ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Initially, the writ petitioner had filed this petition calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 09.03.2019 (Annexure P/1) by which the services of the respondent No. 9 has been absorbed on the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology) in accordance with sub-rule (4) of Rule 6 of the Chhattisgarh Chikitsa Shiksha (Rajpatrit) Tatha Sewa Bharti Niyam, 2013 (for short, the Rules of 2013) and further claimed a relief that appropriate action be taken against the erring officers including the respondent No. 8, who are instrumental in appointing the respondent No. 9 on the post of Associate Professor. 2. On 13.01.2021, the question with regard to maintainability of the writ petition was raised on the ground that in a service matter, PIL is not maintainable pursuant to which the petitioner filed an application for amendment in the writ petition which was ultimately allowed on 02.07.2021. Accordingly, the petitioner now claims that appropriate writ in nature of quo warranto be issued ousting the respondent No. 9 from the post of Associate Professor of (Ophthalmology). 3. Return has been filed on behalf of the respondents No. 1 to 7/State on 16.11.2021 stating that in the service matter, PIL is not maintainable and it was also pleaded that the pre-requisite for issuance of writ of quo warranto is not fulfilled and present petition is bad and liable to be dismissed and furthermore, it has also been pleaded that as per the Rules of 2013, the State Government has been conferred with the power to relax any of the provisions of the said Rules by virtue of Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 2013, and relaxing the said rules, respondent No. 9 has been absorbed on the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology) and the said Rules have not been questioned and as such, the instant petition in the shape of PIL which has subsequently been converted into a writ petition seeking a writ of quo warranto is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 4. The respondent No. 9 has also filed her return on 08.12.2021 stating amongst others, that there is no public interest involved in this petition and it is not aimed for redressal of genuine public harm or injury. 4. The respondent No. 9 has also filed her return on 08.12.2021 stating amongst others, that there is no public interest involved in this petition and it is not aimed for redressal of genuine public harm or injury. The petitioner has no locus to challenge the appointment/absorption of the petitioner on the post of Associate Professor as the respondent No. 9 fulfills all the eligibility criteria required for appointment on the said post. Submissions 5. Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the appointment of respondent No. 9 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of 2013. The respondent No. 9 could not have been absorbed on the post of Associate Professor without issuing any advertisement and without following the due process of law, as such, it is a fit case where a writ of quo warranto be issued against the respondent No. 9 ousting her from the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology). 6. Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents No. 1 to 7 as well as Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Sourabh Sahu, learned counsel for the respondent No. 9 would submit that in service matter, PIL is not maintainable. In support of their contention, they have relied upon decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. They would further submit that for seeking a writ of quo warranto, a person whose appointment is challenged must not have the eligibility to hold the post and only that aspect can be looked into, but the petitioner has not made any pleading that the respondent No. 9 was not eligible to be appointed on the post of Associate Professor, whereas, she was having the eligibility for holding the said post. She has rightly been absorbed/appointed on the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology). As such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the record with utmost circumspection. Public Interest Litigation in Service matter 8. It is not in dispute that in service matter, PIL is not maintainable as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Others, (1998) 7 SCC 273 , Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 , Dr. Public Interest Litigation in Service matter 8. It is not in dispute that in service matter, PIL is not maintainable as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & Others v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Others, (1998) 7 SCC 273 , Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 , Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India, (2004) 3 SCC 363 , Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 5 SCC 136 , B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees Association & Others, (2006) 11 SCC 731 , Neetu v. State of Punjab, (2007) 10 SCC 614 , Seema Dharmdhere, Secretary, Maharashtra Public Service Commission v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC 290 , Girijesh Shrivastava & Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, (2010) 10 SCC 707 , Bholanath Mukherjee & Others v. Ramkrishna Mission Vivekananda Centenary College & Others, (2011) 5 SCC 464 , and Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra & Others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 and consequently, the petitioner has amended the writ petition and sought a writ of quo warranto. 