JUDGMENT : Plaintiffs in the suit filed this second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C. The respondents herein are the defendants in the suit. 2. An extent of Ac.0.18 cents in RS.No.493/5 and an extent of Ac.0.13 cents in RS.No.493/4 altogether Ac.0.31 cents of land in Gollapudi, Ibrahimpatnam Sub-Registry, Vijayawada is the property in dispute. Over that property plaintiffs filed O.S.No.1374 of 2002 before learned Rent Controller-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada for declaration that they are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property and for delivery of vacant possession of the same and also for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to demolish a wall constructed by them shown as A.D. in the plaint plan and for costs and such other reliefs. Defendants filed their written statement and resisted it. After due trial, by a judgment dated 06.11.2007 the learned trial Court decreed the suit with costs granting all the reliefs. 3. Aggrieved by the trial Court’s judgment, the defendants in the suit preferred their first appeal in A.S.No.274 of 2007 and learned II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada heard the contentions on both sides and by a judgment dated 04.06.2012 allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment of the trial Court and finally, dismissed the suit. 4. It is against that judgment of the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs in the suit are here with this second appeal. 5. On 07.10.2015 a learned Judge of this Court admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. “Whether the Court below was in error in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs on the ground of adverse possession though there is no pleading in the defence of the defendants in that regard and by mis applying the provision of Article 65 of the Limitation Act? 2. Whether the judgment of the Court below is vitiated for accepting exhibit B1 which is an unregistered document and inadmissible in evidence? 3. Whether the Court below was in error in not deciding the appeal in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code?” 6. Before this Court learned counsel on both sides submitted oral arguments and filed written submissions and cited legal authorities. 7. In the plaint, it is stated that both the plaintiffs are brothers to each other and were sons of late Venkateswara Rao. The plaint schedule property was their ancestral property. Before this Court learned counsel on both sides submitted oral arguments and filed written submissions and cited legal authorities. 7. In the plaint, it is stated that both the plaintiffs are brothers to each other and were sons of late Venkateswara Rao. The plaint schedule property was their ancestral property. There was partition of that property during the life time of father of the plaintiffs and their junior paternal grandfather. The plaint schedule property and some other properties subsequently came to the share of the plaintiffs and they have been enjoying them. 8. On 12.05.1993 sale of certain properties in favour of the defendants took place concerning Ac.1.15 cents of land of Smt. Sita Ratnamma, who is mother of the plaintiffs, and Ac.0.25 cents of land in RS.No.493/5. There remained the plaint schedule property, which was a pond used for drinking water for the family members as well as water useful for cattle. The defendants also purchased various properties from various others and all of them abut the plaint schedule land. The plaintiffs have been residing at different places. Taking advantage of this fact, the defendants trespassed into the plaint schedule land and filled up the pond and constructed a wall in or about the year 1993. That is shown in red colour demarcating as ABCD in the plaint plan. Thus, defendants occupied and encroached Ac.0.31 cents, which is shown in the plaint plan which belonged to the plaintiffs. Since the absolute rights of the plaintiffs are trampled and since the defendants failed to positively respond and rectify their mistakes, the present suit is filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession and for mandatory injunction to demolish the wall. 9. In the written statement, defendants denied the case set up in the plaint and stated that plaintiffs have absolutely no property either by the time of filing of suit or earlier to it and the property in dispute is the property of the defendants and the wall constructed is within their own property and it does not cause any inconvenience or harm to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs have not come to Court with clean hands and plaintiffs were never in possession and enjoyment of this property. They stated that the partition alleged in the plaint and assertion that the plaintiffs have got their share over this plaint schedule property are matters that are to be proved by the plaintiffs. It is then stated that defendant is an educational institution rendering yeomen service to the society running on no profit and no loss basis. Considering its noble objects, people living in Gollapudi donated Ac.0.80 2/3 cents of land in RS.Nos.493/4 and 493/5 way back in the year 1981. At para No.6 of the written statement, they further narrated various registered sale deeds under which the defendants purchased properties during the year 1981 and 1989 and stated that altogether Ac.7.14 cents of land came to the hold of the defendants. It is also stated that the plaint schedule referred Ac.0.31 cents of land is part of the property donated by the plaintiffs and their father in the year 1981 to the defendants. Since the year 1981 defendants are in absolute possession and enjoyment of this property and it is without any obstruction, objection or interference from