JUDGMENT : 1. Since an identical issue is involved in bunch of these appeals, they are heard analogously and are being disposed off by this common judgment. 2. The details of civil suits decided on 31.01.2015 filed by the plaintiffs with regard to declaration and injunction of suit properties described in the suits, their case No., name of the parties and appeal filed before this court are given in tabulated form as under : Appeal No. Civil Suit No. Parties before the trial Court Property /Sale deed date FA /54/2015 23-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Rakesh Kumar Verma and Others Khasra No. 509/2 area 5 Acres, Sale deed dated 24.05.2000 FA /55/2015 21-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Ku. Ranjna Daani and Others Khasra No. 16 area 3.95 Ha, Sale deed dated 01.06.2000 FA /56/2015 22-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Smt. Geeta Agrawal and Others Khasra No. 545/2 area 1.46 Ha, Sale deed dated 24.05.2000 FA /63/2015 23-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Rakesh Kumar Verma and Others Khasra No. 509/2 area 5 Acres, Sale deed dated 24.05.2000 FA /64/2015 22-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Smt. Geeta Agrawal and Others Khasra No. 545/2 area 1.46 Ha, Sale deed dated 24.05.2000 FA /65/2015 21-A/2011 Komal Singh and others vs. Ku. Ranjna Daani and Others Khasra No. 16 area 3.95 Ha, Sale deed dated 01.06.2000 3. For sake of convenience the parties have been referred to as described in the civil suit before the learned Additional District Judge, Bemetara and the pleadings and evidence brought on record in Civil Suit No. 23A/2011 and ground raised in appeal No. 54/2015 are being considered for deciding these bunch of first appeal. 4. These are defendants’ first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure arising out of judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bemetara (C.G.) as detailed in foregoing paragraphs. 5. The case of the plaintiffs is that, the plaintiff No. 1 had executed a registered power of attorney dated 20.12.1982 in favour of defendant No. 2 for taking care of his land situated at Village Keshdabri, Tahsil- Berla, District-Bemetara (C.G.) bearing khasra no. 509/2 area 5 Acres. 5. The case of the plaintiffs is that, the plaintiff No. 1 had executed a registered power of attorney dated 20.12.1982 in favour of defendant No. 2 for taking care of his land situated at Village Keshdabri, Tahsil- Berla, District-Bemetara (C.G.) bearing khasra no. 509/2 area 5 Acres. It is contended by the plaintiffs that, when the defendant No. 2 Satish Daani interfered in the interest of the plaintiff No. 1, he cancelled the power of attorney, for which, he executed a revocation of power of attorney dated 25.06.1997, before the Sub-Registrar, Durg and the information was also sent to defendant No. 2 by U.P.C. on 05.07.1997. The further case of plaintiffs is that, despite having knowledge about the revocation of power of attorney and also he has no right over the property of the plaintiffs, the defendant No. 2 had executed sale deed dated 24.05.2000, 01/06/2000 by which, sold out the land in question of the plaintiff to the appellants for consideration to the tune of Rs. 1,10,000/-, 1,10,300/-, 02,18,000/- and the said amount has not been paid to the plaintiffs. It is specifically contended by the plaintiffs that, without any information, with the connivance of the revenue authorities, the defendant No. 1 got his name mutated in the revenue records. 6. It has been further contended that on the basis of cancelled Power of Attorney, the defendant No. 2 has sold the portion of suit property bearing Khasra No. 509 which was earlier 2.64 Ha. out of which 2 Ha has been sold to the defendant No. 1, as such the property has been divided as Khasra No. 509/1 area .64 Ha which was in the name of the plaintiffs and new Khasra No. 509/2 which was recorded in the name of defendant No. 1. Subsequently, by the order of Tahsildar Berla the name of Plaintiffs have been recorded in the Revenue Record. It has been further contended that defendant No. 2 besides defendant No. 1 has also sold property to his sister Smt. Geeta Agrawal the portion of suit property bearing Khasra No. 545 area 1.46 RA and portion of Khasra No. 68 area 0.40 RA total 1.86 Ha for sale consideration of 1,10,300/- on 01.06.2000 and land bearing Khasra No. 16 area 3.95 Ha has sold to his sister Ranjana Daani for sale consideration of 2,18,000/-. But no sale consideration was given to the plaintiffs. But no sale consideration was given to the plaintiffs. As such the sale deed dated 24.05.2000 is void-ab-initio and the defendant No. 1 has no title over Khasra No. 509/2. 7. In the year 2000, when the plaintiff No. 1 filed an application before the Tahsildar for mutation of name of his sons and daughters, at that time, the defendant No. 2 informed him about the sale deed. The learned Tahsildar passed an order in favour of the plaintiffs. It is further contended by the plaintiffs that, being aggrieved by the order of Tahsildar, the defendant No. 2 filed an appeal before the Sub- Divisional Officer. The Sub-Divisional Officer had dismissed his appeal being time barred. Therefore the defendant No. 2 had filed second appeal before the Additional Collector, Bemetara. The said second appeal was also dismissed by the Additional Collector. Being aggrieved by the said order, defendant No. 2 had filed the revision before the Board of Revenue. Before the Board of Revenue, an application was filed by Defendant No. 1 and 2 to implead themselves as party to the case. The said application was allowed on 16.02.2007 and accordingly Geeta Agrawal and Ranjana Daani were impleaded as party to the case. Thereafter the said order dated 16.02.2007 was cancelled by the Board of Revenue vide its order dated 11.05.2009. Being aggrieved by the said order Smt. Geeta Agrawal and Ranjana Daani has filed a Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court, which is still pending consideration. 8. On the above pleading the plaintiffs have prayed that the sale deed dated 24.05.2000 is void document not binding upon the plaintiffs, the possession of land bearing Khasra No. 509/2 area 2 Ha situated at village Keshdabri PH No. 2 Tahsil Berla District Bemetara be granted to the plaintiffs, the defendant No. 1 be kindly restrained from transferring the suit property, mense rea to the tune of Rs. 60,000/- for damages of crops be also granted. 