ORDER 1. Petitioner (plaintiff in the court below) is aggrieved against an order dated 22.09.2023 (Annex. 8) passed by the learned District Judge, Sirohi vide which application Order 39 Rule 7 filed by the respondents/defendants, seeking appointment of Commissioner, was allowed. 2. Civil suit pending before the court below inter alia is for seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated December 30, 2021, alleging that same is based on the revoked power of attorney and other documents. An injunction restraining defendants/respondents herein from selling, mortgaging and/or leasing suit property has also been prayed for. In the written statement (Annexure. 4) to the suit, filed by defendants, the averments of the plaint have been denied. 2.1. Learned court below, vide an order dated September 22, 2023 (Annexure. 5) has granted a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC, in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff and against the respondents/defendants. 2.2. Prior to passing of the aforesaid injunction order, respondents had filed an application dated August 17, 2022 (Annexure. 6) under Order 39 Rule 7 CPC, seeking appointment of a Commissioner for the inspection of the disputed property. In response, the petitioner submitted a reply dated August 27, 2022 (Annexure. 7), refuting certain facts in the application and objecting to the appointment of a Commissioner. The petitioner asserted that he is the owner of the suit property, and therefore, there was no necessity to appoint a Commissioner. 2.3. On the same day, i.e., on September 22, 2023, when vide a separate order application under order 39 rules 1 and 2 filed by plaintiff was allowed, the aforesaid second application under order 39 rule 7 filed by defendants was also allowed by the learned District Judge vide separate order impugned herein (Annexure. 8). 3. I have perused the file and heard the rival arguments of the learned counsels. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the court below has committed an illegality by appointing a Commissioner at the instance of defendants, as it lacked the jurisdiction to pass an order under Order 39 Rule 7 after rendering decision on the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC. Especially when the same Court has already observed in the injunction order that there is a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff. 4.1. Especially when the same Court has already observed in the injunction order that there is a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff. 4.1. He would further urge that lis in pending suit is qua false and forged document of the power of attorney, which was not in existence as on December 30, 2021. Suit is not for possession of the land; rather, it is for declaration and cancellation of the sale deed, which was registered by the Sub-Registrar on the basis of a forged power of attorney. According to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act also, there is no requirement for any inspection of the suit property. Hence, there was no requirement for the appointment of a Commissioner when the sale deed itself was fraudulently registered by the respondents. Setting aside the order appointing the Commissioner is thus prayed for. 5. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondents defends the impugned order for the reasons mentioned therein. He states that the trial court is fully vested with jurisdiction thereof and has rightly allowed the application filed by the respondents under Order 39 Rule 7 CPC. The Commissioner is very much warranted and has thus been rightly appointed as per the law. Therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference. 6. After hearing the competing contentions of learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that, de-hors order 39 rule 7 ibid, the trial court even on its own volition, can exercise its discretion to appoint the Commissioner to make a local investigation for elucidating any matter in dispute. Reference may be had to the provision contained in Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. Though, no doubt, in the present case, Order 39 Rule 7 has been invoked at the instance of the respondents for the appointment of the Commissioner. Reference may be had to the provision contained in Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. Though, no doubt, in the present case, Order 39 Rule 7 has been invoked at the instance of the respondents for the appointment of the Commissioner. Let us also first have a look at the relevant part of Order 26 Rule 9 which is as below: 'Commissions to make local investigations: In any suit in which the Court deems a local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute, or of ascertaining the marketvalue of any property, or the amount of any mesne profits or damages or annual net profits, the Court may issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court: Provided that, where the State Government has made rules as to the persons to whom such commission shall be issued, the Court shall be bound by such rules. ' 7. A perusal of the above clearly reflects that in any pending trial where court deems it fit and proper, a local investigation can be carried out for the purpose of assisting the court based on the report to be submitted by the Commissioner. No doubt, such a report is not meant to collect any evidence that can be taken for or against either of the parties, but is merely intended to assist the court regarding the physical status of the property in question. In the present case, given the rival factual assertions of both parties, as to who are the persons occupying the property, I am also of the view that no prejudice would be caused to either side if the court below wishes to seek assistance of a local Commissioner to provide a report after inspecting the site/property in question. 8. Adverting now to the contention that once the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 has been decided, provisions of Order 39 Rule 7 could not have been invoked by the trial Court. I may hasten to add here that the Rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and not mistress thereof, and in the larger interest, the Courts ought to be conscious that the substantial discharge in administration of justice should not be subjugated. I may hasten to add here that the Rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and not mistress thereof, and in the larger interest, the Courts ought to be conscious that the substantial discharge in administration of justice should not be subjugated. Be that as it may, both the applications i.e. one under order 39 Rule 1 and 2; and the other under order 39 rule 7 were disposed of on the same day vide separate orders. There is no procedural bar in doing so by a trial court. In any case, having expressed my views in the preceding paragraphs, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is rendered otiose since the trial Court has the inherent discretion to invoke the power under Order 26 Rule 9 at any stage during the pendency of the trial, either before the commencement of evidence or even thereafter. I do not find any relevance of the argument that the Court below could not have passed an order under Order 39 Rule 7 of the CPC. 9. As an upshot, no ground to interfere in the present writ petition is made out and the same is accordingly dismissed. 10. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.