JUDGMENT : Manish Kumar Nigam, J. 1. This writ petition is preferred against the impugned order dated 18.11.2020 passed by respondent no.3, District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, (wrongly mentioned as respondent no.4 in the prayer clause) cancelling the No Objection Certificate dated 13.10.2020. The impugned order dated 18.11.2020 is annexed as Annexure No.10 to the writ petition. Pleadings have been exchanged in the present writ petition. At the time of admission of present petition, after hearing Counsel for respondent-Corporation, Standing Counsel and Counsel for Caveater, effect and operation of the order dated 18.11.2020 passed by the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra was stayed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 20.1.2021. 2. Brief facts of the case are that an advertisement was issued on 25.11.2020 by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation calling applications for award of MS/HSD retail outlet dealership under open category at the location 2014 at Ghorawal Bardiyan Road, District Sonbhadra. The petitioner applied in pursuance to the aforesaid advertisement for award of MS/HSD retail outlet, participated in the selection process and was declared successful. A letter of intent was issued for the aforesaid location to the petitioner on 19.5.2020. 3. On 19.5.2020, the respondent no.2, Chief Regional Manager, Varanasi wrote a letter to the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra for issuing No Objection Certificate in respect to the Gata No. 51Ami, Village-Gavkunda, Pargana-Bardhiya, Tehsil-Ghoraval. District-Sonbhadra offered by the petitioner for constructing the retail outlet. After the letter dated 19.5.2020 written by the respondent no.2 to the respondent no.3, District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, an objection was filed online on 2.9.2020 by the respondent no.4, Shyam Bihari Dwivedi before the respondent no.3 raising certain grievances. The complaint so made by the respondent no.4 was examined and enquired by the Additional District Magistrate, Sonbhadra and he has submitted its report dated 12.10.2020 recording therein that in the Khatauni of 1426-1431 Fasli, Khata No.6, Arazi No.51Ami, Area 0.6260 hectare name of Amresh Chand, Subhash, Chand and Rohit Tiwari is recorded as Bhumidhar with transferable rights and in Khata No.2, Arazi No.51A Miljumla, Area 0.6260, name of Anil Kumar, Shyam Bihari (respondent no.4) and Avadh Bihari is recorded as Bhumidhar with transferable rights. It was further recorded that Khata No.6 is a separate Khata and in the aforesaid Khata, the new retail outlet is proposed by the petitioner. It was further recorded that Khata No.6 is a separate Khata and in the aforesaid Khata, the new retail outlet is proposed by the petitioner. It was also recorded by the Additional District Magistrate, Sonbhadra as the respondent no.4 is not a co-tenure holder in Khata No.6 but a co-tenure holder in Khata No.2, therefore his rights are not affected. Accordingly, the complaint of respondent no.4 was rejected. 4. After completing the enquiry, the respondent no.3, District Magistrate issued a No Objection Certificate on 13.10.2020, copy of the same is annexed as Annexure No.4 to the writ petition. It appears that after grant of No Objection Certificate on 13.10.2020, the respondent No.4, Shyam Bihari again moved an application before the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra for cancellation of No Objection Certificate dated 13.10.2020 on various grounds. Copy of the complaint is annexed as Annexure No. 9 to the writ petition. After receiving the complaint of the respondent no.4, the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra re-examined the matter and cancelled the No Objection Certificate granted by him on 13.10.2020 by means of order dated 18.11.2020. 5. Being aggrieved with the order dated 18.11.2020, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. It has been contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the order impugned dated 18.11.2020 passed by respondent no.3 is an ex-parte order without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and, as such, the order is in violation to the principles of natural justice. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint made by the respondent no.4 is frivolous, as he has no right in the land offered by the petitioner for constructing the retail outlet. It has been further contended that the respondent no.4 is the Bhumidhar of Khata No.2 and has no concern with the land of the petitioner which is Khata No.6. In this connection, relevant revenue records have been filed by the petitioner which is annexed as Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition. It has been further contended that the respondent no.4 is the Bhumidhar of Khata No.2 and has no concern with the land of the petitioner which is Khata No.6. In this connection, relevant revenue records have been filed by the petitioner which is annexed as Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition. It has been also contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that so far as complaint of the respondent no.4 that some dispute is pending before the Revenue Court is bogus in as much as the land on which the outlet is being installed was purchased by Amresh Chand, Subhash Chand and Rohit Tiwari from Amravati Devi, the only daughter and legal heir of Ram Jiyut, the recorded tenure holder. After the land was purchased by Amresh Chand and others, their name were also mutated in the revenue records and the proceedings for mutation was contested by the respondent no.4 and his brothers challenging the right of Amaravati to transfer the land which was ultimately decided in favour of the Amresh Chand and others. It has also been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that after a lapse of 15 years from the date on which the proceedings relating to mutation were finalised, a restoration application was filed by the respondent no.4 in the court of Additional Commissioner, Mirzapur on 7.9.2020 on frivolous ground. 