ORDER : 1. The petitioner - Jaheer Ansari @ Jaheer Ahmed and the complainant Smt.Narayani Devi are present in person and have been duly identified by their respective counsel. 2. These two misc. petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been filed on behalf of the petitioner(s) with a prayer to quash FIR No. 357/2020 registered at Police Station Kotwali Sikar, District Sikar for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120B of IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act and all subsequent proceedings arising out of it. The first Criminal Misc Petition (S.B Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5087/2021) was filed on behalf of the accused petitioner Jaheer Ansari challenging the aforesaid FIR on merits. However, the second criminal misc. petition (No. 5712/2023) has been filed on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of the aforesaid FIR on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that during pendency of investigation, the petitioners have entered into a compromise with the complainant and she does not want to pursue the impugned FIR. He further submits that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has also filed a criminal misc. petition (No. 6260/2023) for quashing of the impugned FIR on the ground of compromise entered into between the parties, which is listed today before this Court along with these two misc. petitions. 4. Learned counsel for the complainant while accepting the factum of compromise submits that the complainant has no objection if the FIR in question is quashed. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that apart from the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120B of IPC, the FIR has been registered under the provisions of SC/ST Act as well and the same cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. He, however, accepts the factum of compromise having been entered into without coercion and duress. 6. In order to support his contention that FIR/proceedings under the provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ST Act') can be quashed, learned counsel for the petitioner invites Court's attention towards the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2021 SC 5228 . 7. 7. In the above referred case of Ramawatar (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed thus: “12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused. 13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court's plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow - hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlements. 14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that ven though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court's power to do “complete justice.” However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as follows: “48. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as follows: “48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it.” The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and 6, 48 ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only disputesettling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely disputesettling. It is a “problem solver in the nebulous areas” [See K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.” 15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper-castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twinfold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of castebased atrocities. 16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a 'special statute' would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.” 8. The aforesaid judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court settles the legal position so far as this Court's power to quash the proceedings/FIR (in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure) is concerned, in cases where the parties have entered into compromise in the cases involving offences under the provisions of SC/ST Act. The only caution which is to be borne in mind is, that the compromise must be with free will. So far as for the remaining offences alleged in this case are concerned, this Court is of the opinion that since the parties have resolved their dispute and also finding that the present case is wholly covered by the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. 2012 Cr.L.J. (SC) 4934 and in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Choudhary Bhajan Lal & Ors. AIR 1992 SC 604 , the aforesaid FIR is liable to be quashed in view of compromise arrived at between the parties. 9. In view of the aforesaid legal position and considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and in light of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ramawatar (supra) and Gian Singh (supra), the FIR is liable to be quashed in the face of compromise between the parties although the offences are not compoundable. 10. In view of the above, both criminal misc. petitions are allowed and the FIR No. 357/2020 registered at Police Station Kotwali Sikar, District Sikar as well as all subsequent proceedings arising out of it, are quashed and set aside. Consequence to follow. 11. The stay application also stands disposed of.