9. Now, the question is, whether the petitioner has made out a case for issuance of a writ of quo warranto? Since the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of quo warranto, therefore, we deem it appropriate to notice the meaning of “quo warranto”. Meaning of quo warranto: - 10. According to the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, “Quo Warranto is a writ that lies against a person who usurps any franchise, liberty or office.” 11. Corpus Juris Secundem defines quo warranto as follows: - “Quo Warranto is a proceeding to determine the right to the exercise of franchise or office and to oust the holder if his claim is not well-founded or if he has forfeited his right.” 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth Edition Reissue Volume-I, para 265, this writ has been defined as follows: - “An information in the nature of quo warranto took the place of obsolete writ of quo warranto which is against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty to enquire by what authority he supported his claim in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined.” 13. In the words of Spelling, Injunction and other Remedies, Vol.2, page 1516, ““Quo warranto” is the remedy or proceeding where the state inquires into the legality of the claim which a party asserts to an office or franchise, and to oust him from its enjoyment if the claim be not well founded, or to have the same declared forfeited and recover it, if, having once been rightfully possessed and enjoyed, it has become forfeited for misuser or nonuser.” 14. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 35A (page 647) “The writ of “quo warranto” is not a substitute for mandamus or injunction nor for an appeal or writ of error, and is not to be used to prevent an improper exercise of power lawfully possessed, and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer or corporation or persons purporting to act as such from usurping a power which they do not have.” Principles of law governing issuance of writ of quo warranto: - 15. It has been held that a writ of quo warranto will be issued in respect of an office, only if the following conditions are satisfied, firstly that office must be public, secondly it must have been created by a statute or by the Constitution itself, thirdly the office must be of substantive character, an office independent in title, fourthly the respondent must have asserted his claim to the office and lastly that the respondent is not legally qualified. 16. The first reported case in India of quo warranto was Corkhill, Re., ILR (1895) 22 Cal 717. It was a case of show cause why the incumbent to the office of Commissioner of Corporation should not cease to as such on the ground that he was not voted by qualified voters. On merits, the application was dismissed. The other case is Banwarilal Roy, Re, (1944) 48 CWN 766 which was allowed by the High Court, but set aside by the Privy Council on the ground that the writ was issued beyond Presidency Town, i.e., for a mofussil area. 17. On merits, the application was dismissed. The other case is Banwarilal Roy, Re, (1944) 48 CWN 766 which was allowed by the High Court, but set aside by the Privy Council on the ground that the writ was issued beyond Presidency Town, i.e., for a mofussil area. 17. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of The University of Mysore and another v. C.D. Govinda Rao and another, AIR 1965 SC 491 : (1964) 4 SCR 575 while dealing with the nature of writ of quo warranto has held in no uncertain terms that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority. The object of the writ qua-public office has been explained by Their Lordships as under: - “7. ... Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the enquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.” 18. In the matter of B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N., (2001) 7 SCC 231 : AIR 2001 SC 3435 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court after referring to the Halsbury's Laws of England, Words and Phrases and leading decisions on the point have observed that a writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against the person who is not entitled to an office of public nature and is only a usurper in office, that it directed to such person to show by what authority he was entitled to hold the office. It is pointed out that challenges can be made on various grounds, including the ground that the possession of the office does not fulfill the required qualifications or suffers from a disqualification, which debars him from holding the office. It has been further stated that if such person fails to do so, a writ of quo warranto shall be directed against him. 19. Similarly, in the matters of High Court of Gujarat and another v. Gujarat Kisan Mazdoor Panchayat and others, (2003) 4 SCC 712 and R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464 similar proposition of law has been propounded with regard to writ of quo warranto. 20. In the matter of Centre for PIL and another v. Union of India and another, (2011) 4 SCC 1 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the requisites and object of issuance of writ of quo warranto. Paragraph 51 of the report states as under:- “51. The procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. Paragraph 51 of the report states as under:- “51. The procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. Before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto he must satisfy the court inter alia that the office in question is a public office and it is held by a person without legal authority and that leads to the inquiry as to whether the appointment of the said person has been in accordance with law or not. A writ of quo warranto is issued to prevent a continued exercise of unlawful authority.” 