JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. This batch of writ appeals preferred under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, are directed against the impugned order (common) passed by learned Single Judge allowing the writ petitions holding that the writ petitioners (private respondents herein) are entitled for compensation under the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, the Act of 2013). 2. Since common facts and question of law are involved in this batch of writ appeals, they have been clubbed together, heard together and being disposed of by this common judgment. For disposal of these appeals, Writ Appeal No. 361 of 2022, arising out of order dated 12.05.2022 passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 2899 of 2020, and connected cases, is taken as the lead case. 3. The facts, in nutshell, are that the lands of the writ petitioners were subject to the land acquisition proceedings by issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the Act of 1894) on 22.09.2012 (Annexure P/2 to the writ petition) followed by notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, issued on 30.04.2013 (Annexure P/3 to the writ petition). A notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 was issued for public hearing providing an opportunity to raise objection vide notification dated 27.05.2013. Thereafter, the award was passed on 11.11.2013 (Annexure P/4 to the writ petition) under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 and the possession of the land of the writ petitioner was taken admittedly on 09.12.2013. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the award dated 11.11.2013 (Annexure P/4 to the writ petition) was not given effect to and the Land Acquisition Officer/respondent No. 3 passed a second and amended award on 06.05.2014. In the meanwhile, the Act of 2013 came into force with effect from 01.01.2014, and therefore, the writ petitioners are entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013 in view of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 and also for the reason as per award dated 11.11.2013 neither compensation was paid nor the writ petitioners were noticed in compliance of Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894. Compensation has been paid after lapse of more than 5 years without any interest and resettlement and rehabilitation amount on 16.06.2020. Accordingly, writ petitions were filed seeking appropriate writ/direction for determination, payment of compensation and consequential benefits of interest for subject acquisition, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. 4. The respondent/State and the beneficiary i.e. the NTPC filed their return stating that the writ petitioners are not entitled to compensation as per the Act of 2013 but they are entitled for compensation under the Act of 1894. The writ petitioners have the remedy of filing a reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 to seek enhancement of the compensation amount and as such, writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 5. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order held that in view of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Others, (2020) 8 SCC 129 , the petitioners are entitled for compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013 by virtue of proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, against which this batch of writ appeals have been preferred. 6. Mr. Prafull Bharat, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant/NTPC would submit that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the writ petitioners are entitled for payment of compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013 as the award was already passed on 11.11.2013 and the possession of the land was taken on 09.12.2013 and therefore, irrespective of the provisions contained in Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894, the award dated 11.11.2013 has become final, though some arithematical and clerical errors was corrected by award dated 06.05.2014 in exercise of power under Section 13A of the Act of 1894. But for all other purposes, the award dated 11.11.2013 would be considered as final and therefore, by virtue of the principles of law laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Indore Development Authority (supra), paragraph 366.2 the petitioner’s case would be governed by the Act of 1894 and he will not be entitled to compensation under the Act of 2013. Therefore, the writ appeals deserve to be allowed. 7. Mr. Therefore, the writ appeals deserve to be allowed. 7. Mr. H.S.Ahluwalia, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the respondent/State would support the contentions raised by the counsel for the appellant and would submit that the writ petitioners are not entitled for compensation under the Act of 2013 but under the Act of 1894. 8. Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the original writ petitioners would support the impugned order and submit that since the amended award was passed on 06.05.2014 after coming into force the Act of 2013 w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and the award dated 11.11.2013 has merged into the subsequent award dated 06.05.2014, and since award dated 11.11.2013 was never communicated to the writ petitioners under Section 12(2) of the Act by issuance of the notice, therefore, the writ petitioners will be entitled to compensation as per the Act of 2013 and the learned Single Judge was right in directing the State to re-determine the compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013 as such, writ appeals deserve to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions hereinabove and have gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions contained in Section 24 of the Act of 2013 which states as under: “24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),- (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 11. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Indore Development Authority (supra) while conclusively setting at rest the controversy, laid down the principles for applicability of Section 24(1) (a) and (b) of the Act of 2013 and also the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 20213. It was held by Their Lordships as under:- “366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013. 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed. 366.3. The word 'or' used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as 'nor' or as 'and'. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 366.4. The expression 'paid' in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the "landowners" as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1) (b). 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. 366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1) (b). 