plaintiffs or others and plaintiffs never raised any question about their enjoyment of this property till the date of filing of the suit. The acquiescence on part of the plaintiffs and the hostility on part of the defendants made the plaintiffs lose their right in the property. After lapse of 20 years from 1981 these plaintiffs have no right in any manner to claim for themselves any ownership over the property. If plaintiffs have any right in the property, they should have claimed it within 12 years from the year 1981 which means on or before 1993. Since plaintiffs have not raised any objection within that period, they lose their right to have any claim over the property. Therefore, the assertions in the plaint about title and possession are incorrect and false. For all these reasons, they sought for dismissal of the suit. 10. On these rival pleadings, the learned trial Court settled the following issues for trial: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration and vacant possession of the plaint schedule property as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the mandatory injunction as prayed for? 3. To what relief?” 11. At the trial, both the plaintiffs testified as PWs.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration and vacant possession of the plaint schedule property as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the mandatory injunction as prayed for? 3. To what relief?” 11. At the trial, both the plaintiffs testified as PWs.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.A.1 to A.9. For defendants, DW.1 testified and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.4. The learned trial Court based its decision on Exs.A.1 to A.9 and concluded that plaintiffs proved their title and the defendants unlawfully occupied the property and constructed the compound wall. Ex.B.1 is letter of gift deed dated 30.03.1981 relied on by the defendants. It was considered by the learned trial Court and it stated that it is an unregistered document and insufficiently stamped and it is void and it could not convey title to the defendants. It observed that when the wall was constructed was not properly explained by DW.1 and they made unauthorized construction of the wall since Ex.B.3- approved plan does not contain any permission for construction of wall. It observed that property being ancestral the father of the plaintiffs was not entitled to gift it under Ex.B.1 to the defendants and such a document could not convey any title to the defendants. With these observations, it held all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. 12. Learned first appellate Court at para No.10 of its impugned judgment settled the following point for its consideration. “Whether the decree and judgment in O.S.No.1374/2002 on the file of IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller is sustainable on law and on facts?” 13. At para No.11 it recorded the various grounds urged in the appeal in 11 points. The learned first appellate Court observed that in a suit for declaration of title, plaintiffs have to sustain their case on their own strength and the weakness of the defendants or the failure of the defendants in proving their own case by itself does not permit the plaintiffs to have their title declared. Going by that proposition it analysed the evidence on record and stated that the whole claim of the plaintiffs about their rights over the property basically rested on Ex.A.1. That Ex.A.1 is only a declaration submitted by father of the plaintiffs before Land Ceiling Authorities in the year 1975. That being a self-serving document cannot be called as a document establishing title. That Ex.A.1 is only a declaration submitted by father of the plaintiffs before Land Ceiling Authorities in the year 1975. That being a self-serving document cannot be called as a document establishing title. It then analysed Ex.A.2-title deed and pattadar pass book and Ex.A.3-tax receipt and Exs.A.8 and A.9, which are 10-1 adangals and it observed that in all these documents there is no mention about Survey No.493/4, which is one of the survey numbers mentioned in the plaint and in its schedule and there has been no explanation from the plaintiffs as to how they could substantiate their title over that extent of the property in Survey No.493/4. Coming to the remaining extent of land, which is said to be in Survey No.493/5, it observed that from the oral evidence and the documents available before it, it seems that in Survey No.493/5 the family of plaintiffs had originally got Ac.0.59 cents and in the year 1993 they sold out Ac.0.25 cents to the defendants under registered sale deed and much prior to it their family donated Ac.0.30 cents in 1981 to the defendants under Ex.B.1. It stated that plaintiffs should have filed the sale deeds executed in the year 1993 in favour of defendants so as to show that on one boundary or the other they still had property. They did not file it and conveniently suppressed the relevant material from the consideration of the Court. It observed that Ex.B.1 and its execution and validity were not questioned by the plaintiffs in the suit. With those observations, it found that plaintiffs completely failed to establish title over the plaint schedule property by their own evidence. It then went on to consider the contentions raised by the defendants based on Ex.B.1 on the question about the admissibility of the document as it was unregistered and under stamped. Learned first appellate Court referred Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and stated that for collateral purpose it could be looked into so as to find out how defendants came into possession of the plaint schedule property. Then it recorded a finding that defendants have been in possession of the property since