JUDGMENT J.J. Munir, J. These Civil Revisions arise out of orders passed by the Presiding Officers of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals at Ballia and Chandauli that are not awards amenable to appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The revisions were not formally connected, but since both involve an identical question about maintainability, the issue is being dealt with by a common order. 2. Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022 preferred under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenges an order passed by the Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ballia in Misc. Case No. 22 of 2019, refusing to set aside the ex-parte award dated 22.12.2018 passed in Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 44 of 2022. 3. By the order impugned in Civil Revision No. 48 of 2022, the revisionist has invoked this Court's jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code to set aside the order dated 18.10.2021 passed by the Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandauli in Misc. Case No. 93 of 2018, whereby the Tribunal has condoned a delay of four years and nine months by the claimants in making an application to restore Motor Accident Claims Petition No. 104 of 2010, that was dismissed in default on 10.12.2013. This Court, noticing some conflict of opinion about the maintainability of a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code against an order passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act, asked the learned Counsel appearing for the revisionists in both matters to address us on the issue of maintainability. 4. Mr. Vikrant Pandey, learned Counsel for the revisionist has been heard in Civil Revision No. 66 of 2022 and Mr. Prakhar Saran Srivastava, learned Counsel for the revisionist in Civil Revision No. 48 of 2022. Both the learned Counsel have been heard only on the question of maintainability. 5. In yesteryears and in different Courts, there has been conflict of opinion whether a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act or the Tribunal functioning under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115(1) of the Code, so as to make an order passed by the Tribunal amenable to the High Court's jurisdiction in a Civil Revision. Much of the reasoning in those decisions has centered around the distinction between a Court and a Tribunal. Much of the reasoning in those decisions has centered around the distinction between a Court and a Tribunal. It has also been considered in those decisions what subordination of a Court means in the context of Section 115 of the Code. In particular, notice has been taken of Section 3 of the Code, which defines the subordination of Courts. 6. Amongst older decisions holding that the Tribunal constituted under the Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code are those of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Orissa Co-operative Insurance Company (now) New India Assurance Company Limited v. Subashini Pradhan and others 1977 SCC Online Ori 3 : 1977 ACJ 283 ; a Division Bench of the Kerela High Court in Beeran v. Rajappan 1979 SCC Online Ker 189 : 1980 ACJ 287 and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Barkat Singh and others v. Hans Raj Pandit and others 1984 SCC Online P&H 632 : AIR 1985 P&H 263 . In our Court also, there is a decision by a learned Single Judge, holding that under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 "the Act of 1939" for short, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court, within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. The said decision is Satish Chandra and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh through the Collector, Farrukhabad. In Smt. Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company and others 1979 SCC Online All 191 : 1979 AWC 438 , a Division Bench of this Court opined that the Claims Tribunal being a Civil Court was amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. In Kamla Yadav v. Smt. Sushma Devi and others 2004 (22) LCD 40, a learned Single Judge of this Court opined that the Division Bench in Afsari Begum (supra) had not noticed the provision of Section 3 of the Code and Section 110-C (2) of the Act of 1939 while holding that the Tribunal under the Act of 1939 is a Court subordinate to the High Court. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, referred the matter to a Full Bench. In due course, the matter came up before a Division Bench for consideration. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, referred the matter to a Full Bench. In due course, the matter came up before a Division Bench for consideration. The Division Bench noticed that the learned Single Judge had not considered the later Bench decision of this Court in Om Prakash and another v. Rukmani Devi and others 1982 SCC Online All 404 : AIR 1982 Allahabad 389. The Division Bench in Om Prakash (supra) held that the Tribunal is not a Court and is a creature of a special statute. It does not enjoy the status of a Civil Court and its orders are, therefore, not amenable to appeal under Order XLIII of the Code. The Division Bench, before whom the reference by the learned Single Judge in Kamla Yadav (supra) came up, directed the matter to be laid before a Full Bench to resolve the conflict of opinion between the Division Bench in Afsari Begum and the Division Bench in Om Prakash. The following questions were referred for opinion of the Full Bench, as would appear from the report of the decision in Kamla Yadav : Whether Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a subordinate Civil Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Whether in view of the provision of section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code only the Courts referred to in Section 3 are the Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court and the District Court as the case may be and no other i.e. the authorities and that Tribunals such as one constituted under Motor Vehicles Act do not come within the framework of expression "Courts subordinate to High Court" for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code? Whether the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mussamant Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company, reported in (1979 ALJ 1168) to the effect that Claims Tribunal constituted under Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to High Court and its orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code is in consonance with the letter and spirit of provisions of Section 115 read with section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and in particular Section 110-C(2) Motor Vehicles Act, if not, is the present revision maintainable in this Court? If not, is it open to this Court to entertain, hear and dispose of the same under Article 227 of the Constitution? 7. Their Lordships of the Full Bench answered the questions referred, in Paragraph No. 32 of the report thus : Our answer to question No. 1 is in affirmative, that a revision lies against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Our answer to question No. 2 is that the Courts mentioned in section 3 CPC are not the only Civil Courts, other Courts and Tribunals can also be Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, for the purposes of section 115 CPC. Our answer to question No. 3 is that the judgment rendered in the case of Mussamat Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company. 