JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. 1. Being aggrieved by Exhibit P9 order passed by the 1st respondent, viz. the Chairperson of Kerala State Human Rights Commission, dated 20.6.2019, in H.R.M.P. No. 213/11/2019, by which, the Secretary of Thiruvananthapuram Corporation was directed to proceed further, as per the notice issued to the opposite party and dispose of the complaint, instant writ petition is filed praying to call for the records leading to the passing of Exhibit-P9 order dated 20.06.2019 from the 1st respondent and to quash the same, by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction. 2. Short facts leading to filing of the writ petition are that; petitioner has obtained Exhibit-P1 building permit dated 27.9.2016 from the Thiruvananthapuram Corporation, and started construction work. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent herein, filed O.S. No. 2049/2018 and obtained an ex-parte interim injunction. The petitioner filed a detailed objection with 9 documents and the court below vacated the interim injunction vide Exhibit P2 order. Subsequently, 2nd respondents fraternal niece has filed another suit, under the instance of respondent No. 2, and obtained another ex-parte injunction against the petitioner in O.S. No. 1365/2019 on the file of Principal Munsiff”s Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The said injunction order was also vacated with costs, vide Exhibit P3 order. 3. Pursuant to the above, the 2nd respondent and her henchmen, continued obstruction against the construction made by the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner obtained a counter injunction against the 2nd respondent (Exhibit P4), which is still in force. In spite of Exhibit-P4, the 2nd respondent and her henchmen obstructed the construction. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached this court seeking for police protection, and vide Exhibit P5 judgment dated 4.4.2019 in W.P. (C) No. 8236 of 2019, this Court directed the petitioner to approach the concerned Civil Court and seek for appropriate remedy. 4. Subsequently, petitioner obtained Exhibit-P6 protection order dated 24.9.2019 from the court below against the 2nd respondent and her men. Petitioner has also filed an application for renewal of Exhibit-P1 permit. In the above circumstances, the 2nd respondent has clandestinely approached the 1st respondent and filed Exhibit-P8 petition dated 11.12.2019, by suppressing all the above material facts and obtained Exhibit-P9 order dated 20.06.2019, behind the back of the petitioner, which is under challenge in this writ petition. 5. On 04.12.2021, we passed the following order: “xxx xxx xxx 4. In the above circumstances, the 2nd respondent has clandestinely approached the 1st respondent and filed Exhibit-P8 petition dated 11.12.2019, by suppressing all the above material facts and obtained Exhibit-P9 order dated 20.06.2019, behind the back of the petitioner, which is under challenge in this writ petition. 5. On 04.12.2021, we passed the following order: “xxx xxx xxx 4. We have gone through the pleading and grounds raised. Petitioner has made out a prima facie case for admission. Admit. Issue notice to 2nd respondent returnable in two weeks. In the meanwhile, there shall be a stay of the operation of impugned order.” 6. Smt. Mini V.A. learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that Exhibit-P9 order passed by the 1st respondent is, without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Moreover, the 2nd respondent has clandestinely approached the 1st respondent and filed Exhibit P8 petition, by suppressing all the material facts and obtained Exhibit P9 order. 7. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of this court in Sivanandan T.P. and Another vs. Corporation of Kochi and Others, 2020 (1) KHC 270 . 8. Referring to Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that Exhibit-P8 complaint does not come under the purview of human rights, as defined under Section 2(d), which means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution of India or embodied in the international Covenants and enforceable by Courts in India. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner further stated that the allegations in the complaint that due to the construction work of the petitioner, the floor tile of her building became damaged, and that, the petitioner has closed her pathway, were considered by the competent civil court while passing Exhibits-P2, P3 and P4 orders. 10. Learned counsel also submitted that it has come out in evidence that both the properties of the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were separated, with a compound wall constructed using bricks, which remained un-plastered. No crack of damage has been caused to the said old wall. 11. 10. Learned counsel also submitted that it has come out in evidence that both the properties of the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were separated, with a compound wall constructed using bricks, which remained un-plastered. No crack of damage has been caused to the said old wall. 11. Further, learned counsel petitioner made reference to Regulations 16 and 17 of the Kerala State Human Rights (Procedure) Regulations, 2001, which deals with the nature of complaints and complaints not ordinarily maintainable. 12. Upon receipt of notice, learned counsel for the respondents made submissions to sustain the order impugned. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. Respondent No. 2 is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 2049/2018 on the file of the learned I Additional Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram. Writ petitioner herein is the defendant therein. Respondent No. 2 herein, in I.A. No. 10335/2018 in O.S. No. 2049/2018, has sought for an order under Order XXXIX Rule 1 CPC, restraining the respondent/writ petitioner from making any illegal piling construction in “B” Schedule property. Perusal of the averments made in the said petition indicates that the plaintiff therein/complainant has stated thus: “He started piling up the commercial building at a place, away from two or three feet from the northern side of Plaint A schedule property. The pilling has been destroying the walls and floor tiles of the plaintiffs house. Frequently such damage is attributed to vibration of the plaintiffs house which is very close to the defendants property. It will damage the foundation of the plaintiffs house. Water coming due to deep digging of the earth flows through the walls of the plaintiffs property causing the destruction of walls and toilets which are situated near the wall. Defendants act is against the provisions of Kerala Municipal Building Rules. Corporation did not take any action on the complaint filed by the plaintiff as complaint No. 4363/2018. Defendant is a businessman working abroad and has political influence in the locality. Plaintiff being a lady has no capacity to fight against the defendant. Plaintiff is not in a position to reconstruct the building which was damaged due to the defendants illegal action. She also has no other shelter. After a complaint before the Corporation, the defendant started day and night work with two huge machines which will badly affect the plaintiffs building. Plaintiff is not in a position to reconstruct the building which was damaged due to the defendants illegal action. She also has no other shelter. After a complaint before the Corporation, the defendant started day and night work with two huge machines which will badly affect the plaintiffs building. Collapse of building will lead to death of inmates in the building. Thus, this petition to restrain the respondent/defendant from making any illegal piling construction in the B schedule property.” 