the year 1981. Learned first appellate Court referred Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and stated that for collateral purpose it could be looked into so as to find out how defendants came into possession of the plaint schedule property. Then it recorded a finding that defendants have been in possession of the property since the year 1981. It observed that during the evidence of PW.1 it was elicited that the plaint schedule property is now used as ground for games and sports and the defendants were found in continuous uninterrupted hostile possession to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and there was failure on part of the plaintiffs in seeking reliefs within 12 years from the time of Ex.B.1/1981 and held that the possession of defendants became adverse to the plaintiffs and thereby plaintiffs lost title, if any. It further observed that plaintiffs absolutely failed to localize their property and as per the plaint schedule defendants owned and possessed properties on south, on west and on north and that there were no material produced for identification of the land. That there was no proof showing possession of this property by the plaintiffs subsequent to 1981. The pass books and tax receipts are of the year 2001 and 2002 and documents between 1981 and 2001 were not produced at all. For all these reasons, it concluded that plaintiffs were never in possession of the plaint schedule property subsequent to 1981. It recorded an observation that learned trial Court without looking into the nature of Ex.A Series documents and failing to recognize Ex.A.1 by itself does not indicate title of the plaintiffs mistakenly decreed the suit. For all these reasons, it set aside the judgment of the trial Court. 14. Learned counsel for appellants submits that the well considered judgment of the learned trial Court was upset in the first appeal and the first appellate Court failed to deal with the matter appropriately and as is required under Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. and cited Parimal v. Veena, AIR 2011 SC 1150 . In that case their Lordships held that the first appellate Court being the final Court of facts has to formulate the points for its consideration and independently weigh the evidence on the issues which arise for adjudication and record reasons for its decision on the said points. 15. In that case their Lordships held that the first appellate Court being the final Court of facts has to formulate the points for its consideration and independently weigh the evidence on the issues which arise for adjudication and record reasons for its decision on the said points. 15. As against this, learned counsel for respondents submit that it was the ill-considered judgment of the trial Court that was reversed in the first appeal and the learned first appellate Court though framed only one point for consideration, a reading of its judgment would indicate that it had addressed all the rival contentions and independently weighed the evidence and reached to its own conclusions and cited Ali Mohammud v. Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2000(4) ALT 673 (D.B), wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court explaining Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. and after citing the precedent held that mere failure to frame points for consideration does not by itself suggest that the appellate Court did not consider the points of both sides. After a reading of first appellate Court’s judgment if it indicates that there was adequate discussion of points in controversy that is sufficient compliance of requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. 16. On considering all these rival submissions and on perusal of the judgment of the learned first appellate Court, this Court has to state that though the learned first appellate Court mentioned a comprehensive point for consideration as to whether the trial Court’s judgment is sustainable or not, it really went through the entire oral and documentary evidence and considered rival submissions and considered all the factual findings recorded by the trial Court and pointed out as to how trial Court committed error and giving elaborate reasons it reached to its own conclusions as to whether the plaintiffs in the suit were able to establish their title and finally it came to its conclusions. Its 18 page judgment from para No.11 to 24 clearly discloses elaborate consideration of points at controversy. Therefore, though in form the judgment of the first appellate Court may not satisfy Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C., but in its substance it completely satisfied its requirements and left nothing for guess work as it gave its own findings. Its 18 page judgment from para No.11 to 24 clearly discloses elaborate consideration of points at controversy. Therefore, though in form the judgment of the first appellate Court may not satisfy Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C., but in its substance it completely satisfied its requirements and left nothing for guess work as it gave its own findings. Therefore, the contention raised in this appeal that the judgment of the first appellate Court is incorrect in terms of Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. is incorrect and is thus negatived. 17. Learned counsel for appellants argued that the findings of the first appellate Court that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title over the plaint schedule property is incorrect as it ignored the clear admissions of the defendants that the plaint schedule property belonged to the ancestors of the plaintiffs. In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, admitted facts need not be proved. Further the plaintiffs substantially proved their title by their pleadings and by their oral and documentary evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the first appellate Court is erroneous. 