1979 ALJ 1168, has been rightly decided and is approved. Hence, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise. 8. The issue was settled by the Full Bench of this Court in the year 1997 and the controversy ought to have come to a quietus. A Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Union of India, represented by its Secretary, Railway Board, New Delhi and others v. Mysore Paper Mills Limited, Bhadravathi, Karnataka State and others 2003 SCC Online Kar 552 : AIR 2004 Karanataka 1, was confronted with the question whether a Tribunal constituted under the Act was a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. Their Lordship of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper Mills (supra) held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal established under the Act is not a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. Noticing the said decision, a Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited through Divisional Manager, Meerut v. Smt. Manju and others 2007 SCC Online All 192 : (2007) 4 Al LJ 541 (DB) of course, for added reasons, but without noticing the Full Bench decision of our Court in Kamla Yadav (supra) noted with approval, the view of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court that the Tribunal was not a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. The decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Manju (supra) was not as such about the maintainability of a civil revision, but about the maintainability of a First Appeal From Order from an order of the Tribunal that was not an award and appealable under Section 173 of the Act. Nevertheless, the point was discussed and the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court referred to with approval. 9. Drawing inspiration from the decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Manju and the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper Mills, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and another 2016 SCC Online All 1744 : (2016) 5 All LJ 744, proceeded to hold : 19. In the light of recent apex court judgement (supra), and keeping in view the apex court judgements relied upon in the five-Judge judgement, the Division Bench judgement leaves no scope for revisional jurisdiction to be invoked under section 115 CPC against interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunals unless prescribed under the Special Act. The view taken seems to be a good law for more than one reason. Firstly, restricting the remedy against the judgements passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to appeal under Section 173 of the Act implies that other remedies are barred particularly when Section 169 read with Rule 221 framed thereunder narrow down the application of the provisions of CPC. The view taken seems to be a good law for more than one reason. Firstly, restricting the remedy against the judgements passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to appeal under Section 173 of the Act implies that other remedies are barred particularly when Section 169 read with Rule 221 framed thereunder narrow down the application of the provisions of CPC. Secondly, if the intention of legislation on the aspect of remedies before this court is understood on the criteria of treating the Tribunal to be a 'court' then in that event, the requirement of specifying the remedy of appeal under Section 173 of the Act would stand obliterated and the provisions of section 96 CPC will automatically apply. (emphasis by Court) 10. The same view was taken by a learned Single Judge in Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram and others 2016 (34) LCD 2316 holding a revision against an interlocutory order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal not maintainable under Section 115 of the Code. At the same time, there were other decisions where the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav was followed and orders of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal that were not appealable were held amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code. These are decisions of learned Single Judges of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Rakesh Kumar and others 2010 (4) AWC 4153 (LB); U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Lajwati 2018 (36) LCD 217; and Sandhya Vaish and others v. New India Insurance Company Limited and others 2011 (1) All LJ 408. Some conflict of opinion appears to have emerged post decision of the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav on account of the decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Manju following the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper Mills, and some conflicting opinions of learned Single Judges about the issue whether an interlocutory order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, or so to speak, whether the Tribunal established and constituted under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code. A reference on this issue in the form of two questions was made to a larger Bench by a learned Single Judge at the Lucknow Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company v. Smt. Ramawati 2017 (9) ADJ 752 (LB). The questions referred to the larger Bench in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company (supra) read : 31. In the background stated above and to settle the position, the following questions are framed for reference to the Larger Bench/Full Bench: "(i) Whether in absence of an enabling provision, the Full Bench judgement in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Shushma Devi and others, 2004 (22) LCD 40, would hold the field in contradiction to the Apex Court judgements relied upon in the Division Bench judgement rendered in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Manju and others, 2007 (2) AWC 1927 ; and as to whether the view taken by this Court in the case of Virendra Yadav v. Ramesh and another (Civil Revision No. 120 of 2016) and similar view expressed in Prabhakar Tiwari v. Shiv Ram was rightly obliterated by the learned Single Judge in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Lajwati by holding that the Full Bench view taken in the case of Kamla Yadav v. Sushma Devi would alone be applicable and followed. (ii) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by this Court in absence of an enabling provision under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is permissible treating the Tribunal to be a subordinate Court within the meaning of section 3 CPC". 11. Before the said questions could be placed before a larger Bench, the revision, wherein the order was made, came to be decided by the Court. The questions were never laid before a larger Bench. These facts appear from the order dated dated 14.07.2017 passed on C.M. Application No. 95241 of 2017 in Civil Revision No. 49 of 2015, which was an application for modification/clarification of the judgement and order dated 06.04.2017, making the reference to a larger Bench. 12. The result was that the reference made in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company was not answered. 12. The result was that the reference made in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company was not answered. The question before this Court is : Whether the view of the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav that a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code requires reconsideration? This Court does not think that it would be in keeping with the settled principles regarding adherence to binding precedent about making a reference to a larger Bench for reconsideration, if the issues settled by the Full Bench in Kamla Yadav were again referred. Much doubt could be thrown up regarding the correctness of the decision in Kamla Yadav and the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Paper Mills may be a strong inspiration to do that. But, it can be nothing more than an inspiration. A reading of the statute also, particularly the provisions of Section 3 of the Code and Rule 221 of the Rules framed under the Act, which applies only certain provisions of the Code to proceedings before the Tribunal, may present an alluring proposition to think that the Full Bench decision in Kamla Yadav ought to be reconsidered. But, on principle, nothing appears to this Court to be so fundamentally wrong about the reasoning of the Full Bench to persuade this Court to make a reference to a larger Bench on the lines it was done by the learned Single Judge in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company. In the opinion of this Court, the Full Bench decision of this Court in Kamla Yadav is binding precedent. There is nothing for this Court not to go by it. 13. The Civil Revisions are, accordingly, held maintainable. 14. Since orders were reserved in these revisions on the point of maintainability, when these came up before the Court as fresh causes, lay both these matters as fresh on 13.01.2023. 15. The interim orders passed in both the revisions shall continue to remain in operation till the next date of listing.