9. The defendants contested the case denying the allegations made in the plaint. Defendant No. 1 has filed written statement mainly contending that they had purchased the disputed land vide registered sale deed dated 24.05.2000 and 01/06/2000 from defendant no. 2, who was the power of attorney holder of plaintiff No. 1. 60,000/- for damages of crops be also granted. 9. The defendants contested the case denying the allegations made in the plaint. Defendant No. 1 has filed written statement mainly contending that they had purchased the disputed land vide registered sale deed dated 24.05.2000 and 01/06/2000 from defendant no. 2, who was the power of attorney holder of plaintiff No. 1. It is further stated by the defendant No. 1 that, after the execution of the sale deed of the disputed land, they are in peaceful possession thereof. It is further contended that, they are the bonafide purchaser from the ostensible owner and the said transfer is for consideration, therefore he has every right over the disputed land, hence the suit filed by the plaintiffs deserves to be dismissed. 10. Defendant No. 2 has filed written statement mainly contending that in the capacity of power of attorney holder of plaintiff No. 1, he executed sale deeds dated 24.05.2000, 1/06/2000, 01/06/2000 in favour of defendant No. 1. It is further contended by the defendant No. 2 that, he never interfered in the interest of the plaintiffs along with his father and brother. It is specifically contended by the defendant No. 2 that, he has not received any information regarding the revocation of power of attorney and bonafidely he has executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant No.1. It is further specifically contended by the defendant no. 2 that, the plaintiff No. 1 has not given any written or oral information regarding the revocation of power of attorney and at the time of execution of power of attorney, there wes no condition mentioned for revocation of power of attorney, therefore the said revocation is illegal and Void-ab-Initio, hence the suit filed by the plaintiffs deserves to be dismissed. 11. 11. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court has framed the following issues: 1- D;k oknh Øa- 1 ds }kjk fnukad 20&12&1982 dks izfroknh Øa- 2 dks fn;k x;k ikoj vkWQ vVkuhZ fnukad 25&06&1997 dks jftLVMZ fujLrh nLrhukek }kjk [kkfjt dj] mldh lwpuk izfroknh Øa- 2 dks 05&07&1997 dks fyf[kr Hkstdj ,oa ekSf[kd :i ls ns fn;k Fkk- 2- D;k izfroknh Øa- 2 dks fn;k x;k jftLVMZ ikWoj vkWQ ,VkuhZ fujLr gks tkus dh tkudkjh ds ckn Hkh izfroknh Øa- 2 us izfr- Øa- 1 dks okn xzLr Hkwfe fodz; dj fn;k\ 3- D;k izfroknh Øa- 2 us okn xzLr Hkwfe ds fodz; dh izfrQy dh jkf'k dk Hkqxrku oknhx.k dks ugha fd;k\ 4- D;k okn xzLr Hkwfe dk izfroknh Øa- 1 ds i{k esa ukekarj.k fnukad 15&10&2000 dks gks tkus ds QyLo:i oknhx.k ds }kjk fu/kkZfjr vof/k esa vihy izLrqr ugha djus ls oknhx.k ij ca/kudkjh gS\ 5- D;k izfroknh Øa- 2 }kjk izfroknh Øa- 1 ds i{k esa okn xzLr Hkwfe dk fd;k x;k fodz; i= voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gS\ 6- D;k oknhx.k izfroknh Øa- 1 ls okn Hkwfe dk fjDr vkf/kiR; izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 7- D;k oknhx.k okn xzLr Hkwfe dk varjorh ykHk nkok vuqlkj izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 8- D;k okn dk ewY;kadu mfpr jhfr ls fd;k x;k gS\ 9- lgk;rk ,oa O;; 12.The plaintiffs to substantiate their case have exhibited documents Sale Deed dated 24.05.2000 Ex.P/1, Order sheet of Tahsildar, Berla Ex.P/2, Order sheet of Sub Divisional Officer, Saza Ex.P/3, Order dated 25.05.2006 of the Additional Collector, Bemetara Ex.P/4, Order sheet of Revenue Board Ex.P/5, Registered Power of Attorney dated 20.12.1982 Ex.P/6, Cancellation of Registered Power of Attorney Ex.P/7, Application submitted before the Board of Revenue Ex.P/8, Affidavit of Rakesh Verma Ex.P/9, Kistbandi Khatoini Ex.P/10, Khasra Panchasala Ex.P/11, Order Sheet of Tehsildar Berla Ex.P/12, Copy of Mutation Register Ex.P/13, Rinpustika Ex.P/14, Certificate of UPC dated 05.07.1997 Ex.P/15, Application for addition of name Ex.P/16. The plaintiffs to substantiate their case has examined Komal Singh as PW/1, Prabhuram Sahu PW/2. The defendants to substantiate their case have exhibited documents Copy of application for addition of name as Ex.D/1, Application for Stay Ex.D/2, Objection raised by the plaintiffs Ex.D/3, Sale deed Ex.D/1 exhibited by Rakesh Verma. The defendants have examined Rakesh Verma and Satish Kumar Daani as DW/1 and 2. The defendants to substantiate their case have exhibited documents Copy of application for addition of name as Ex.D/1, Application for Stay Ex.D/2, Objection raised by the plaintiffs Ex.D/3, Sale deed Ex.D/1 exhibited by Rakesh Verma. The defendants have examined Rakesh Verma and Satish Kumar Daani as DW/1 and 2. 13.The learned Trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material on record has partly decided the Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs and rest of the issues No. 2, 3,4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 have been fully decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned Trial Court while deciding the issue No. 1 has recorded its finding that the power of attorney was cancelled by the registered deed of cancellation on 25.06.1997 which was not subject to challenge by the defendants and by oral evidence as well as information sent to the defendant No. 2 through Under Certificate of Posting has been pleaded and proved. There was no rebuttal to this effect. Therefore, the trial Court has recorded its finding that the information has been communicated to the defendants despite that he has executed the sale deed, and accordingly, allowed the suit filed by the plaintiffs vide its judgment and decree dated 31.01.2015. 14. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the defendants have filed present first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC before this Court mainly contending that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from perversity and illegality and learned trial Court erred in not framing any issue with regard to ostensible owner as the appellant has purchased the disputed land from ostensible owner i.e. defendant No. 2 with the implied consent of plaintiff No. 1. It has also been contended that learned trial Court has erred in considering the fact that the appellant is a bonafide purchaser and after taking reasonable care has purchased the property, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside and would pray for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 15. Learned Sr. Advocate Ms. Sharmila Singhai assisted by Mr. Kawaljit Singh Saini and Ms. 15. Learned Sr. Advocate Ms. Sharmila Singhai assisted by Mr. Kawaljit Singh Saini and Ms. Archi Agrawal, counsel for the appellants would submit that from perusal of the power of attorney, it is crystal clear that it is an absolute power of attorney and it is nowhere mentioned that it can be revoked at the instance of executor. From perusal of the power of attorney, it further reveals that nowhere it is mentioned that before executing the sale deeds, the attorney has to take the permission or give information in this regard to the owner. Hence, the power of attorney holder had acted as per the terms and conditions of the deed and has not exceeded his duties. It is a settled proposition of law that the sale deeds can be executed by the power of attorney holder in favor of any citizen of India. In the present case, the power of attorney holder namely, Satish Daani has executed the sale deed in favor of his sisters which is in accordance with law. Merely executing the sale deeds by attorney in favor of his sister does not amount to illegality under the law of the land. 16. She would further submit that it is settled position in law that power of attorney is governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act i.e. Agency and as far as cancellation of agency is concerned, there is a specific legal requirement under section 206 of the Indian Contract Act and the Act requires a reasonable notice to be given to the attorney holder. But in the present case no such legal requirement has been fulfilled by the Komal Singh who has executed the power of Attorney in favour of the Satish Daani, Shiv Daani and Chandrashekar Daani. From perusal of the sale deeds, it is crystal clear that though sale deeds were executed by the power of attorney holder in favour of Rakesh Verma, Geeta Agrawal and Ranjana Daani respectively are in accordance with law and in those sale deeds, it is specifically mentioned that full consideration amount was received by the power of attorney holder. It is not the case where in the short span of time, the power of attorney has been revoked. It is not the case where in the short span of time, the power of attorney has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the power of attorney was executed on 20.12.1982 whereas the revocation of the power of attorney (Mansukhnama) was executed on 25.06.1997 which is about after more than 15 years, that too without giving any reasonable notice to the power of attorney holder, particularly when both the persons were residing in the same village. 17. It has also been contended by the learned Sr. Advocate for the appellant that when in the sale deeds itself, it is clearly mentioned that a full and final consideration amount was received by the power of attorney holder, in that circumstances, the court cannot go beyond the contents of the document according to Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act. She would further submit that the plaintiff Komal Singh (PW1) has specifically stated that he has given the information regarding revocation of power of attorney to the attorney by UPC but he has completely failed to produce any letter from which it can be witnessed that such letter has been sent by him for providing information regarding revocation and would pray for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. In support of her contention she relies upon the judgment in case of State of Rajasthan and Another v Basant Nahata ((2005) 12 SCC 77), Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Salima [ (1981) 3 SCC 317 ] and Suraj lamp & India Pvt. Ltd Vs. State of Haryana [ (2012) 1 SCC 656 ]. 18. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiffs would oppose the submission of the learned Sr. Advocate for the appellant and would submit that from the evidence brought on record it is quite vivid that defendant No. 2 was aware of the cancellation of Power of Attoreney, despite knowledge of this fact he has executed the sale deed after about more than 1½ year this clearly shows that without any authority he has sold the suit property. He would further submit that both the purchasers Geeta Agrawal and Rajanda Daani in connected appeals have not turned up as witnesses in the court below to support their pleading made in their respective written statements. Since they have not turned up as witnesses, hence the pleadings on their part stand unproved. He would further submit that both the purchasers Geeta Agrawal and Rajanda Daani in connected appeals have not turned up as witnesses in the court below to support their pleading made in their respective written statements. Since they have not turned up as witnesses, hence the pleadings on their part stand unproved. It is further contended that the defendant No. 2 Satish Kumara Daani has not specifically denied about the cancellation of Power of Attorney in the written statement filed before the trial Court therefore, the fact is admitted by him that before execution of sale deed Power of Attorney has been cancelled. He would further submit that suit is within limitation as possession and dispossession were alleged in the year 2007. The issue of limitation has already been decided by the trial Court vide its order dated 11.05.2011 which has not been challenged, as such it has become final. It has been further contended that the sale consideration was never paid to the original owner of the land, as such, the sale deed is illegal. The sale deed has been executed in favour of Ranjana Daani and Geeta Agrawal who have not examined themselves to prove that they are bonafide purchaser, as such, the trial Court has rightly drawn inference against them. It has been further contended that in the evidence brought on record by the plaintiffs it is proved that notice was sent through the U.P.C. and evidence to rebut service of notice through U.P.C. has not been brought on record by the defendants. Even no evidence