6. Amresh Chand and others, bhumidhar of land of Khata No.6 filed an application under section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 and the Competent Authority namely Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghoraval, District-Sonbhadra vide order dated 13.6.2019 has declared the land of Khata No.6 as non-agricultural land free from land revenue. In that case too, a frivolous restoration application was filed by the respondent no.4 which was dismissed by the Competent Authority on 8.10.2020 (copy of the order has been filed as Annexure 14 to the writ petition). 7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4 contended that the property in dispute belong to one Harihar Ram who had two sons namely Ram Jiyut and Govind. Ram Jiyut had one daughter Amravati while Govind had three sons namely Anil Kumar, Shyam Bihari (respondent no.4) and Avadh Bihari. After the death of Harihar Ram, the landed property was divided between his sons, namely Ram Jiyut and Govind. Ram Jiyut had one daughter Amravati while Govind had three sons namely Anil Kumar, Shyam Bihari (respondent no.4) and Avadh Bihari. After the death of Harihar Ram, the landed property was divided between his sons, namely Ram Jiyut and Govind. After the marriage of Amravati, daughter of Ram Jiyut, he was looked after by the respondent no.4 and his other real brothers and as Ram Jiyut was happy with the respondent no.4, he executed a registered will dated 16.12.1997 in respect of his entire landed property, including the land, which is subject matter in the present case in favour of respondent no.4 and his other real brothers, namely Anil Kumar and Avadh Bihari. Amravati along with others have signed the will executed by Ram Jiyut as a witness to the aforesaid will. After the death of Ram Jiyut, respondent no.4 and his other real brothers have filed a case No. 71/660 of 1998 and case No.71/660A of 1998 under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act for recording their name in the revenue records in place of Ram Jiyut in the agricultural properties left by Ram Jiyut. In the aforesaid case, the notices were issued and after receiving the notices, Amaravati daughter of Ram Jiyut filed objections which was registered as Case No. 71/660 of 1998 and case No.71/660A of 1998 claiming succession, being the real daughter of deceased Ram Jiyut. Both the aforesaid cases were decided by a common judgement dated 20.1.2005 passed by the Tehsildar, Sonbhadra. The claim of the petitioner and his other real brothers was rejected by Tehsildar, Sonbhadra vide order dated 20.1.2005 and the claim of Amravati Devi was accepted and it was directed that the name of Amravati be recorded as Bhumidhar in place of Ram Jiyut. It was further contended that during the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings under section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, Amravati executed an agreement to sale dated 8.6.2001 in favour of Amresh Chand Tiwari, Subhash Chand Tiwari and Dinesh Chand Tiwari, all sons of Basant Lal in respect of property in dispute. Against the order dated 20.1.2005 passed by the Tehsildar, Sonbhadra, rejecting the claim of the respondent no.4 and his brothers, an appeal No.34 of 2004-05 under section 210 of the Land Revenue Act was filed before the court of Sub Divisional Officer, Sonbhadra. Against the order dated 20.1.2005 passed by the Tehsildar, Sonbhadra, rejecting the claim of the respondent no.4 and his brothers, an appeal No.34 of 2004-05 under section 210 of the Land Revenue Act was filed before the court of Sub Divisional Officer, Sonbhadra. In the aforesaid appeal an interim order dated 10.3.2005 was passed by Sub Divisional Officer, Sonbhadra staying the order dated 20.01.2005. By another order dated 21.03.2005, the Sub Divisional Officer, concerned summoned the lower court record. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that against the order dated 21.3.2005 passed in appeal No.34 of 2004-05 under section 210 of the Land Revenue Act, the agreement holders namely Amresh Chand Tiwari, Subhash Chand Tiwari and Dinesh Chand Tiwari filed a Revision No.122/21 of 2005 under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act before the Commissioner, Mirzapur. During the pendency of Revision No.122/21 of 2005, a fake compromise was prepared on 10.8.2005 and was produced in the court of Commissioner, Mirzapur on 16.8.2005. In the said compromise, signatures of the respondent no.4, were fraudulently made by some imposter as the respondent no.4 was present at his posting place situated at a long distance that is Jorhat (State of Assam). By order dated 24.8.2005, the Commissioner, Mirzapur decided the revision