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. 367. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for consideration on merits.” 12. Reverting to the facts of the case, in light of principles of law laid down by Their Lordships in Indore Development Authority (supra), as noticed hereinabove, in the present case, the writ petitioners land were subjected to acquisition under the provisions of the Act of 1894. The award dated 11.11.2013 was passed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 and the possession of the land was taken on 09.12.2013. After issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land was divided into various Khasra either by mutation or by sale or purchase leading to passing of an amended award in exercise of the power under Section 13-A of the Act of 1894, correcting the award dated 11.11.2013 by award dated 06.05.2014. 13. After issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the acquired land was divided into various Khasra either by mutation or by sale or purchase leading to passing of an amended award in exercise of the power under Section 13-A of the Act of 1894, correcting the award dated 11.11.2013 by award dated 06.05.2014. 13. It is the case of the writ petitioners that when the award dated 11.11.2013 was passed, none of the petitioners were present at the time of passing the award and the Collector did not notice them under Section 12(2) Act of 1894 and the amended award was passed on 06.05.2014 and the award amount was tendered to writ petitioners only on 16.06.2020, which they have accepted under protest, therefore, the award is deemed to have been passed on 06.05.2014 and in the meanwhile, the Act of 2013 has came into force w.e.f. 01.01.2014, therefore, they are entitled to re-determination of the compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013, which the learned Single Judge has also found favour with. The learned Single Judge has further accepted the submission of the writ petitioners that the award dated 11.11.2013 cannot be said to be final award in absence of notice to them under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 and therefore the award dated 06.05.2014 which is the final award and in such case, the petitioners case would fall under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The learned Single Judge has recorded its finding at paragraphs 31 and 32 as under: “31.The petitioners have filed the documents regarding receipt of compensation, which does not mention the mode in which the compensation was paid to them, either it was tendered or deposited in their accounts. Further there is no such pleading present in the reply and affidavit of the respondents side to show that the amount of compensation was ever deposited in the Court of land acquisition officer. Hence, in such a case, the proviso of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 comes into play. Although it will be deemed that the proceeding under the Act, 1894 has continued under Section 24 (1) (b), which has not lapsed. Hence, in such a case, the proviso of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 comes into play. Although it will be deemed that the proceeding under the Act, 1894 has continued under Section 24 (1) (b), which has not lapsed. Further out of the twin conditions as provided under Section 24(1), one of the conditions of taking possession of the acquired land has been met with, therefore, the proceeding, under the Act, 1894 shall not lapse on this count also. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in case of Indore Development Authority (Supra), the proviso to Sub-section (24) (2) of the Act, 2013 has to be construed independently and the beneficiaries concerned have entitlement to receive compensation in accordance with the provision of this Act. The receipt of compensation by the petitioners in the year 2020 shall not operate as bar as the specific words in this proviso is that the amount of compensation has to be deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, which appears to be not complied by the respondents side. 32. On the basis of these considerations and the law as settled by the Supreme Court in case of Indore Development Authority, it is held that the petitioners have entitlement to be compensated under the norms of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act, 2013, as they have been found to be entitled for such compensation under the proviso to Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013.” 14. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the learned Single Judge is justified in holding that the petitioners are entitled for compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013 in absence of notice of passing of award dated 11.11.2013 to them under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 and award was passed on 06.05.2014 after coming into force of Act of 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014. 15. In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be necessary to consider Section 12 of the Act of 1894, which reads as under: “12. Award of Collector when to be final. 15. In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be necessary to consider Section 12 of the Act of 1894, which reads as under: “12. Award of Collector when to be final. – (1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector’s office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 16. A careful perusal of Section 12(1) of the Act of 1894 would show that the award of the Collector shall be final once it is filed in the Collector’s office and of which the Collector shall give immediate notice of the award to the to such persons interested and if they are not present personally through their representatives when the award is made. The purpose of service notice under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 is only to enable the aggrieved interested person(s) to decide whether the compensation given to them in the award is to be accepted or reference is to be made to the Court concerned for enhancement of compensation under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 and the non-issuance of notice soon after making of an award does not vitiate the award which is an offer for payment of compensation for the land sought to be acquired. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Kaliyappan v. State of Kerala & Others, AIR 1989 SC 239 , clearly held that as far as making of award is concerned, it is the date of the signing of the award which amounts to making of the award and communication of the award is not sine qua non for making the award. 17. In the matter of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, (1962) 1 SCR 676 , Their Lordships of Supreme Court have considered the object of service of notice under Section 12 of the Act of 1894, in the following words:- “5. 