ORDER : 1. The petitioner is a widow of late Dr. Nandkumar Madharia has filed the writ petition on the count that the respondents No. 1 and 2 have stopped the family pension which is payable to her after death of her husband on account of objection raised by respondent No. 5 who is claiming herself to be Smt. Indrani Madharia and widow of deceased Dr. Nandkumar Madharia. 2. The facts as reflected from the record are that the petitioner’s husband retired as Government Ayurveda Doctor in the year 2010 and since then he was getting her pension regularly. The petitioner’s husband died on 26.06.2021 therefore, petitioner moved an application before respondent No. 2 for releasing the family pension as she is legally wedded wife of deceased and nominee in the pension documents. Thereafter the respondent No. 2 has released the family pension upto January 2022 thereafter it was stopped. After verification, the facts reveal that respondent No. 5 has filed an affidavit claiming herself to be Smt. Indira Madharia and legally wedded wife of deceased for grant of family pension. The petitioner made a representation before the respondent authorities for releasing the pension but no action has been taken therefore, she filed the present writ petition and prayed for following relief: 10(a) Direct the respondents No. 1 to 4 to stop paying the pension of the petitioner’s husband late Shri Nand Kumar Madharia to the respondent No. 5 as she is not the legitimate wife of late Shri Nand Kumar Madharia and pay his pension to his legitimate wife i.e. the petitioner. 10(b) Pass any orders) that this Hon’ble Court deems fit. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that only on the basis of forged documents, respondent No. 5 is claiming to be wife of deceased Nand Kumar Madharia. He would draw attention of this court towards Annexure P/6 which is an affidavit of respondent No. 5 claiming that she has already solemnised marriage on 21-10-2009 with the deceased and also changed her name from Dharmin Bai to Indrani Madharia and she was living with the deceased as his wife since 21.10.2009. She has also moved an application for recording her name in the passbook and service book of late Nand Kumar Madharia. She has also moved an application for recording her name in the passbook and service book of late Nand Kumar Madharia. He would further submit that since the petitioner is legally wedded wife of deceased therefore, action of respondent No. 2 in not releasing the family pension to the petitioner suffers from arbitrariness and would pray for issuance of direction to respondent No. 2 to release family pension. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Bank would submit that since there is a dispute about identification of the petitioner and respondent No. 5 who is legally wedded wife of deceased Nand Kumar Madharia, therefore, they have paid family pension upto January 2022 and thereafter it was stopped. He would further submit that on the basis of certain documents, the Bank has withheld the family pension. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 5 would support of the action of the respondents and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. From the pleading and material placed on record, it is quite vivid that there are disputed facts with regard to the status of the petitioner vis-versa respondent No. 5 which can be adjudicated after recording of evidence and material placed on record by the competent Civil Court. These disputed facts about the status of petitioner and respondent No. 5 cannot be determined by this Court in absence of any material on record as such the present writ petition which required adjudication of disputed facts cannot be decided by this Court. The law has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. M/s. Puna Hinda, 2021 (10) SCC 690 , paragraph 17, 18 and 24 which reads as under: 17. Mr. Nataraj, learned ASG appearing for the appellants, pointed out that there are serious disputes about the facts in respect of authenticity of the Joint Final Report and the work done. Therefore, such disputed question of facts could not have been adjudicated by the Writ Court as disputed question of facts relating to recovery of money could not have been entertained thereunder. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court reported as Kerala State Electricity Board and Another vs. Kurien E. Kalathil and Others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 wherein it was held as under: “10. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court reported as Kerala State Electricity Board and Another vs. Kurien E. Kalathil and Others, (2000) 6 SCC 293 wherein it was held as under: “10. We find that there is a merit in the first contention of Mr. Raval. Learned counsel has rightly questioned the maintainability of the writ petition. The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature. 11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not by itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies.” 18. Mr. Nataraj also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported as Joshi Technologies International Inc vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 7 SCC 728 wherein the following was held: “55. Law in this aspect has developed through catena of judgments of this Court and from the reading of these judgments it would follow that in pure contractual matters the extraordinary remedy of writ under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. However, in a limited sphere such remedies are available only when the Non-Government contracting party is able to demonstrate that it is a public law remedy which such party seeks to invoke, in contradistinction to the private law remedy simpliciter under the contract. Some of the case law to bring home this cardinal principle is taken note of hereinafter. xxx xxx xxx 59. On the basis of these facts, this Court observed that the aforesaid observations of the High Court relying upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty Case (1979) 3 SCC 489 : (1979) 2 LLJ 217 , were not correct. Thus observed the Court, speaking through Ratnavel Pandian, J. Ajai Pal Singh Case (1989) 2 SCC 116 : (1989) 1 SCR 743 , SCC pp. 125-126, Paras 21-22: “21. This finding in our view, is not correct in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case because in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Case (1979) 3 SCC 489 (1979) 2 LLJ 217 there was no concluded contract as in this case. 125-126, Paras 21-22: “21. This finding in our view, is not correct in the light of the facts and circumstances of this case because in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Case (1979) 3 SCC 489 (1979) 2 LLJ 217 there was no concluded contract as in this case. Even conceding that the BDA has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in ‘other authority’ for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution, while determining price of the houses/flats constructed by it and the rate of monthly instalments to be paid, the ‘authority’ or its agent after entering into the field of ordinary contract acts purely in its executive capacity. Thereafter the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by the contract in the absence of any statutory obligations on the part of the authority (i.e. BDA in this case) in the said contractual field. 22. There is a line of decisions where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights are governed only by the terms of the contract, no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple [Radhakrishna Agarwal vs. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457 , Premji Bhai Parmar vs. DDA, (1980) 2 SCC 129 and Divisional Forest Officer vs. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 238 : (1981) 3 SCR 662 ]” xxx xxx xxx 69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, “normally”, the Court would not exercise such a discretion: 69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it. 69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration. 69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination. 69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.” 24. Therefore, the dispute could not be raised by way of a writ petition on the disputed questions of fact. Though, the jurisdiction of the High Court is wide but in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavour, are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. The dispute as to whether the amount is payable or not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed questions of facts. There is no admission on the part of the appellants to infer that the amount stands crystallized. Therefore, in the absence of any acceptance of Joint Survey Report by the competent authority, no right would accrue to the writ petitioner only because measurements cannot be undertaken after passage of time. Maybe, the resurvey cannot take place but the measurement books of the work executed from time to time would form a reasonable basis for assessing the amount due and payable to the writ petitioner, but such process could be undertaken only by the agreed forum i.e., arbitration and not by the Writ Court as it does not have the expertise in respect of measurements or construction of roads. 8. Thus there are all disputed facts, which are required to be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court, as such writ petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed by this Court. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to recourse remedy of Civil law as available to her. 8. Thus there are all disputed facts, which are required to be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court, as such writ petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed by this Court. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to recourse remedy of Civil law as available to her. It is made clear that this writ petition was filed on 21-6-2022 and remained pending for more than nine months, therefore, period of pendency of this writ petition before this court will be excluded for computing the period of limitation. 9. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with the aforesaid liberty granted to the petitioner. 10. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.