in terms of the fake compromise behind the back of the respondent No. 4. True copy of the order dated 24.8.2005 deciding the revision is filed as Annexure No.8 to the counter affidavit. It has been further contended by learned counsel for the respondent that after the order dated 24.8.2005, the agreement holders namely Amresh ChandTiwari, Subhash Chand Tiwari, Dinesh Chand Tiwari leased out the land to the petitioner vide a lease dated 17.7.2020 for establishing the petrol pump for a period of 29 years 11 months. When the respondent no.4 came to know about these facts , he moved a recall application on 7.9.2020 for recalling the order dated 24.8.2005 passed in Revision No.122/21-2005 under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The aforesaid recall application was rejected by the Additional Commissioner, Mirzapur on the ground of delay vide its order dated 3.3.2021. Against the order dated 3.3.2021 rejecting the recall application filed by respondent no.4 by the Additional Commissioner, the respondent no.4 has filed Revision No. 759 of 2021 before the Board of Revenue, Prayagraj. The aforesaid recall application was rejected by the Additional Commissioner, Mirzapur on the ground of delay vide its order dated 3.3.2021. Against the order dated 3.3.2021 rejecting the recall application filed by respondent no.4 by the Additional Commissioner, the respondent no.4 has filed Revision No. 759 of 2021 before the Board of Revenue, Prayagraj. It has also been brought on record by means of a supplementary affidavit that the revision so filed by the respondent no.4 before the Board of Revenue was allowed vide a judgment and order dated 8.10.2021 and by the aforesaid order, the Board of Revenue has set aside the order dated 3.3.2021 passed by Additional Commissioner, Mirzapur, order dated 21.3.2005 passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ghorawal, Sonbhadra and order dated 20.1.2005 passed by Tehsildar, Ghorawal, Sonbhadra and remanded the matter to the trial court i.e. Tehsildar, Ghorawal, Sonbhadra to decide afresh within a period of six months. 9. It has been further contended by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that as per paragraph No.13 of the No Objection Certificate, in case any dispute is pending before any court in respect to the land where outlet is to be established, the No Objection Certificate will be deemed to be cancelled. Since, there is a dispute pending regarding the land in dispute between the petitioner and the respondent no.4, therefore, the respondent No.3 has rightly cancelled the No Objection Certificate. 10. The learned counsel for respondent no.4 as well as counsel appearing for the respondent nos.1 and 2 and learned Standing counsel appearing for the respondent no.3 contended that the order dated 18.11.2020 passed by the respondent no.3 cancelling the No Objection Certificate granted earlier was passed in exercise of powers under Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 and the petitioner has a statutory alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 154(2) of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 and, as such, the present writ petition is not maintainable. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply has submitted that against the order dated 8.10.2021 passed by the Board of Revenue, a writ petition has been filed by the petitioner being Writ Petition No.2185 of 2021 and in the aforesaid writ petition by means of interim order dated 3.1.2022, the Hon’ble High Court has stayed the order dated 8.10.2021 passed by the Board of Revenue and the aforesaid writ petition is pending. It was further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that after the order dated 20.01.2005 passed by the Tehsildar, Ghorawal, Amravati executed sale deed dated 24.01.2005 in favour of Amresh Chand and others. After execution of sale deed, Amresh Chand and others intervened in mutation proceeding and during pendency of proceedings, respondent No.4 and his brothers compromised the matter and accepted the claim of Amravati and sale deed executed by Amravati. Thereafter name of Amresh Chand and others was mutated in revenue records. The respondent no.4 did not take any steps till the year 2020 and it was only when the retail outlet was allotted to the petitioner and a request for No Objection Certificate was made, the respondent no.4 has moved an application for recall of order on frivolous grounds. Other brothers of respondent no.4 did not join the respondent in filing the recall application and have accepted the compromise. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that after the interim order was granted by this Hon’ble Court vide order dated 20.1.2021, the respondent no.3, the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra has passed an order dated 17.2.2021 by which the No Objection Certificate dated 13.10.2020 was revived till further order and the order dated 17.1.2021 was made subject to final order passed in Writ Petition No. 26239 of 2022 (the present writ petition). It has been further contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that as the No Objection Certificate was revived, the petitioner has invested a huge amount in establishing the retail outlet and the same is being run by the petitioner. 