ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the circular dated 23.10.2017 (Annexure-3) and the special condition No. 59 of Clause 40 of Notice Inviting Bid (NIB) dated 29.09.2023 (Annexure 1). 2. The facts of the case are that the bids had been invited by the respondent Department for the work for “Transportation of Foodgrains Under PDS from FCI Depots and sugar from Godowns To FPS in Dungerpur Districts for the period 12 Months.” 3. A condition had been stipulated in the said NIB that no flour mill owner shall be eligible to participate in the tender process. The said special condition No. 59 of Clause 40 as reproduced hereunder, is the bone of contention in the present matter: ^^foHkkxh; fn'kk funsZ'k tfj;s i=kad ,Q40¼7½ [kkŒysŒ@ ifjogu@2016&17 fnukad 23-10-2017 ds rgr tkjh funsZ'kkuqlkj vkVk fey ekfyd fcM esa Hkkx ysus gsrq ;ksX; ugha gksaxsA vr% fey ekfyd fcM gsrq vik= gksaxsA fcM ÁfØ;k ds fdlh Hkh Lrj ij ;g rF; mtkxj gksus dh n'kk esa ÁLrqr ÁLrko ;k tkjh dk;kZns'k rRdky ÁHkko ls fujLr dj fn;k tkosxkA lkFk dh QeZ dks CySd fyLV@fMckj djrs gq, tek dk;Z lEiknu ÁfrHkwfr jkf'k@vfrfjDr dk;Z laiknu ÁfrHkwfr jkf'k ¼vlarqfyr fcM dh n'kk esa½ iw.kZr;k tCr dj yh tkosxhA bl ckcr fcMnkrk }kjk ;g 'kiFk i= ÁLrqr djuk gksxk fd og@QeZ fdlh Hkh vkVk fey dk LokfeRo ugha j[krs gS vFkok vkVk foØ; lEcfU/kr O;kikj ugha djrs gSA** 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the above condition is in violation of the basic principles of law as the same would curtail participation of the eligible bidders in the tender process and further, would limit competition and would effectually not get a low rate, ultimately resulting into a heavier financial burden on the public exchequer. Learned counsel further submits that even otherwise the petitioner firm is situated/operational at Pokran in District Jaisalmer whereas the work in question is for District Dungarpur and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner can in any manner, enter into any corrupt activity. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. A perusal of the record shows that the special condition No. 59 has been incorporated in the NIB in pursuance to the circular dated 23.10.2017 as issued by the Food and Supplies Department. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. A perusal of the record shows that the special condition No. 59 has been incorporated in the NIB in pursuance to the circular dated 23.10.2017 as issued by the Food and Supplies Department. Circular dated 23.10.2017 provided as under: ^^fo"k;% ifjogu fufonk esa 'krksZ esa la'kks/ku ds Øe esaA mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr ys[k gS fd jk"Vªh; [kk| lqj{kk ;kstukUrxZr [kk|kUu ifjogu gsrq lEcaf/kr gkWylsyj (RSFCSC/KVSS etc.) }kjk fufonk;sa vkeaf=r dh tkdj njsa vuqeksfnr dh tkrh gSA dfri; ftyksa esa vkVk fey ekfydksa }kjk Hkh ifjogu fufonk esa Hkkx fy;k tk jgk gS] ftuds fo:) [kk| lqj{kk dh xsgwa ds nq:i;ksx dh xEHkhj f'kdk;rsa ÁkIr gq;h gS ,oa gky gh esa Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks us Hkh buds fo:) dk;Zokgh dh gSA vr% vkVk fey ekfydksa }kjk [kk| lqj{kk dh xsgwa ds nq:i;ksx dks jksdus gsrq mudks fufonk esa Hkx ysus gsrq iw.kZr% vik= eku tk;sA fufonk Ái= esa mDr 'krZ dk Li"V vadu gks dh vkVk fey ekfyd ifjogu fufonk gsrq ik= ugha gksxsA mijksDr funsZ'kksa dh dMkbZ ls ikyuk dh tkosaA** 7. After considering the arguments as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and considering the circular dated 23.10.2017, this Court does not find any reason to quash the circular dated 23.10.2017 and to interfere in the present writ petition for the following reasons: (i) Admittedly, the circular in question was issued way back in the year 2017 and the impugned condition No. 59 has been incorporated in NIB in pursuance of the said circular. The petitioner, being well aware of the said condition and the circular of the year 2017, did not choose to assail the same earlier but, after having participated in the tender process, has opted to challenge the same only after apprehending that his technical bid would be rejected because of the said condition. It cannot be assumed that the petitioner was not aware of the above circular or impugned condition before entering his bid as the NIB specifically provides for an affidavit to be furnished by the bidder along with the bid to the effect that the bidder neither owns any flour mill nor is it involved in any business relating to foodgrain flour. The said requirement of filing of affidavit has been specified in the special condition No. 59 itself. The said requirement of filing of affidavit has been specified in the special condition No. 59 itself. Even the check-list qua the documents to be uploaded along with technical bid also specifies for uploading of the said affidavit. Meaning thereby, the petitioner Firm was well aware of the fact that it is not eligible to participate in the tender process but then too, it did file its bid. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner, with open eyes, participated in the tender process and now, after technical bid having been opened, has opted to challenge the circular as well as special condition No. 59 which cannot be held to be tenable. (ii) A bare perusal of circular dated 23.10.2017 makes it clear that the decision that the flour mill owners or the persons/firms involved in foodgrain flour business should not be allowed to participate in the tender process for transportation of the foodgrain has been taken with the purpose to curtail the corrupt activities being undertaken by such owners/persons. The circular specifies that various complaints regarding such corrupt activities had been received in the past and cognizance of such complaints had even been taken by the Anti Corruption Department. Therefore, to curtail such corrupt activities in future, the said decision was taken. In the specific opinion of this Court, the decision as taken, being totally logical and reasoned, cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. It is the settled position of law that the Government and their undertakings must have a free hand in setting terms of the tender and only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala-fide or actuated by bias, the Courts would interfere. (iii) Further, the scope of judicial review by the Courts in the matters wherein the conditions of tender/bid are under challenge is well defined, narrow and very limited. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Limited vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216 , laid down the following principles governing such issues: “23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge: (a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities. (b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very limited. (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts is not warranted. (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work. (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by court is very restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government.” (iv) The Hon’ble Apex Court further, while laying down criteria for interfering in such matters framed two questions to be considered and to decide the issue on basis of the reply to the said two questions. The Court observed as under: “Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala-fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached?” (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.” 8. If the answers to the above questions are in negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.” 8. Testing on the touch stone of the questions as above framed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as observed in the preceding paras, this Court is of the clear opinion that circular dated 23.10.2017 and consequential special condition No. 59 cannot be termed to be arbitrary, irrational or mala-fide. It is rather in public interest and to ensure curtailment of corrupt practices. 9. In view of above analysis, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with the present writ petition and the same is therefore, dismissed. 10. The stay petition and the pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.