15. Respondent therein/writ petitioner has refuted the allegations made in the said I.A. 16. Considering the rival submissions and taking note of the learned Commissioners report, learned I Additional Munsiff in I.A. No. 10335/2018 in O.S. No. 2014/2018, has observed thus: “As per Ext.A1 settlement deed itself, the house in plaint “A” schedule property is very old and thatched one. Thus, the cracks reported by the commissioner may be due to the old age of the building. No damage is reported to the compound wall with asbestos sheet, temporary shed in defendants property construction for labourers or any other nearby properties. If the construction work in defendants property is of such a nature to cause damage to neighbouring properties, it would have damaged the compound wall especially the asbestos sheets and the temporary shed in the defendants property. No damage is reported to the plaintiffs compound wall also. Plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case that the defendant has been carrying out construction work in his property in such a way that it will cause damage to plaint “A” schedule property and building in it.” 17. Ultimately, vide Exhibit-P2 order dated 14.01.2019, learned I Additional Munsiff has dismissed I.A. No. 10335/2018 in O.S. No. 2049/2018, filed for an injunction. 18. O.S. No. 1365/2019 on the file of the learned Principal Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram, is stated to have been filed by one of the fraternal cousins of the 2nd respondent herein. I.A. No. 11358/2019 in O.S. No. 1365/2019 has been filed for an injunction restraining the defendant/writ petitioner from proceeding with the construction, on the grounds, inter alia, that the writ petitioner has obstructed the pathway. 19. Writ petitioner/defendant therein has refuted the averments made in I.A. No. 11358/2019. I.A. No. 11358/2019 in O.S. No. 1365/2019 has been filed for an injunction restraining the defendant/writ petitioner from proceeding with the construction, on the grounds, inter alia, that the writ petitioner has obstructed the pathway. 19. Writ petitioner/defendant therein has refuted the averments made in I.A. No. 11358/2019. Upon considering the rival contentions, and while dismissing I.A. No. 11358/2019 in O.S. No. 1365/2019, vide order dated 25.01.2019 (Exhibit-P3), learned Principal Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram, ordered thus: “......Moreover, Exts.B1 and B2 show that there is an another suit pending between the plaintiffs near relative and respondent as O.S. No. 2049/2018 with respect to the same disputed property and the ongoing construction in the plaint B schedule property, in which the respondent obtained a counter injunction as per Ext.B2. Thus, the plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case to show that there exists plaint C schedule pathway. Ext.A6 document shows that the respondent is carrying out construction work in accordance with approved plan and permit. That shows, the balance of convenience in his favour. So if injunction is granted it will cause irreparable loss to the respondent and non granting of injunction will not cause any hardships to the plaintiff. The conduct of the plaintiff suppressing the existence of another case pending with respect to the disputed property which is filed by near relative of the plaintiff also shows that plaintiff is not entitled to any discretionary remedy of the court. Thus, all the points are found against the plaintiff. In view of these findings in point Nos.1 to 4, the petition is liable to be dismissed.” 20. In O.S. No. 2049/2018, writ petitioner/defendant therein has filed I.A. No. 799/2019, for an injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. Respondent therein is the complaint before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. 21. After considering the rival submissions, learned I Additional Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram, vide Exhibit-P4 order dated 19.02.2019 in I.A. No. 799/2019 in O.S. No. 2049/2018, has ordered as under: “In the result, the petition is allowed and the respondent/plaintiff is restrained by a temporary injunction from trespassing into petition schedule property, causing any obstruction to the lawful construction as per approved plan and license there, carving out a new pathway through it and making any alteration to its present lie and nature till the disposal of the suit.” 22. Further, vide order dated 24.09.2019 in I.A. No. 3470/ 2019 in O.S. No. 2049/2018, the learned I Additional Munsiff, Thiruvananthapuram, ordered police protection for construction. 23. Complaint in H.R.M.P. No. 213/11/12/2019 before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission reads thus: “Before the Hon’ble Human Rights Commission Officer Complainant: Anithakumari aged 31 years, D/o Sulochna, Aattuvarambil House, Erumalathop, Aanayara, Venpalavattom, Petta P.O. Thiruvananthapuram, Pin-695029. Opposite Party: Babu S/o Ramakrishnan, Aged 59 years, TC 9/813, Mangadimoottil, Arappura Veetil, Chirayinkeezhu P.O. Sharkkara Village, Chirayinkeezhu. Complaint: 1. I am residing in the above said address with my aged mother, adult, daughter. 2. The Opposite party purchased some property in the east-northern side of my property and attempting to construct a commercial complex and piling work for the same is being carried out. Due to the said piling work, damage caused to the wall of my building and floor tiles, regarding which I have given a complaint to the Corporation Secretary etc. But, due to the money power and political power of the opposite party, no action has been taken so far. Subsequently, though I have filed several complaints before so many authorities, all of them are unattended due to the influence of the opposite party and the authorities are not considering any value to my life and the lives of my family members and also our property. So, the opposite party is doing inhuman activities. Apart from this, there was a pathway to the main road from my property on the eastern side, which was blocked by him by influencing my mother. Therefore your good-self may be pleased to conduct an Enquiry about such inhuman activities of the opposite party and necessary action may be taken according to law. Sd/- Anithakumari.” 24. Translated version of Exhibit-P9 order dated 20.6.2019 in H.R.M.P. No. 213/11/2019, which is impugned in this writ petition, reads as under: “The complaint is with respect to the fact that the opposite party purchased property near to the house of the complainant for constructing a commercial complex, and piling work for the same is being carried out, due to which damages were caused to the house and wall of the complainant, and though she filed complaint before the Secretary of the Corporation, no action is forthcoming. In this respect as per the report submitted by the Corporation Secretary which is said to have been reported by the concerned Corporation Engineer on the basis of inspection conducted by the Building Inspector, and the said report says that due to the piling work conducted by the opposite party cracks were caused to the Hall, rooms, staircase and floor tiles of nearby building bearing No. T.C. No. 79/1290 and it is also says that the opposite party is directed to produced the permit obtained if any for the same. While going through the complaint and report, it is found that the allegation raised in the complaint is true. Hence it is directed to the Secretary of the Corporation that further proceedings will be initiated as per the notice issued to the opposite party and the complaint is disposed accordingly.” 