12. It has also been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the present writ petition was entertained by this Court, affidavits have been exchanged by the parties and as there is no factual controversy in the matter in dispute, no useful purpose will be served by relegating the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy after the lapse of three years. So far as maintainability of the present petitioner on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the order impugned has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the availability of alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 154(2) of 2002 Rules will not be a bar for entertaining the present writ petition. 13. 13. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be appropriate to look into the provisions of law under which the No Objection Certificate is being granted. In this connection, it will be relevant to note that section 3 of the Petroleum Act, 1934 provides that no person shall import, transport or store, any petroleum save in accordance with the rules made under section 4. Section 3 of the Petroleum Act, 1934 is quoted as under:- 3. Import, transport and storage of petroleum.— (1) No one shall import, transport or store any petroleum save in accordance with the rules made under section 4. (2) Save in accordance with the conditions of any licence for the purpose which he may be required to obtain by rules made under section 4, no one shall import [petroleum Class A], and no one shall transport or store any petroleum. 14. Section 4 of the Petroleum Act, 1934 provides for rules for the import, transport and storage of petroleum. Section 4 of the Petroleum Act, 1934 is quoted as under : 4. Rules for the import, transport and storage of petroleum.— The [Central Government] may make rules— (a) ……. (b) ……. (c) ……. (d) ……. (e) ……. (f) regulating the places at which and prescribing the conditions subject to which petroleum may be stored; (g) specifying the nature, situation and condition of all receptacles in which petroleum may be stored; (h) prescribing the form and conditions of licences for the import of 12 [petroleum Class A], and for the transport or storages of any petroleum, the manner in which applications for such licences shall be made, the authorities which may grant such licences and the fees which may be charged for such licences; (i) ……. (j) ……. (k) ……. (l) ……. 15. (j) ……. (k) ……. (l) ……. 15. Clause (f), (g) and (h) of Section 4 of the Petroleum Act, 1934 provides that the Central Government may make rules regulating the places at which and prescribing the conditions subject to which petroleum be stored, specifying the nature, situation and condition of all receptacles in which petroleum be store, prescribing the form and conditions of licenses for the import of (petroleum Class A), and for the transport or storage of any petroleum, the manner in which applications for such licenses shall be made, the authorities which may grant such licenses and the fees which may be treated for such licences. 16. In exercise of powers conferred under Section 4 of the Petroleum Act, 1934, Petroleum Rules, 2002 has been framed by the Government of India. Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 provides for grant of No Objection Certificate. Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 is quoted as under:- 144. No-objection certificate.—(1) Where the licensing authority is the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, an applicant for a new licence other than a licence in Forms III, XI, XVII, XVIII or XIX shall apply to the District Authority with two copies of the site-plan showing the location of the premises proposed to be licensed for a certificate to the effect that there is no objection, to the applicant receiving a licence for the site proposed and the District Authority shall, if he sees no objection, grant such certificate to the applicant who shall forward it to the licensing authority with his application Form IX. (2) Every certificate issued by the District Authority under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of the plan of the proposed site duly endorsed by him under his official seal. (3) The Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, may refer an application not accompanied by certificate granted under sub-rule (1) to the District Authority for his observations. (4) If the District Authority, either on a reference being made to him or otherwise, intimates, to the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, that any licence which has been applied for should not, in his opinion, be granted, such licence shall not be issued without the sanction of the Central Government. (4) If the District Authority, either on a reference being made to him or otherwise, intimates, to the Chief Controller or the Controller, as the case may be, that any licence which has been applied for should not, in his opinion, be granted, such licence shall not be issued without the sanction of the Central Government. (5) The District Authority shall complete his inquiry for issuing no objection certificate (NOC) under sub-rule (1) and shall complete the action for issue or refusal of the NOC, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of receipt of application by him. (6) Where the location of storage of petroleum is within the notified area of a Port or Airport under the control of the state, or establishment of Indian Space Research Organisation or Department of Atomic