18. As against this, learned counsel for respondents submits that plaint schedule is a vague description and plaintiffs failed to localize the property and they failed to produce relevant documentary evidence and oral evidence to prove their title and the whole case of the appellants/plaintiffs mainly rested on Ex.A.1, which is not a document of title and their Ex.A.2- title deed and pattadar pass book was issued in the year 2003, which was subsequent to the suit which was laid in the year 2002 and their documents do not indicate one of the survey numbers mentioned in the plaint schedule and that a suit for declaration of title should win or fall on the strength of the evidence led by plaintiffs and not on the weaknesses of the defendants. Learned counsel for respondents cited Union of India v. Vasavi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 269 . Referring to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, their Lordships held that a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession cast burden of proving the case on the plaintiff and that has to be established to the satisfaction of the Court irrespective of the fact whether defendants proved their defence or not. Referring to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, their Lordships held that a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession cast burden of proving the case on the plaintiff and that has to be established to the satisfaction of the Court irrespective of the fact whether defendants proved their defence or not. In the absence of establishment of its own title, the plaintiffs must necessarily be non-suited even if title set up by defendants is found against the defendants. Rule is that weakness of case set up by defendants cannot be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiffs. 19. Having considered these rival submissions and having considered the evidence on record and the findings of both the Courts below, this Court has to state that the averments in the plaint and the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 do not indicate when the partition took place among ancestors of the plaintiffs and which properties fell to the share of which sharers. They failed to show sale deed dated 12.05.1993 under which several properties including some extents of properties in RS.No.493/4 and RS.No.493/5 were sold out to defendants. If really plaintiffs still owned and possessed any properties abutting to the properties that were sold on 12.05.1993, recitals for boundaries in that sale deed would certainly indicate the property of the plaintiffs. The observations of the first appellate Court that such material document was suppressed from evidence is a matter of fact and the correctness of which is not challenged in this appeal. Learned counsel for appellants failed to explain why such document was not furnished for verification of the Courts below. Learned trial Court at page No.10 referred to Ex.A.1 and stated that father of the plaintiffs for himself and all his family members made such declaration before Land Ceiling Authorities and therefore, plaint schedule property is found to be the ancestral property of the plaintiffs and thereby plaintiffs proved their title. Referring to this aspect of the matter learned first appellate Court stated that Ex.A.1 is a mere declaration made by the father of the plaintiffs before Land Ceiling Authorities and that is self-serving in nature and does not establish title of the plaintiffs over any property. Appellants in this appeal are expected to indicate what is the legal infirmity of such observation of learned first appellate Court on Ex.A.1. Appellants in this appeal are expected to indicate what is the legal infirmity of such observation of learned first appellate Court on Ex.A.1. Learned counsel for appellants has not shown anything to this Court as to how that observation of the first appellate Court could be called as incorrect. 20. Referring to revenue records such as pattadar pass book and title deed pass book and tax receipt and adangals the clear observation of the first appellate Court is that they do not contain any mention of plaintiffs owning any property in Survey No.493/4 which is part of the plaint schedule property. As against this, the appellants have to show how on fact or law such observation is incorrect. It shall be recorded that appellants have not shown any error on fact or law concerning this finding of the first appellate Court. Thus, concerning one part of the plaint schedule there is unassailable finding of the first appellate Court. Thus, concerning the remaining part of the plaint schedule which is Survey No.493/5, the learned first appellate Court stated that plaintiffs held no title over that part of the property also since their ancestors had parted with their possession under Ex.B.1 to defendants. It is here the further submissions of the learned counsel for appellants shall be considered. 