25. As rightly contended by the writ petitioner, there is total suppression of all the civil litigations between the parties and the interim orders passed by the courts below, in the complaint preferred by the 2nd respondent herein. 26. On the aspect of suppression of material facts, we deem it fit to consider a few decisions as hereunder: (i) In Arunima Baruah vs. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 120 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at paragraphs 11 to 14, held as under: “11. The courts jurisdiction to determine the lis between the parties, therefore, may be viewed from the human rights concept of access to justice. The same, however, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction to deny equitable relief when the complainant does not approach the court with a pair of clean hands; but to what extent such relief should be denied is the question. 12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question. 13. In Moody vs. Cox, (1917) 2 Ch. 71 : (1916-17) All ER Rep 548 (CA), it was held: (All ER pp. 555 I-556 D) “It is contended that the fact that Moody has given those bribes prevents him from getting any relief in a court of equity. The first consequence of his having offered the bribes is that the vendors could have rescinded the contract. But they were not bound to do so. They had the right to say “no, we are well satisfied with the contract; it is a very good one for us; we affirm it.” The proposition put forward by counsel for the defendants is: “It does not matter that the contract has been affirmed; you still can claim no relief of any equitable character in regard to that contract because you gave a bribe in respect of it. If there is a mistake in the contract, you cannot rectify it, if you desire to rescind the contract, you cannot rescind it, for that is equitable relief.” With some doubt they said: “We do not think you can get an injunction to have the contract performed, though the other side have affirmed it, because an injunction may be an equitable remedy.” When one asks on what principle this is supposed to be based, one receives in answer the maxim that anyone coming to equity must come with clean hands. I think the expression “clean hands” is used more often in the textbooks than it is in the judgments, though it is occasionally used in the judgments, but I was very much surprised to hear that when a contract, obtained by the giving of a bribe, had been affirmed by the person who had a primary right to affirm it, not being an illegal contract, the courts of equity could be so scrupulous that they would refuse any relief not connected at all with the bribe. I was glad to find that it was not the case, because I think it is quite clear that the passage in Dering vs. Earl of Winchelsea, (1787) 1 Cox Eq Cas 318, which has been referred to, shows that equity will not apply the principle about clean hands unless the depravity, the dirt in question on the hand, has an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for. In this case the bribe has no immediate relation to rectification, if rectification were asked, or to rescission in connection with a matter not in any way connected with the bribe. Therefore that point, which was argued with great strenuousness by counsel for the defendant, Hatt, appears to me to fail, and we have to consider the merits of the case. 14. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 16, pp. 874-876, the law is stated in the following terms: “1303. He who seeks equity must do equity. “In granting relief peculiar to its own jurisdiction a court of equity acts upon the rule that he who seeks equity must do equity. By this it is not meant that the court can impose arbitrary conditions upon a plaintiff simply because he stands in that position on the record. The rule means that a man who comes to seek the aid of a court of equity to enforce a claim must be prepared to submit in such proceedings to any directions which the known principles of a court of equity may make it proper to give; he must do justice as to the matters in respect of which the assistance of equity is asked. In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed. *** *** *** 1305. In a court of law it is otherwise: when the plaintiff is found to be entitled to judgment, the law must take its course; no terms can be imposed. *** *** *** 1305. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands. “A court of equity refuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the subject-matter of the litigation has been improper. This was formerly expressed by the maxim “he who has committed iniquity shall not have equity”, and relief was refused where a transaction was based on the plaintiffs fraud or misrepresentation, or where the plaintiff sought to enforce a security improperly obtained, or where he claimed a remedy for a breach of trust which he had himself procured and whereby he had obtained money. Later it was said that the plaintiff in equity must come with perfect propriety of conduct, or with clean hands. In application of the principle a person will not be allowed to assert his title to property which he has dealt with so as to defeat his creditors or evade tax, for he may not maintain an action by setting up his own fraudulent design. The maxim does not, however, mean that equity strikes at depravity in a general way; the cleanliness required is to be judged in relation to the relief sought, and the conduct complained of must have an immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for; it must be depravity in a legal as well as in a moral sense. Thus, fraud on the part of a minor deprives him of his right to equitable relief notwithstanding his disability. Where the transaction is itself unlawful it is not necessary to have recourse to this principle. In equity, just as at law, no suit lies in general in respect of an illegal transaction, but this is on the ground of its illegality, not by reason of the plaintiffs demerits.” (ii) In Prestige Lights Ltd. vs. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 , at paragraphs 33, 34 and 35, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “33. It is thus clear that though the appellant-Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that though the appellant-Company had approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. 34. The object underlying the above principle has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J. in R. vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486, in the following words: “It has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement he should made a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside, any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.” (iii) In Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 1 SCC 560 , at paragraphs 16 and 17, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “16. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. In Advocate General, State of Bihar vs. M.P. Khair Industries, (1980) 3 SCC 311 , this Court was of the opinion that such a repeated filing of writ petitions amounts to criminal contempt. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is not merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel’s fee quantified at Rs. 50,000.” (iv) In Amar Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2011) 7 SCC 69 , on the aspect of a litigant approaching the court, with unclean hands, at, paragraphs 53 to 57 and 59, the Hon’ble Apex Court considered several judgments, and finally, at paragraph No. 60, extracted a paragraph from Dalip Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 : “53. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts. Courts held that such litigants have come with “unclean hands” and are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case. 54. In Dalglish vs. Jarvie, 2 Mac. & G. 231, the Court, speaking through Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. laid down: “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward.” 55. In Castelli vs. Cook, 1849 (7) Hare 89, Vice Chancellor Wigram, formulated the same principles as follows: “A plaintiff applying ex-parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when the other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not properly brought forward, the plaintiff is told that the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.” 56. In Republic of Peru vs. Dreyfus Brothers and Company, 55 L.T. 802, Justice Kay reminded us of the same position by holding thus: “...If there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good faith with the Court when ex-parte applications are made.” 57. In one of the most celebrated cases upholding this principle, in the Court of Appeal in R. vs. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, 1917 (1) K.B. 486 Lord Justice Scrutton formulated as under: “.....and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex-parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts-facts, now law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it - the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.” 59. The aforesaid requirement of coming to Court with clean hands has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court in a large number of cases. The aforesaid requirement of coming to Court with clean hands has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court in a large number of cases. Some of which may be noted, they are: Hari Narain vs. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 , Welcome Hotel and Others vs. State of A.P. and Others, (1983) 4 SCC 575, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and Another vs. Government of Karnataka and Another, (1991) 3 SCC 261 , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others vs. Government of A.P. and Others, (2007) 4 SCC 221 , Prestige Lights Limited vs. SBI, (2007) 8 SCC 449 , Sunil Poddar and Others vs. Union Bank of India, (2008) 2 SCC 326 , K.D. Sharma vs. SAIL and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayashree and Others vs. Bhagwandas S. Patel and Others, (2009) 3 SCC 141 , Dalip Singh vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 60. In the last noted case of Dalip Singh (cited supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has given this concept a new dimension which has a far reaching effect. We, therefore, repeat those principles here again: “For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa (non-violence), Mahavir, Gautam Budha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.” (v) In Kishore Samrite vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2013) 2 SCC 398 , at paragraphs 32 to 36, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “32. With the passage of time, it has been realised that people used to feel proud to tell the truth in the Courts, irrespective of the consequences but that practice no longer proves true, in all cases. The Court does not sit simply as an umpire in a contest between two parties and declare at the end of the combat as to who has won and who has lost but it has a legal duty of its own, independent of parties, to take active role in the proceedings and reach at the truth, which is the foundation of administration of justice. Therefore, the truth should become the ideal to inspire the courts to pursue. This can be achieved by statutorily mandating the Courts to become active seekers of truth. To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood, must be appropriately dealt with. The parties must state forthwith sufficient factual details to the extent that it reduces the ability to put forward false and exaggerated claims and a litigant must approach the Court with clean hands. It is the bounden duty of the Court to ensure that dishonesty and any attempt to surpass the legal process must be effectively curbed and the Court must ensure that there is no wrongful, unauthorised or unjust gain to anyone as a result of abuse of the process of the Court. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs. 33. One way to curb this tendency is to impose realistic or punitive costs. 33. The party not approaching the Court with clean hands would be liable to be non-suited and such party, who has also succeeded in polluting the stream of justice by making patently false statements, cannot claim relief, especially under Article 136 of the Constitution. While approaching the court, a litigant must state correct facts and come with clean hands. Where such statement of facts is based on some information, the source of such information must also be disclosed. Totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court and such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is bound to make “full and true disclosure of facts.” [Refer: Tilokchand H.B. Motichand and Others vs. Munshi and Another, (1969) 1 SCC 110 , A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam and Another, (2012) 6 SCC 430 , Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) SCC 1 421, Abhyudya Sanstha vs. Union of India and Others, (2011) 6 SCC 145 , State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan and Another, (2011) 7 SCC 639 , Kalyaneshwari vs. Union of India and Another, (2011) 3 SCC 287 ]. 34. The person seeking equity must do equity. It is not just the clean hands, but also clean mind, clean heart and clean objective that are the equi-fundamentals of judicious litigation. The legal maxim jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another, is the percept for Courts. Wide jurisdiction of the court should not become a source of abuse of the process of law by the disgruntled litigant. Careful exercise is also necessary to ensure that the litigation is genuine, not motivated by extraneous considerations and imposes an obligation upon the litigant to disclose the true facts and approach the court with clean hands. 35. No litigant can play “hide and seek” with the courts or adopt “pick and choose.” True facts ought to be disclosed as the Court knows law, but not facts. 