Energy, NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE from the District Authority referred to in sub-rules (1) to (5) shall not be required : Provided that consent for establishment of petroleum storage from the competent authority of concerned notified area or head of the establishment, as the case may be, is obtained. (7) The district authority shall issue a no objection certificate in the following proforma, namely : PROFORMA NO OBJECTION CERTIFICATE (See rule 144) No…………. Date……….. Subject:-No objection certificate With reference to the application No……….dated………..submitted by……….and in pursuance of rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, there is no objection for granting licence under the Petroleum Rules, 2002 to Shri/Smt./M/s…………address………...for storage of petroleum products in their premises at Survey No……….../Gat No…………/Khasra No………..Plot No………… Village………….Taluka/Tehsil………….District………….State ………...as shown in the site plan duly endorsed and enclosed herewith. Date……….. Subject:-No objection certificate With reference to the application No……….dated………..submitted by……….and in pursuance of rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, there is no objection for granting licence under the Petroleum Rules, 2002 to Shri/Smt./M/s…………address………...for storage of petroleum products in their premises at Survey No……….../Gat No…………/Khasra No………..Plot No………… Village………….Taluka/Tehsil………….District………….State ………...as shown in the site plan duly endorsed and enclosed herewith. (1) The following particulars have been considered while issuing this no objection certificate, that- (a) possession of the site by the applicant is lawful and authorisation from land owner or lease holder for developing premises under these rules for storage of petroleum products; (b) interest of public, specially the facilities like schools, hospitals or proximity to places of public assembly and the mitigating measures, if any, is provided; (c) traffic density and impact on traffic; (d) conformity of proposal to the local or area development planning; (e) accessibility of the site to fire tenders in case of emergency and preparedness of fire services for combating the emergencies; (f) genuineness of purpose; (g) any other matter pertinent to public safety; Signature of the district authority issuing no objection certificate with his office seal (in towns having a Commissioner of Police, the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner of Police and for any other place the District Magistrate). Note.-The licensing authority shall accept the no objection certificate within a period of three years from the date of its issue for considering grant of licence.] 17. Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 provides for cancellation of No Objection Certificate. Rule 150 of the petroleum rules is quoted as under:- 150. Cancellation of no-objection certificate.—(1) A no-objection certificate granted under rule 144 shall be liable to be cancelled by the District Authority or the State Government, if the District Authority or the State Government is satisfied, that the licensee has ceased to have any right to use the site for storing petroleum: Provided that before cancelling a no-objection certificate, the licensee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) A District Authority or a State Government cancelling a no-objection certificate shall record, in writing, the reasons for such cancellation and shall immediately furnish to the licensee and to the licensing authority concerned, copy of the order cancelling the no-objection certificate. 18. Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 provides for appeals. (2) A District Authority or a State Government cancelling a no-objection certificate shall record, in writing, the reasons for such cancellation and shall immediately furnish to the licensee and to the licensing authority concerned, copy of the order cancelling the no-objection certificate. 18. Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 provides for appeals. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 154, an appeal against any order of the District Authority, refusing to grant or cancelling a No Objection Certificate shall lie to the authority which is immediately superior to the said District Authority. Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 is quoted as under : 154. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie against any order refusing to grant, amend or renew a licence cancelling or suspending a licence to— (i) ……. (ii) ……. (iii) ……. (iv) ……. (2) An appeal against any order of the District Authority refusing to grant or cancelling a no-objection certificate shall lie to the authority which is immediately superior to the said District Authority. (3) Every appeal shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against and shall be presented within sixty days of the order passed. 1[(4) The Appellate Authority shall dispose of the appeal within 60 days of receipt of the appeal] 19. There is no dispute that sub-rule (2) of Rule 154 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 provides for an appeal against the order of the District Authority, cancelling the No Objection Certificate, which is statuary in nature. It is equally well settled that the availability of an alternative remedy does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining the writ petition in appropriate cases. Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in case of State of UP Vs. Mohammad Nooh reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 in paragraph Nos.10 and 11 has held as under : 10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. In the King v. Postmaster General Ex parte Car-michael, (1928) 1 KB 291, a certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the superior court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex v.Wadsworth Justices Ex parte Read, (1942) 1 KB 281 is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction. At page 284 Viscount Caldecote C.J. observed: "It remains to consider the argument that the remedy of certiorari is not open to the applicant because others were available. It would be ludicrous in such a case as the present for the convicted person to ask for a case to be stated. It would mean asking this court to consider as a question of law whether justices were right in convicting a man without hearing his evidence. That is so extravagant an argument as not to merit a moment's consideration. It would mean asking this court to consider as a question of law whether justices were right in convicting a man without hearing his evidence. That is so extravagant an argument as not to merit a moment's consideration. As to the right of appeal to quarter sessions, it may be that the applicant could have had his remedy if he had pursued that course, but I am not aware of any reason why, if in such circumstances as these, he preferred to apply for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction, the court should be debarred from granting his application." Likewise in Khurshed Modi v. Rent Controller, Bombay AIR (1947) Bom 46, it was held that the High Court would not refuse to issue a writ of certiorari merely because there was a right of appeal. It was recognized that ordinarily the High Court would require the petitioner to have recourse to his ordinary remedies, but if it found that there had been a breach of fundamental principles of justice, the High Court would certainly not hesitate to issue the writ of certiorari. To the same effect are the following observations of Harries C.J. in Assistant Collector of Customs v. Soorajmull Nagarmul (1952) 56 CWN 453, 467 at page 470: "There can, I think, be no doubt that Court can refuse to issue a certiorari if the petitioner has other remedies equally convenient and effective. But it appears to me that there can be cases where the court can and should issue a certiorari even where such alternative remedies are available. Where a Court or Tribunal, which is called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions discards all rules of natural justice and arrives at a decision contrary to all accepted principles of justice then it appears to me that the court can and must interfere." It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari. (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 14, art. 40, p. 189). (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 14, art. 40, p. 189). If, therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the superior court to issue a writ of certiorari to correct the errors of an inferior court or tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions and not to relegate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the superior court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal, e.g., by furnishing security required by the statute, should it then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the superior court must deny the writ when an inferior court or tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior court or tribunal on appeal or revision? The case of In re, Authers (1889) LR 22 QBD 345 referred to in Janardan Reddy's case, (1951) SCR 344 furnishes the answer. There the manager of a club was convicted under a certain statute for selling beer by retail without an excise retail license. Subsequently he was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, namely, beer without a license under another statute. Upon hearing of the later charge the magistrate treated it as a second offence and imposed a full penalty authorised in the case of a second offence by the latter statute. His appeal to the quarter sessions having been dismissed, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus and it was granted by the King's Bench Division on the ground that the magistrate could not treat the later offence as a second offence, because it was not a second offence under the Act under which he was convicted for the second time. Evidently the point was taken that if there had been any error, irregularity or illegality committed by the magistrate, the quarter sessions could have on appeal corrected the same and that the quarter sessions having dismissed the appeal the court of Queen's Bench Division could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. Evidently the point was taken that if there had been any error, irregularity or illegality committed by the magistrate, the quarter sessions could have on appeal corrected the same and that the quarter sessions having dismissed the appeal the court of Queen's Bench Division could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. This was repelled by the following observation of Hawkins J.: "This is true as a fact, but it puts the prosecution in no better position, for