21. Learned counsel submits that Ex.B.1 is unregistered and unstamped document and was rightly refused from consideration by the trial Court, but the learned first appellate Court erroneously considered it under Section 49 of the Registration Act stating that for collateral purpose such a document could be looked into. The fact that Ex.B.1 is unregistered and was written on Rs.5/- stamp paper and thereby under stamped is not in dispute. It is a document dated 30.03.1981. It was executed by seven individuals which include father of the plaintiffs. Document states that it is a donation and thus a gift deed. It is mentioned that the families of executants hold Ac.0.76 cents in Survey No.493/4 and Ac.0.59 cents in Survey No.493/5 and considering the service to education rendered by defendants/respondents herein they have donated this property and delivered possession of the property to them. It is this document which is in contest now. 22. Learned counsel for appellants cited Ranga Reddy v. Sadhu Padamma, 2002(6) ALD 752 . Shaik Khadaru Mastan v. Sayyad Fathimun Bee, 2007 (6) ALD 482 . It is this document which is in contest now. 22. Learned counsel for appellants cited Ranga Reddy v. Sadhu Padamma, 2002(6) ALD 752 . Shaik Khadaru Mastan v. Sayyad Fathimun Bee, 2007 (6) ALD 482 . In both the cases, this Court had held that an unregistered gift deed effecting immovable property cannot be admitted in evidence even for collateral purpose. Learned counsel for appellants also cited K.B.Saha and Sons Private Limited v. Development Consultant Limited, (2008) 8 SCC 564 . In this case referring to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 their Lordships held that a document that is required to be registered, if not registered, is not admissible in evidence. However, it can be used as evidence for collateral transaction or purpose. Explaining about collateral transaction, their Lordships held that it must be divisible from the transaction which requires registration and must not by itself require to be registered. For proof of terms of the document such an unregistered document cannot be used. Based on these propositions learned counsel for appellants submits that consideration of Ex.B.1 by the learned first appellate Court is against law. Learned counsel further submits that on the uestion of adverse possession there were no pleadings on part of the respondents/defendants in their written statement, yet the learned first appellate Court considered the case in terms of Article 65 of Schedule to the Limitation Act. That based on Ex.B.1 when the defendants contend that by such document they got the property, it is admission of the title of the plaintiffs and therefore, defendants did not prescribe their title. The contention of the defendants for adverse possession and contention raised based on Ex.B.1 are mutually inconsistent and learned first appellate Court wrongly cast burden on the plaintiffs stating that it was for them to prove that the defendants failed to prescribe their title by adverse possession and therefore, the judgment of the first appellate Court cannot be sustained. 23. Having considered all the above submissions of the appellant, this Court finds no merit in any of the submissions for the following reasons: 24. The contention of the appellants that by producing Ex.B.1, the respondents/defendants admitted the title of the appellants and therefore, no independent proof was required for them to substantiate their own title is incorrect and is against law. Ownership is a legal consequence based on legally recognizable facts. The contention of the appellants that by producing Ex.B.1, the respondents/defendants admitted the title of the appellants and therefore, no independent proof was required for them to substantiate their own title is incorrect and is against law. Ownership is a legal consequence based on legally recognizable facts. Defendants claiming themselves to be mere donees had not been shown by the plaintiffs by evidence that the defendants had adequate knowledge of the title of their donors. The plaintiffs having come to the Court seeking to declare their own title have to rest their case on the evidence that they adduced. Excluding the entire case of defendants and their documents the case of the plaintiffs/appellants who claimed the title has to be considered. That was what the first appellate Court did. It considered the total oral evidence of plaintiffs and all the documents submitted by the plaintiffs and reached to a conclusion that based on such evidence it was unable to find title of plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property. That finding of facts could not be found fault with by the appellants in this appeal. The further discussion of the appellate Court concerning Ex.B.1 alone formed part of the main focus of the appellants. Law is that title to immovable property cannot be created by admissions. Any admission of title must be clear and explicit-vide M.P.Wakf Board v. Subhan shah, (2006) 10 SCC 696 . In the case at hand, defendants/respondents did not make any such clear and explicit admission. Therefore, the contention of the appellants that in terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act that admitted facts need not be proved is of no help. 25. Coming to Ex.B.1 accepting that such an unregistered and under stamped gift deed could not be read in evidence still the appellants could not succeed for the following reasons: 26. A reading of the plaint indicates that Ex.B.1 was not referred to by the plaintiffs and thus, they completely ignored what their ancestors did. They did not come to the Court questioning the validity of Ex.B.1. Their case is that defendants unlawfully trespassed into plaint schedule property. To counter the allegation of unlawful trespass the pleadings and evidence of defendants is Ex.B.1. They did not come to the Court questioning the validity of Ex.B.1. Their case is that defendants unlawfully trespassed into plaint schedule property. To counter the allegation of unlawful trespass the pleadings and evidence of defendants is Ex.B.1. They state that they did not trespass into the property and in fact they were given this property by way of donation and having been delivered of possession they have been using this property for the school since 1981. Be it noted, defendants in their written statement did not plead adverse possession. Be it also noted that in the written arguments filed by respondents/defendants