of 1950, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned appellate court did not err in holding them guilty of default in payment of rent. 23. In view thereof, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the defendants that once the plaintiff has refused to accept the rent tendered by them through money order, they were not obliged to tender it again, requires no consideration as the rent tendered was not the rent agreed and payable. 24. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the defendants are of no assistance to him having been rendered in entirely different facts and circumstances. 25. In the case of Shiv Dutt Bhatia (supra), the question for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the tenant can be said to have committed default in paying or tendering the rent for the relevant period if he had deposited such rent in the Court during the pendency of landlord’s appeal against the decree passed in the first suit. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that since the tenant was continuously depositing the rent during pendency of the first appeal preferred by the landlord, for the same period, the second suit filed for eviction for default in payment of rent could not be decreed. However, no such situation obtains in the instant case. 26. A Division Bench of this Court has, in the case of Smt. Manak Bai & Ors. (supra), held that it is not obligatory for a tenant to deposit the rent in the Court under Section 19A to escape from liability of eviction if the rent tendered by him either personally or by postal money order is refused to be accepted by the landlord. However, in the instant case, this Court has held that since the defendants have not tendered the rent at the agreed rate, it was not a valid tender. 27. However, in the instant case, this Court has held that since the defendants have not tendered the rent at the agreed rate, it was not a valid tender. 27. The judgment in the case of Mahesh Bhatiya (Shri) & Anr., rather being of assistance to the defendants, probably goes against them. Therein, while deciding the misc. appeals preferred against the order passed by the learned trial court determining provisional rent under Section 7 of the Act of 1950 in a suit filed by the landlord for fixation of standard rent, it was held that rent agreed in an earlier suit between the parties at the enhanced rate would not operate as res judicata so as to bar subsequent suit for fixation of standard rent by the landlord. 28. Since, there is concurrent finding of fact with regard to the defendants being in second default in payment of rent which has been upheld by this Court also and it has been held by this Court that they are not entitled for the protection under Section 13(6) of the Act of 1950 as their predecessor-in-interest, the deceased tenant, had already availed that benefit in an earlier suit filed by the plaintiff for eviction and the substantial question of law framed by this Court has been answered in plaintiff’s favour, the civil second appeal deserves to be allowed. 29. Accordingly, the civil second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 24.3.1999 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.7, Jaipur City in Civil Regular Appeal No.27/98 are quashed and side aside and the judgment and decree dated 25.3.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jaipur City (East), Jaipur in Civil Suit no.252/1993 are restored.