was brought on record that U.P.C. is forged one, as such, the learned trial Court has rightly drawn presumption of service of notice against the defendant No. 2. It has been further contended that appellants to prove that they are the bonafide purchasers have not adduced any evidence or what steps they have taken to prima facie establish that they are the bonafide purchasers. In absence of any material placed on record the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court does not deserve to be interfered by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeals. In absence of any material placed on record the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court does not deserve to be interfered by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the appeals. In support of his submission he relies upon the judgment of Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and Another (2009) 4 SCC 193 , Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanushali { (2020) 7 SCC 366 }, Suraj Lamp and Industries v. State of Haryana and Others (2012) 1 SCC 656 , State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata [(2005) 12 SCC 77], Civil Revision No. 5798/2012 (High Court of Punjab & Haryana) - Yashpal and Others v. Kiraninder Singh and Others, Amarnath v Gianchand and Another 2022 SCCOnline SC 102, V. Chandrasekaran and Another v. Administrative Officer and Ors (2012) 12 SCC 133 , Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral AIR 1981 SC 1191 , Shiv Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 445 , M.S. Madhusoodhanan and Another v. Kerala Kaumudi (P) Ltd. and Others (2004) 9 SCC 204, Bai Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 448 , Roop Kumar v. Mohan TheDaani (2003) 6 SCC 595 , V. Anantha Raju and Another v. T.M. Narasimham & Others 2021 SCC OnLine SC 969 and Bai Heera Devi v. Official Assignee. Bombay ( AIR 1958 SC 448 ). 19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost satisfaction. 20. From the pleadings of the parties and material on record the following issues emerged for determination by this Court. (1) Whether the learned trial Court was justified in recording a finding that the defendant No. 2 was aware of cancellation of Power of Attorney on 25.06.1997 by considering the oral and service of notice sent to him Under Certificate of Posting to be valid service of notice? (2) Whether the finding recorded by the learned trial Court with regard to bonafide purchaser without framing any issue, is legal and justified ? (3) Whether defendants No. 1 and 2 being bonafide purchasers are entitled to get protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ? 21. (2) Whether the finding recorded by the learned trial Court with regard to bonafide purchaser without framing any issue, is legal and justified ? (3) Whether defendants No. 1 and 2 being bonafide purchasers are entitled to get protection of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ? 21. To ascertain the issue No. 1 framed by this Court it is expedient for this Court to examine the relevant provisions of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 and the Provision of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Power of Attorney Act, 1882 Section 1A Definition – In this Act, “Power-of-Attorney” includes any instruments empowering a specified person to act for and in the name of the person executing it. Section 2 Execution under power-of-attorney - The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof. This section applies to powers-of-attorney created by instruments executed either before or after this Act comes into force. The Indian Contract Act, 1882 Section 206 - Reasonable notice must be given of such revocation or renunciation, otherwise the damage thereby resulting to the principal or the agent, as the case may be, must be made good to the one by the other. Section 207 - Revocation and renunciation may be expressed or implied. —Revocation or renunciation may be expressed or may be implied in the conduct of that principal or agent respectively. Finding of the Court with regard to Issue No. 1 22. From the bare perusal of the provisions of Power of Attorney Holder Act it is quite vivid that the Power of Attorney holder becomes agent of Attorney and he cannot go beyond the principle. His agency can be terminated as per provisions of Section 206 or 207 of the Contract Act. In this case this Court has to see whether in view of Power of Attorney agency has been created and how agency can be terminated. His agency can be terminated as per provisions of Section 206 or 207 of the Contract Act. In this case this Court has to see whether in view of Power of Attorney agency has been created and how agency can be terminated. From bare perusal of Section 206 of the Contract Act it is quite vide that notice of revocation or renunciation can be done after notice and as per Section 207 it may be expressed or implied. Whether the requirement of Section 206 and 207 has been established or not it has to be ascertained after cancellation of Power of Attorney or not ? 23. From the evidence of the plaintiff PW/1 Komal Singh he has clearly stated in his evidence under Order 18 Rule 4 of the CPC that vide letter dated 05.07.1997 the defendant No. 2 was aware of the cancellation of Power of Attorney and there is no cross-examination on this point and on the contrary in paragraph 31 of evidence he has stated that he has informed Chandra Shekher Daani, Satish Daani and Shiv Daani through letter about cancellation of Power of Attorney. He has sent through letter under postal certificate and the receipt of the same was exhibited as Ex. 15. He has also stated that he has already informed orally to Chandrashekhar Daani after sending UPC as such he has not sent through registered post. It is also brought on record that he has met Chandrashekhar Daani in the Seventh month of 1997. It has been again confirmed by him that he has given information in the way and the near to the District Court, Durg. The defendant No. 1 examined himself and he has admitted before the trial Court that he has no receipt with regard to payment made to Satish Daani. He has also admitted that Ranjana Daani and Geeta Agrawal are real sisters of Satish Daani. The defendant No. 1 has admitted in the cross examination that he does not know Komal Singh and after initiation of this litigation he could recognize him. He has admitted that at the time of registration of sale deed he has not conducted any inquiry to verify who is Komal Singh. The defendant No. 1 has admitted in the cross examination that he does not know Komal Singh and after initiation of this litigation he could recognize him. He has admitted that at the time of registration of sale deed he has not conducted any inquiry to verify who is Komal Singh. The defendant No. 2 was examined before the trial Court who in the cross examination as admitted that after cancellation of Power Of Attorney in the year 1997 he is treating himself to be Power Of Attorney holder. He has also admitted that even after information regarding cancellation of Power of Attoreny the purchasers have neither raised any protest before him or before Komal Singh. 24. From the evidence brought on record it is quite vivid that the defendant No. 2 Satish Daani was aware of the cancellation of Power of Attorney and after cancellation of Power of Attorney the sale deed was executed. It is pertinent to mention here that as per the provisions of Section 206 of the Contract Act no specific mode of cancellation of Power of Attorney has been provided. Only requirement is the person in whose favour Power of Attorney has been granted, or cancelled should be aware. Thus, considering the entire facts and evidence brought on record it is well established that the notice was served under UPC to the defendant No. 2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Samittri Devi and Others vs. Sampuran Singh and another { (2011) 3 SCC 556 } has examined the effect of service of notice by UPC and held that presumption of service of notice is rebutable unless it has been placed on record that the certificate has been obtained by fraud. No such evidence was brought on record by the defendants to rebut the presumption. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- 27. As far as a notice sent under postal certificate is concerned, in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema Vs. B.B. Gujaral & Anr. [ 1981 (3) SCC 317 ], a bench of three judges of this Court on the facts of that case, refused to accept that the notice sent under a postal certificate by a detenue under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, to the Assistant Collector of Customs, retracting his original statement had been duly served on the concerned office. This was because the respondent rebutted the submission by producing their file to show that such a letter had not been received in their office in the normal course of business. However, the proposition laid down in that case is relevant for our purpose. This Court observed in paragraph 6 of that judgment as follows: "6. ............The certificate of posting might lead to a presumption that a letter addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was posted on August 14, 1980 and in due course reached the addressee. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable presumption. Neither Section 16 nor Section 114 of the Evidence Act compels the court to draw a presumption. The presumption may or may not be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of a case, the court may refuse to draw the presumption. On the other hand the presumption may be drawn initially but on a consideration of the evidence the court may hold the presumption rebutted and may arrive at the conclusion that no letter was received by the addressee or that no letter was ever despatched as claimed. After all, there have been cases in the past, though rare, where postal certificates and even postal seals have been manufactured. In the circumstances of the present case, circumstances to which we have already referred, we are satisfied that no such letter of retraction was posted as claimed by the detenu." 28. The proposition laid down in this judgment has been followed in two subsequent cases coming before this Court in the context of Section 53(2) of the Companies Act 1956 providing for presumption of service of notice of the board meeting, sent by post. In M.S. Madhusoodhanan vs. Kerala Kaumudi (P) Ltd. and others [2004 (9) SCC 204], a bench of two Judges of this Court referred to the proposition in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) in para 117 of its judgment, and held in the facts of that case, that the notice by postal certificate could not be presumed to have been effected, since the relations between the parties were embittered, and the certificate of posting was suspect. As against that, in a subsequent matter under the same section, in the case of VS Krishnan Vs. As against that, in a subsequent matter under the same section, in the case of VS Krishnan Vs. Westfort Hi-Tech Hospital Ltd. [ 2008 (3) SCC 363 ], another bench of two Judges referred to the judgment in M.S. Madhusoodhanan (supra), and drew the presumption in the facts of that case that the notice sent under postal certificate had been duly served for the purposes of Section 53(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, since the postal receipt with post office seal had been produced to prove the service. 29. Thus, it will all depend on the facts of each case whether the presumption of service of a notice sent under postal certificate should be drawn. It is true that as observed by the Privy Council in its above referred judgment, the presumption would apply with greater force to letters which are sent by registered post, yet, when facts so justify, such a presumption is expected to be drawn even in the case of a letter sent under postal certificate.” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court again in case Mohd. Asif Naseer vs West Watch Company through its Proprietor { AIR 2020 SC 2006 } has examined the service of notice through UPC and held at para 17 and 18 as under : 17………..While considering a case of service of notice under the Companies Act, this Court, in the case of V.S. Krishnan vs. Westfort HiTech Hospitals (2008) 3 SCC 363 , has held that service of notice sent under certificate of posting would be sufficient where “there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption”. 18. It may be so that mere receipt of notice having been sent under certificate of posting, in itself, may not be sufficient proof of service, but if the same is coupled with other facts and circumstances which go to show that the party had notice, the same could be held to be sufficient service on the party. In the present case, the law permits filing of a document (receipt of under certificate of posting in this case) to be filed along with an affidavit, which has been done so in this case. In the present case, the law permits filing of a document (receipt of under certificate of posting in this case) to be filed along with an affidavit, which has been done so in this case. Further, there was clear admission of the respondent (tenant) that the appellant was his landlord (for which sale deed had been supplied to the tenant) and subsequent act of the respondent (tenant) depositing the rent under Section 30(1) of the Rent Control Act in the Court and other attending circumstances, as have been considered by the Prescribed Authority, would all clearly go to show that there was sufficient proof of service of notice, which finding of fact has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority, and we see no reason for the Writ Court to have unsettled such concurrent findings of fact.” 28. In view of the above, it is clear that the sale deeds were executed by Satish Daani, in favour of Rakesh Verma, Ranjana Daani and Geeta Agrawal, when the P.O.A. dated 20-12-1982, was already cancelled by a registered cancellation deed dated 25-06-1997 Though this fact was within the knowledge of Defendant No. 2 still he has executed the sale deed which is beyond his authority given to him. The learned trial Court has rightly recorded this finding with regard to execution of sale deed after cancellation and even having of knowledge about it which neither suffers from perversity or illegality which warrants interference by this Court in the first appeal. Thus, the issue No. 1 is decided against the appellant. Finding of the Court with regard to Issue No. 2 29. Learned Senior counsel for defendants No. 1 & 2 would submit that the learned trial Court has held that defendants No.1 & 2 are not the bonafide purchasers, but no issue was framed, therefore, this is material irregularity committed by the trial Court which goes to the root of the case, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, deserves to be set aside on this count alone and the matter may be remanded back to the trial Court to decide the issue afresh. 30. 30. From perusal of the record, it is quite vivid that defendant No. 1 has taken specific plea that defendant No. 1 is bonafide purchaser and cross-examination of witnesses was also done, wherein, defendant No. 1 Rakesh Verma has clearly stated that he does not know about Komal Singh, after initiation of trial only, he came to know about Komal Singh. He has also admitted that at the time of execution of sale deed no inquiry with regard to Komal Singh has been done by him. The witness has further admitted in the cross-examination at para 11 that before registration of sale deed he has not made any attempt to verify about cancellation of Power of Attorney. He has also admitted that in this regard he has not issued notice or advertisement. It is pertinent to mention here that other defendants Smt. Ranjana Daani and Geeta Agrawal have not appeared before the trial Court to substantiate their pleadings with regard to bonafide purchaser. These submissions are incorrect proposition of law and facts. As from evidence and the material placed on record, it is quite vivid that defendant No. 1 has taken specific plea on bonafide purchaser and also led evidence in his support, the parties went to trial knowing fully well what they were required to prove their stand before the Court. They have adduced evidence of their choice in support of their respective claims, evidence has been considered by court below. The appellant cannot now turn around and say that the evidence should not be looked into. This is against well accepted principle, as such, the contention raised by learned Senior counsel for defendants No. 1 & 2 that the matter may be remanded back deserves to be rejected. 31. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kali Prasad Agarwall & others Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Limited & others {(1989) AIR (SC) 1530}, has held at paragraphs 16 & 17 as under:- “16. It was, however, urged for the appellants that there is no proper pleading or issue for determination of the afore- said question and the evidence let in should not be looked into. It is too late to raise this contention. The parties went to trial knowing fully well what they were required to prove. They have adduced evidence of theft choice in support of the respective claims. That evidence has been considered by both courts below. It is too late to raise this contention. The parties went to trial knowing fully well what they were required to prove. They have adduced evidence of theft choice in support of the respective claims. That evidence has been considered by both courts below. They cannot now turn round and say that the evidence should not be looked into. This is a well accepted principle. 17. In Kunju Kesavan v. M.M. Philip & Others, [1964] 3 SCR 634, this Court has stated (as summarised in the head note at p. 637): "The parties went to trial, fully understanding the central fact whether the succession as laid down in the Ezhava Act applied to Bhagavathi Valli or not. The absence of an issue, therefore, did not lead to a material sufficient to vitiate the decision. The plea was hardly needed in view of the fact that the plaintiff stated in his replication that the "suit property was obtained as makkathayam property, by Bhagavathi Valli under the Ezhava Act". The subject of exemption from Part IV of the Ezhava Act, was properly raised in the trial court and was rightly considered by the High Court." 32. Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mohd. Kareemuddin Khan (Died) & others Vs. Syed Azam { (1997) 2 ALT 625 } has held at paragraph 7 as under:- “7........The position of law is well settled that where parties adduce evidence in respect of a matter for which an issue has not been struck and both sides are well aware of the dispute which relates to the issue, the defect of non- framing of the issue is cured and there will be no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Court to go into that question and decide that aspect of the matter. It was observed in Kali Prasad v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 1530 .......” 33. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court committed illegality in not framing issue with regard to bonafide purchasers is erroneous and incorrect application of law. Accordingly, it is rejected as non-framing of issue does not so fatal, which vitiates the trial. Finding of this Court with regard to Issue No. 3. 34. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court committed illegality in not framing issue with regard to bonafide purchasers is erroneous and incorrect application of law. Accordingly, it is rejected as non-framing of issue does not so fatal, which vitiates the trial. Finding of this Court with regard to Issue No. 3. 34. Learned Senior counsel for defendant No. 1 would further submit that since they are protected under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as they have purchased the property in good faith for consideration from ostensible owner defendant No. 2 as provided under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act without notice of existence of option. Section 3(ii) of the Act, 1882 defines “a person is said to have notice’ of fact when he actually knows the fact or when, but for willful absenteeism from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made or gross negligence, he would have known it”. But, from the evidence adduced by defendant No. 1, it is reflected on record that before execution of the sale-deed no publication of notice was issued by them. Despite knowing this fact, they have purchased the property, therefore, they cannot be granted benefit of Section 43 of the Act, 1882 being purchase of property from ostensible owner. Sections 41 and 43 of the Act, 1882 reads as under:- “41. Transfer by ostensible owner.—Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immoveable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it: provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith. 43. Transfer by unauthorised person who subsequently acquires interest in property transferred.—Where a person [fraudulently or] erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option.” 35. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option.” 35. Even defendant No. 1 has admitted in his cross- examination that no paper publication of notice was given before execution of sale-deed, which shows that he has not acted in good faith they have purchased the property, therefore, they cannot get any protection under Section 43 of the Act, 1882. It is well settled legal position that a bonafide purchaser means the person who has purchased the property in a good faith without any notice of the real title over the purchase property, purchase that property from a person who himself not having good title over that property. It means firstly he should act in good faith, secondly, he must be honestly in his intention and thirdly, he purchased the property with a false notice of false title over the purchased property. 36. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Sukhwinder Singh Vs. Jagroop Singh {Civil Appeal No. 760 of 2020 decided on 28.01.2020), has examined the entire law on bonafide purchaser and has held at paragraph 11 & 12 as under:- “11. Further, in a circumstance where the defendant No.2 had contested the suit and had put forth the contention that he was a bonafide purchaser without notice and through his evidence had deposed that he had no knowledge of agreement entered into between the defendant No.1 and defendant No.2, that aspect required appropriate consideration. However, the Courts below have on the contrary concluded that the defendants No.1 and 2 being of the same village, the defendant No.2 would have knowledge of the agreement entered into by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff. Such conclusion is only an assumption and there is no evidence with regard to the knowledge of defendant No.2 even if he was from the same village. In addition, the Lower Appellate Court has concluded that since the defendant No.1 has not caused appearance in spite of notice having been issued and he not being examined as a witness it could be gathered that there is connivance amongst the defendants to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. Such assumption is also not justified since the defendant No.2 had purchased the property for a consideration under a registered document and the defendant No.2 was also put in possession of the property. Such assumption is also not justified since the defendant No.2 had purchased the property for a consideration under a registered document and the defendant No.2 was also put in possession of the property. In that circumstance the defendant No.1 who had lost interest in the property, if had not chosen to appear and defend the suit the same cannot be a presumption of connivance in the absence of evidence to that effect. 12. In the background of the above consideration, the plaintiff in any event was not entitled to a decree for specific performance and possession of the property against the defendant No.1. In the circumstance the declaration of the Sale Deed dated 11.06.2004 executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 to term the same as null and void as claimed by the plaintiff also did not arise. Despite the said position what is necessary to be taken note is that the sale in favour of the defendant No.2 was on 11.06.2004 i.e. subsequent to the date of the suit agreement dated 03.01.2004. Despite holding that the defendant No.2 is a bonafide purchaser, what cannot be lost sight is that the defendant No.1 had received a sum of Rs.69,500/- from the plaintiff as far back as on 03.01.2004. That apart if the transaction was concluded at that stage the plaintiff would have been entitled to the benefit of the land. Even as per the ground at (Para x) raised by the defendant No.2 in this appeal, it would indicate that there has been considerable appreciation in the market price. Though in the normal circumstance the return of the advance received and the compensation for denial of the property was to be paid by the defendant No.1, as noted, the defendant No.1 having lost interest in the property has not appeared in the instant proceedings nor is there any material to indicate that he has benefited from the appreciation since even as per the contention of the plaintiff he has sold the property for a lesser price. In that situation the plaintiff cannot be left ‘high and dry’. If that be the position the defendant No.2 who has benefited from the property will have to repay the advance and compensate the plaintiffin the peculiar facts of the instant case. In that situation the plaintiff cannot be left ‘high and dry’. If that be the position the defendant No.2 who has benefited from the property will have to repay the advance and compensate the plaintiffin the peculiar facts of the instant case. In that circumstance the defendant No.2 (the appellant herein) is required to be directed to pay a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- only which is inclusive of the advance amount of Rs.69,500/- to the plaintiff (the respondent No.1 herein) in full quit of all claims. The said amount is also to be directed to be paid by the defendant No.2 to the plaintiff within a period of three months failing which the same should carry interest at 12% per annum till payment. The plaintiff should also be entitled to withdraw the amount of Rs.70,500/- stated to have been deposited by him before the Trial Court.” 37. From the above stated provisions of Section 41 of the Act, 1882, it is quite vivid that the transfer by ostensible owner with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorized to make it: provided that the transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer, has acted in good faith. 38. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Hardev Singh Vs. Gurmail Singh (Dead) by Lrs. { (2007) 2 SCC 404 }, has examined provisions of Sections 41 & 43 of the Act, 1882 and has held that Section 43, on the other hand, embodies a 'rule of feeding the estoppel' and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts thereupon and it is immaterial whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation In order to get the benefit of the said provision, the conditions which must be satisfied are :- (1) the contract of transfer was made by a person who was competent to contract; and (2) the contract would be subsisting at the time when a claim for recovery of the property is made. 39. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mrs. 39. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar vs. Thamarasseri Roman Caqtholic Diocese Rep by its Procurator Devssia’s son Rev. Father Joseph Kappil {Civil Appeal No. 2592/2022 decided on 01.04.2022} has held at paragraph 11 and 19 as under:- 11. The High Court has held and in our view rightly so, that if the respondent had exercised reasonable care as required by the proviso to Section 41, they could have easily found out that there was no power of sale. 19. It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property that “no one can confer a better title than what he himself has”. The appellant’s sister did not have the power to sell the property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore, the vendors of the respondent could not have derived any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the respondent themselves did not have any title, they had nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps the litigation. 40. Thus, from the above factual matrix, evidence brought on record and also considering legal position it is quite vivid that appellant is unable to prove that he has purchased the property from ostensible owner defendant No. 2, therefore, he is not entitled to get protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned trial Court while allowing the suit filed by the plaintiffs has recorded this finding that at paragraph 23 that purchasher is not bonafide purchasher, this finding is based upon appreciation of evidence, material on record which is neither perverse, nor contrary to the evidence, warranting interference by this Court. Thus, issue No. 3 framed by this Court is also decided against defendants No. 1 and 2. 41. The Senior Advocate for the appellant has referred the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mrs. L.M.S. Ummu (Supra) to substantiate that the letter sent through UPC is having rebutable presumption. This legal position is not disputed but in the same judgment it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the evidence to rebut the service should have brought on record which the appellant has failed to do. Thus, this judgment is in line with the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject. This legal position is not disputed but in the same judgment it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the evidence to rebut the service should have brought on record which the appellant has failed to do. Thus, this judgment is in line with the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject. The learned Senior Advocate has also referred judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Basant Nahata (Supra) to substantiate that grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by the Chapter X of the Indian Contract Act. The legal position with regard of Power of Attorney has held in this case is not in dispute. In the present case the cancellation of Power of Attorney is involved, as such, this judgment does not help the defendants. Similarly, the judgment of referred by the learned Senior Advocate in case of Suraj Lamp and India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also deals with the power conferred upon the Attorney whose favour Power of Attorney has been executed. This legal proposition is neither disputed by the plaintiffs nor this was the issue raised, therefore, this judgment is also not very much relevant for deciding the lis between the parties. 42. Consequently it is held that the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court in all the suits bearing Civil Suit No. 21A/2011, 22A/2011 and 23A/2011 decided on 31.01.2015 are legal, justified and the first appeals bearing appeal No. 54/2015, 55/2015, 56/2015, 63/2015, 64/2015 and 65/2015 deserve to be dismissed, and accordingly, the same are dismissed. The interim order passed by this Court granting status quo to be maintained by both the parties and made absolute on 06.07.2015 stand vacated. 43. No order as to costs. 44. Decree be drawn accordingly.