35. No litigant can play “hide and seek” with the courts or adopt “pick and choose.” True facts ought to be disclosed as the Court knows law, but not facts. One, who does not come with candid facts and clean breast cannot hold a writ of the court with soiled hands. Suppression or concealment of material facts is impermissible to a litigant or even as a technique of advocacy. In such cases, the Court is duty bound to discharge rule nisi and such applicant is required to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court. [K.D. Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481]. 36. Another settled canon of administration of justice is that no litigant should be permitted to misuse the judicial process by filing frivolous petitions. No litigant has a right to unlimited drought upon the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. [Buddhi Kota Subbarao vs. K. Parasaran, (1996) 5 SCC 530 ].” 27. Though the decisions extracted above relate to exercise of writ jurisdiction, principles of law laid down therein can be made applicable to the case on hand. 28. That apart, just by getting a report from the Secretary of Thiruvananthapuram Corporation, the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, without giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner/respondent in the complaint, has passed the impugned order, disposing of the complaint, which is violative of the principles of natural justice. 29. On the aspect of violation of the principles of natural justice, let us consider the following decisions: (i) In Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association vs. The Designated Authority and Others, (2011) 2 SCC 258 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “65. More often than not, it is not easy to draw a line demarcating an administrative decision from a quasi-judicial decision. Nevertheless, the aim of both a quasi-judicial function as well as an administrative function is to arrive at a just decision. In A.K. Kraipak and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 262 , this Court had observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. In A.K. Kraipak and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1969) 2 SCC 262 , this Court had observed that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power, regard must be had to: (i) the nature of the power conferred; (ii) the person or persons on whom it is conferred; (iii) the framework of the law conferring that power; (iv) the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and (v) the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. 77. It is trite that rules of “natural justice” are not embodied rules. The phrase “natural justice” is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly i.e. fair play in action. In A.K. Kraipak (supra), it was observed that the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. 80. It is thus, well settled that unless a statutory provision, either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences which obviously cover infraction of property, personal rights and material deprivations for the party affected. The principle holds good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or Tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. It is equally trite that the concept of natural justice can neither be put in a strait-jacket nor is it a general rule of universal application. 81. Undoubtedly, there can be exceptions to the said doctrine. As stated above, the question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. As stated above, the question whether the principle has to be applied or not is to be considered bearing in mind the express language and the basic scheme of the provision conferring the power; the nature of the power conferred and the purpose for which the power is conferred and the final effect of the exercise of that power. It is only upon a consideration of these matters that the question of application of the said principle can be properly determined. [See: Union of India vs. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another, (1970) 2 SCC 458 ].” (ii) In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise and Others, (2015) 8 SCC 519 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “20. Natural justice is an expression of English Common Law. Natural justice is not a single theory-it is a family of views. In one sense administering justice itself is treated as natural virtue and, therefore, a part of natural justice. It is also called “naturalist” approach to the phrase “natural justice” and is related to “moral naturalism.” Moral naturalism captures the essence of commonsense morality-that good and evil, right and wrong, are the real features of the natural world that human reason can comprehend. In this sense, it may comprehend virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence in relation to justice as all these are attributes of natural justice. We are not addressing ourselves with this connotation of natural justice here. 21. In Common Law, the concept and doctrine of natural justice, particularly which is made applicable in the decision making by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, has assumed different connotation. It is developed with this fundamental in mind that those whose duty is to decide, must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred both without bias and they must given to each of the parties to adequately present the case made. It is perceived that the practice of aforesaid attributes in mind only would lead to doing justice. Since these attributes are treated as natural or fundamental, it is known as “natural justice.” The principles of natural justice developed over a period of time and which is still in vogue and valid even today were: (i) rule against bias, i.e. nemo judex in causa sua and (ii) opportunity of being heard to the concerned party, i.e. audi alteram partem. These are known as principles of natural justice. These are known as principles of natural justice. To these principles a third principle is added, which is of recent origin. It is duty to give reasons in support of decision, namely, passing of a “reasoned order.” 22. Though the aforesaid principles of natural justice are known to have their origin in Common Law, even in India the principle is prevalent from ancient times, which was even invoked in Kautilya’s “Arthashastra.” This Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, (1978) 1 SCC 405 : AIR 1978 SC 851 explained the Indian origin of these principles in the following words: “Indeed, natural justice is a pervasive facet of secular law where a spiritual touch enlivens legislation, administration and adjudication, to make fairness a creed of life. It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes and, save where valid law excludes, it applies when people are affected by acts of authority. It is the bone of healthy government, recognised from earliest times and not a mystic testament of judge-made law. Indeed from the legendary days of Adam-and of Kautilya’s Arthashastra the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice, which makes it social justice. We need not go into these deeps for the present except to indicate that the roots of natural justice and its foliage are noble and not new-fangled. Today its application must be sustained by current legislation, case law or other extant principle, not the hoary chords of legend and history. Our jurisprudence has sanctioned its prevalence even like the Anglo-American system.” 