ORDER : 1. The four petitioners herein have called in question the constitutional validity of the Rules known as the Chhattisgarh School Education Services (Educational and Administrative Cadre) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2019 (for short ‘the Rules of 2019’) impugning as being patently arbitrary, capricious and violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India in addition to it, being promulgated in ignorance of clauses 9 and 11 of the executive order dated 5-3-2019 issued by the General Administration Department of Chhattisgarh. 2. Since common question of law and fact is involved in both the writ petitions, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The petitioners have questioned the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Rules on the following factual backdrop: For the sake of convenience, W.P. (S) No. 4955/2020 is being taken-up as lead case. 4. The two petitioners herein were working as Head Masters with effect from 2-3-2012, earlier they were working with the Tribal Welfare Department, but now, they have been absorbed in the Department of School Education. It is their case that while working in the Tribal Welfare Department, they were governed by the Chhattisgarh Tribal and Scheduled Caste Development Department Educational Cadre (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules, 2011 (for short ‘the Rules of 2011’). It is their further case that the Explanation appended to Rule 15(1) of the Rules of 2011 has been held to be discriminatory and ultra-vires to the provisions of the Constitution of India by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 30-4-2014 passed in W.P. (S) No. 1407/2012 (Tilak Ram Mandavi and Another vs. State of CG and Others) and other connected writ petitions and it has further been held and further, liberty has been granted to frame fresh explanation/rule, however, it has been observed that till the rule is framed, the qualifying service of the Lecturers, who have been promoted from the post of Head Master will be taken from the date of their appointment as Head Master Middle School (Post Graduate). Furthermore, on 4-2-2019, again, another Division Bench of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 1305/2015 (Shikshak Sangh Nagar Palika Nigam Raipur vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others) and other connected writ petitions quashed the order dated 10-3-2015 whereby the State Government has directed for amalgamation of the services of the Tribal Cadre to the Education Department for uniformity in the standard of education wherein it has been held that even after such amalgamation, the employees belonging to Shikshak Cadre-A and Shikshak Cadre-B will be governed separately and establishment, promotion and all other benefits will be governed by the earlier rules and regulations. Thereafter, on 5-3-2019, order Annexure P-5 was issued by the State Government clearly stating in clause 9 that even after amalgamation, the employees belonging to Shikshak Cadre-E and Shikshak Cadre-T will be governed by their earlier promotions rules, but thereafter, on the same day, the Rules of 2019 were promulgated in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, whereby amalgamated recruitment rules were brought into force with effect from the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette i.e. 5-3-2019 and whereby the earlier promotion avenues available to the Lecturer/Head Master of the Tribal Department to the post of Principal have totally been changed and a new formula has been inserted on the experimental basis to the effect that a ratio of 65:25 has been made available. Further case of the petitioners is that promotion to the post of Principal will be made by 65% Lecturer and 25% Head Master even without ascertaining the consequences of the same to the effect that Junior Lecturer becomes Principal and Senior Head Master will face deprivation of the opportunity of promotion to the post of Principal despite being much more senior than the Junior Lecturer which will lead to administrative chaos and marring of the career prospect. Such a rule has been enacted while ignoring clauses 9 and 11 of the GAD order dated 5-3-2019 issued on the same date on which the Rules of 2019 were brought into force which leads to deprivation of promotional avenues to the petitioners, as such, the Rules of 2019 deserve to be declared ultra-vires. 5. Such a rule has been enacted while ignoring clauses 9 and 11 of the GAD order dated 5-3-2019 issued on the same date on which the Rules of 2019 were brought into force which leads to deprivation of promotional avenues to the petitioners, as such, the Rules of 2019 deserve to be declared ultra-vires. 5. Reply has been filed on behalf of the State/respondents stating inter-alia that the writ petition has been filed only on the basis of apprehension that upon coming into force of the Rules of 2019, Junior Lecturers would become Principal ahead of the petitioners and senior Head Masters would be deprived of promotion, but the petitioners have failed to place any material on record to support their case as no substantive pleadings have been made in this regard and it is well settled law that only the Government servant has right to be considered fairly in accordance with law, but they have no right to be promoted and even the chance of promotion is not a condition of service under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Serial No. 18 of Schedule II of the Rules of 2019 takes care of all the persons who were working on the post of Head Master. The said rules are more in relation for bringing equality amongst the persons having the requisite qualifications were given proper opportunity and equal treatment so as to get a chance of promotion and in the instant case, the Government has taken a policy decision of unifying the education cadre in the State by amalgamating the employees working in the Departments of Tribal Welfare, School Education, municipalities, etc. and for the same, effective mechanism has to be implemented so that none of the persons can remain in disadvantageous position with benefit to maximum. As such, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. 6. Rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioners reiterating their stand taken in the writ petition stating that the impugned notification issued by General Administration Department whereby joint/combined recruitment rules have been formulated for Head Masters and for the persons working in the Department of School Education and Tribal Welfare Department, is contrary to law and is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore it is liable to be struck down being unconstitutional. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Sunil Kumar Soni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, would submit that the Rules of 2019 promulgated with effect from 5-3-2019 are violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as the said Rules have been brought into force in ignorance of clauses 9 and 11 of the executive instructions issued on 5-3-2019 by which it has clearly been stated that even after amalgamation, employees belonging to Shikshak Cadre-B will be regulated by a separate establishment and promotion with all other benefits will also be governed by the earlier Rules of 2011. Furthermore, by the impugned Rule, the promotional avenues available particularly to the petitioners/Head Masters of the Tribal Department to the post of Principal have totally been changed and a new formula has been inserted on experimental basis to the effect that a ratio of 65:25 is made available which is clearly detrimental to the interest of the petitioners and would lead to deprivation of the opportunity of promotion to the post of Principal giving mar over the Junior Lecturers holding the post of Principal and thereby violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore it deserves to be struck down. 8. Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State/respondents, would support the impugned notification and submit that promulgation of the Rules of 2019 by the State Government is a matter of policy whereby the Rules of 2019 have been framed with an object sought to be achieved and virtually, by the Rules of 2019, the entire educational cadre in the State has been unified and brought under the umbrella of the consolidated Rules of 2019, as, earlier, there was categorisation of teachers as per the schools in the State Chhattisgarh under different departments viz. Municipal, Panchayat, Tribal, Education, etc. and teachers and staff of such schools were being governed by different set of Rules applicable to such departments and were governed as per the conditions of service provided therein. The learned State counsel would further submit that a policy decision has been taken by the State Government whereby all the schools have been taken-over by the School Education Department and for governing the services of all the teachers and employees, the present Rules of 2019 have been framed. The learned State counsel would further submit that a policy decision has been taken by the State Government whereby all the schools have been taken-over by the School Education Department and for governing the services of all the teachers and employees, the present Rules of 2019 have been framed. The petitioners initially belonged to the Department of Tribal Welfare and were governed by the Rules of 2011, however, subsequently, they have been absorbed and became the employees of the School Education Department and now, being governed by the Rules of 2019. At no earlier point of time, the petitioners have questioned the policy decision of the State Government nor have raised any objection to the absorption in the School Education Department and they have voluntarily accepted their absorption without any protest or demur and have now turned around and are making objections with respect to the Rules of 2019. The learned State counsel would also submit that the petitioners cannot challenge the Rules of 2019 on the apprehension that their promotional avenues will be affected as the said Rules are neither violative of any rights nor violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution and even otherwise, the chance of promotion is not a condition of service and therefore the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed and they have no merit. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. The petitioners have questioned the constitutional validity of the Rules of 2019 being violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Rules of 2019 have been promulgated by the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. 11. The power of declaring an Act of the Legislature to be invalid can be derived from the theory in jurisprudence of the eminent jurist Kelsen. In every country, there is a hierarchy of legal norms known as “ground-norms” (basic norms). In India, the ground-norms in the Indian Constitution in hierarchy is as under: (i) Constitution of India. (ii) Statutory Law which may be either law made by Parliament or by the State Legislature. (iii) Delegated legislation, which may be in the form of rules made under the Statute, regulation made under the Statute. In India, the ground-norms in the Indian Constitution in hierarchy is as under: (i) Constitution of India. (ii) Statutory Law which may be either law made by Parliament or by the State Legislature. (iii) Delegated legislation, which may be in the form of rules made under the Statute, regulation made under the Statute. (iv) Purely executive order not made under any Statute. 