21. Similarly, in the matter of Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal and others, (2013) 1 SCC 501 , it has been held that writ of quo warranto lies when appointment is made contrary to statutory provisions and laid down the test to issue a writ of quo warranto to see whether person holding the office is authorised to hold the same as per law. Thus, the petitioners seeking issuance of writ of quo warranto have to satisfy that the appointment of the private respondents is contrary to statutory rules and they lack eligibility. 22. In the matter of Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo and others, (2014) 1 SCC 161 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in no uncertain terms that writ of quo warranto can be issued only when person holding public office lacks eligibility or when appointment is contrary to statutory rules and held as under in paragraph 21: - “21. From the aforesaid exposition of law it is clear as noonday that the jurisdiction of the High Court while issuing a writ of quo warranto is a limited one and can only be issued when the person holding the public office lacks the eligibility criteria or when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. That apart, the concept of locus standi which is strictly applicable to service jurisprudence for the purpose of canvassing the legality or correctness of the action should not be allowed to have any entry, for such allowance is likely to exceed the limits of quo warranto which is impermissible. The basic purpose of a writ of quo warranto is to confer jurisdiction on the constitutional courts to see that a public office is not held by usurper without any legal authority.” 23. In a decision in the matter of Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India and others, (2009) 8 SCC 273 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have pointed out the distinction between “eligibility” and “suitability” and held that “eligibility” is based on objective factor and it is therefore liable to judicial review, but “suitability” pertains to realm of opinion and is therefore, not amenable to any judicial review, and held as under in paragraphs 39, 43 and 44: - “39. At this stage, we may state that, there is a basic difference between "eligibility" and "suitability". The process of judging the fitness of a person to be appointed as a High Court Judge falls in the realm of "suitability". Similarly, the process of consultation falls in the realm of suitability. On the other hand, eligibility at the threshold stage comes under Article 217(2)(b). This dichotomy between suitability and eligibility finds place in Article 217(1) in juxtaposition to Article 217(2). The word "consultation" finds place in Article 217(1) whereas the word "qualify" finds place in Article 217(2). 43. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. "Eligibility" is an objective factor. Who could be elevated is specifically answered by Article 217(2). When "eligibility" is put in question, it could fall within the scope of judicial review. However, the question as to who should be elevated, which essentially involves the aspect of "suitability", stands excluded from the purview of judicial review. 44. At this stage, we may highlight the fact that there is a vital difference between judicial review and merit review. Consultation, as stated above, forms part of the procedure to test the fitness of a person to be appointed a High Court Judge under Article 217(1). Once there is consultation, the content of that consultation is beyond the scope of judicial review, though lack of effective consultation could fall within the scope of judicial review. Consultation, as stated above, forms part of the procedure to test the fitness of a person to be appointed a High Court Judge under Article 217(1). Once there is consultation, the content of that consultation is beyond the scope of judicial review, though lack of effective consultation could fall within the scope of judicial review. This is the basic ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 and Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re, (1998) 7 SCC 739 .” Their Lordships further concluded that in case involving lack of eligibility, writ of quo warranto would certainly lie and observed in paragraphs 71 and 74 as under: - “71. "The overarching constitutional justification for judicial review, the vindication of the rule of law, remains constant, but mechanisms for giving effect to that justification vary". Mark Elliott "Judicial review must ultimately be justified by constitutional principle." Jowett In the present case, we are concerned with the mechanism for giving effect to the constitutional justification for judicial review. As stated above, "eligibility" is a matter of fact whereas "suitability" is a matter of opinion. In cases involving lack of "eligibility" writ of quo warranto would certainly lie. One reason being that "eligibility" is not a matter of subjectivity. However, "suitability" or "fitness" of a person to be appointed a High Court Judge: his character, his integrity, his competence and the like are matters of opinion. 74. It is important to note that each constitutional functionary involved in the participatory consultative process is given the task of discharging a participatory constitutional function; there is no question of hierarchy between these constitutional functionaries. Ultimately, the object of reading such participatory consultative process into the constitutional scheme is to limit judicial review restricting it to specified areas by introducing a judicial process in making of appointment(s) to the higher judiciary. These are the norms, apart from modalities, laid down in Supreme Court Advocateson-Record Assn. (supra) and also in the judgment in Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re. (supra). Consequently, judicial review lies only in two cases, namely, "lack of eligibility" and "lack of effective consultation". It will not lie on the content of consultation.” 