ORDER : 1. Heard. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension issued by the State Government dated 10.04.2023, whereby the petitioner who is holding the post of Chief Municipal Officer at Municipal Council, Jashpur, District Jashpur has been placed under suspension. 3. The case, in nutshell, is that the substantive post of the petitioner is Chief Municipal Officer. She was appointed by the State Government as such on 28.02.2014. Her services were transferred to Municipal Council, Jashpur in the month of February, 2022. After receiving certain complaint against the petitioner, an inquiry was conducted by the Committee, constituted by the District Collector on certain allegations and irregularities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. On 17.02.2023 a report was submitted by the Committee where allegations made against the petitioner were found proved. The petitioner was also provided opportunity of hearing which is evident from the contents of inquiry report. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and reply was filed by her on 21.02.2023. There are allegations of dereliction of duty, financial irregularities etc. against the petitioner. The petitioner has been placed under suspension by the State Government vide order dated 10.04.2023 on the ground that the petitioner has delayed regularization of the government land in urban area, failed to give approval for construction of road, drainage, electric poles, pipelines for the financial year 2021-2022, sanctioned 500.00 lacs without prior approval of P.I.C. awarded work of 9.69 lacs to Firm Sheetal Jain, Jashpur and used Community Hall as her own residence and spent Rs. 11.37 lacs and, therefore, she was placed under suspension by the State Government exercising powers under Rule 33 of Chhattisgarh State Municipal (Executive/Engineering/Health) Service Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 2017 (for short ‘Rules 2017’). 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that for placing an employee of Municipal Council under suspension, the authority has to fulfill two conditions: (i) The order has to be passed after getting concurrence of the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority. (ii) If the disciplinary proceedings are pending against members of service. He would further submit that neither concurrence of the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority has been taken, nor departmental proceeding is pending. He would also submit that even article of charge was not issued to the petitioner till 12.04.2023, when this petition was filed. (ii) If the disciplinary proceedings are pending against members of service. He would further submit that neither concurrence of the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority has been taken, nor departmental proceeding is pending. He would also submit that even article of charge was not issued to the petitioner till 12.04.2023, when this petition was filed. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Balram Singh vs. Municipal Council, Dhamtrari, 1992 MPLJ 195. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State would submit that after receiving complaint against the petitioner, a preliminary inquiry was conducted, where the allegations were found proved and the matter was placed before the State Government. The State Government vide order dated 24.03.2023 took a decision to place the petitioner under suspension and to initiate departmental enquiry against her. He would further submit that suspension and initiation of department enquiry is not a afterthought proceeding, therefore, the provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules, 2017 would not apply. He would also submit that the decision has been taken by the State Government which is the appointing authority of the petitioner and the said authority can act as disciplinary authority too. He has placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of P.R. Nayak vs. Union of India, (1972) 1 SCC 332 , The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and Others vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, 1971 (1) SCC 734 and Union of India and Another vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents annexed with the instant petition. 7. The petitioner has been placed under suspension by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 10.04.2023. The order of the suspension itself discloses certain irregularities committed by the petitioner. The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules, 2017 would be relevant for disposal of this case and same reads as under: 33. 7. The petitioner has been placed under suspension by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 10.04.2023. The order of the suspension itself discloses certain irregularities committed by the petitioner. The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules, 2017 would be relevant for disposal of this case and same reads as under: 33. Suspension pending disciplinary proceedings: (1) In view of the nature and circumstances of the charges, if the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority concurs that it is necessary or desirable that the members of service against whom the disciplinary proceedings are pending should be suspended, then, subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 86 of the Act, the Appointing Authority or Director, may pass an order of suspension. (2) If, for a criminal or any other charge, a member of the service is in police custody for a continuous period of forty-eight hours or more, then he shall be deemed to be suspended from the date of such custody. (3) If a criminal proceedings on a criminal charge is pending against the member of the Service and the charge relates to his actions as an employee of the municipality, or if it could lead to a disturbance in his discharge of official duties in the municipality, or if it involves moral turpitude, the Appointing Authority may, at his discretion, suspend him till the proceedings are over. 8. From bare reading of the provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules, 2017, it is apparent that: (i) for placing an employee of the Municipal Council under suspension, concurrence of the Appointing Authority and the Disciplinary Authority is necessary or desirable; (ii) The disciplinary proceeding should be pending against that employee; (iii) If a member of the service is in police custody for a continuous period of 48 hours, he shall be deemed to be suspended from the date of such custody and (iv) If criminal proceedings or charge pending relates to his actions as an employee of the municipality or it can lead to a disturbance in his discharge of official duties, or if it involves moral turpitude then the Appointing Authority may suspend such employee till the proceedings are over. 9. 9. In the case in hand, after receiving certain complaint against the petitioner, the District Collector constituted a Committee vide order dated 14.02.2023 and thereafter, an inquiry was conducted by the Committee consisting of three members, who found allegations to be true. Inquiry report dated 17.02.2023 reflects that the statement of the petitioner was also recorded where she has admitted the allegations made against her. Though such admission cannot be used against the petitioner at this stage however, the report can be taken into consideration by the department for taking any action or for contemplating any departmental inquiry. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 17.02.2023 by the District Collector. Five members Committee was again constituted and they also recorded the same finding and found allegations proved, made against the petitioner and the report was submitted on 20.03.2023. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 20.03.2023 and a detailed reply was filed by the petitioner on 24.03.2023. 10. Counsel for the State/respondents has placed on record the note-sheet of the State Government dated 23.03.2023. After going through the inquiry report, the State Government took the decision to place the petitioner under suspension and to initiate departmental enquiry and thereafter, order of suspension was passed on 10.04.2023. The document submitted by the counsel for Municipal Council would show that on 21.04.2023, the article of charge has been issued to the petitioner alongwith statement of the witnesses, list of documents and of witnesses. The article of charge has been issued by the State Government itself, but according to counsel for the petitioner same has not been served upon the petitioner till date. 11. In the matter of Balram Singh (supra), Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh while examining the pari materia Rule 53(3) of Madhya Pradesh Municipal Employees (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968, whereby an employee was placed under suspension on the basis of registration of FIR, held in Para-5 as under:- “5. A bare reading of the said provisions in the service rules would show that the petitioner could not be put under suspension in pursuance of any Government directive in that regard. A bare reading of the said provisions in the service rules would show that the petitioner could not be put under suspension in pursuance of any Government directive in that regard. The letter, dated 13 April 1987 (Annexure P2) of the State Government makes a mention of crime No. 86 of 1986 against the subject mentioned in the letter, but the letter does not show that any criminal case was pending against the petitioner in any Court. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the pending “criminal charge” referred in Rule 53(3) would include registration of an offence by the police and the general power of the superintendence conferred on the State Government must include power to direct suspension of any employee of a municipal council. We find no substance in the contention. Power of superintendence of the State Government cannot extend to the extent of putting or directing to put any employee under suspension in disregard of rule 53 of the service rules and in service rules, we find no power to suspend an employee only on the basis of registration of an offence by the police. If such a power is inferred, any employee may be suspended even if the offence is registered by the police on the basis of a false report. Further, if such power was intended to be given, specific provision in that regard would have been made and there would have been no necessity for providing in Sub-Rule (2) of rule 53 that a municipal employee who is detained in custody on a criminal charge for a period longer than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended under the rule. It is also not the case of the respondent that any departmental enquiry was initiated or pending against the petitioner. As stated earlier, the petitioner has made a specific statement that no criminal case or departmental enquiry is pending against him, which is not specifically denied by the respondent. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order of suspension deserves to be quashed.” 12. In the matter of P.R. Nayak (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of contemplation of disciplinary proceedings and passing of order of suspension in the background of the charges and circumstances held in Paras 41 and 42 as under: “41. In the matter of P.R. Nayak (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of contemplation of disciplinary proceedings and passing of order of suspension in the background of the charges and circumstances held in Paras 41 and 42 as under: “41. In S. Govinda Menon vs. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 566 , allegations were made against a member of the Board of Revenue. The State Government placed him under suspension under Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The present Rule 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, came into existence in place of Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. Rule 3 is in identical language. In Govinda Menon case, it was contended that the order of suspension was bad because there was no formal order of the Government for instituting disciplinary proceedings. The order of suspension stated that preliminary inquiries had shown prima facie that the officer is guilty of corruption, nepotism and other irregularities of grave nature. The order further indicated these features. The detailed enquiry into the charges was in progress. The evidence was to be collected. In the interest of the proper conduct of the enquiry it was necessary that the officer should not be allowed to continue in that post. “The officer is suspended till the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are completed.” This Court on reading the order of suspension held that it showed that the Government had accepted the proceedings and had decided to go forward with the disciplinary proceedings and there was no formal order necessary to initiate disciplinary proceedings. This Court also held in Govinda Menon case that the word “charges” occurring in Rules 5(2) and 7 of the 1955 Rules corresponding to Rules 8 and 3 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, did not have the same meaning. The word “charges” in Rule 5(2) of the 1955 Rules corresponding to Rule 8 of the 1969 Rules, refers to definite charge or charges which are reduced into writing whereas the words “having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case” occurring in the present Rule 3 and the corresponding Rule 7 of the 1955 Rules have a wider meaning denoting accusation or imputations. The ruling in Govinda Menon case, is that there is power of the Government to suspend a member when disciplinary proceedings in the shape of inquiry are contemplated and the order of suspension in the background of charges and circumstances amounts to initiation of disciplinary proceedings. 42. In case of Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs vs. Tarak Nath Ghosh, 1971 (1) SCC 734 this Court had to consider whether suspension of a member of the Service would only be ordered after definite charges had been communicated in terms of the old Rule 5 (2) which corresponds to the present Rule 8 or whether the Government was entitled to place an officer under suspension even before that stage had been reached after the preliminary investigation had been made into the conduct of the officer concerned following allegations of corrupt practice levelled against him. The earlier decisions of this Court were referred to and thereafter it was said “Merely because the order mentioned that disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against the respondent, as compared to Rule 7 which contains phrases like ‘the initiation of disciplinary proceedings’ and the ‘starting of such proceedings’ we cannot hold that the situation in the present case had not reached a stage which called for an order of suspension. In substance disciplinary proceedings can be said to be started against an officer when complaints about his integrity or honesty are entertained and followed by a preliminary enquiry into them culminating in the satisfaction of the Government that a prima facie case has been made out against him for the framing of charges. When the order of suspension itself shows that Government was of the view that such a prima facie case for departmental proceedings had been made out the fact that the order also mentions that such proceedings were contemplated makes no difference. Again the fact that in other rules of service an order of suspension may be made when ‘disciplinary proceedings were contemplated’ should not lead us to take the view that a member of an All India Service should be dealt with differently. The reputation of an officer is equally valuable no matter whether he belongs to All India Service or to one of a humbler cadre. The reputation of an officer is equally valuable no matter whether he belongs to All India Service or to one of a humbler cadre. It is the exigency of the conditions of service which requires or calls for an order of suspension and there can be difference in regard to this matter as between a member of an All India Service and a member of a State Service or a Railway Service.” 13. In Tarak Nath Ghosh (supra) while discussing the term “suspension” the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Para-8 has held as under: “8. ‘Suspension’ according to the Oxford Dictionary means “the action of suspending or condition of being suspended; the action of debarring or state of being debarred, esp. for a time, from a function or privilege; temporary deprivation of one's office or position.” A master can, subject to the contract of service, ask his servant not to render any service without assigning any reason but this would not be by way of punishment and the master would have to pay the servant his full wages or remuneration in such an eventuality. As Halsbury puts it: “Whether or not the master has power to suspend a servant during the duration of the contract of service depends upon the construction of the particular contract. In the absence of any express or implied term to the contrary, the master cannot punish a servant for alleged misconduct by suspending him from employment and stopping his wages for the period of suspension.” (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Vol. 25, Article 989, Page 518) Rule 7 of the Service Rules expressly provides for suspension of a member of the Service for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. When serious allegations of misconduct are imputed against a member of a Service normally it would not be desirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. If the disciplinary authority takes note of such allegations and is of opinion after some preliminary enquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite charges can be framed. If the disciplinary authority takes note of such allegations and is of opinion after some preliminary enquiries that the circumstances of the case justify further investigation to be made before definite charges can be framed. It would not be improper to remove the officer concerned from the sphere of his activity inasmuch as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him or look into papers which are in his custody and it would be embarrassing and inopportune both for the officer concerned as well as to those whose duty in was to make the enquiry to do so while the officer was present at the spot. Such a situation can be avoided either by transferring the officer to some other place or by temporarily putting him out of action by making an order of suspension. Government may rightly take the view that an officer against whom serious imputations are made should not be allowed to function anywhere before the matter has been finally set at rest after proper scrutiny and holding of departmental proceedings. Rule 7 is aimed at taking the latter course of conduct. Ordinarily when serious imputations are made against the conduct of an officer the disciplinary authority cannot immediately draw up the charges: it may be that the imputations are false or concocted or gross exaggerations of trivial irregularities. A considerable time may elapse between the receipt of imputations against an officer and a definite conclusion by a superior authority that the circumstances are such that definite charges can be levelled against the officer. Whether it is necessary or desirable to place the officer under suspension even before definite charges have been framed would depend upon the circumstances of the case and the view which is taken by the Government concerned.” 14. In the matter of Ashok Kumar Aggarwal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the scope of judicial review is limited in cases of suspension for the reason that passing of suspension order is of an administrative nature and suspension is not a punishment. Para-14 is reproduced herein-below: “14. It was submitted that the scope of judicial review is limited in cases of suspension for the reason that passing of suspension order is of an administrative nature and suspension is not a punishment. Para-14 is reproduced herein-below: “14. It was submitted that the scope of judicial review is limited in cases of suspension for the reason that passing of suspension order is of an administrative nature and suspension is not a punishment. Its purpose is to only forbid the delinquent to work in the office and it is in the exclusive domain of the employer to revoke the suspension order. The Tribunal or the court cannot function as an appellate authority over the decision taken by the disciplinary authority in these regards.” 15. From careful reading of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the factual matrix of the present case, it is quite apparent that the preliminary inquiry shows that prima facie the petitioner is guilty of corruption and irregularities of grave nature. The State Government which is appointing authority and which may act as disciplinary authority too, after considering the preliminary inquiry report decided to go forward with disciplinary proceedings and to place the petitioner under suspension therefore, there was no requirement of formal order to initiate disciplinary proceedings. 16. In the matter of Balram Singh (supra), the petitioner was placed under suspension on the ground that some criminal case was registered against him, whereas, no criminal case was registered against him and further, there was no concurrence, therefore, the case was allowed and order of suspension was set aside. Whereas in the present case, the suspension order itself indicates the charges leveled against the petitioner. The State Government is superior to the disciplinary authority, therefore, it has power to take decision to place an employee under suspension. The note-sheet submitted by counsel for the respondents during course of hearing would show that the matter was referred to the State Government and decision was taken to initiate departmental proceedings and to place the petitioner under suspension on 24.03.2023, much prior to issuance of order of suspension. Therefore, the decision has been taken with regard to initiation of department enquiry and placing the petitioner under suspension by the competent authority. 17. The charge-sheet has been issued by the State Government which may act and proceed as disciplinary authority and document in this regard has been placed before this Court by counsel for the respondents. Therefore, the decision has been taken with regard to initiation of department enquiry and placing the petitioner under suspension by the competent authority. 17. The charge-sheet has been issued by the State Government which may act and proceed as disciplinary authority and document in this regard has been placed before this Court by counsel for the respondents. Further, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tarak Nath Ghosh (supra), the suspension is not a punishment, but it is an action of debarring an employee specially for a time being from discharging his functions, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity in issuance of the order of suspension by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner. 18. Consequently, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.