12. The first judgment laying down the principle that the Court has the power to declare a Statute unconstitutional was the well known decision of the US Supreme Court in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L Ed 60 : 5 US (I Cr) 137 (1803). The said principles have been followed thereafter in most countries including India. 13. The question that arises for consideration is how and when the power to declare the Statute/Rules/Regulation as unconstitutional/invalid/illegal should be exercised. The US Supreme Court in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 15 87 L Ed 1628 : 319 US 624 (1943) held that since this power prevents the full play of the democratic process, it is vital that it should be exercised with rigorous self-restraint. 14. The US Supreme Court enunciated the principle that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the Statute and the burden is always upon the person who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional provisions. The aforesaid principle has been adopted by the Constitution Bench of our Supreme Court in the matter of Charanjit Lal Choudhary vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1951 SC 41 and it has been held as under: “10. Prima-facie, the argument appears to be a plausible one, but it requires a careful examination, and, while examining it, two principles have to be borne in mind: (1) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual, in those cases where on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (2) that it is the accepted doctrine of the American courts, which I consider to be well-founded on principle, that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. A clear enunciation of this latter doctrine is to be found in Middleton vs. Texas Power and Light Company, 248 U.S. 152 and 157, in which the relevant passage runs as follows: “It must be presumed that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds.” 15. “Ut res magis valeat quam pereat” is a maxim which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void. It is an application of this principle that Courts while pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a Statute starts with a presumption in favour of constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the Statute within the competence of Legislature. 16. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Corporation of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 has held that a Statute has to be read so as to make it valid and if possible, an interpretation leading to a contrary position should be avoided, it has to be constructed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 17. Similar is the proposition of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Gujarat vs. R.A. Mehta, (2013) 3 SCC 1 wherein it has been held that Statute must be constructed in such a manner so as to make it workable and bearing in mind the legal maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” and it was observed as under: “98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. “The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative.” The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and “to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.” The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute.” 18. A Statute is construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” Therefore, a presumption is there that Legislature does not have jurisdiction and burden of establishing that the Act is not within the competence of the Legislature or that it transgressed other constitutional mandates, such as those relating to fundamental rights, it is always upon the person who challenges the vires. (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, Page 592) 19. It is a settled principle of law that the Statute enacted by the Parliament or State Legislature cannot be declared unconstitutional lightly. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. In the matter of State of A.P. vs. McDowell and Co. The Court must be able to hold beyond any iota of doubt that the violation of the constitutional provisions was so glaring that the legislative provisions under challenge cannot stand. In the matter of State of A.P. vs. McDowell and Co. (1996) 3 SCC 709 while considering the challenge to the central enactment, their Lordships held as under: “43. A law made by the Parliament or the Legislature can be struck down by courts on two grounds and two grounds alone, viz. (1) lack of legislative competence and (2) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-II of the Constitution or of any other constitutional provision. There is no third ground. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of the concepts of procedural unreasonableness and substantive unreasonableness-concepts inspired by the decisions of United States Supreme Court. Even in U.S.A. these concepts and in particular the concept of substantive due process have proved to be of unending controversy, the latest thinking tending towards a severe curtailment of this ground (substantive due process). The main criticism against the ground of substantive due process being that it seeks to set up the courts as arbiters of the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting the particular piece of legislation. It is enough for us to say that by whatever name it is characterized, the ground of invalidation must fall within the four corners of the two grounds mentioned above. In other words, say, if an enactment is challenged as violative of Article 14, it can be struck down only if it is found that it is violative of the equality clause/equal protection clause enshrined therein. Similarly, if an enactment is challenged as violative of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1), it can be struck down only if it is found not saved by any of the clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 and so on. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. The Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom.” 20. The principles of law applicable to judge the constitutional validity of the Statute are also applicable equally to test the constitutional validity of the Rules/subordinate legislation framed under the said Statute. If the rules go beyond the rule making power conferred by the Statute, the same has to be declared ultra-vires. If the rule supplants any provision for which power has not been conferred, it becomes ultra-vires. Therefore, in order to determine the validity/legality of the rules, the basic test is to determine and consider the source of power which is relatable to the rule. Similarly, a rule must be in consonance with the parent statute as it cannot travel beyond it and for this, reference may profitably be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief vs. Subhash Chandra Yadav, (1988) 2 SCC 351 wherein it has been held as under: “14........But before a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule. If either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void.” 21. Similarly, in the matter of Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs. State of H.P. (2000) 3 SCC 40 , their Lordships held as under: “13. It is very common for the legislature to provide for a general rule making power to carry out the purpose of the Act. When such a power is given, it may be permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see if the rules framed satisfy the test of having been so framed as to fall within the scope of such general power confirmed. When such a power is given, it may be permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see if the rules framed satisfy the test of having been so framed as to fall within the scope of such general power confirmed. If the rule making power is not expressed in such a usual general form then it shall have to be seen if the rules made are protected by the limits prescribed by the parent Act.” 22. In the matter of State of Tamil Nadu vs. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 it has been held as under: “16. The court considering the validity of a sub-ordinate Legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate Legislation conforms to the parent Statute. Where a Rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the Statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the Rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the Parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.” 23. In the matter of Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 the Supreme Court held that subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by the Statute passed by the competent legislature and referred to several grounds on which a subordinate legislation can be challenged as follows: “A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.” 24. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be questioned on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary.” 24. In the matter of Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of law as under: “Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra-vires the power granted and on relevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whether characterized as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be “reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.” See Leila Mourning vs. Family Publications Service, 411 US 356. If they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorized end or do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the objects of delegation, court might well say, “Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra-vires” per Lord Russel of Killowen, C.J. in Kruse vs. Johnson, (1898) 2 QB 91.” 25. In the matter of J.K. Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 13 SCC 673 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that Court while considering the constitutional validity of a rule, has to start with the presumption that the impugned rule is intra-vires and approach of the Court should be to save the rule from being declared ultra-vires. It was laid down as under: “129. Apart from the grounds referred to by this Court in the above judgment in Indian Express Newspapers ( AIR 1986 SC 515 ), it is important to bear in mind that where the validity of subordinate legislation is challenged, the question to be asked is whether the power given to the rule-making authority [in the present case the Central Government under Section 642(1) of the Companies Act] is exercised for the purpose for which it is given. Before reaching the conclusion that the rule is intra-vires (we have to begin with the presumption that the rule is intra-vires), the court has to examine the nature, object and the scheme of the legislation as a whole and in that context, the court has to consider what is the area over which powers are given by the section under which the rule-making authority is to act. However, the court has to start with the presumption that the impugned rule is intra-vires. This approach means that the rule has to be read down only to save it from being declared ultra-vires if the court finds in a given case that the above presumption stands rebutted.” 26. The afore-stated principle of law laid down in JK Industries Ltd. (supra) has been followed with approval by the Supreme Court in the matter of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Rajasthan Electricity Regulating Commission, (2015) 12 SCC 611 . 27. It is also well settled principle of law that the Court would lean in favour of constitutionality of a statute unless it is manifestly discriminatory. In the matter of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others vs. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai and Another, AIR 1986 SC 1205 the Supreme Court held as under: “23.........There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The courts must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed against problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. It must be borne in mind that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common rapport, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of legislation.” 28. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Bihar vs. Sir Kameshvar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 declined to declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground of unreasonableness. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Bihar vs. Sir Kameshvar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 declined to declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground of unreasonableness. It was pertinently held as under: “71. Mr. Raghav Saran who appeared in Cases Nos. 310, 311 and 329 of 1951, raised a novel point that the Act not being reasonable and just, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to declare it void on that ground. He was unable to support his argument on any reasonable basis. The constitutionality of a statute passed by a competent legislature cannot be challenged on the ground that the law made is not reasonable or just.” 29. Thus, from the above-stated principles of law enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, the grounds which emerge to adjudge the constitutional validity of a subordinate legislation is (i) lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation; (ii) violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India; (iii) violation of any provision of the Constitution of India; (iv) failure to conform to the Statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act; (v) repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment and (vi) manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness. 30. Now, the question would be, whether the Rules of 2019 enacted by the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which is one of the sub-ordinate legislation, have been enacted in lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation; or whether it is in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India; or whether it is in violation of any provision of the Constitution of India; or whether it fails to conform to the Statute under which it is made or it exceeds the limits of authority; or whether it is repugnant to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment; or whether it suffers from manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness. 31. 31. A careful perusal of the pleadings would show that it is not the case of the petitioners that the competent authority promulgated the Rules of 2019 lacks legislative competence to make the Rules, but it has only been stated that the Rules of 2019 is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India pleading that it totally ignores clauses 9 and 11 of the executive instructions dated 5-3-2019 issued on the same date by the General Administration Department of the State of Chhattisgarh. By the Rules of 2019, different criteria for promotion from the post of Head Master to Principal has been made and promotion to the post of Principal will be made by 65% from Lecturers and 25% from Head Masters and that will deprive them (Head Masters) from the opportunity of being promoted on the post of Principal despite being much more senior than the Junior Lecturers which leads to administrative chaos. As such, it is quite vivid that it is not the case that the authority competent lacks legislative competence to make the impugned Rules, but it is the case of the petitioners that their promotional avenues will be affected by promulgation of the new Rules which they have promulgated in terms of the Rules of 2019 as well as the executive instructions dated 5-3-2019. Therefore, the Rules of 2019 is liable to be struck down. 32. It is admitted position on record that the petitioners are working on the post of Head Master in the Department of Tribal Welfare and now, they have been absorbed in the Department of School Education and presently, they are continuing on the said post and have called in question the Rules of 2019 and claimed benefit under the Rules of 2011 along with executive instructions dated 5-3-2019 which is no longer applicable by virtue of the Rules of 2019 by virtue of the repeal clause i.e. Rule 22 of the Rules of 2019. Serial No. 18 of Schedule-II of the Rules of 2019 of which the petitioners are having grievance states as under: S. No. Name of Service/Post Total number of duty posts Percentage of the number of duty posts to be filled in Remarks E T By direct recruitment [See rule 6(1)(a)] By promotion [See rule 6(1)(b)] By transfer/deputation of persons from other services [See rule 6(1)(c)] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 18. Principal 2591 1898 10% 90% -- The emergent vacancies as on 1st January every year shall be bifurcated as follows: (1) 10% posts shall be filled by direct recruitment through limited examination of the lecturers working in Government schools/ lecturers working with panchayat/lecturer working in urban body. (2) 65% posts shall be filled by promotion of the lecturers, in which 70% posts shall be for lecturers of Ecadre and 30% posts for lecturers E (L.B.) cadre. If sufficient number of eligible candidates are not available in feeding cadre in the Ecadre, the posts shall be filled by promotion of E (L.B.) cadre and vice-versa. (3) 25% of the posts shall be filled by promotion of, Head Master Middle School (Trained Post graduate) of which 70% posts shall be filled from Head Master Middle School (Trained Post graduate) of E-cadre and 30% posts shall be filled from E (L.B.) cadre. If sufficient number of eligible candidates are not available in feeding cadre in the Ecadre, the posts shall be filled by promotion of E (L.B.) cadre and vice-versa. Note: Posts of the T/T (L.B.) cadre shall also be filled as per procedure described in point (1), (2) and (3) above. 