if the magistrate had no power to give himself jurisdiction by finding that there had been a first offence where there had been none, the justices could not give it to him." 11. On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases-and the instant case is in point-where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court's sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that. 20. The superior court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that. 20. Again the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , (in Paragraph Nos.14 and 15 of the Judgment at Page 9 & 10) has held that alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of principle of natural justice or where order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Paragraph Nos. 14 and 15 of the judgment in case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra) is quoted as under : 14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”. 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of principle of natural justice or where order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” 21. Recently in case of Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd and another Vs. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Ltd and another reported in (2021) 6 SCC 15 , (in paragraph 67 of the judgment at Page 52), the Apex Court has held as under : 67. It is well settled that availability of an alternative remedy does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining a writ petition in an appropriate case. The High Court may entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy, particularly (1) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (iv) the vires of an Act is under challenge. Reference may be made to Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 and Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation and Ors Vs. Gayatri Construction Company and Ors, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 172 , cited on behalf of Respondent No.1. 22. Again in case of Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Ltd through the Authorised Signatory Vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd through the Director and others reported in (2021) 9 SCC 657 (in Paragraph 137 at Page 726), the Apex Court has reiterated the same which is quoted as under :- “137. As held by this Court in catena of cases including in the cases of Babu Ram Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zilla Parishad Muzaffar Nagar reported in AIR 1969 SC 556 , Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai & Ors. Reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 , Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. Reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 308 and recently in the case of Kalpraj Dharamshi Vs. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., that non exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is a rule of self-restraint. Reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337, Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 308 and recently in the case of Kalpraj Dharamshi Vs. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., that non exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 is a rule of self-restraint. It has been consistently held that the alternate remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, (1) where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (2) where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice; and (3) where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.” 23. Coming to the facts of the present case in paragraph Nos. 15, 18, it has been stated by the petitioner that prior to passing of the order impugned dated 18.11.2020, no notice was given to the petitioner. It was also stated in paragraph No.16 that petitioner was not supplied a copy of the complaint before cancelling the No Objection Certificate. In paragraph No.17, it has been stated that the order is liable to be set aside on the ground of arbitrariness and non-observance of principles of natural justice as enshrined under Article 14 of Constitution of India. From perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that there is not even whisper that petitioner was heard before passing the order impugned. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra respondent no.3, the aforesaid pleadings made by the petitioner has not been specifically denied and there is no mention in the counter affidavit that before passing the order impugned dated 18.11.2020 any notice or opportunity was given to the petitioner. In the counter affidavit, the stand taken by the State is that since in the No Objection Certificate, it was mentioned by the then District Magistrate that if any dispute is pending before any Court in respect of the land, the No Objection Certificate would stand cancelled automatically. Thus from the pleadings exchanged between the parties, it is apparent that before cancelling the No Objection Certificate, the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, respondent no.3 has failed to observe the principles of natural justice as no notice was issued to the petitioner before passing the order of cancellation. Thus from the pleadings exchanged between the parties, it is apparent that before cancelling the No Objection Certificate, the District Magistrate, Sonbhadra, respondent no.3 has failed to observe the principles of natural justice as no notice was issued to the petitioner before passing the order of cancellation. Further, as per the proviso to Rule 150 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, which provides for cancellation of No Objection Certificate makes it mandatory that before cancelling the No Objection Certificate, the licensee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The respondent no.3 has also failed to observe the statutory mandate of giving opportunity to the petitioner before cancelling the No Objection Certificate as provided in proviso to the Petroleum Rules, 2002. 24. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion that relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy would serve no purpose. Further more this petition was filed in the year 2020 and an interim order was also granted by this Court at the time of admission. Pleadings have been exchanged by the parties, therefore there will be no justification for relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy. 25. In case of Chiraunji Lal Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in 2002 (2) AWC 946 , the Division Bench of this Court has held (Paragraph Nos.6 and 7 of the judgment at Page 947) relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of L. Hirday Narain Vs. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly reported in AIR (1971) SCC 33 that since petition remained pending for eight years and, therefore, it would not be in the interest of justice to throw out the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. Paragraph Nos.6 and 7 of the judgment are quoted as under:- “6. So far as the question of relegating the writ petitioner-appellant to the alternative remedy available under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, we find that the writ petition was filed in the year 1991 and remained pending before this Court for 8 years and, therefore, it would not be in the interest of justice to throw out the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. In the case of L. Hirday Narain, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows : “12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appellable. In the case of L. Hirday Narain, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows : “12. An order under Section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appellable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because as the date on which the petition was moved the period prescribed by Section 33A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of the Income-tax Officer under Section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits.” 7. The above principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are fully applicable in the present case. Moreover, no disputed questions of fact are involved in the present case and only interpretation of the Government order is to be made. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge was not justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy and ought to have decided it on merits.” 26. It is also to be mentioned that at the time when the writ petition was entertained, learned Counsel for the respondents were allowed time to file counter affidavit and at that time, the objection as to availability of alternative remedy was not raised and, therefore, now, after exchange of pleadings, after hearing the arguments on merit, having come to the conclusion that the impugned exercise is vitiated, there appears to be no justification for relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy as provided under sub-rule (2) of Rule 154 of Petroleum Rules, 2002. Even in the counter affidavit, filed by the opposite parties, no such plea of alternative remedy has been taken. After exchange of pleadings at the stage of hearing, dismissal of writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy would not be justified, particularly when the impugned order is non-est in the eyes of law on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. 27. After exchange of pleadings at the stage of hearing, dismissal of writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy would not be justified, particularly when the impugned order is non-est in the eyes of law on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. 27. So far as the contention regarding the pendency of litigation before this court as well as other forum, we are not inclined to go into the aforesaid questions in the present proceedings. The restoration application was filed after a lapse of 15 years and prima facie appears to be an attempt to keep the litigation alive. In case, the said proceedings are decided finally in favour of respondent no.4, it shall be open to him to apply afresh for cancellation of the No Objection Certificate. We further clarify that the observations made above will not influence the pending litigation between the parties. At this stage, when in pursuance of interim order of this Court, the petitioner has established a retail outlet and is running the same after incurring huge expenses and this fact has not been denied by the respondents, we find absolutely no ground to cancel the No Objection Certificate. 28. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 18.11.2020 passed by respondent no.3, District Magistrate, Sonbhadra is hereby quashed. 29. No order as to cost.