27. It, thus, cannot be denied that principles of natural justice are grounded in procedural fairness which ensures taking of correct decision and procedural fairness is fundamentally an instrumental good, in the sense that procedure should be designed to ensure accurate or appropriate outcomes. In fact, procedural fairness is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms. 28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. 28. It is on the aforesaid jurisprudential premise that the fundamental principles of natural justice, including audi alteram partem, have developed. It is for this reason that the courts have consistently insisted that such procedural fairness has to be adhered to before a decision is made and infraction thereof has led to the quashing of decisions taken. In many statutes, provisions are made ensuring that a notice is given to a person against whom an order is likely to be passed before a decision is made, but there may be instances where though an authority is vested with the powers to pass such orders, which affect the liberty or property of an individual but the statute may not contain a provision for prior hearing. But what is important to be noted is that the applicability of principles of natural justice is not dependent upon any statutory provision. The principle has to be mandatorily applied irrespective of the fact as to whether there is any such statutory provision or not. From the aforesaid discussion, it becomes clear that the opportunity to provide hearing before making any decision was considered to be a basic requirement in the Court proceeding. Later on, this principle was applied to other quasi-judicial authorities and other tribunals and ultimately it is now clearly laid down that even in the administrative actions, where the decision of the authority may result in civil consequences, a hearing before taking a decision is necessary. It was, thus, observed in A.K. Kraipak’s case (supra) that if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see how these rules should not be made available to administrative inquiries. In the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 also the application of principle of natural justice was extended to the administrative action of the State and its authorities. It is, thus, clear that before taking an action, service of notice and giving of hearing to the noticee is required. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Suvarna Board Mills and Another, (1994) 5 SCC 566 , this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Suvarna Board Mills and Another, (1994) 5 SCC 566 , this aspect was explained in the following manner: “3. It has been contended before us by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action Under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a straight-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law: All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 38. But that is not the end of the matter. While the law on the principle of audi alteram partem has progressed in the manner mentioned above, at the same time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarked that the principles of natural justice are very flexible principles. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind of functions performed and to the extent to which a person is likely to be affected. For this reason, certain exceptions to the aforesaid principles have been invoked under certain circumstances. For example, the Courts have held that it would be sufficient to allow a person to make a representation and oral hearing may not be necessary in all cases, though in some matters, depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination of witnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of the principles of natural justice. Likewise, in service matters relating to major punishment by way of disciplinary action, the requirement is very strict and full-fledged opportunity is envisaged under the statutory rules as well. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. On the other hand, in those cases where there is an admission of charge, even when no such formal inquiry is held, the punishment based on such admission is upheld. It is for this reason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisional hearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courts have held that under certain circumstances principles of natural justice may even be excluded by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on.” 30. Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 is an Act to provide for the Constitution of a National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commissions in States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of human rights and for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto. 31. As rightly submitted by the petitioner, Section 2(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 defines “human rights” to mean the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India. 32. Section 2(m) of the Act, 1993 defines “public servant” and it states that “public servant” shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 33. Chapter III of the Act, 1993 deals with functions and powers of the Commission. Section 12 coming under Chapter III speaks about functions of the Commission and it reads thus: “12. Functions of the Commission - The Commission shall perform all or any of the following functions, namely: (a) inquire, suo motu or on a petition presented to it by a victim or any person on his behalf [or on a direction or order of any court], into complaint of: (i) violation of human rights or abetment thereof. (ii) negligence in the prevention of such violation, by a public servant. (b) intervene in any proceeding involving any allegation of violation of human rights pending before a court with the approval of such court. (c) visit, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any jail or other institution under the control of the State Government, where persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, reformation or protection, for the study of the living conditions of the inmates thereof and make recommendations thereon to the Government. (c) visit, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any jail or other institution under the control of the State Government, where persons are detained or lodged for purposes of treatment, reformation or protection, for the study of the living conditions of the inmates thereof and make recommendations thereon to the Government. (d) review the safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or any law for the time being in force for the protection of human rights and recommend measures for their effective implementation. (e) review the factors, including acts of terrorism, that inhibit the enjoyment of human rights and recommend appropriate remedial measures. (f) study treaties and other international instruments on human rights and make recommendations for their effective implementation. (g) undertake and promote research in the field of human rights. (h) spread human rights literacy among various sections of society and promote awareness of the safeguards available for the protection of these rights through publications, the media, seminars and other available means. (i) encourage the efforts of non-governmental organisations and institutions working in the field of human rights. (j) such other functions as it may consider necessary for the promotion of human rights.” 