JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 21.09.2010, passed under the signatures of Director, Higher Education, whereby request for promotion to the post of Acharya in Sanskrit Collage having been made by petitioner came to be rejected, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying therein for following main relief(s):- i) That the decision of respondent No.2 conveyed vide memorandum dated 21.09.2010 may be quashed and set aside. The petitioner may be held entitled to appointment as Pandit/Head Pandit in Sanskrit Collage/Pathshala. ii) That the respondents may be directed to consider the petitioner for appointment as Pandit/Head Pandit with effect from the date of his juniors were so appointed. 2. Precisely, the facts, as emerge from the record are that the petitioner was appointed as Shashtri in the department of Education of Himachal Pradesh on 01.09.1980, as is evident from Office order dated 01.09.1980(Annexure P-1). After being appointed as Shastri, as detailed herein above, petitioner passed Acharya in October, 1980. He also passed B.A. in 1985 and thereafter followed by M.A and M. Phill in the year 1987- 88, respectively. In the year 1993-94, he also completed his Ph.D. In the seniority list of Shastris (Annexure P-2), petitioner’s name was reflected at serial No. 84 as it stood on 31.05.1997. State of Himachal Pradesh framed Himachal Pradesh, Education Department, Class-III (Cadre of Head Pandits, Pandits and Other Teaching Persons of Sanskrirt Collage and Sanskrit Pathshalas) Service Rules, 1973(hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules’) for the next higher promotional post i.e. Pandit, the method of recruitment and the eligibility criteria prescribed is as follows:- Educational qualifications and other qualifications for direct recruitment. 8. Method of recruitment whether by direct recruitment or by promotion/deputation. 11. (i) Essential Acharya from recognized University/Institution or Diploma of which is recognized equivalent to Archarya or Arya University incorporated under law; or a Shiksha Shastri from the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Tirupati, Madras. (ii) Desirable knowledge of English or Matriculation or its equivalent from the recognized Board of University. 50% by direct Recruitment, 10% from amongst the Shastris already working in the School and Inspection Cadre of Education Department on the basis of seniority-cum-merit/fitness provided further that in the case of other categories, they must fulfill the requisite qualifications as prescribed in Column No.8 of ths Annexure. 3. 50% by direct Recruitment, 10% from amongst the Shastris already working in the School and Inspection Cadre of Education Department on the basis of seniority-cum-merit/fitness provided further that in the case of other categories, they must fulfill the requisite qualifications as prescribed in Column No.8 of ths Annexure. 3. In the year 1994, some of Shastris came to be promoted by way of promotion as Pandit, as per provisions of 1973 Rules. Since, petitioner was similar situated person to aforesaid person, he also filed representation on 5th August, 2010 (Annexure P-5) requesting therein authorities to grant him promotion to the post of Pandit in Sanskrit Collage, however such prayer of him came to be rejected vide communication dated 21st September, 2010 (Annexure P-6). In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying them for reliefs as reproduced hereinabove. Prayer made in the instant petition has been seriously opposed by respondents on the ground of inordinate delay in approaching the Court of law. 4. Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General while making this Court peruse averments contained in the petition vis-à-vis reliefs sought for vehemently argued that entire case of the petitioner is based upon cases of Shashtris, who were granted promotion to the higher post on 24.09.1994, as per provisions of 1973 Rules, but no steps, if any, ever came to be taken by the petitioner for redressal of his grievances, immediately after promotion of other Shastri in the year 1994 for the reason that during aforesaid period he remained posted at the place of his convenience. He submitted that petitioner, who is 56 years of age, has approached this Court after inordinate delay of 18 years and as such prayer made on his behalf deserves to be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay itself. 5. Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, while responding to the afore submissions of learned Additional Advocate General argued that true it is that cause of action had accrued to the petitioner in the year 1994, but since on account of his being not considered for the promotion to the higher post, recurring loss is being caused to him, delay, if any, in filing the petition shall not come in the way of the petitioner. Apart from above, she further argued that the case of the petitioner was rejected in the year 2010, whereafter immediately he approached this Court in the instant proceedings. 6. Having heard learned counsel representing parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that petitioner is claiming promotion to the higher post as well as seniority on the ground that the person similarly situate to him were granted promotion to the higher post of Pandit in the year 1994, but at that stage despite his being fully eligible, he was not granted promotion to the post of Pandit. Earlier petitioner alongwith other similar situated person, who were granted promotion were teaching in School/Pathshala, but subsequently in the year 1992 these institutions were upgraded as Sanskrit Colleges. Though, it has not been seriously disputed by the respondents that petitioner being similar situate person ought to have been considered for promotion to the higher post of Pandit alongwith other Shastris, who were actually given promotion in the year 1994, but prayer made in the instant petition has been opposed on the ground of inordinate delay in approaching the Court of law. Interestingly the case in hand, cause of action, if any, had actually accrued to the petitioner in the year 1994, but he kept on sleeping over the matter for the reasons best known to him. After 16 years of promotion of similarly situate persons to the higher post, petitioner woking from the deep slumber and he filed representation to the department claiming parity. For almost one year his representation/application remained pending, but yet he found it not fit to approach appropriate court of law for redressal of his grievance. It is only after rejection of his application in the year 2011; he has approached in Court in the instant proceedings for the reliefs as reproduced hereinabove. No plausible explanation, if any, qua inordinate delay in approaching the Court of law has been rendered on record. Though Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, attempted to carve out the case that since on account of denial of promotion, and seniority recurring losses are being suffered by the petitioner, plea of limitation raised by respondents-State is not tenable, however, this Court is not impressed with aforesaid submission of Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate. Though Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, attempted to carve out the case that since on account of denial of promotion, and seniority recurring losses are being suffered by the petitioner, plea of limitation raised by respondents-State is not tenable, however, this Court is not impressed with aforesaid submission of Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate. It is not in dispute that in the year 1994, petitioner was very much in service and he was fully aware of the fact that person similarly situate to him have been offered promotion to the higher post, but yet he remained silent and waited for almost 18 years to agitate his claim. Admittedly, in 18 years much water has flown under the bridge and in case prayer made in the petition is considered and decided at this juncture, entire seniority list would get disturbed. In 18 years many fresh teachers must have been appointed or employees other than Shastris, who were given appointment in the year 1994 must have been granted promotion to the next higher post. Some of the employees, who were recruited alongwith petitioner must have been retired as has happened in the case of the petitioner himself. Accepting the prayer made by petitioner in the instant petition would amount to unsettling the entire seniority list which is not permissible under the law. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and others vs. Chaman Rana (2018) 5 SCC 798 has categorically held that as far back as in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., considering a claim for promotion belated by 14 years, this Court had observed that a period of six months or at the utmost a year would be reasonable time to approach a court against denial of promotion and that it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion not to entertain such claims by persons who tried to unsettle the settled matters, which only clog the work of the court impeding it in considering genuine grievances within time in the following words: “2…..A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.” 10. Mere repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for grant of relief, was considered in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. Kasbekar, by Chagla, C.J. observing as follows: “2. ……Now, we have had occasion to point out that the only delay which this Court will excuse in presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extra-legal or extra-judicial. Once the final decision of the Government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner……..” 11. The appellant, in its counter-affidavit before the High Court, had specifically taken the objection that the claim was highly belated, and that any direction for a retrospective consideration would have a destabilizing effect in unsettling the settled position which would lead to complete chaos apart from other administrative consequences. The High Court failed to consider the objection. In Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, this Court observed as follows: “16. The High Court failed to consider the objection. In Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, this Court observed as follows: “16. A court or tribunal, before directing “consideration” of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a “live” issue or whether it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue. If it is with reference to a “dead” or “stale” issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration…” 12. In Dev Dutt, the DPC was held on 16.12.1994. The appellant therein, aggrieved by his supersession moved the High Court with utmost expedition leading to the pronouncement by the Single Judge on 21.08.2001 and by the Division Bench on 26.11.2001. The appeal was instituted before this Court in the year 2002. If that were not sufficient to distinguish the case of the respondents, reference may also be made to the observations in para 36 as follows: “36. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation.” 13. The High Court erred in placing absolute reliance on Dev Dutt and Sukhdev without noticing the fact situation of the respondents. In Union of India v. Bahadur Singh, it was observed: “9. The courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. …” 14. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. …” 14. A subsequent pronouncement by this Court could not enthuse a fresh lease of life, or furnish a fresh cause of action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim. In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, it was observed that: “29.…Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for all are in a way slaves of time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.” 15. The observations with regard to the modus operandi of the representation syndrome to revive what are clearly dead and stale claims as discussed in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and the caution to be exercised by the Court are also considered apposite in the facts of the present case. 16. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, any direction to consider retrospective promotion of the respondents at such a belated passage of time of over 17 to 20 years, would virtually bring a tsunami in the service resulting in administrative chaos quite apart from the financial implications for the Government. The order of the High Court is therefore held to be unsustainable and is set aside.” 8. Repeatedly, Hon’ble Apex court as well as this Court has held that fence sitter cannot be extended any relief by Court of law. Admitted the case at hand, petitioner remained fence sitter and just two years prior to his retirement approached this Court in the instant proceedings for grant of relief as noticed hereinabove. Though record reveals that petitioner after pronouncement of judgment dated 27.04.2010 passed in CWP(T) No. 5828 of 2008, decided on 27th April, 2010, titled Daya Sindhu vs. State of H.P. & Anr. filed representation (Annexure P-5), but there is no explanation available on record that why petitioner remained silent till 2010, especially when factum with regard to promotion given to similarly situate person had came to his notice in the year, 1994. 9. filed representation (Annexure P-5), but there is no explanation available on record that why petitioner remained silent till 2010, especially when factum with regard to promotion given to similarly situate person had came to his notice in the year, 1994. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, 2014 AIR SCW 6519, held that relief cannot be extended to the persons, who have approached the Court after long delay, that too, who are fencesitters. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above.” 10. Even Division Bench of this Court, while placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held in LPA No.604 of 2011, titled Karan Singh Pathania vs. State of H.P. and Others that “fencer cannot be held entitled to any relief” 11. In I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. In I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: “17. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the Single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellantswrit petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge.” 12. In Banda Development Authority, Banda vs. Moti Lal Agarwl and Ors., 2011 AIR SCW 2835, similar principle has enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it has been held as under:- 15. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. xxx xxxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. xxx xxxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.” 13. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this court finds no merit in the claim of the petitioner and accordingly, present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits and hopelessly time barred. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s), disposed of accordingly.