JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.PC, lays challenge to judgment dated 30.7.2022, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., in Criminal Appeal No. 9-S/10 of 2020, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.11.2021/28.12.2021, in criminal Case No. 11-3 of 2016, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that respondent/complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Act before the learned ACJM, Shimla, stating therein that it had advanced a loan to the tune of Rs. 1.00 lac to the accused, who with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque amounting to Rs. 1,15,750/-, but fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured. Since accused failed to make the payment good within the stipulated period despite his having received legal notice issued to him, complainant had no option but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the competent court of law. 3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 26.11.2021/28.12.2021, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above. 4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, petitioner-accused preferred an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated 30.7.2022. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to setaside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by the court below. 5. Vide order dated 27.9.2022, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount within four weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid order was never complied with. 5. Vide order dated 27.9.2022, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount within four weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid order was never complied with. Though, repeatedly, this Court adjourned the matter on the requests made by the learned counsel for the petitioner enabling the petitioner to deposit he balance amount, but in vain. 6. Today, during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner states that petitioner is not coming forward to impart the instructions and as such, this Court may proceed to decide the case on its own merits. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this court finds that both the courts below have dealt with each and every aspects of the matter very meticulously and there is no scope left for this Court to interfere. 8. In the case at hand, there is no denial, if any, by the petitioner accused with regard to his having availed the facility of loan and issuance of cheque as well as his signature thereupon, rather an attempt has been made by the accused to carve out a case that since he had cleared the entire liability, there was no occasion for him to issue the cheque in question. Apart from above, there is no denial, if any, by the petitioner with regard to his having availed the facility of loan amounting to Rs.1.00 lac from the respondent-complainant-bank. Since there is no dispute, if any, with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon of petitioner, presumption as available under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act comes into play, which clearly provides that there shall be presumption available in favour of the holder of the cheque that same was issued in discharge of the lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is/was under obligation to raise probable defence. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to raise the probable defence. 9. Probable defence could be raised by the accused by referring to the documents adduced on record by the complainant or by leading some cogent and convincing evidence. However, in the case at hand, accused, despite ample opportunities, failed to raise the probable defence. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), 260 has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein: “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 10. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that he successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. With a view to rebut the presumption, accused tried to set up a case that cheque in question was not issued for discharge of liability, but such defence of him never came to be probablized. As has been noticed herein above, at no point of time, specific denial, if any, came to be putforth by the accused that he had not availed the loan facility from the bank concerned and cheque was not issued by him. He took up a defence that he had made the entire payment to the bank, but nowhere specifically denied his having issued the cheque. To rebut the presumption that cheque was issued towards discharge of lawful liability, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that no cheque was issued by him towards discharge of lawful liability. Though he submitted before the courts below that he had no liability towards the complainant, but nowhere stated that cheque was not issued by him. Since he admitted factum with regard to his having issued cheque as well as signature thereupon, court below rightly applied presumption as available under Section 139 of the Act in favour of the complainant that cheque was issued in discharge of lawful liability. 11. To prove its case, complainant company examined its authorized officer Sh. Dhiraj Kumar as CW1, who deposed that Golf Link Private Finance Company, has authorized him to file the complaint and give statement on behalf of the company vide resolution Ext.CW1/C. He also deposed that accused availed loan amounting to Rs. 1.00 lac on 6.6.2015 from their company. Complainant with a view to prove aforesaid fact, adduced on record demand promissory note receipt Ext.CW1/D and the address proof of the accused as Ext.CW1/E. Besides above, this witness also produced on record copy of the loan agreement Ext.CW1/F entered between the accused and complainant company. He deposed that with a view to discharge the part payment of the loan liability, the accused issued cheque Ext.CW1/G in favour of the complainant. He deposed that with a view to discharge the part payment of the loan liability, the accused issued cheque Ext.CW1/G in favour of the complainant. He also produced on record receipt Ext.CW1/H, regarding handing over of the cheque Ext.CW1/H. He deposed that cheque was presented in the account of company, but same was dishonoured due to reason “insufficient funds” in the bank account of the accused vide memo Ext.CW1/K. He deposed that legal notice Ext.CW1/M was sent to the accused for making the payment of cheque amount through registered post, postal receipts whereof are Ext.CW1/N and Ext.CW1/N-1. He also placed on record the acknowledgement card Ext.CW1/P. Cross-examination conducted upon this witness, if perused in its entirety, clearly suggests that accused was unable to extract something contrary to what he stated in his examination-in-chief. Interestingly, at no point of time, suggestion, if any, came to be putforth to the aforesaid official of the bank that accused had cleared the entire loan liability and he had not issued any cheque towards discharge of the lawful liability. In his cross-examination, CW1 denied the suggestion put to him that no notice was received by the accused. He admitted during cross-examination that the amount of Rs/ 51,800/- has been paid by the accused, copy of receipt whereof is Ext.Dx, but definitely denied that the whole amount has been paid. Though liberty was granted to the accused to lead the evidence in defence, but he failed to avail the aforesaid liberty. If the evidence led on record is perused in its entirety, it clearly reveals that cheque Ext.CW1/G amounting to Rs. 1,15,750/- was issued by the accused towards discharge of liability, but same was returned vide memo Ext.CW1/K dated 10.12.2015 on account of insufficient funds in the bank account of the accused. Since despite having received legal notice Ext.CW1/M dated 15.12.2015, accused failed to make the payment good, complainant was well within its right to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act. 12. If the entire evidence led on record by the complainant is read in its entirety, no illegality and infirmity can be said to have been committed by the courts below while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. In the case at hand, complainant successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. In the case at hand, complainant successfully proved all the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act. He successfully proved on record that before instituting proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, it had served legal notice upon the accused, thereby calling upon him to make the payment good. Neither he replied to the legal notice, nor paid the money. Similarly factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. Defence set up by the accused that he had cleared the entire loan liability never came to be proved on record in accordance with law. Since factum with regard to advancement of loan stands established on record and same was never repaid, cheque issued for discharge of lawful liabilty could be well presented by the complainant before the bank concerned for encashment. 13. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452 , wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 14. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 15. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 16. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 17. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.