34. Section 13 of the Act speaks about powers relating to inquiries and it reads thus: “13. Powers relating to inquiries: (1) The Commission shall, while inquiring into complaints under this Act, have all the powers of a civil court trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), and in particular in respect of the following matters, namely: xxx xxx xxx (3) The Commission or any other officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Commission may enter any building or place where the Commission has reason to believe that any document relating to the subject matter of the inquiry may be found, and may seize any such document or take extracts or copies therefrom subject to the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in so far as it may be applicable. xxx xxx xxx (5) Every proceeding before the Commission shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Commission shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).” 35. Section 14 of the Act speaks about investigation and sub-section (5) therein states that, the Commission shall satisfy itself about the correctness of the facts stated and the conclusion, if any, arrived at in the report submitted to it under sub-section (4) and for this purpose, the Commission may make such inquiry (including the examination of the person or persons who conducted or assisted in the investigation) as it thinks fit. 36. Section 16 of the Act speaks about persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard and it reads thus: “16. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard - If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission: (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person. (b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply where the credit of a witness is being impeached.” (Emphasis supplied) 37. Section 17 of the Act, 1993 speaks about inquiry into the complaints and it reads thus: “The Commission while inquiring into the complaints of violations of human rights may: (i) call for information or report from the Central Government or any State Government or any other authority or organisation subordinate thereto within such time as may be specified by it: Provided that: (a) if the information or report is not received within the time stipulated by the Commission, it may proceed to inquire into the complaint on its own. (b) if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly. (b) if, on receipt of information or report, the Commission is satisfied either that no further inquiry is required or that the required action has been initiated or taken by the concerned Government or authority, it may not proceed with the complaint and inform the complainant accordingly. (ii) without prejudice to anything contained in clause (i), if it considers necessary, having regard to the nature of the complaint, initiate an inquiry.” 38. Section 18 speaks about steps during and after inquiry and it reads thus: “18. Steps during and after inquiry - The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely: (a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abetment thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority: (i) to make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary. (ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons. (iii) to take such further action as it may think fit; (b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary. (c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary. (d) subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative. (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission. (f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission.” 39. (f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission.” 39. Section 21 of the Act, 1993 coming under Chapter V speaks about constitution of State Human Rights Commissions, wherein sub-section (5) states that a State Commission may inquire into violation of human rights only in respect of matters relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II and List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 40. Section 36 under Chapter VIII speaks about matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission, and it reads thus: “36. Matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission: (1) The Commission shall not inquire into any matter which is pending before a State Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for the time being in force. (2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed.” 41. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10(2) r/w. Section 29 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, the Kerala State Human Rights Commission has made the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations. Regulation 2(d) defines “complaint” to mean all petitions and communications received by the Commission from a victim or any other person on his behalf in person or by post or by telegram or by fax or by any other means whatsoever alleging violation of human rights or abetment thereof or negligence in the prevention of such violation by a public servant of all or any of the human rights defined in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 read with sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Act. 42. Regulations 16 and 17 read as under: “16. Nature of Complaints: (i) Every complaint should disclose a complete picture of the matter complained of and disclose the name and address of the respondent. The Commission may, if it considers necessary: (a) call for further relevant information from the complainant. (b) direct the complainant to file affidavit/s in support of the complaint. (c) obtain sworn statements of the complainant. Nature of Complaints: (i) Every complaint should disclose a complete picture of the matter complained of and disclose the name and address of the respondent. The Commission may, if it considers necessary: (a) call for further relevant information from the complainant. (b) direct the complainant to file affidavit/s in support of the complaint. (c) obtain sworn statements of the complainant. (d) take statement of the complainant by issuing Commission for that purpose or by any other means considered necessary. (ii) No fee shall be chargeable on complaints/ interlocutory applications.” “17. Complaints not ordinarily maintainable: The Commission may dismiss inlimine complaints of the following nature: (a) Illegible. (b) vague, anonymous or pseudonymous. (c) trivial or frivolous. (d) barred under sub-sections (1) or (2) of section 36 of the Act. (e) allegations do not disclose involvement of any public servant. (f) issue raised relates to civil disputes, service matters, labour or industrial disputes. (g) allegations do not raise any violation of human rights. (h) If the matter raised is subjudice before a Court of Tribunal. (i) the matter is covered by a Judicial verdict/decision of the National Commission or a State Commission. (j) Where the complaint is only a copy of the petition addressed to some other authority. (k) Where the petition is not signed or where the original petition is not sent to the Commission. (l) Where the matter raised is outside the purview of the Commission or on any other ground.” 