33. A careful perusal of the aforesaid Schedule appended to the Rules of 2019 would show that for the post of Principal, as per Rule 6, posts shall be filled 10% through direct recruitment and 90% by promotion. Out of 90%, 65% of the posts are to be filled from Lecturers of whom 70% would be from E/T cadre and 30% from E/T (LB) cadre. Similarly, with respect to 25% posts which were to be filled from Head Master (trained Post-Graduate) therein also, 70% posts are to be filled from E/T cadre and 30% from E/T (LB) cadre. The said rule nowhere debars or takes away the rights of the petitioners from being promoted to the post of Principal. Similarly, with respect to 25% posts which were to be filled from Head Master (trained Post-Graduate) therein also, 70% posts are to be filled from E/T cadre and 30% from E/T (LB) cadre. The said rule nowhere debars or takes away the rights of the petitioners from being promoted to the post of Principal. Their right to be considered for promotion has expressly been provided in the Rules of 2019 and the Rules of 2019 have been brought into force unifying the education cadre in the State combining the teachers working in the Departments of Tribal, School Education, Municipal, Panchayat, etc. and as claimed by the State, for effectively taking care of their service conditions and their promotional avenues, the Rules of 2019 have been enacted. 34. It is well settled law that although an employee has no right to be promoted, he has a right to be considered for promotion. This right to be considered for promotion is one of the matters relating to employment or appointment within the meaning of Article 16(1) of the Constitution [See: General Manager, Southern Railway vs. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36]. Although a candidate has a fundamental right to be considered for promotion (Article 16), it will be available only if he falls within the prescribed zone of consideration. Article 16(1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration a fundamental right to be considered for promotion. If such a person is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right under Article 16(1) [See: Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 ]. However, the power of judicial review does not extend to interfering with a policy providing for avenues of promotion and to direct what avenues the authority should provide for its various employees, although the court will interfere if there is arbitrariness or resultant discrimination [See: Union of India vs. Syed Mohd. Raza Kazmi, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 534]. However, since it is a matter of policy, the courts should not direct the Government to frame or reframe a promotional scheme in a particular manner in exercise of the power of judicial review and interfere with the channels of promotion to officers working in different departments and offices of the Government [See: Govt. of Tamil Nadu vs. S. Arumugham, (1998) 2 SCC 198 ]. of Tamil Nadu vs. S. Arumugham, (1998) 2 SCC 198 ]. 35. It is well settled that the power to frame rules to regulate the conditions of service under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution carries it with the power to amend or alter the said rules. Any rules which affects the right of person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, although mere chance of promotion may not. The authority competent to lay down criteria is also competent to change the criteria. 36. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 have held that “mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not.” 37. Similarly, in the matter of Air Commodore Naveen Jain vs. Union of India and Others, (2019) 10 SCC 34 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have affirmed the view relying on various judicial precedents that policy of the State affecting chances of promotion cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory so as to attract the violation of either Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution and observed as under: “13. In State of Mysore vs. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753 (SC) this Court held that a right to be considered for promotion, is a condition of service but mere chances of promotion are not. The rule which merely affects the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. The said judgment was quoted with approval in later judgment reported as Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar vs. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 wherein this Court held as under: (SCC p. 329, Para 15) “15......All that happened as a result of making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collectors division wise and limiting such promotions to 50 per cent of the total number of vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector was to reduce the chances of promotion available to the petitioners. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore vs. G.B. Purohit (supra) that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. In Purohit case (supra) the district wise seniority of sanitary inspectors was changed to state-wise seniority, and as a result of this change the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their chances of promotion which were protected under the proviso to Section 115, sub-section (7). This contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J. (as he then was), speaking on behalf of this Court observed: (SLR Para 10) “10.........It is said on behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.” “14. In Dwarka Prasad vs. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 535 the argument examined was that the promotion opportunities have to be provided in ratio with the strength of the feeder cadre. It was held as under: (SCC p. 542, Para 16) “16. Fixation of quotas or different avenues and ladders for promotion in favour of various categories of posts in feeder cadres based upon the structure and pattern of the Department is a prerogative of the employer, mainly pertaining to the policy-making field. The relevant considerations in fixing a particular quota for a particular post are various such as the cadre strength in the feeder quota, suitability more or less of the holders in the feeder post, their nature of duties, experience and the channels of promotion available to the holders of posts in the feeder cadres. Most important of them all is the requirement of the promoting authority for manning the post on promotion with suitable candidates. Thus, fixation of quota for various categories of posts in the feeder cadres requires consideration of various relevant factors, a few amongst them have been mentioned for illustration. Mere cadre strength of a particular post in the feeder cadre cannot be a sole criterion or basis to claim parity in the chances of promotion by various holders of posts in feeder categories.” 15. Mere cadre strength of a particular post in the feeder cadre cannot be a sole criterion or basis to claim parity in the chances of promotion by various holders of posts in feeder categories.” 15. In A. Satyanarayana vs. S. Purushotham, (2008) 5 SCC 416 this Court held that the power of the State to fix quota for promotion cannot be said to be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 426, Paras 23 and 25-26) “23. We, however, are of the opinion that the validity or otherwise of a quota rule cannot be determined on surmises and conjectures. Whereas the power of the State to fix the quota keeping in view the fact situation obtaining in a given case must be conceded, the same, however, cannot be violative of the constitutional scheme of equality as contemplated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a policy decision and, in particular, legislative policy should not ordinarily be interfered with and the superior courts, while exercising their power of judicial review, shall not consider as to whether such policy decision has been taken mala-fide or not. But where a policy decision as reflected in a statutory rule pertains to the field of subordinate legislation, indisputably, the same would be amenable to judicial review, inter-alia, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [See: Vasu Dev Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 12 SCC 753 and State of Kerala vs. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365 ]. *** *** *** 25. While saying so, we are not unmindful of the legal principle that nobody has a right to be promoted; his right being confined to right to be considered therefor. 26. Similarly, the power of the State to take a policy decision as a result whereof an employee's chance of promotion is diminished cannot be a subject-matter of judicial review as no legal right is infringed thereby.” 38. Finally, coming to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down, it is quite vivid that right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, but mere chance of promotion is not. Finally, coming to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down, it is quite vivid that right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, but mere chance of promotion is not. Thus, it is also quite vivid that in the present case, the State Government has taken a policy decision unifying the services of teachers working in different departments and promulgated the Rules of 2019 governing their service conditions and promotional avenues for the post of Principal from Head Master as clearly been provided in Serial No. 18 of Schedule II of the Rules of 2019 wherein, 90% posts of Principal have to be filled up by promotion and out of 90%, 65% of the posts are to be filled from Lecturers of whom 70% would be from E/T cadre and 30% from E/T (LB) cadre. Similarly, with respect to 25% posts which were to be filled from Head Master (trained Post-Graduate) therein also, 70% posts are to be filled from E/T cadre and 30% from E/T (LB) cadre. As such, promotional avenues have clearly been provided for employees like the petitioners herein who are working on the post of Head Master and it is not the case that promotional avenues have totally been taken away by promulgation of the Rules of 2019. More particularly, the petitioners have accepted their absorption in the Department of School Education and they have not questioned their absorption at any point of time, and only claimed that they should be governed by the Rules of 2011 which appears to have been repealed by Rule 22(1) of the Rules of 2019. As such, the Rules of 2011 cannot be imposed as having been repealed by promulgation of the Rules of 2019 and furthermore, the Rules of 2019, governing the service conditions of the petitioners herein is in place, the petitioners also cannot be governed by the executive instructions dated 5-3-2019, as the Rules of 2019 will prevail over the executive instructions dated 5-3-2019. 39. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, we are unable to hold that the Rules of 2019 promulgated by the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. 39. In view of the aforesaid legal discussion, we are unable to hold that the Rules of 2019 promulgated by the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India is violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Consequently, both the writ petitions sans merit and deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.