in this second appeal, it is also categorically mentioned that defendants did not plead title by adverse possession. However, it is not as though certain relevant facts are not pleaded in the written statement. In the written statement there is specific and elaborate factual narration on part of the defendants. At para No.5 and then at para No.6 stating that as they obtained possession under Ex.B.1, they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of this property and since 1981 plaintiffs have not been in possession and enjoyment of this property and that the defendants have been uninterruptedly, peacefully, openly enjoying this property and the school has been conducting its activities over this property and encircled this property by raising the compound wall and the plaintiffs should have come to Court within 12 years from 1981 if they believed they had a right over this property and they failed to come and therefore they lost their rights over the property and remedy for the property. Thus, their pleadings are absolutely in consonance with Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads: “27. Extinguishment of right to property:- At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.” 27. Coming to Ex.B.1 irrespective of the fact that it is admissible or inadmissible in terms of the Registration Act or Indian Stamp Act, the fact remains that, that was a document that was shown to the plaintiffs. Even according to plaintiffs they are not in possession of the property and it is the defendants who are in possession of the property. Therefore, in the context of absence of possession of property by plaintiffs, the facts are to be assessed. 28. Even according to plaintiffs they are not in possession of the property and it is the defendants who are in possession of the property. Therefore, in the context of absence of possession of property by plaintiffs, the facts are to be assessed. 28. N.Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, AIR 1919 Privi Council 44; Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 469 ; State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute Society, (1970) 3 SCC 802 and Ganga Prasad Singh v. Ajodhya Prasad Singh, (2000) SCC Online Orissa 166. These are the rulings where the Courts have considered invalid documents which are unregistered and unstamped including gift deeds. Starting from Privi Council and thereafter the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and thereafter the High Courts have held that possession obtained under an invalid document is adverse from the date of the document itself as against the executants of the documents and their successors in interest. In the case at hand, Ex.B.1 being invalid from the date of Ex.B.1, which is 30.03.1981, the defendants being in possession, their possession has been hostile to the real owners. After 1981, even according to plaintiffs, till they filed this suit in the year 2002, which is 21 years, they never initiated any legal proceedings nor served a notice nor interrupted the possession of the defendants. They all of a sudden came and contend that their property is trespassed into. There is no believable evidence that the alleged trespass took place in 1993 or thereafter. On the other hand, possession of plaint schedule property by the defendants under the invalid document could be seen from 1981. Viewed from this angle, the observations of the first appellate Court that the plaintiffs lost their right and in other words defendants prescribed their title by adverse possession shall be upheld. 29. To sum up, the claim of title of appellants is an exercise in futility. Ex.A.1 is a self-serving declaration and that does not help in proving title. Exs.A.2, A.3, A.8 and A.9 are revenue entries. They are not documents of title. Ex.B.1 put forth by defendants is unregistered and under stamped and could not convey and confer title on the defendants. Ex.A.1 is a self-serving declaration and that does not help in proving title. Exs.A.2, A.3, A.8 and A.9 are revenue entries. They are not documents of title. Ex.B.1 put forth by defendants is unregistered and under stamped and could not convey and confer title on the defendants. Since that being not a document of title, question of interpretation of such a document is not a question of law, vide Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M.Papaiah, (1989) 3 SCC 612 . Having failed to establish their title, having not been in possession of the property, having failed to establish in terms of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act that the person in possession of the property/defendants are not the owners of the property and having failed to seek for possession within twelve years from the time of loss of possession, appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled for any reliefs they claimed in their suit. 30. The judgment of the learned first appellate Court did not basically hinge on question of adverse possession. It independently decided the case of the plaintiffs/appellants herein and held that they failed to prove their title. It merely did not dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs on the ground that defendants prescribed their title by adverse possession. Consideration of Ex.B.1 by the first appellate Court and the final conclusions reached by it are in accordance with facts and in terms of law. For all these reasons, this Court finds no substance in the contentions raised for the appellants. All the points are held against the appellants. 31. In the result, this Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree dated 04.06.2012 of learned II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada in A.S.No.274 of 2007. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.