24. These are the norms, apart from modalities, laid down in Supreme Court Advocateson-Record Assn. (supra) and also in the judgment in Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, Re. (supra). Consequently, judicial review lies only in two cases, namely, "lack of eligibility" and "lack of effective consultation". It will not lie on the content of consultation.” 24. In the matter of N. Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and others, (2009) 7 SCC 1 the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is not for the court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned and observed in paragraphs 134 and 139 as under: “134. Indisputably, a writ of quo warranto can be issued inter alia when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as has been held by this Court in High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat, (2003) 4 SCC 712 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 565 and R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1128 : (1993) 25 ATC 464. (See also Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana, (2002) 6 SCC 269 ) In Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 273 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1802, this Court has stated that it is not for the court to embark upon an investigation of its own to ascertain the qualifications of the person concerned. (See also Arun Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 9 SCC 375 .) We may furthermore notice that while examining if a person holds a public office under valid authority or not, the court is not concerned with technical grounds of delay or motive behind the challenge, since it is necessary to prevent continuance of usurpation of office or perpetuation of an illegality. [See Kashinath G. Jalmi (Dr.) v. Speaker, (1993) 2 SCC 703 .] 139. In R.K. Jain (supra), consultation by the executive which the Chief Justice having found to be not necessary, it was held that no case for issuance of writ of quo warranto has been made out, stating: (SCC p. 173, para 73) "73. Judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed of qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted whether fair, just and reasonable. Judicial review is concerned with whether the incumbent possessed of qualification for appointment and the manner in which the appointment came to be made or the procedure adopted whether fair, just and reasonable. Exercise of judicial review is to protect the citizen from the abuse of the power, etc. by an appropriate Government or department, etc. In our considered view granting the compliance with the above power of appointment was conferred on the executive and confided to be exercised wisely. When a candidate was found qualified and eligible and was accordingly appointed by the executive to hold an office as a Member or Vice-President or President of a Tribunal, we cannot sit over the choice of the selection, but it be left to the executive to select the personnel as per law or procedure in this behalf." In that case, it was held that no case for issuance of a writ of certiorari had been made out as a third party had no locus standi to canvass the legality or correctness of the action seeking for issuance of a writ of certiorari. Only public law declaration would be made at the behest of the appellant who was a public-spirited person.” 25. The judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra Gupta (supra) has been followed with approval by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of M. Manohar Reddy and another v. Union of India and others, (2013) 3 SCC 99 . 26. In the matter of Valsala Kumari Devi M. v. Director, Higher Secondary Education and others, (2007) 8 SCC 533 , the Supreme Court has defined the word “suitability” as under: - “The expression “suitability” means that a person to be appointed shall be legally eligible and “eligible” should be taken to mean “fit to be chosen”.” 27. Similarly, in the matter of Registrar General, High Court of Madras v. R. Gandhi and others, (2014) 11 SCC 547 , the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle of law laid down in Mahesh Chandra Gupta (supra) and held that judicial review is permissible only on assessment of eligibility and not on suitability of an appointee. 28. Similarly, in the matter of Registrar General, High Court of Madras v. R. Gandhi and others, (2014) 11 SCC 547 , the Supreme Court has reiterated the principle of law laid down in Mahesh Chandra Gupta (supra) and held that judicial review is permissible only on assessment of eligibility and not on suitability of an appointee. 28. In the matter of Renu and others v. District and Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi and another, (2014) 14 SCC 50 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated that for issuance of writ of quo warranto, the Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules and the person holding the post has no right to hold it, and observed as under: - “15. Where any such appointments are made, they can be challenged in the court of law. The quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a weapon to control the executive from making appointment to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to an enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. For issuance of writ of quo warranto, the Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules and the person holding the post has no right to hold it. For issuance of writ of quo warranto, the Court has to satisfy that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules and the person holding the post has no right to hold it. (Vide University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India, (1992) 2 SCC 428 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 561 : (1992) 20 ATC 239 : AIR 1992 SC 1213 , B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N., Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana, Arun Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 9 SCC 375 , Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto, (2010) 9 SCC 655 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 771, and Central Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo, (2014) 1 SCC 161 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 1.) 