17. In the matter of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, (1962) 1 SCR 676 , Their Lordships of Supreme Court have considered the object of service of notice under Section 12 of the Act of 1894, in the following words:- “5. In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under s.12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer Section 18 gives him the statutory, right of having the question determined by Court, and' it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance.” 18. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum & Another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 , had occasion to consider the purpose of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894. It has been held by Their Lordships that knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly, when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award. 19. The argument raised on behalf of behalf of the writ petitioners that Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 is mandatory and should have been issued to the petitioner and in absence of which the award cannot be said to be final, came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Bailamma (Dead) & Others v. Poornapranjna House Building Co-operative Society & Others, AIR 2006 SC 1132 , Their Lordships have clearly held that mere fact of non issuing of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 would not invalidate the award or the acquisition proceedings and held as under: “25….However, having regard to the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Act, he must give immediate notice to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. Thus viewed, there can be no doubt that after the award is approved the same becomes an offer to be made to the persons interested, and this can be done by either giving notice to the persons interested of the date on which he may orally pronounce the award, or by giving written notice of the award to the persons interested. The question of limitation for filing a reference under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act has to be determined by reference to the date on which the award was either pronounced before the parties who were present, or the date of the receipt of notice of the award by those not present. The question of limitation for filing a reference under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act has to be determined by reference to the date on which the award was either pronounced before the parties who were present, or the date of the receipt of notice of the award by those not present. The mere fact that the Collector did not pronounce the award after notice in the presence of the parties interested will not invalidate the award, though it may have a bearing on the question of limitation in the matter of seeking a reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act….” 20. As such, the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 was not mandatory and non-service of notice of award to the person(s) interested would not vitiate the award and the award would be deemed to be final once it has been pronounced and signed by the Collector and date of signing of award would be date of making the award. 21. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chhaganlal v. Land Acquisition Officer, Mahasamund, 1964 JLJ 730 , has held that the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer is final and conclusive subject to the provisions of Section 18 and the Land Acquisition Officer. Similarly, the expression “shall be filed in the Collector’s office” in Section 12 of the Act of 1894 connotes the idea of permanent preservation as a public record. The filing of an award in the Collector’s office consists in the physical act of receiving award in the Collector’s office, so that it may be deposited in the custody and among the records of the Collector’s office. Their Lordships further held that the Land Acquisition Officer cannot review its award and held that once it is made and embodied in the award, the Land Acquisition Officer has no jurisdiction to review it. The offer embodied in the award cannot be treated as an offer under the Law of Contract which can be revoked at any time before “the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively.” The award is not subject to sub-section (2) of Section 12 and does not depend on the question whether the provisions of sub-section (2) have or have not been complied with. It was further held that award under Section 11 becomes final, even if it is not filed in Collector’s office or notice of award is not given to the person interested under sub-section (2) of Section 12. 22. Even otherwise, it is now well-settled law that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order unless a power of review is expressly conferred on it by the State under which it derives jurisdiction. (See. Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.), (1987) 4 SCC 525 and Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. & Another, (2005) 13 SCC 777 .). 23. As such, in this case, the award dated 11.11.2013 passed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 even though it has not been communicated to the writ petitioners, has become final and would not render the award invalid as Section 12(2) of the Act of 1894 is not mandatory in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Baliamma (Dead) & Others (supra) and the decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Chhaganlal (supra). The land acquisition officer has no power and jurisdiction to review its own award, except for limited purpose under Section 13A of the Act of 1894, for all practical purposes, the land acquisition award dated 11.11.2013 would be final award for the purpose of determination of the compensation and thereafter the possession of the land has also been taken by the State Government on 09.12.2013 and lands have vested with Government free from encumbrances under Section 16 of the Act of 1894. Undisputedly, the award has been passed and the possession has been taken before the commencement of the Act of 2013 which came into force w.e.f 01.01.2014. 24. The learned counsel for the writ petitioners has pressed paragraph 366(1) of the Indore Development Authority (supra) to buttress his submission. Undisputedly, the award has been passed and the possession has been taken before the commencement of the Act of 2013 which came into force w.e.f 01.01.2014. 24. The learned counsel for the writ petitioners has pressed paragraph 366(1) of the Indore Development Authority (supra) to buttress his submission. In the instant case, as held above, the award has been passed on 11.11.2013 and the possession has been taken on 09.12.2013 so paragraph 366(1) would not be applicable as the award had already been made prior to 01.01.2014, therefore Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 would not be applicable and paragraph 366(3) would also not be applicable and therefore, paragraph 366(2) would be applicable as the award has been passed under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 and by virtue of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013, the proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894. Therefore, the finding of the learned Single Judge that the petitioner’s case would be covered by Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 is clearly erroneous in view of the legal analysis made hereinabove and if there is any delay in making payment of compensation to them, the writ petitioners would definitely be entitled to interest thereon by virtue of Section 34 of the Act of 1894 read with paragraph 366(4) in the matter of the Indore Development Authority (supra). 25. At this stage, Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned counsel for the writ petitioners would submit that the learned Single Judge has rightly extended the benefit of proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and as such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissed. 26. This argument deserves to be noted for rejection. The land acquisition award was passed on 11.11.2013 and the possession has also been taken on 09.12.2013 and thereafter the lands have vested with the State free from all encumbrances by virtue of Section 16 of the Act of 1894, which has attained finality in view of the analysis made hereinabove. The compensation has also been paid to them which was accepted by the writ petitioners on 16.06.2020, though under protest. Thereafter, the writ petition came to be filed on 02.11.2020. In our considered opinion, at the best, they will be entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Act of 1894, which we have already held in para 24. However. The compensation has also been paid to them which was accepted by the writ petitioners on 16.06.2020, though under protest. Thereafter, the writ petition came to be filed on 02.11.2020. In our considered opinion, at the best, they will be entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Act of 1894, which we have already held in para 24. However. The Supreme Court, in Indore Development Authority (supra), refused to entertain the petition which was preferred after an inordinate delay in the matter of land acquisition. It was observed by Their Lordships pertinently in paragraphs 352, 356, 359 and 362 as under: “352. There is a plethora of decisions where, owing to delay of 6 months or more, this Court has repelled the challenge to the acquisition proceedings. In our opinion, Section 24 does not revive the right to challenge those proceedings which have been concluded. The legality of those judgments and orders cannot be reopened or questioned under the guise of the provisions of Section 24(2). By reason of our reasoning in respect of that provision (which we have held that under Section 24(2) that word "or" is to be read as 'and' or as 'nor,' even if one of the requirements has been fulfilled, i.e., either possession taken or compensation paid), there is no lapse unless both conditions are fulfilled, i.e., compensation has not been paid nor has possession been taken; the legality of the concluded proceedings cannot be questioned. It is only in the case where steps have not been taken by the authorities. The lapse or higher compensation is provided Under Section 24(2) and its proviso under the 2013 Act. xxx xxx xxx 356. We are of the opinion that courts cannot invalidate acquisitions, which stood concluded. No claims in that regard can be entertained and agitated as they have not been revived. There has to be legal certainty where infrastructure has been created or has been developed partially, and investments have been made, especially when land has been acquired long back. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 . The landowners had urged that since the 2013 Act creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. It is the duty of the Court to preserve the legal certainty, as observed in Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 . The landowners had urged that since the 2013 Act creates new situations, which are beneficial to their interests, the question of delay or laches does not arise. This Court is of the opinion that the said contention is without merits. As held earlier, the doctrine of laches would always preclude an indolent party, who chooses not to approach the court, or having approached the court, allows an adverse decision to become final, to re-agitate the issue of acquisition of his holding. Doing so, especially in cases, where the title has vested with the State, and thereafter with subsequent interests, would be contrary to public policy. In A.P. State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-Rolling Mills, (1994) 2 SCC 647 , this Court observed that equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade the law. There is no dearth of talent left in longing for the undue advantage of the wholesome provisions of Section 24(2) on the basis of wrong interpretation. xxx xxx xxx 359. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. In our considered opinion, Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse under Section 24. The lapse under Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein. xxx xxx xxx 362. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 27. In view of settled legal position, the writ petitions suffer from delay and laches which is inordinate and the land acquisition proceedings have already concluded and compensation has already been paid to them. Thereafter, they filed the writ petitions on 02.11.2020, as such, they cannot be permitted to revive stale and dead claims except to the extent of interest on delayed payment of compensation amount. 28. Concludingly, it is held that the petitioner’s land has been vested in the State free from all encumbrances by virtue of Section 16 of the Act of 1894 much prior to coming into force the Act of 2013, and only the compensation could not be paid to them right in time which was ultimately paid on 16.06.2020, the proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would not be applicable to the writ petitioners, therefore, the learned Single Judge was absolutely unjustified in holding that they are entitled for compensation under the Act of 2013 as the compensation was paid to them on 16.06.2020. At the best, the writ petitioners would be entitled to interest as held above in accordance with Section 34 of the Act of 1894 and as per the law laid down in Indore Development Authority (supra) also. 29. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 12.05.2022 is set aside. However, the writ petitioners will be entitled to interest on the compensation amount in accordance with law. All the writ appeals are allowed to the extent stated hereinabove leaving the parties to bear their own cost.