43. On the aspect as to how, a complaint regarding damage caused to a building, on account of ongoing construction, has to be considered, in Sivanandan T.P. and Another vs. Corporation of Kochi and Others, 2020 (1) KHC 270 , this court observed thus: “11. I have carefully assessed the afore dialectical stands of the parties, as voiced by their learned counsel as above since I cannot find Ext.R3(c) proceedings and Ext.R3(b) report in WP (C) No. 3769/2018 to be in consonance with R.11A of the KMB Rules. This is because as per sub R.5 of the said Rule, when a complaint is received by the Secretary with respect to the damage caused to a building on account of an ongoing construction, he is obliged to place it before the Technical Expert Committee constituted by the Government under sub-R.12 of the said Rule. This is because as per sub R.5 of the said Rule, when a complaint is received by the Secretary with respect to the damage caused to a building on account of an ongoing construction, he is obliged to place it before the Technical Expert Committee constituted by the Government under sub-R.12 of the said Rule. However, in this case, instead of doing so, the Secretary obtained a report from an Engineer of the Thrissur Engineering College, because the parties had agreed to such course. Since the KMB Rules provide for a statutory mechanism in such situation, I cannot approve the action of the Secretary, even if the parties had agreed to it, particularly since nothing has been placed on record to show the competence of the Engineer who had been engaged by the Secretary. Hence, the fact that the report of such Engineer has not been challenged by Sri. Sivanandhan would be of no consequence, since the same is not obtained under the statutory scheme but traversing beyond it, which the Secretary could not do as per law.” 44. On the aspect of jurisdiction of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, to entertain a complaint regarding civil dispute, a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Malabar Cements Ltd. vs. K. Baburajan and Others, 2019 (4) KHC 131 , after considering clause (f) of Regulation 17 of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001, held as under: “18. At this juncture, we may take note of Regulation 17 of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001 which deals with maintainability of complaints before the Commission. Regulation 17 states that, the Commission may dismiss in limine complaints of the nature enumerated in clauses (a) to (l). Clause (f) of Regulation 17 provides that, the Commission may dismiss in limine, complaints wherein the issue raised relates to civil disputes, service matters, labour or industrial dispute. Clause (i) of Regulation 17 provides that, the Commission may dismiss in limine complaints, if the matter is covered by a judicial verdict/decision of the National Commission or a State Commission. Similarly, going by clause (l), the Commission may dismiss the complaints in limine, where the matter raised is outside the purview of the Commission or on any other ground.” 45. That apart, it is trite law that Human Rights Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with civil disputes. Similarly, going by clause (l), the Commission may dismiss the complaints in limine, where the matter raised is outside the purview of the Commission or on any other ground.” 45. That apart, it is trite law that Human Rights Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with civil disputes. On the said aspect, reference can be made to a few decisions as under: (i) In G. Manikyamma vs. Roudri Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (2014) 15 SCC 197 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “43. In our opinion, the Human Rights Commission does not have any jurisdiction to deal with the disputed questions of title and possession of the property. 47. It can be seen from the language, there is nothing in Section 12 which authorises the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate upon the disputes of title and possession of property.” (ii) In Leelamma Rajan @ Sosamma vs. State of Kerala and Others, 2021 (5) KLT 681 , a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, after considering the statutory provisions and the decision in Mariyadas vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, 2019 KHC 963 , held as under: “13. After considering the statutory provisions of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, and the Kerala Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2001, a Division Bench of this Court in Mariyadas vs. Revenue Divisional Officer held that a complaint relating to pathway of a house being a civil dispute, the same is not maintainable, and that Kerala State Human Rights Commission ought to have dismissed the complaint in limine... xxx xxx xxx 14. Though Mr. Ramesh P. learned counsel for the 6th respondent, made submissions on the averments in the counter affidavit, and reiterated that the complaint for violation of property rights, would come within the ambit of Protection of Civil Rights Act, is maintainable before the Kerala State Human Rights Commission, we are of the view that in the light of the specific exclusion in Regulation 17(f) dealing with civil disputes, service matters, labour or industrial disputes and the decision of this Court in Mariyadas v. Revenue Divisional Officer extracted supra, contentions of the learned counsel for the 6th respondent cannot be countenanced. 15. As regards the request of Mr. 15. As regards the request of Mr. K.P. Harish, learned Senior Government Pleader, for production of the Village Administrative Officers report, for the purpose of deciding this case, we are of the view that it is not necessary as this Court in detail has discussed and decided as in the foregoing paragraphs, to the jurisdiction of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission to adjudicate any civil dispute, which requires evidence to be adduced by the contesting parties. 16. It is trite law that when evidence is required to be produced to adjudicate rights of the rival contentions, moreso in the nature of a civil dispute, the same cannot be entertained by the Commission, like any other complaint, not dealing with a civil dispute.” 46. From the material on record, it could be further deduced that the complaint in H.R.M.P. No. 213/11/12/2019, is stated to have been filed on 11.12.2019. There is no material to indicate that the above suits have been disposed of, when the complaint was entertained. On the contra, it could reasonably be presumed that the suits were pending, in which, Section 36 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, would also apply to the facts of the case. 47. Giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case, and in the light of the above discussion and decisions, we are in agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Kerala State Human Rights Commission ought not to have interfered with the civil matter and passed the impugned order, which is required to be interfered with. Accordingly, we set aside the order dated 20.06.2019 in H.R.M.P. No. 213/11/12/2019 (Exhibit-P9), passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission. 48. Writ Petition is allowed.