29. Recently, the Supreme Court in the matter of Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 6 SCC 162 has again examined the scope of writ of quo warranto by revisiting the law on the subject and held that writ of quo warranto has to be issued only when the Court is satisfied that the incumbent was not eligible at all as per the statutory provisions for being appointed or elected to the public office or that he/she has incurred disqualification to continue in the said office, which satisfaction should be founded on the indisputable facts and observed as under by cautioning the courts:- “39. We have adverted to some of those decisions in the earlier part of this judgment. Suffice, it to observe that unless the Court is satisfied that the incumbent was not eligible at all as per the statutory provisions for being appointed or elected to the public office or that he/she has incurred disqualification to continue in the said office, which satisfaction should be founded on the indisputable facts, the High Court ought not to entertain the prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto.” 30. Lastly, the Supreme Court, in the matter of State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, AIR 2022 SC 4902 reviewed the earlier case laws and held that a writ of quo warranto can be issued where appointment has not been made in accordance with law. 31. Lastly, the Supreme Court, in the matter of State of West Bengal v. Anindya Sundar Das, AIR 2022 SC 4902 reviewed the earlier case laws and held that a writ of quo warranto can be issued where appointment has not been made in accordance with law. 31. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down for issuance of a writ of quo warranto, a careful perusal of the writ petition would show that it is a case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 9 was appointed on a substantive post of Medical Officer by the State Government on 17.02.2006 in accordance with relevant rules and she was having lien on that post, and thereafter, by order dated 25.02.2010, she was appointed as Associate Professor (Ophthalmology) on contract basis as per Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Contract Appointment) Rules, 2012. Thereafter, by order dated 09.03.2019, she (respondent No. 9) was absorbed on the post of Associate Professor (Opthalmology), whereas, according to the writ petitioner, the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology) in a Medical College is a Class I post to be filled 100% by promotion by the Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission from among the regular Assistant Professor and as such, the petitioner only calls in question the appointment of the respondent No. 9 by absorption on the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology). The petitioner has neither pleaded in the writ petition nor during the course of argument has substantiated that the respondent No. 9 is not eligible to hold the post of Associate Professor. As such, the eligibility of respondent No. 9 for the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology) is not under challenge as there is no pleading at all in writ petition that respondent No. 9 is not eligible for the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology). What is under challenge is the mode and manner of her appointment by way of absorption, which, according to the State, by virtue of Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 2013, in exigency of service, appointment can be made by way of absorption. What is under challenge is the mode and manner of her appointment by way of absorption, which, according to the State, by virtue of Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 2013, in exigency of service, appointment can be made by way of absorption. The said Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 2013 clearly empowers the State Government to make appointment by way of absorption in exigency of service, which the State has demonstrated to have exercised Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 2013 in exigency of service, as such, the writ petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the respondent No. 9 lacks the eligibility for the post of Associate Professor (Ophthalmology), as such, there is no challenge to the eligibility of respondent No. 9 and we decline to entertain the writ petition as the petitioner has failed to make out clear case for issuance of writ of quo warranto following the principles of law laid down by Their Lordships of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Statement (Private) Ltd. v. H.R.Deb & Others, AIR 1968 SC 1495 , in which Their Lordships have clearly held that the High Court, in a quo warranto proceeding should be slow to pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringement of law. 32. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost.